by Nigel West
What made Unversagt of such great interest to MI5 was the number of reports from captured agents suggesting that in June 1940 he had been based in Boulogne to supervise the despatch of several spies across the Channel, some of whom had claimed that Unversagt himself intended to be parachuted into England in September 1940. He was also thought to have visited London in August 1939 to contact an existing spy ring. The opportunity to question such an active adversary raised the prospect of clearing up quite a few unresolved investigations that dated back to before the war, including that of the Duchesse de Château-Thierry, a woman suspected of having engaged in German espionage.2 Although Unversagt volunteered to be dropped into England, he was instead posted to an Abwehr training centre at 48 rue Joseph II in Brussels. However, during the ‘invasion summer’ of 1940 Unversagt was known to have helped prepare several agents, among them Sjoerd Pons and Charles van den Kieboom, who landed in Kent, and Francois de Deeker, who rowed ashore in Scotland. All three had made comprehensive confessions, and had identified WERNER as their Abwehr contact.
On 5 June 1945 Unversagt was flown from Wiesbaden to RAF Harrington and escorted to the London Cage in Kensington Palace Gardens so he could be transferred to Camp 020, where he underwent a lengthy interrogation. The resulting reports proved fascinating, and revealed several cases of espionage about which MI5 had minimal previous knowledge, such as the escaped PoW Gunner William Hewson, code-named WILLI:
… who had served at Dunkirk, Greece and captured in Crete serving with an Anti-Aircraft unit. It is not known why he was picked for training or from what camp he originated. He was sent to Brussels with instructions to be trained for a mission in England forthwith (September 1942). He spent two months living with Unversagt and was trained in S/W by a woman instructor of Eins Gruppe. For his cover story of ‘escaped PoW’ he was sent to a Black Forest camp where he remained about four weeks before an ‘escape’ was arranged and he was helped to the Swiss border. Unversagt personally received a few post cards and a letter or two during the next few months. None, it is claimed, contained anything except greetings and thanks for having been assisted out of Germany. Nothing of intelligence interest was ever received; what happened to WILLI eventually is not known. One of his cover addresses was a Stalag,
In fact, Hewson had reported his escape, and his recruitment by the Abwehr, as soon as he had reached the British consulate in Basel. Another very similar case involved Conrad Bach, a 25-year-old RASC soldier code-named SEBASTIAN:
British POW RASC, captured at Dunkirk. Of dual English Swiss nationality; spoke good German. Was from a prison camp on the Prussian border where he had been an interpreter. Was willing to be sent on and was sent to Brussels for training. He was to give information on any military matters and trained in S/W, methods cannot be recalled. He remained in Brussels for about two months and was then taken to the Swiss border towards the end of the summer of 1941. He had an uncle who was a schoolmaster near Frouenfeld, Switzerland, and it was anticipated that with this contact his journey to England would be facilitated. Cover story was that of POW escaping. After this man crossed the border he was never heard of again although it was rumoured that he was employed at his uncle’s school.
In Bach’s case his reported version was slightly contradicted by Unversagt, so he was re-interviewed by MI5 to clear up the apparent discrepancies.
Unversagt’s lengthy statements to his interrogators showed that he had been a very active Abwehr recruiter based in Brussels until August 1944, when he had fallen ill with jaundice and had returned home to Bad Ems. In his absence the Brussels Abstellen had collapsed in September 1944 and been withdrawn to Wiesbaden where, from November 1944, he was assigned the task of preparing a stay-behind organisation composed of refugees from Belgium and Luxembourg. However, not a single recruitment was achieved before the entire organisation had been disbanded in February, following the destruction of the Abwehr office in Wiesbaden in an Allied air raid in February 1945. Thereafter, Unversagt claimed he had simply stayed at home, running his family’s hotel.
Inversagt’s value was his intimate knowledge of so much espionage that had been investigated by MI5, and his willingness to complete a comprehensive organisational chart of the Abwehr in France and Belgium. He also proved willing to provide his perspective on some important cases, such as Joseph Van Hove:
Joseph Jan Van Hove, a Belgian national, was executed in England on 12th July, 1944. It has been possible to check his German Secret Service activities with his spy master Werner Unversagt, and the impression gained is that Van Hove was elaborating on his entire story, hence the following observations:
In 1941 Mayer, an agent of the Abwehr once attached to Oberst Recke of Tangiers – introduced Unversagt to Vanhove (who was working on an airfield in Lille). When the latter paid a visit to Brussels, the question of a mission to North Africa was discussed and Vanhove was willing to accept it. He was informed he would be contacted again later. He left the airfield, went to Calais and was contacted there for the second time. This briefly dismisses a long story given by Vanhove which contains something of the truth; the reference he made to receiving letters from Unversagt is incorrect, although it is possible he received a note from Mayer inviting him to Brussels. Unversagt states that he did not give a post box number or instructions to write Poste Restante at any time.
In July 1942 Unversagt was paying some anti-invasion network agents when he heard of the whereabouts of Vanhove and called on him. (He was living with Rombaut connected with the ROBERT Stelle and although Unversagt did not know those agents, he presumes they worked for Group III IM). Unversagt agrees he may have given the impression that he found Vanhove through his parents – this, however, is not true; he denies having given the man 600 francs.
As Vanhove had been employed on ships, it was decided that he would best be employed as a steward and it was decided to place him on a Swiss ship running from Italy to the USA. Vanhove was contacted in Antwerp, informed of the mission, and asked if he could find a companion for the task (two refugees making a better cover story than a man alone). Vanhove introduced Romyn who was given the alias Robinson.
According to Vanhove, the second clause of his contract mentioned that he would obey all orders, even to being dropped over England by parachute. Unversagt maintains that no such clause was ever given to an agent.
Vanhove’s last mission was to be via Sweden against the UK or USA. It is not correct, according to Unversagt, that he was to try and infiltrate the British Intelligence Service and later drop over the continent by parachute; Unversagt also denies the threat of reprisals and denunciation.
It is correct that Vanhove was taken to Antwerp for instruction on a naval mission; he was handed over to an officer of Eins Heer whom Unversagt cannot recall or identify.
In Stettin, Vanhove mentioned that he saw Unversagt with another person. This is correct, the other person being an Oberleutnant of the Ast in that town, and it is believed covered IH and IM matters. Unversagt met him twice whilst arranging the departure of Vanhove for Sweden; his name cannot be recalled.
With regard to letters, several, but not all, of the letters sent from Sweden to Brussels, were received (it is known that others went astray.) Vanhove stated that he was not expected to write every day, but once or twice per week: this Unversagt also states is incorrect, since every effort was made to impress the agents that quality and not quantity was desired.
Although Vanhove arrived in England, was tried and executed, his masters in Brussels never knew what happened after they received no further letters from Sweden.
Vanhove was not the only Abwehr agent managed by Unversagt who ended up in one of Petrie’s reports to Churchill, and on the scaffold at Pentonville, for a month before him another of Unversagt’s spies had suffered the same fate:
Pierre Richard Charles Neukermans was the fifteenth spy to be executed in Britain during the war. The Liquidation Report on Neukermans was used when interrogating Unversagt, with the result that hit
herto unknown facts have come to light and complete the picture of Neukermans.
Neukermans, during the last days of his interrogations, admitted he had been an agent in 1939; Unversagt confirms this and is inclined to think that he may have been employed even before the outbreak of war. At that time Rumpe was in Brussels and the history of how he recruited Neukermans is not known. In 1940 Brinkhaus took over and inherited Neukermans. The man was found to be very pro-German, a loyal and zealous worker. His information and results had already proved him trustworthy.
Unversagt first met Neukermans in the summer of 1941 and was charged with the administration side of the case. It is confirmed that there was no mission until the spring of 1942 when order was received to build up a network of W/T agents on the Belgian coast and Neukermans was sent to Westende; according to Neukermans, he had been sent for training only. Of the W/T training in Brussels Unversagt knows little since agents were handed over to Ii and the OTTO and Baron George von Widera are thought to be cover names used by the NCOs who instructed. It may be recalled that Neukermans stated that he did not wish to leave Belgium when it was proposed that he should go on a mission to Turkey, Britain or a neutral country. Unversagt states, however, that Neukermans was continually pressing to be allowed to go on a mission, preferably to England. (Turkey could not have been mentioned as it was Abwehr OST territory.) He adds that Neukermans was continually probing for information in Brussels and regularly handed in information on resistance movements, other Abwehr departments and rumours. It was reported by Neukermans that we encouraged him to visit bars where members of the underground movement were to be found, bars where Unversagt already had agents; to this Unversagt stated that he was probably asked to obtain any information of a direct espionage nature (not counter-espionage which was the prerogative of Abt III). Of agents working in cafes Unversagt knows nothing.
As a result of pressure from Berlin demanding results from England, it was decided to prepare Neukermans for a mission. He was trained in secret writing by I.g. whose instructor, Berger, was known to Neukermans as Bicker or Beckmann. (Berger did not invent the match head for S/W as claimed).
Through von Bassewitz, Major Brinkhaus (alias Ackermann alias Bergman) was introduced to Louis de Bray and arrangements made to assist Neukermans. After two attempts failed, Neukermans returned to Brussels for other instructions and it was learned that de Bray had admitted his story was a fraud in order to obtain money. In April 1943, arrangements were made to send Neukermans to Britain via Iberia. Neukermans was given his mission, but Unversagt points out that Neukermans, exaggerating as usual, has added ‘Targets for British Bombers, U-Boat Detectors and Plans of Towns’. The idea of stealing a British plane is another example of the imagination. Eins Heer were not interested in these activities at that time.
In relating his story of the voyage from Brussels to Perpignan, Neukermans mentions that he was accompanied by Brinkhaus, whereas it was in fact Unversagt. It is correct, however, that they were joined at Toulouse by PEDRO, but Unversagt is positive that no mention was made of a Dutch agent whom PEDRO was arranging to send to England. In the first place such a case cannot be recalled, and secondly it is most unlikely that such a statement, even if it were true, would be made in the presence of another agent under such conditions.
Of the letters sent by Neukermans from England to the enemy, about twelve were received. The value of the information cannot be ascertained by Unversagt who was not as yet, in charge of assessing the value of information received in agents’ reports.
The report of the execution of Neukermans on 23rd June 1944 was heard by Unversagt over the wireless and came as a great blow. Arrangements were made for Neukermans’ wife to stay with Unversagt’s wife for a short while, and to receive some 50,000 francs as compensation from Berlin (though it is claimed she was at no time aware that her husband was an agent). As Unversagt lost touch with her shortly afterwards, he cannot say whether she received all the money.
Other points which can now be cleared up in the Neukermans case are as follows:-
Rue Dauzenburg, 54: This was Unversagt’s home, not that of Brinkhaus.
Place du Grand Sablon: Address of Mayer, one of Brinkhaus’s agents.
Place de Barricades: Where it was thought the Abwehr had an office, was one of the roads used to approach the rue Royale offices and used to confuse agents.
Le Lion Belge, Chausee de Wavre: Artist known as ‘Le Marocain’ is identified with Mayer. The name ‘Le Marocain’ is not known to Unversagt.
Place Collignon: Doctor of Medicine described as an agent was, in fact, Unversagt’s doctor, Dr. Laurent, to whom Neukermans was asked to call at a period when Unversagt was under treatment in order to obtain some medicine.
ALBERTI: Unversagt has never heard this cover name which was thought by Neukermans to apply to Brinkhaus.
CHARRON: Believed to be the cover name of Wagner.
St Moritz Badge: Neukermans stated that he had seen Unversagt wearing a badge with ‘St. Moritz’ written on it, states that he has been to St. Moritz but has never worn such a badge.
Neukermans reported seeing a coloured agent undergoing W/T training. Unversagt has no knowledge of such a person.
Unversagt is unable to recall the information which was received from Neukermans. It was the duty of Leutnant Kohler to collate and examine all information received. Neukermans wrote in secret ink from England regarding troop movements from Belfast to Liverpool and later Africa (without details). Badges observed. Belgian soldiers in No. 10 Commando in Corsica. Belgian war materiel in a camp near Rochdale. Number of French soldiers in England. Communist movements. Building of a factory in Wales with a drawing of a munitions factory. Belgian troops moving to camps on the south coast of England and shipping movements to the Congo. The name of a double-agent was mentioned (no details can be recalled) and the copies of German documents from the Belgian Military Administration Department which had been transferred to Britain. These documents referred to the food problem in Belgium. There were also two messages for Eins Luft containing plans and full descriptions of three German airfields in Belgium and France and some details, which cannot be recalled, regarding the 8th US Air Force in Britain. Berlin’s comment on this information averaged from bad to satisfactory. One of the Eins Luft messages was reported to be good and useful.
Unversagt also had some recollections of Waldemar Janowsky, the spy captured in Canada:
Unversagt first met Janowsky in Brussels during the spring of 1942, shortly after this man had arrived from the Brandenburg Regiment. It is understood that he had previously been in Africa in the Waffenstillstandkommission. Their contact was slight, but Unversagt accompanied Janowsky on two or three occasions to the coast during the building up of the coastal network which was later taken over by Janowsky.
Janowsky was under the direct orders of Leiter I, Major Kramer, and was not attached to Referat Eins Heer.
In about September Unversagt again saw Janowsky when he handed back the coastal network organisation and on which occasion Unversagt learned of Janowsky’s proposed mission to Canada. At a later date Unversagt learned from various secretaries in Leiter 1 that Janowsky had been in W/T contact from Canada and that the messages had suddenly stopped. Unversagt admires Janowsky’s record and learned that as a result of the Canadian mission Janowsky was promoted to the rank of officer.
In the case of Jean Fraval, the pilot who arrived at Camp 020 in March 1944, having travelled via Barcelona, Unversagt had much to say:
Unversagt confirms that report, with the exception of containing exaggerations and incorrect deductions by Fraval, is correct. Unversagt formed a good impression of Fraval at the first meeting with de Granville in July 1943, and as the man lived in Brittany, it was decided to let him return home and find out the prospects of travelling to England by sea.
In the meantime arrangements would be made to train him. The sea route proved impractical, and Fraval went to Brussels. Fraval’s statement that he made a sim
ilar enquiry at Paimpol is incorrect. He stayed at a pension, 15 rue aux Laines, where the two agents Desgranges and Aubert had previously stayed. The Abwehr held the room in the name of Dr Lang. According to Unversagt, Fraval did not leave this address because it was too expensive for him, and further, Fraval did not pay the rent as he suggests. He left and stayed with Unversagt because it was more suitable for observation and discipline. (Fraval and Tocabens3 were becoming a little careless at the time.)
Although Fraval has stated that he received his S/W training mostly from Unversagt, the latter is doubtful of this though he adds that he probably gave some instruction. I.g. were responsible for the training. In addition to confirming the account of a letter containing secret ink being passed from Paris to Brussels to show Fraval it would pass the censorship, Eins Heer carried this out as a test to see whether the German censorship worked; it did not in this case.
For communication with England Fraval said he would send his British address to the Germans who would then communicate with him. Unversagt, however, doubts the authenticity of this statement but cannot certify it as incorrect. Again Fraval mentioned that it was proposed he should fly a plane back to the enemy and that Unversagt told him which aircraft were of the greatest interest. Unversagt observes that Eins Luft may have suggested stealing an aircraft, but that he himself certainly did not mention types of aircraft, this being outside the province of Eins Heer.
Fraval mentioned that Unversagt was interested in obtaining a Swiss passport which the former mentioned accidentally he had been trying to buy. Unversagt denies that there is any truth in this and adds that passports and any other papers were obtainable with ease through Berlin. It was Group III’s task to obtain passports.
