by Bruce Catton
In addition, Halleck’s relations with Washington were not happy. The additional powers he had been demanding so eagerly had been flatly refused him. McClellan, himself a badly harassed man this spring, was complaining that Halleck was not sending adequate reports, and was acidly suggesting that he himself could hardly make proper decisions touching on matters in Tennessee when he did not even know how many troops Halleck had and what he was doing with them. And now, on top of everything else, Halleck was discovering that Grant was not at all where Halleck had supposed him to be, and that movements on the Cumberland had been determined, not at St. Louis or at Washington but in the headquarters tent at Fort Donelson—at which place, Army gossip said, the Federal troops were getting badly out of hand, looting captured supplies, oppressing Tennessee civilians and in general behaving with a great lack of discipline.27
Halleck digested this, and on March 3 he sent a furious report to McClellan:
I have had no communication with General Grant for more than a week. He left his command without my authority and went to Nashville. His army seems to be as much demoralized by the victory of Fort Donelson as was that of the Potomac by the defeat of Bull Run. It is hard to censure a successful general immediately after a victory, but I think he richly deserves it. I can get no returns, no reports, no information of any kind from him. Satisfied with his victory, he sits down and enjoys it without any regard to the future. I am worn out and tired with this neglect and inefficiency. C. F. Smith is almost the only officer equal to the emergency.28
To a man carrying the load Halleck then was carrying, much can be forgiven; but this dispatch, even after all allowances are made, is fundamentally unforgivable, and when Grant found out about it (as he did, long afterward) he was stonily unforgiving to the end of his days. Of all the commanders in western Tennessee, he had been the one who tried to keep driving on at the moment when the foe was reeling from a decisive defeat, and to say that he was sitting down complacently to bask in his victory without regard for the future was to make a woeful misstatement of fact—a misstatement, furthermore, for which no information in Halleck’s position provided the slightest justification. Grant had done what an energetic district commander might be expected to do, in the way of clearing his visit to Nashville with headquarters; also, the limits of his command not having been spelled out, it simply was not correct to say that he had “left his command” when he went to Nashville to see Buell.
McClellan responded to this message as a very busy general in chief might be expected to respond to a subordinate complaining about his troubles; that is, he offered Halleck full support in any disciplinary program which Halleck might consider necessary. He wired in prompt reply:
The future success of our cause demands that proceedings such as Grant’s should at once be checked. Generals must observe discipline as well as private soldiers. Do not hesitate to arrest him at once if the good of the service requires it, and place C. F. Smith in command. You are at liberty to regard this as a positive order if it will smooth your way. I appreciate the difficulties you have to encounter, and will be glad to relieve you from trouble as far as possible.
To show that Halleck had backing at the very top for anything he might do in this matter, the telegram was countersigned as approved by Stanton himself.
Halleck was not yet finished. On March 4 he sent McClellan a message which read:
A rumor has just reached me that since the taking of Fort Donelson General Grant has resumed his former bad habits. If so, it will account for his neglect of my often-repeated orders. I do not deem it advisable to arrest him at present, but have placed General Smith in command of the expedition up the Tennessee. I think Smith will restore order and discipline.
Then, on the same day, he gave Grant the first news that Grant was in trouble. To him he sent this telegram:
You will place Major General C. F. Smith in command of expedition and remain yourself at Fort Henry. Why do you not obey my orders to report strength and positions of your command?29
This telegram arrived just sixteen days after the unconditional surrender of Fort Donelson.
CHAPTER TEN
“What Command Have I Now?”
General Halleck probably meant nothing in particular by his sudden attack on Grant. He himself had been chided by McClellan for failure to keep Washington informed about troop numbers and dispositions, and a major general who is reprimanded is quite likely to do two things almost automatically—to pass the reprimand along to an underling, and to show that whatever fault existed was not his own. Grant was ideally situated to take both reprimand and blame, and Halleck gave them to him—his attitude sharpened, possibly, by his recent disappointments. He certainly had no intention of driving Grant out of the Army, even though he almost succeeded in doing it.
Nor was Grant himself actually harmed very greatly. He went under a cloud, but only briefly; and if, much later, he came to see that Halleck had played a double game with him, and grew to dislike the man intensely, his discovery did not come until the war had ended, by which time the relations between Grant and Halleck were no longer matters of especial public concern. It may even be that the experience was a useful step in Grant’s military education.
In the beginning, at least, the trouble did not seem especially serious. Grant replied to Halleck’s wire promptly, saying that he had put Smith in charge of the upriver expedition, as directed, and asking whether he was to abandon Clarksville altogether; there were Army stores and heavy ordnance items there that would have to be disposed of before the post was given up. Then Grant went on, temperately enough, to state his defense:
I am not aware of ever having disobeyed any order from headquarters—certainly never intended such a thing. I have reported almost daily the condition of my command and reported every position occupied. I have not, however, been able to get returns from all the troops, from which to consolidate a return for departmental headquarters. All have come in except from General Smith’s command at Clarksville—five small regiments of infantry and two companies of artillery. The general has probably been unable to get his in consequence of being ordered to Nashville by General Buell. General Smith has been relieved by General Buell and was ordered immediately to the Tennessee by me.
As soon as I was notified that General Smith had been ordered to Nashville I reported the fact and sent a copy of Buell’s order. My reports have nearly all been made to General Cullum, chief of staff, and it may be that many of them were not thought of sufficient importance to forward more than a telegraphic synopsis of.
Grant gave Halleck an outline report of his own forces. He had in his command forty-six infantry regiments with an average strength of five hundred men, three cavalry regiments and eight independent companies, and ten batteries of light artillery. He proposed to leave four small regiments at Fort Donelson and, until further notice, two at Clarksville. Fort Henry itself was badly flooded, with six feet of water inside the walls, and the Tennessee River was so high that there were few places where troops could be embarked; continuous rains had made it almost impossible to go across-country from Fort Donelson to Fort Henry. And, finally:
In conclusion I will say that you may rely on my carrying out your instructions in every particular to the very best of my ability.1
The matter might have ended there, if Halleck had been willing, and although Grant much later wrote that he was “virtually in arrest” at this time it is clear that this was not the case; he was tied to Fort Henry, but otherwise he was under no restriction whatever. But Halleck was the sort that must repeat, explain and underline a scolding, to make certain that the person scolded is properly impressed, and in this case he lit a fire that almost got away from him. Also—and this was much more important than any incidental damage to either man’s self-esteem—the whole process unquestionably served as a brake on action; Federal movements in the Tennessee Valley thereafter went more slowly than would otherwise have been the case, and this was too bad because speedy movement w
as of very great importance.
Ever since the capture of Fort Donelson, the high command’s contribution to the campaign had been negative, and what had been gained had come from sheer on-the-spot energy acting in the absence of orders from above. Halleck had been out of touch, contributing an occasional “Not so fast!” when the erratic telegraph let his voice be heard; Buell had occupied Nashville in spite of himself, had had the vapors as a result and was calling for top-level conferences; and McClellan had been too far off, too poorly informed and too busy with other matters to exert much influence. What had been done had been done by subordinates who would take advantage of any leeway provided by a system of defective communications and loose controls. Now the system was being tightened and the leeway was vanishing. In consequence, nobody would be moving very rapidly.
Halleck’s plan was for a raid on Confederate railroad connections. Grant had planned to interpret his orders rather liberally, and just before Halleck’s disciplinary blast struck him he had written to Smith explaining that he himself would immediately start upstream with part of the troops and that Smith was to assume command at Forts Henry and Donelson and lead an expedition to the town of Paris, twenty-five miles west of the Tennessee, on the railroad to Memphis. Grant was thinking beyond the immediate tactical problem, when he wrote this. Governor Isham Harris of Tennessee, a loyal Confederate and an all-out war man, was pushing the Confederate conscription act, and had ordered all Tennesseeans to register for the draft. Certain Confederate troops were in Paris to help enforce this order, and Grant believed that if his soldiers could disperse these troops, break up the conscription and in general weaken Confederate control over western Tennessee they would be inflicting lasting damage on the Confederacy’s ability to make war.2
However, this now was impossible. Grant sent Smith a copy of Halleck’s plan of campaign, copying out for him the telegram of March 4: “You will place Major General C. F. Smith in command of expedition and remain yourself at Fort Henry.” Significantly, Grant did not add the final sentence which conveyed Halleck’s reprimand. Was he, in dealing with his former commandant at West Point, reluctant to put that humiliating note in the record?3
On the first of March, Lieutenant William Gwin of the Navy had taken gunboats Lexington and Tyler far up the Tennessee to disperse a Rebel outpost at a place called Pittsburg Landing. This was a spot of no apparent consequence; there was a landing place at the water’s edge, with a road climbing to high ground and meandering off through half-settled country (passing a log meetinghouse known as Shiloh Church, on the way) and going at last to the important railroad junction town of Corinth, which was a little more then twenty miles from the river. Lieutenant Gwin drove the Confederates away, picked up such news as he could get, and came back downstream to report; and from that moment Pittsburg Landing, Shiloh Church, and the fields and woods and orchards and ravines between and around them were invisibly touched with a power that would draw two great armies together.
Gwin brought back word that the Confederates were in considerable strength in the vicinity of Corinth—a thing which was not true then, but which very soon would be—and Grant, passing it along, warned Smith that he might find as many as twenty thousand enemy troops there. He went on:
If this should prove true I can hardly say what course should be pursued to carry out the instructions. A general engagement is to be avoided while the bridges are to be destroyed, if possible. The idea probably is there must be no defeat and rather than risk one it would be better to retreat.
Whether a battle could actually be avoided was an open question; a few days later Smith himself, writing to a friend, commented dryly:
My orders are to accomplish a certain purpose without bringing on a general engagement, to retire rather than to do so. Now if my men were soldiers in the proper acceptation of the term, this piece of strategy might do very well, but as they are not soldiers I mean to fight my way through if necessary. And when I get them into a fight it shall be no child’s play. They begin to understand me about that.4
Grant gave Smith his final orders on March 5, and on the same day Halleck sent Grant a telegram amplifying the original orders:
It is exceedingly important that there should be no delay in destroying the bridge at Corinth or Bear Creek. Don’t delay the matter a moment. If successful, the expedition will not return to Paris but will encamp at Savannah [a town on the eastern bank of the river, about nine miles downstream from Pittsburg Landing] unless threatened by superior numbers. Prepare everything to reinforce him [Smith] there. Dismount the water batteries at Henry and Donelson, and remove all stores, except for a small garrison at Donelson. Travelers can pass to Nashville, but no one will be permitted to land at the forts except in extreme cases. None must be allowed to go up the Tennessee. See to this. What we do there must not be communicated to the public.5
This, clearly, was not the sort of dispatch a department commander would send to a general who was “in virtual arrest.” Grant acknowledged it, saying that the transports would be loaded and sent upstream as soon as the gunboats arrived. Then Halleck returned to the question of the reprimand, sending Grant this telegram, dated March 6:
General McClellan directs that you report to me daily the number and positions of the forces under your command. Your neglect of repeated orders to report the strength of your command has created great dissatisfaction and seriously interfered with military plans. Your going to Nashville without authority, and when your presence with your troops was of the utmost importance, was a matter of very serious complaint at Washington, so much so that I was advised to arrest you on your return.
There were times when Grant seemed very modest, almost self-effacing, but there was not really anything meek about him. He promptly sent back a reply which conceded nothing whatever and which invited a showdown:
I did all I could to get you returns of the strength of my command. Every move I made was reported daily to your chief of staff, who must have failed to keep you properly posted. I have done my very best to obey orders and to carry out the interests of the service. If my course is not satisfactory, remove me at once. I do not wish to impede in any way the success of our arms. I have averaged writing more than once a day since leaving Cairo to keep you informed of my position, and it is no fault of mine if you have not received my letters. My going to Nashville was strictly intended for the good of the service, and not to gratify any desire of my own.
Believing sincerely that I must have enemies between you and myself, who are trying to impair my usefulness, I respectfully ask to be relieved from further duty in the department.6
Halleck picked this up without delay, and telegraphed in retort:
You are mistaken. There is no enemy between you and me. There is no letter of yours stating the number and position of your command since capture of Fort Donelson. General McClellan has asked for it repeatedly with reference to ulterior movements, but I could not give him the information. He is out of all patience waiting for it. Answer by telegraph in general terms.
Dutifully enough, Grant made his report. Of infantry, present for duty, he had 35,147; of cavalry, 3169; of artillery, 54 pieces and 1231 men. Approximately 25,000 were embarked on the expedition, and 5700 more were at the landing above Fort Henry awaiting transportation. The rest of the men were at Clarksville, Fort Donelson and Fort Henry. In the grand total, he noted, were 7829 men in a new division commanded by Sherman.
Grant also returned to the argument, still without discernible meekness:
Your dispatch of yesterday just received. I will do all in my power to advance the expedition now started. You had better chance of knowing my strength whilst surrounding Fort Donelson than I had. Troops were reporting daily, by your orders, and immediately assigned to brigades. There were no orders received from you until the 28th February to make out returns, and I made every effort to get them in as early as possible. I have always been ready to move anywhere, regardless of consequences to myself, but with a dispositio
n to take the best care of the troops under my command. I renew my application to be relieved from further duty.7
Halleck seems to have been inclined to let the matter rest here. He replied that McClellan had repeatedly asked for information which he could not give, saying: “This certainly indicated a great want of order and system in your command, the blame of which was partially thrown on me, and perhaps justly, as it is the duty of every commander to compel those under him to obey orders and enforce discipline. Don’t let such neglect occur again, for it is equally discreditable to you and me.” Then Halleck dropped the argument, beginning a new paragraph, “But to business …” Guns and stores at Clarksville should be sent down to Paducah, skeleton garrisons should be planted at Fort Henry and Fort Donelson and all other troops should be rushed up the Tennessee as rapidly as possible. And, finally:
As soon as these things are arranged you will hold yourself in readiness to take the command. There will probably be some desperate fighting in that vicinity and we must be prepared.… I shall organize and send you reinforcements as rapidly as possible, and when I get them under way I shall join you myself.8
This probably would have ended it, except that on March 11 Grant got a letter which Halleck had mailed on March 6, enclosing an unsigned letter which had been passed on by the eminent Judge David Davis and which alleged extensive disorders at Fort Donelson and much defalcation of captured Confederate stores and equipment. In a covering note, Halleck remarked:
