by John Hackett
By midnight 3 August 90 per cent of the aircraft of Allied Air Forces Central Europe were serviceable, armed, and protected in hardened shelters. During the last week reactivated UK bases and US airfields in 4 ATAF had been receiving a continuous stream of reinforcement aircraft which had been flown across the Atlantic, usually refuelling in the air. So far, very good; but General Donkin, the Commander Allied Air Forces Central Europe, had much to ponder.
He was well satisfied with the success of the aircraft generation and the reinforcements - but then he had expected all that to go well because it had so often been rehearsed in peacetime exercises and training. His mind was now turned to the adverse factor which had always existed in the military balance: namely that when at full war strength the numerical advantage still favoured the Warsaw Pact in the ratio of approximately 2:1. Tactical surprise had been sacrificed by the Warsaw Pact it was true, but they would nevertheless enjoy the initiative in calling the first shots. Furthermore, SACEUR had ordained that 20 per cent of the nuclear-capable aircraft must be held back and preserved for the time when nuclear strike operations might be necessary. The Air Commander was sanguine about the superiority of his airmen, aircraft and weapons. He knew they would give the highest account of themselves if called to battle. But the uncertain factor, and the critical one, was what the losses would be and whether there would be the numbers left after several days’ fighting to hold the line until the ground forces were reinforced and able to take on the full brunt of the land battle.
Out of the window of the Joint Headquarters building housing HQ NORTHAG and HQ 2 ATAF, which also held HQ BAOR and HQ RAF Germany, both soon to run down and become base organizations, the Duty Officer looked down into the brightly lit forecourt. Blackouts, such an important feature of the Second World War in the defence of large and important targets, had little significance in an age of precision-guided weapons.
Long lines of vehicles stood partially loaded in readiness for the move to the operational location the following night. The Duty Officer watched a Dutch sentry moving slowly down one of the lines. His hair was rather long, the Duty Officer observed, even for a Dutch soldier.
It was only a month or two ago that a parade had been held here to celebrate the thirtieth year of use of these admirably designed buildings, built, like the agreeably laid-out cantonment around them, out of Occupation Costs not long after the Second World War. The comfortable married quarter in which the Duty Officer was now living by himself stood among trees already well grown.
He had sent off the rest of the family’s belongings the day before, to where his wife was staying in her mother’s house in Surrey. They would be thinking about the eldest girl’s eighth birthday, only a week away, for which, as a special treat, she was to be taken to London to see The Mousetrap. He had been taken to see it on his own eighth birthday. Later on in the day he would be sleeping in the strangely empty married quarter for the last time, before moving out to join up with the headquarters in its operational location. He knew those caves only too well from exercises and had always disliked them.
He picked up his pen to go on with his letter, first filling in the date he had left out before. It was 4 August. There were signs in the sky of a new day.
The telephone rang.
He answered it and heard the familiar voice of the British Liaison Officer at I German Corps.
It was urgent and agitated.
‘Parachutists!’ it said, ‘Russian parachutists on. . .’
The voice abruptly died.
Several direct-line telephones were jangling in the Ops room at once. He heard shouts in the building. There were shots outside, the noise of helicopter rotors, a violent explosion.
He threw the switch of the alarm system and unhooked the direct line to AFCENT and in that moment looked up.
A Russian soldier was standing in the doorway.
The Duty Officer was getting to his feet and reaching for the pistol lying by the gas respirator on the table before him when the Russian shot him dead.*
*It has been possible to put together the account here given of the personal experience of the G3 Duty Officer, who was one of the earlier fatal casualties of the fighting in Germany, on the basis of evidence of others present in the Ops room at the time, and the preservation of the officer’s letter to his wife. This story is told by one of the present writers, who was a close friend.
CHAPTER 12: NATO Forces
The structure and strength of the forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as they stood against those of the Warsaw Pact in the summer of 1985, must now be examined.
Attempts on the part of the Atlantic Council to prescribe to Allied governments, in the early days of the Alliance, what force goals they should meet had long been abandoned. Member states had always, in fact, put up no more than what they thought they could afford, usually claiming in self-justification that nothing more was necessary.
In actual structure NATO was still in 1985 much as it had been for the past twenty years. Except for some adjustment in the matter of naval and tactical air command (to which detailed reference is made in Appendix 3) there had been little change.
At the head of the Alliance of the fifteen signatory states stood the North Atlantic Council, meeting at ministerial level in normal times at least twice a year but with permanent representatives at ambassador level meeting constantly. The senior military authority in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the peacetime military structure which was such an important and unusual feature of the Alliance, was the Military Committee, composed of an independent chairman and a Chief of Staff of each Allied country except France, which had withdrawn from it in 1966, Iceland, which had no forces, and Luxembourg, which was represented by Belgium. The Military Committee was in permanent session with its own military staff. There were two Supreme Allied Commanders, SACEUR for Europe and SACLANT for the Atlantic, both American, and the Cs-in-C of the Joint Allied Command Western Approaches (JACWA) who were British. Under SACEUR were three regional commands: the northern, AFNORTH, with a British Commander-in-Chief; the central, AFCENT, under a French C-in-C until France’s withdrawal from the integrated military organization in 1966 and thereafter under a German; and the southern, AFSOUTH, under an American admiral.
In peacetime there were under AFNORTH, which took in Schleswig-Holstein, Denmark and Norway, the assigned forces of Norway and Denmark and one German division. There were plans for reinforcements from the UK, Canada and elsewhere, if they could be got there in time, in an emergency.
Under AFCENT were the Northern and Central Army Groups, NORTHAG and CENTAG, the first under a British, the second under an American, commander. Also under AFCENT was AIR-CENT, which provided centralized control of the two Allied air forces supporting NORTHAG and CENTAG.
Under AFSOUTH, commanded by a US admiral, came the assigned Italian and Turkish forces (and, as long as she remained a member, the forces of Greece) with the US Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean also earmarked, though not assigned. There was an overall air command (AIRSOUTH) but two subordinate naval commands and separate commands for ground defence in Italy, under an Italian general, and, in the south-eastern part of the area, including Turkey, under an American.
In spite of the great importance of the flanks the critical area of NATO on land was clearly the Central Region, covering the Federal Republic of Germany up to (but excluding) Schleswig-Holstein and the Federal frontier with the Low Countries. It was in the Central Region that NATO’s greatest concentration of ground and tactical air forces was gathered, facing those of the Warsaw Pact across the Demarcation Line which separated West and East Germany, then followed the Czechoslovak frontier down to neutral Austria on the south-eastern flank.
All the regular forces of the Federal Republic (organized in three corps and twelve divisions, with sixteen armoured and fifteen armoured infantry, two mountain and three airborne brigades) were assigned to NATO in peacetime. The six Territorial Army brigade-sized groups established fo
r Home Defence were not, until a lengthy argument came to an end in 1985; then these too, with the three Territorial Commands of five Military Districts, came under SACEUR. They were to play an important part in the war, though they could have been even more effectively used if they had come under Allied command rather earlier. Two German corps (II German and III German) were under command to CENTAG, the other (I German) to NORTHAG. About half the Federal German Army (the Bundeswehr) of some 350,000 were conscripts on a fifteen-month term of service.
Germany had, however, paid considerable attention to the problems of mobilization and of making reinforcements speedily effective. In the mid-1970s a Standby Reserve had been created, which the Defence Minister could call up in emergency without prior recourse to Parliament, and plans had been made for a number of cadre formations to be quickly expanded to war strength. The Territorial Army of about half a million men not only provided the Territorial Commands referred to above, but also defensive, support and communications units throughout the country, relieving the regular forces of all but the forward tasks. The training of reserves was reasonably good, taking advantage of the local and professional knowledge possessed by reservists and of the fact that the more difficult combat posts requiring highly skilled men could be filled by regular personnel, with reservists to assist them. Equipment was also good. Over half the Bundeswehr’s tanks were the new Leopard II with Chobham-type armour, giving much better protection against ATGW, and the advanced, smooth-bore, 120 mm gun. New ATGW were issued widely, to the Territorial Army as well as to regular forces. Artillery was modernized, and included new US SP (self-propelled) guns and the FH-70 medium gun jointly developed with Britain and Italy, thus providing for largely standardized ammunition. Helicopters provided ATGW support and battlefield mobility. New multiple rocket launchers enabled minelets to be sown in the face of advancing enemy tanks. All in all, the Bundeswehr was a well-found force, with the advantage of being on its own ground and highly motivated to defend its own homes.
The United States Army in Europe numbered some 200,000 men, all but 10,000 of these in the US Seventh Army in Germany, whose C-in-C was also COMCENTAG. The reintroduction of the draft in the United States, to which reference is made elsewhere (see Chapter 14), had by 1985 rescued the US Army from a highly dangerous position in relation to reserve manpower. If we do not count the Berlin Brigade the US Seventh Army was organized in two corps, V US and VII US. The four divisions and three additional brigades on station in the late seventies had been augmented by two more brigades, upon each of which the balance of a complete division could be built up in an emergency. The tank strength available to US forces in the Central Region (including tanks in the stockpile) approached 3,000, of which the greater part was by early 1985 the new XM-1, a remarkable tank, with a low silhouette, Chobham armour and advanced new armour-piercing ammunition.
As early as 1978 the United States had taken steps to build up its air reinforcement capacity, so that by 1983 five divisions (two to be built on the brigades mentioned above) could be airlifted to Europe within ten days, to join up there with their already stockpiled equipment. Plans were put into operation at about that time to disperse stockpiles, so as to reduce their vulnerability and make ammunition and other stores more quickly available to forward troops.
The XM-1 was typical of the advanced equipment that began to reach the US troops in Germany in the late seventies and early eighties. At the same time new ATGW began to come into service, including ‘fire and forget’ missiles, with fully automatic terminal guidance, for use from helicopters. The US Army had always laid great emphasis on the use of helicopters, which fulfilled a variety of roles, not least the provision of battlefield mobility. Artillery had been strengthened by the introduction (if only in small numbers) of the cannon-launched guided projectile (CLGP), which gave it a real anti-tank capacity. To the greatly increased firepower were added improvements in target acquisition through the use of RPV (remotely-piloted vehicles) giving instantaneous information. Close air support, with the emphasis on anti-tank action, was much improved with the deployment of the A-10, which began in 1978. The equipment of other tactical aircraft with PGM (precision-guided missiles) gave a much enhanced stand-off capability against land targets. Finally, the air defence of troops in the field was steadily thickened with the introduction of new SAM (surface-to-air missiles) and automatic guns.
The British forces assigned to NATO and stationed in Germany were embodied in the British Army of the Rhine, whose C-in-C was also COMNORTHAG. Excluding the 3,000-strong force in Berlin, they numbered 52,000 at full peacetime strength and were now organized in four armoured and one artillery division with an additional brigade-sized formation (5 Field Force), all under I British Corps. Earmarked for deployment from the UK in an emergency was the newly formed II British Corps, adding another 30,000 men.* Main battle tanks, including those in stockpile, now numbered 1,000, all Chieftain with the improved engine, though not all with Chobham armour.
*II Br Corps was moved to Germany in July 1985., 118
Other equipment, though initially introduced very slowly, enabled most major weapons to be modernized by the early 1980s. ATGW, built jointly with France and Germany, spread throughout the regular and TAVR forces of the UK after a rather hesitant beginning. At long last the air defences of British troops in the field became as good as those of the Bundeswehr and US forces in Europe. Improved reinforcement arrangements, made possible by the increase in the availability of equipment and reserves, gave commanders the additional advantage of being able to replace battle casualties quickly.
With the new equipment and new organizations and tactics to match, morale in the British Army of the Rhine, not at its highest in the 1970s, was now fully restored.
Of the Dutch forces in the Northern Army Group (I Ne Corps) only one armoured brigade and one tank and one reconnaissance battalion were located in Germany, the rest being held back in Holland. Of the 75,000 men which constituted the whole strength of the Dutch Army, more than half (43,000) were conscripts, doing no more than fourteen months’ service. It had long been hoped in NATO that the Netherlands would be persuaded to station more of its assigned forces further forward, nearer to their emergency defence positions. The international tensions of late 1984 succeeded where previous arguments had failed and, though the false detente of the following spring tended to put the movement into reverse, the centre of gravity in the deployment of I Netherlands Corps in the summer of 1985 was further forward than it had ever been before.
The position of the Belgians was not dissimilar, though the conscripted element in the army (23,000 out of 62,000) did only eight months’ service if posted to the Federal Republic of Germany, where there were stationed in peacetime one corps and two divisional headquarters, with one armoured and two infantry brigades, as opposed to ten months if serving in Belgium. I Belgian (I Be) Corps, with some 300 Leopard I tanks, like I Netherlands Corps, with some 450, was under command to NORTHAG. Both corps had received a good deal of new equipment, notably APC, ATGW and air defence weapons. In both cases, however, the supply of new weapons to the reserve formations and battalions that would reinforce them was limited, as was the training carried out by reservists.
In addition to the major national formations Allied Command Europe also included the Canadian Brigade Group which had become by late July the equivalent almost of a small division.* An all-regular force, its quality was high. Old hands in other Allied countries (particularly among the British), who recalled their experience with Canadian troops in the last world war, saw with satisfaction that in their technical skills and their robust and disciplined approach they were, in the changed circumstances of today, as good as ever. The Group was stationed in the CENTAG area, not far from the French divisions.
*Armoured infantry, 3,500 strong, together with a regiment of sixty tanks, an artillery regiment of 155 mm SP howitzers, anti-tank and anti-air missiles, support troops and a tactical helicopter squadron.
Though
France had not been a member of NATO since 1966 II French Corps, of two divisions, with corps and some army troops nearly 50,000 strong, continued to be stationed in Germany, with close military liaison with CENTAG. Three mechanized divisions in France formed the balance of the First French Army, to which the French divisions in Germany belonged. The equipment of the five divisions in the First French Army was modern and good and included battlefield nuclear weapons held inside France, under French control. Little of the equipment was standardized with NATO however, raising potential problems in supply. In addition to the Forces de Manoeuvre, of which the First French Army was part, France disposed of Territorial Defence Forces (Defense Operationelle du Territoire, or DOT) some 50,000 strong. These had a very important role, among others, in the defence of key points in metropolitan France against disruption by sabotage and against civil disorder.
On the southern flank, Italy (twelve months’ service for 120,000 conscripts in an army of 218,000) disposed of twelve divisions (three armoured) with a mixed inventory of tanks. Though Greece’s membership of the integrated military organization had been somewhat conditional since 1974, she continued to have some military links and had modernized most of her mainly conscript army (28-30 months’ service) of twelve divisions (one armoured), largely with French equipment, and, it must be admitted, with an eye on Turkey rather than the forces of the Warsaw Pact. Turkey (twenty months’ service) could field twenty-two divisions (one armoured and two mechanized) in an army of 375,000. Differences between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus, sharpened by competition for Aegean oil, had by the beginning of the eighties grown somewhat less than in the years before. The curtailment of military aid from the US to which this had given rise (it was resumed in 1982) had inevitably reduced the war-fighting capability of both countries, though this had latterly begun once more to improve. Turkish equipment was generally somewhat elderly and in an indifferent state; mobility was limited and it had not been possible to reach a high level of training.
