There were, of course, officers within the SKL who favored the idea of acquiring bases in Norway. Two of these, mentioned by both Salewski and Gemzell, had close personal relationships with Raeder. One was Lieutenant Commander Heinz Assmann, the second Admiralty Staff Officer, an influential position within the Operations Department. He was involved in operational planning, kept the war diary, and prepared Raeder’s reports to Hitler. These confidential duties indicate that he was held in high regard and caused him to have frequent contacts with Raeder. The second officer was Captain (later Admiral) Erich Schulte Mönting. He had been Raeder’s aide-de-camp and then became chief of his personal staff. As such, he had important coordinating duties, including the supervision of German naval attachés in foreign countries and contacts with foreign naval attachés in Germany.
Admiral Raeder continued his interest in the establishment of German bases in Norway after his conversation with Hitler on October 10. He received valuable support from Lieutenant Commander Schreiber and from Alfred Rosenberg, the semi-official philosopher of Nazism and chief of a special office concerned with propaganda in foreign countries.
Schreiber was assigned as naval attaché to Norway on the recommendation of Admiral Carls. He had served on Carls’ staff and he was well acquainted with that admiral’s views on the Norwegian question. Soon after his arrival in Oslo, Schreiber established contact with Vidkun Quisling, the leader of the Norwegian fascist party.
The strategic importance of Scandinavia took on greater importance in both Berlin and London when the Soviet Union attacked Finland on November 30, 1939. Schreiber kindled Raeder’s interest by his reports of rumors of Allied plans to occupy strategic points along the Norwegian coast. These reports reinforced similar information in the Western press and from German diplomats in neutral countries.
The possibility that the war would be longer than previously thought began to arise in November 1939. This possibility brought the economic warfare issue to the forefront, and Hitler issued a directive on this subject on November 29. Raeder quickly exploited this new emphasis by pointing out that Great Britain received substantial supplies from the three Scandinavian countries. He indicated that much of the export from these countries passed through Norway and then via convoys to Great Britain. The resources going to the Allies would go to Germany if that country came under German control. Denial of British access to these valuable raw materials and foodstuffs would serve to shorten the war.16
Hitler Meets Vidkun Quisling
Alfred Rosenberg sponsored a visit to Berlin by Quisling in December 1939. Rosenberg and Quisling had met for the first time in 1933. Quisling had been a reserve officer in the Norwegian Army and the Norwegian Minister of War from 1931 to 1933. It was after his stint as cabinet minister that he founded Nasjonal Samling (National Unity), a party with an ideology similar to Nazism. Its platform was pan-German, anti-Soviet, anti-British, and anti-Semitic. Rosenberg and Quisling’s organizations maintained regular contact. Quisling and Rosenberg met again in June 1939 when the former spoke to a convention of the Nordic Society, a Nazi organization for cultural and trade relations with Scandinavia.
Quisling arrived in Berlin on December 10, 1939, and the next day Raeder was informed that Quisling had requested an interview, based on a recommendation by Rosenberg. The interview was arranged quickly. The traditional view, as reported by historian Telford Taylor, is that Rosenberg was behind this meeting as well as the later ones with Hitler. Ralph Hewins, Quisling’s biographer, has called this into question. He claims that Raeder knew all about Quisling and his party, and that he may have used the Rosenberg organization to establish formal contact.17
There is evidence to support Hewins’ claim. Admiral Schniewind, Chief of Staff of SKL (a position comparable to that of Fritz Halder on the General Staff), has written that many important issues were classified “political,” kept from the SKL, and handled by Schulte Mönting. Schniewind claims Schulte Mönting arranged the contact with Quisling.18 Raeder’s adjutant, Freiwald, worked for Schulte Mönting and he reports that Schulte Mönting and Viljam Hagelin, a Norwegian business executive who was Quisling’s representative in Germany, were old friends.19 Hans-Dietrich Loock claims that there were close contacts between Schulte Mönting, Rosenberg’s people, Quisling, and Hagelin.20
Raeder related at his trial that Schulte Mönting informed him that Quisling had asked for a meeting. This request came through Hagelin who apparently had been sent by Rosenberg. In the same testimony, Raeder claims, “Up until 11 December I had neither connections with Herr Rosenberg, except for the fact that I had seen him on occasion—nor, above all, did I have any connections with Quisling about whom I had heard nothing up to that point.”21
It was natural for Raeder, on trial for his role in the attack on Norway, to downplay his connection with Rosenberg and Quisling. However, it is not believable that Raeder had not heard about Quisling in the many reports from Schreiber, his naval attaché in Norway, who had excellent contacts with Quisling and his organization. In addition, Raeder had probably heard about Quisling from his Chief of Staff, Schulte Mönting.
Raeder was an astute politician, and his motive in arranging the meeting with Quisling through Rosenberg may have been calculated to ensure that any unpleasantness following the meeting of Hitler and Quisling fell firmly at Rosenberg’s door. However, by participating in these meetings, Raeder assured himself of some of the credit in case the enterprise proved successful.
Hagelin accompanied Quisling to the meeting with Raeder. Quisling told Raeder that the Norwegian foreign policy was “controlled by the well-known Jew, Hambro (President of the Norwegian Parliament), a great friend of Hore-Belisha (British Secretary of State for War),” and that British landings near Stavanger and Kristiansand were under consideration. Quisling claimed that Hambro and his followers were counting on Britain to keep the Soviets out of Scandinavia, but he saw it as a pretext for Britain gaining a foothold in Norway. Quisling and his followers wished “to anticipate any possible British step in this direction by placing the necessary bases at the disposal of the German Wehrmacht.”22 Admiral Raeder did not comment on Quisling’s statements but agreed to bring the matter to Hitler’s attention.
Rosenberg prepared a memorandum on Quisling’s visit. While the memorandum recognizes the growing anti-German feeling in Norway, due partly to the war between Finland and the Soviet Union, it is full of praise for Quisling and overestimated highly that individual’s influence and support among the Norwegian people and within the Norwegian Army.
Admiral Raeder made good on his promise to bring the matter to Hitler’s attention by briefing Hitler on December 12 in the presence of Generaloberst Wilhelm Keitel, Chief of the OKW, Major General Alfred Jodl, Chief of Operations at OKW, and Hitler’s naval adjutant, Lt. Commander Karl von Püttkammer. Raeder’s briefing is in agreement with Rosenberg’s memorandum with respect to what Quisling is alleged to have said, but it is less laudatory. With respect to Quisling’s offer of cooperation, Raeder stated, “It is impossible to know with such offers how much the people concerned wish to further their own party schemes and how important German interests are to them.”23
Raeder recommended a cautious approach to the issue. He advised that Norway must not be allowed to fall into British hands, as such an event “could be decisive for the outcome of the war.” It is alleged that he went as far as telling Hitler that Quisling believed there was an agreement between Norway and Great Britain about an occupation of Norway.24 Raeder pointed out that British occupation of Norway would most likely turn Sweden against Germany and this could jeopardize Germany’s naval position in the Baltic and prevent German ships from reaching the high sea. The admiral tempered this by stating that German occupation of bases on the Norwegian coast would result in strong British countermoves, that the navy could not cope with the intense surface warfare that would surely develop over a sustained period, and that the free flow of iron ore from Narvik could be interrupted.
Hitler concurred that a British occupation of Norway was unacceptable, but stated that he wanted to hear Rosenberg’s opinion on the advisability of a personal meeting with Quisling. Raeder concluded his briefing by asking that, if Hitler was favorably impressed with Quisling, the OKW should “be permitted to make plans with Q. for preparing and executing the occupation” by peaceful means or by force.25
Hitler’s decision to receive Quisling, pending a recommendation from Rosenberg, resulted in consultations between Rosenberg and Raeder on December 13, and a letter from Rosenberg to Raeder stating that he would take Quisling to meet Hitler on December 14.26 Those present at the first meeting between Hitler and Quisling included Raeder, Keitel, Hagelin, and Hans Wilhelm Scheidt, head of Rosenberg’s Northern Department. Rosenberg was unable to attend because he had sustained an injury, but he had prepared a memorandum for Hitler on Quisling and his party, and Scheidt served as Rosenberg’s representative at the meeting. Raeder also visited Rosenberg at his home in the morning of December 14, before taking the two Norwegians to see Hitler.27
Although no record of this relatively long meeting has surfaced, Hitler must have been favorably impressed with Quisling, since he ordered OKW to “investigate how one can take possession of Norway.”28 The investigation was to focus on two alternative schemes. One involved minor German military support for a coup by Quisling and his followers, while the second was a military occupation of the country.
Churchill writes that Quisling arrived in Berlin with a “detailed plan” for political action in Norway and that “Hitler’s decision to invade Norway … was taken on December 14.”29 This is misleading. Hitler only directed OKW to investigate how to take control of the country. Churchill’s statement makes it appear that the Germans decided to invade Norway before they actually did.
If Hitler’s order to the OKW to study the matter is viewed as a decision to invade Norway, then the December 22 British War Cabinet directions to the Military Chiefs to plan for operations in Norway must be viewed in the same way. Furthermore, the British Chiefs presented their plans on January 2 and the Allied Supreme War Council was briefed on the final plans on February 5. The German plan was briefed to Hitler on February 29 and his directive was issued the following day. The two events—Hitler’s order after meeting Quisling and the War Cabinet’s directive to the Military Chiefs on December 22—should be viewed as part of contingency planning and were not invasion decisions.
Telford Taylor writes that there were two more meetings between Hitler, Quisling, and Hagelin, on 16 and 18 December. Most sources, including Quisling’s writings, mention only two meetings in total, those on 14 and 18 December. Taylor may have based his statement on Raeder’s testimony at the Nuremberg Trial where he states, “The Fuehrer had two more conferences with Quisling on 16 and 18 December at which I was not present.”30 I believe there were only two meetings, on 14 and 18 December. The second meeting lasted about one hour. Hitler let it be known at the meeting that his preference was for a neutral Norway, but that if the enemy tried to extend the war into this area, he would be forced to react accordingly. He promised monetary support for Quisling and his followers, but Hitler did not inform Quisling that he had directed OKW to explore the feasibility of occupying Norway.
The primary sources of information we have about the two meetings Hitler had with Quisling are from the testimony of Raeder at Nuremberg and Quisling’s writings from prison. We should treat these with care. The charges against Raeder dealt largely with his role in planning the attack on Norway. It is reasonable to assume that he tried to downplay his role in the events leading up to Hitler’s decision. Likewise, Quisling wrote his account while in a Norwegian prison awaiting trial and execution for treason. An excerpt from Quisling’s writing on this subject might be worth repeating:
During all this [discussions with Hitler, Raeder, etc.] there was no question of any German occupation of Norway, certainly not of my giving any guidance and advice with a view to such an occupation. Hitler was, however, emphatically clear that if Norway did not vindicate her neutrality vis-à-vis Great Britain, Germany would attack with all her power. One may take if for granted that the German authorities themselves knew best how to carry out such a counter-action and that they were not willing to discuss it with a foreigner whom they were meeting for the first time….
Rosenberg’s writings about the political preparations for Germany’s operations in Norway, and other more circumstantial evidence, suggest that Quisling not only warned the Germans against real or imagined British plans in Scandinavia but also offered his and his party’s assistance to the Germans. The Germans were eager to use Quisling as a source of information, but they were not willing to compromise their thoughts or plans by sharing them with the leader of a small political party with little credibility in its own country. They merely supplied money to Quisling’s party and received periodic reports about conditions in Norway.
There is no evidence to suggest that the information received from Quisling had any major effect on German preparations, or that Quisling had any knowledge about Germans plans. Claims by some British authors, such as Churchill and Adams, that Quisling provided the Germans with detailed information on the Norwegian military and its facilities, are not supported by subsequent developments or by information in German sources. The fact that German intelligence was wrong on several issues well known to Quisling and his followers suggests that they provided little or no information of military value.
It made good sense for the Germans to keep Quisling in the dark. It would have been extremely foolish and reckless for the Germans to share their plans with Quisling and his followers, or to request the kind of information that would lead them to the obvious conclusion that an invasion was being prepared. Writers during and after World War II have blown the effect of Quisling and his followers on German plans and operations all out of proportion. It served as a convenient explanation by both the British and Norwegians for an embarrassing military defeat, but there is almost no evidence to support the various claims that are made to support this theory.31
Studie Nord
The wheels were now in motion. In response to Hitler’s directive, Jodl’s staff made a preliminary examination titled Studie Nord that outlined a plan for the occupation of Norway. A very small group headed by Colonel (later General) Walter Warlimont, deputy chief of the OKW operations staff, completed this study. Warlimont recommended that a staff headed by a Luftwaffe general with a chief of staff from the navy and an operations officer from the army should further develop the study. Hitler had instructed Keitel and Jodl to keep knowledge of the Norwegian study severely restricted, and this instruction was evidently followed to the letter.
Raeder recognized that the Norwegian venture carried great risk and that a truly neutral Norway would best serve Germany’s interests. Nevertheless, he kept up the psychological pressure on Hitler. The SKL received numerous alarming reports in December 1939 from Schreiber. These reports pointed to disturbing signs of British plans to land in Norway, using help to Finland as a pretext.
Raeder warned Hitler on December 30, 1939, in the presence of Keitel and Püttkammer, that under no circumstances should Norway be allowed to fall into Great Britain’s hands. He suggested that the British could carry out an “unobtrusive occupation” of Norway and that no serious opposition would be offered by either Norwegians or Swedes to such an event. Raeder went on to admonish, “Therefore it is necessary to be prepared and ready.”32
Studie Nord was completed on December 28, but on Hitler’s instruction it was not distributed for evaluation and comment to the three service headquarters until January 10, 1940. It appears that only OKM considered Studie Nord in a serious manner, but even this headquarters recommended that no action be taken unless it became clear that the British intended to move into Scandinavia. On this, there was complete agreement between Raeder and his staff, but there were differences when it came to what emphasis should be placed on the danger of a British occupat
ion of Norway.
Raeder was convinced that Britain would occupy points on the Norwegian coast in the near future, to stop the iron ore traffic from Sweden and hinder German naval operations in the Atlantic and North Sea. He also believed that the Norwegian government would cooperate with the British, or at least fail to offer effective resistance. The accuracy of Raeder’s assessment of British intentions is remarkable.
The operational branch of the SKL, under Admiral C. Fricke, did not believe that a British occupation of Norway was imminent. The SKL took a conservative military view of the forces the British would require for the operation and concluded that Britain did not have the forces necessary to carry out an occupation of Norway and thereafter secure that position against German threats. Fricke and his planners believed that a British occupation of Norway would cause a strong reaction from the Soviet Union.
The SKL viewed a preemptive German strike against Norway as disadvantageous. German imports of iron ore currently proceeded safely through Norwegian territorial waters and this situation would continue as long as Great Britain respected Norwegian neutrality. A German occupation would result in the necessity of providing naval escorts for the ore traffic, and this would put a great strain on the navy. A German strike against Norway would demand almost every ship in the navy for it to have even the slightest chance of success against British superiority at sea. The occupation was a grave decision to make in view of the fact that a successful occupation of Norway would not be a decisive factor in the war against France and Britain. An action against Norway in the absence of a British move in that direction would also be difficult to justify. Hubatsch writes that it was only at the last moment that the SKL agreed that nothing short of force could solve the Norwegian problem.33
Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 Page 8
