by Nigel West
12. Later in the interrogation Golenko said that, although an exile, he still regarded himself as Russian and was intensely interested in conditions in his homeland, Russia; that he was very violently anti-Soviet; and that his monitoring work offered him a unique chance of keeping in touch with conditions in Russia. He was therefore very happy to carry on with this monitoring. The question that his information benefited the Germans does not seem to have weighed with him in the slightest degree.
13. After another fortnight at Rennes Golenko returned to Paris, this time with his apparatus. He was installed on the 8th floor of the Paris-Soir offices, 37 rue du Louvre, Paris, where his apparatus was installed and where he was given three German officers as assistant monitors.
14. The first of these was Walter Wolf, who he had already met in Rennes. Wolff is aged 30/32 about 1m.72 tall, medium build, brown hair, not a German type, very well educated and intelligent.
15. Of the other two officers, Leutnant Koenig, Christian name unknown, aged 30/35, was rather tall, strong, of sporting appearance, a very blond Swedish type; 30/35, tall, thin, fair, with a long fencing scar on his cheek. All three spoke very good Russian.
16. He was also given two capable radio technicians Sonderführer Fahrenkampf, aged 30/35 and Sonderführer Miller, aged about 26. Another technician, name beginning with E, attended occasionally.
17. Once installed at this address, Golenko was forbidden to live elsewhere. His French foreigner’s identity card, docunent No 1 above, was taken from him and in exchange he was given a German document showing that he was employed by ‘Radio-Abteilung’.
18. About October 1940 a Colonel von Scholte (aged 30/35, height about 1m. 75, strong very handsome German type resembling Ribbentrop, conceited) arrived from Berlin and announced himself as Golenko’s chief. Golenko’s colleagues told him that Schulte looked after radio intelligence for German GHQ. Schulte thereafter paid visits of three or four days to Paris at least once a month.
19. Golenko started work for the Germans about October 1940. The results of his monitoring service he translated into French, since he does not know German. They were at once transmitted in morse by Fahrenkampf and Miller transcribed into a complicated cipher. Later the technician Miller, an anti-Nazi with whom Golenko became friendly, let him take a copy of this cipher, which Golenko now has in his papers and produced at the interrogation. He states that it is valid until the end of this year.
20. Golenko claims that not all the information he had was passed to the Germans. Some of it he kept for himself, meaning to incorporate it in a book to be written after the war. He did not pass this information to any other intelligence service.
21. On the outbreak of war between Russia and Germany the Russian Government confiscated all receiving sets in Russia, and broadcast through loud speakers installed in official institutions throughout the USSR. Radio telephone conversations by the public, which had hitherto been allowed, were banned and the network confined to official business. These official conversations were scrambled by an apparatus known as the Vertuschka. For about two months this apparatus made Golenko’s monitoring system useless.
22. About a week after the scrambling had been reported to Berlin a wireless specialist, Colonel Hertz or Hoertz, arrived in Paris with a suite of technicians, took (gramophone) records of many Russian radio telephone conversations and reported to Berlin. The Russian scrambler was not at first very efficient, so that some two months later the Germans built a de-scrambler, which was installed in Golenko’s department and which allowed him to listen in as before. Once this de-scrambler was installed, Golenko’s staff was kept extremely busy monitoring official conversations. Because of this the Germans requisitioned new premises at 100 rue Reaumur, to which they transferred all Golenko’s offices and apparatus. Golenko was given two rooms for his private use here and forbidden to lodge elsewhere. He moved here at about the end of 1941.
23. ‘About two years ago’, i.e. some time in late 1942, Golenko conceived the idea of getting into touch with the British Intelligence Service. This idea he traces to his association in Constantinople about 1920 with two British officers, Colonel Maxwell and Captain Hankin, or Henkin, who had occasionally consulted him on Soviet questions.
24. He did not know how to get into touch with the British Intelligence, but learned through a Paris-Soir journalist that a bar at 23 rue Caromartin, Paris was frequented by Allied and de Gaullist agents. He began to frequent this bar, and once heard there two men talking English quietly. He struck up an acquaintance with one of them, Merchant, who said that he was American and on the point of leaving Paris. He promised, however, to introduce Golenko to a member of his organisation. Merchant disappeared and Golenko never met Merchant’s colleague. He made no other attempts to contact an Allied organisation.
25. Merchant incidentally told Golenko to contact the Americans or the British Army when they entered Paris.
26. Golenko did not finally give up hope of seeing Merchant again for about six months, During this time there was some question of sending his whole department, and him with it, to Berlin. He had no wish to go to Berlin, both because he feared German vengeance for his anti-German work as counter-espionage chief in the last war and because he had his home, his literary activities and his mistress in France. Also he does not speak German.
27. Accordingly, early in 1943 he got a false identity card in the name of Gobelin for 2,000 francs from a man, name unknown, introduced to him by the Paris-Soir journalist Gerard de Beecker, about 45, of 6 rue Vavin, Paris, He kept this in reserve until a favourable opportunity should arise for him to go into hiding.
28. Golenko explains that it was difficult to make very serious efforts to contact Allied organisations because he was watched. His subordinate, Lt Wolf had apparently been detailed to report on his activities. Thus, although Golenko could go out alone, Wolf continually asked him what he had been doing. Early in 1944 Wolf was transferred to the Propagandastaffel in the Champs Elysees and later sent to the (? Eastern) front. Thereafter Golenko was watched by Hauptmann Benter aged about 50, and his sonderführer Hermann who lived on the same floor as Golenko and were employed by the German military press bureau publishing the papers Soldat im Weston, Waoht am Canal and Naohtriohten Blatt at 100 rue Reaumur,
29. As another example of the surveillance, Golenko says that after a visit to his rooms by a Mlle Simone Guybout, who is 28, and her friend, Mlle Andre Zenar, aged about 25, Colonel Schulte, whilst dining with Golenko a few days later asked him why he had left these girls alone in a room containing his technical apparatus.
30. Mlle Simone Guybout, of 64 bis rue Dulong. Paris 17eme, had been Golenko’s private secretary when he was president of L’Amie du Livre. She was a journalist and playwright, and later Golenko’s mistress. She often visited him at 100 rue Reaumur and he actually taught her to transmit morse on the apparatus there. No other person was near at the time and her visits did not arouse suspicion because she was known to be his secretary-mistress.
31. Mlle Zenar was a nurse in a German hospital at or near Boulogne. At the end of June 1944 she visited Paris and Mlle Guybout commented on the money she was spending. Mlle Zenar then admitted that ‘for years’ she had been a member of the Intelligence Service and tried to recruit Mile. Guybout, who, however, has ‘a horror of politics’ and therefore refused. Mlle Guybout told Golenko this after Mile. Zenar had returned to Boulogne. Golenko does not appear to have bothered to use her as a means of contacting the ‘Intelligence Service’.
32. For two or three months before August 1944 Golenko’s work had lessened, since there was less radio telephone traffic in Russia. The last transmission made from his office was on 5 August 1944.
33. On 6 August 1944 (he is sure of this date) his apparatus was removed by German soldiers who, however, overlooked a transmitter-receiver left behind in case his regular apparatus should break down.
34. On 5 August 1944 Golenko, who had been told that his apparatus was to be removed the next da
y; and who guessed that the Germans were preparing to evacuate Paris and that he would shortly have a chance of going into hiding, booked a room under his name Gobelin at a hotel, name unknown, situated at 1 Place de la Sorbonne, Paris. From 5 August 1944 onwards he slept in this room and returned to his office in the morning. There was no danger because night work had ceased and nobody would therefore call for him during the night. Benter and Hermann, who were nominally supposed to keep an eye on him, were too busy preparing the evacuation of their press bureau to do so. At that time it was tentatively arranged that Golenko was to leave for Germany with Benter when the press bureau was evacuated. No date had been fixed for this departure.
35. On 12 August Colonel von Schulte visited Golenko for the last time, telling him that he, Golenko, was to be transferred to Germany. He gave him back his French foreigner’s identity card, document No.1 above, and took away his German identity document showing him to be employed by Radio Abteilung. He gave him in addition a foreigner’s passport showing his nationality as Russian, plus a paper which authorised Golenko to receive lifts by all types of military transport, into Germany.
36. Golenko continued sleeping at his hotel and returning to his office each morning until 15 August 1944, when Benter told him that they were to leave for Germany the following day, 16 August 1944. By this time all Golenko’s subordinates and assistants had left but the Germans apparently continued to trust him and he noticed no surveillance.
37. On 15 August 1944 Golenko removed from his office copies of the telegrams, containing the results of his monitoring, which had been transmitted to Germany (his office records were to be evacuated to Germany by Benter). He also removed the transmitter-receiver set left by Hertz, intending to hand all these over to the Allies when they reached Paris.
38. On 16 August 44 he returned his German passport and the pass allowing him to use military transport, as a precaution should he be arrested by the FFI.
39. On 17 August 1944 street fighting in Paris began and a few days later rumour had it that the Senate building was mined and was to be blown up. This building was too near his hotel for safety and he moved to the Hotel Studio Meuble at 73 rue Nicolau, Paris l6eme. This building was subsequently requisitioned by the American Red Cross and Golenko then moved to a furnished room at l0 rue Louis David, Paris. Only his mistress knew his address. He left his hotel only for meals.
40. As soon as the American Army arrived it set up its HQ at 2 Avenue de l’Opera, under General Rogers. Golenko, after various unavailing attempts to get into touch with the Americans, approached a friend whom he knew to be on good terms with them. This was Clavelier, aged about 40, of 35 rue Marboeuf, Paris, director of the ‘Rival’ (?) perfume works. This man introduced him to the journalist Riesner, an American, who introduced him to the American Secret Service on the second floor of 2 Avenue de l’Opera.
41. Here Golenko saw a Colonel, who introduced him to three other colonels. To them Golenko communicated his telegrams, the German cipher and gave them his transmitter-receiver. The US authorities retained the transmitter, and Golenko has the receiver with him now in London.
42. The only persons who know that Golenko is in possession of this German cipher are (a) the American authorities, and (b) the British authorities through the undersigned. No private person in Paris or London, not even his mistress, knows of this.
43. Golenko stayed at his room in the rue Louis David until 31 October 1944, when he was arrested by the French. Before this he had been followed by a man whom he had seen in the German Major Betticher’s offices, but had shaken him off.
44. Golenko believes he was arrested by the French because his mistress stayed with him for one night and had registered with the landlord or hotel keeper under her real name. Her hotel ‘fiche’ had been noticed by the Police, who knew of her connections with Golenko and knew that Golenko had been working for the Germans in some capacity. Accordingly when they saw that she had ostensibly been staying with a Mr. Gobelin they rightly assumed that Golenko was using this false identity and arrested him.
45. Golenko was interrogated by a police inspector at the Prefecture annexe, 11 rue des Ursins, Paris. He was asked what had been his work for the Germans, but was careful to say only that he listened to ‘Russian broadcasts’ – as anybody with a suitable apparatus could have done; he did not mention radio telephony because he was frightened that his information would find its way through the police to Soviet agents, who would thereupon take a most inconvenient interest in him. It was useless to deny having worked for the Germans on radio matters, for the French knew that aerials and other wireless apparatus had been installed at his old German-occupied address.
46. Golenko told the police that he worked under compulsion for the Germans, got away from them at the first opportunity, and did not attempt escape before for fear of reprisals on his family.
47. Golenko states that the French Police seemed to wish to liquidate him, firstly because he was a White Russian and the French Police was full of Communist sympathisers, secondly because of Golenko’s relations with politicians of the old regime, and thirdly because, as a foreigner whom nobody would worry about, he would be a suitable scapegoat for the treason trials being held in deference to French public opinion.
48. His mistress was arrested for a time, Golenko says to prevent her spreading news of his own arrest. Golenko, however, got a clandestine message through to his daughter, who got the Americans to intervene and obtain his release. He is, however, only under provisional liberty and liable to re-arrest at any time for using a false identity and for collaboration.
49. Golenko was released after one week, i.e. about 7 November 1944. He returned for a time to the rue Louis David and about five days before his departure on 18 November 1944 went to the Hotel California, 19 rue de Berry, under American auspices.
50. He left for this country on 18 November 1944, but does not know why he has been brought here.
SPECIAL POINTS
51. It seems to be true that Golenko was requisitioned, together with his apparatus, by the Germans in 1940, and did not himself make efforts to enter their employ. On the other hand there is no doubt that he was very happy to continue the work started for the French under German auspices, both because the work interested him and because by doing it he realised his dearest ambition, viz. anti-Soviet activity.
52. The above report follows closely Golenko’s previous statement to the Americans.
53. There is a slight discrepancy with the RIS report, which mentions a message sent by W/T from Paris on 7 March 1944. Golenko says his last transmission from Paris was on 5 August 1944. The discrepancy does not appear important.
54. The same report, however, states, that Germany had been calling Golenko in Paris, without result, for about a month, i.e. until the end of September 1944. This implies that Germany had not intended to evacuate Golenko to Berlin as he says and had left him the means of communication between Paris and Germany. This means was presumably the transmitter-receiver mentioned by Golenko.
55. On the other hand Golenko’s account of how he went into hiding rings true. It is very possible that the disorganisation of the German administration, even early in August 1944, was enough to render safe what would normally have been a risky procedure – sleeping out and returning to his office each morning.
56. Para. 3 of the same report says that Golenko was employed, presumably as a cover, on the staff of a German Army news sheet, Soldat im Westen. Golenko denies this.
57. An interesting detail is that Golenko appears to be the father-in-law of the German agent, Feygune (EPS. 15,013), who himself accepted a mission because of his anti-Russian opinions.
CONCLUSIONS
58. It appears that Golenko’s main interest is to continue the work he has done successfully for the Germans and the French. Doubtless he will do it loyally so long as he is kept out of the way of the enemy. On the other hand he is rabidly anti-Soviet and an exceptionally versatile, intelligent and sharp individu
al. From that point of view he may be very dangerous. There is no doubt that he would work for any employer so long as his anti-Soviet opinions wore served.
59. The only doubtful point in his story is raised by para.2 of the RIS report, which states that a month of fruitless calling was made by Germany, but that no reply was received from the agent in Paris. This implies that Golenko was left in Paris with the knowledge and approval of the Germans, with whom he was expected to communicate by W/T.
60. When his future employment is discussed the wisdom of allowing him the use of transmitting apparatus should be most carefully considered.
Golenko was moved from Claridge’s to a mews house in Belgravia and placed under MI5 surveillance until he could be moved to Camp 020. There he was challenged on his version of his work for the enemy, unaware that Herbert Hart had accumulated a significant dossier on a personality on the Paris–Stuttgart circuit code-named GUSTAV listing the activities since March 1942. MI5 concluded that Golenko had lied concerning his post-occupation mission, for he had received a substantial amount of money. Furthermore, the very fact that his controller continued to transmit to him for the entire month of September 1944 was a sure indication that a reply was expected from behind the Allied lines.
Most Secret Sources show that this man has been an agent of Ast Stuttgart working in Paris since early in 1942. His principal, but by no means only, task was to intercept Russian radio telephony links and send to Stuttgart the results of his interception, sometimes worked up with a commentary. These intercepts were translated into French before they were forwarded with Golenko’s comments to Ast Stuttgart. This activity seems to have been going on from early in 1942 till at least 7th August, 1944, when the agent sent by W/T from Paris a report about Russian arrangements for sending aviation petrol to the front, based on intercepts of Russian communications from Baku.
Most Secret Sources show that Golenko was regarded as an extremely valuable agent, both by Ast Stuttgart and Berlin HQ, though he was described in a report from Ast Stuttgart on 2nd March 1943 as having recently been judged reliable. Apart from this interception of Russian traffic, Golenko was engaged in the following activities at least:
