Sundlo considered it foolish to confront an attacker on the flat terrain in the harbor area where the defenders would be subject to the full fury of naval firepower. He wanted to establish the main defense line along the high ground in the eastern part of the town, with a covering force in the harbor area. This covering force was not expected to become involved in decisive combat but to delay and channel an enemy advance towards the main defensive line. It appears that Sundlo intended to use his forces in an offensive role and did not think elaborate defense works were called for. The division did not agree and Sundlo later clarified that when he had expressed the opinion that elaborate prepared defense positions were not needed, he referred to the covering force. Whatever the case, the difference in views between Fleischer and Sundlo apparently extended to precisely how that defense should be carried out.
It is difficult to determine the thinking behind the location of the first two bunkers. There was 3,000 meters between them and they were therefore not mutually supporting. The distances from the Fagernes and Framnes bunkers to the central harbor area were 1,800 and 1,000 meters, respectively. The central parts of the harbor were therefore outside the effective range of machineguns and small arms.
Major Sigurd Omdal, the regimental executive officer, recommended that a number of machinegun nests be built in the harbor area. The division plan for construction of defensive positions in Narvik, however, involved only the expansion and strengthening of the bunker system. It called for the construction of four additional reinforced concrete bunkers: one on the west side of the Framnes Peninsula, one near Vassvik, one at Ornes, and one at Ankenes on the west side of the harbor. The plan also called for supporting machinegun positions near at least two of these bunkers. The engineer company was tasked with building the bunkers. The regiment requested that the engineers also build the machinegun positions, but the division directed that infantry be used for that purpose. It appears that Colonel Sundlo also wanted to build machinegun positions along Rombakfjord. During his trial, Sundlo stated that he believed an enemy attack would come from the north side of town and he did not think a landing would take place directly in the harbor.8
Major Omdal’s recommendation for the construction of machinegun positions in the harbor area was not acted on. Instead, infantry troops were to patrol or occupy posts along the 3-kilometer harbor area separating the two bunkers. There was only one prepared position between the two bunkers. This was a covered infantry position at the south end of the Iron Ore Pier. Infantry positions were also dug or blasted out of rocks along the north side of Framnes Peninsula, between Kvitvik and Lillevik.
There are differing reports on the general plan for defensive preparations. Colonel Sundlo still wanted to place the main defensive effort along the high ground on the city’s northeastern side with a forward covering force, including machineguns, in the harbor area. General Fleischer did not agree. According to Sundlo, Fleischer wanted the defense to be concentrated on the western side of the city and as part of that decision, Sundlo was ordered to prepare positions for an infantry company along the northwestern slope of the Framnes Peninsula. According to Sundlo, Fleischer confirmed this decision when he visited Narvik in early 1940. The division chief of staff, Major Odd Lindbäck-Larsen, stated later that the division did not tell the regimental commander how he should conduct the defense of the town and he found it unlikely that Fleischer would have ordered Sundlo to prepare infantry positions on Framnes Peninsula against the colonel’s wishes and without telling the chief of staff. Lindbäck-Larsen stated that he was surprised to find defense works on that peninsula.
Fleischer inspected the Narvik defenses on March 7 and 8, 1940 and expressed his satisfaction with the progress. It seems strange that he would have approved the defense works on Framnes Peninsula if it were not his intention that they should be located there. According to his own testimony about the inspection, the chief of staff protested sharply the fact that there were no defensive positions in the harbor area. Fleischer did not support his arguments, stating that it was Sundlo’s decision as to how he conducted the defense. According to Lindbäck-Larsen, this discussion led to a decision to place machineguns in the harbor area and to prepare a position at the southern end of the Iron Ore Pier.
The division directed the engineers to build bunkers at Vassvik and Ornes on March 18, and to construct an artillery bunker on Fagernes. The bunkers’ exact locations were to be determined by Colonel Sundlo and the commander of 3rd Mountain Artillery Bn. Only the machinegun bunkers at Fagernes and Framnes were placed under the control of the regiment and occupied by infantry prior to April 8. The construction of the bunkers at Vassvik and Ornes had started. Those at Kvitvik and Ankenes were nearly complete but control had not been transferred to the regiment. Construction of the artillery bunker at Fagernes had not begun. The infantry positions in the Kvitvik-Lillevik area were to be completed by mid-April.
The defensive plans required that a reinforced infantry company maintain a state of readiness that would allow it to occupy all defensive positions in Narvik within three hours. The need for a higher readiness level was recognized after the navy announced that it could not provide three hours of early warning. The reinforced company earmarked for Narvik was located at Elvegårdsmoen in the inter-war period, not at Narvik. The tense situation after the Altmark incident and the need for a higher readiness level caused General Fleischer to move the reinforced company from Elvegårdsmoen to Narvik on February 17, 1940. He ordered Colonel Sundlo to prevent landings by foreign troops, regardless of nationality.
In hindsight it is easy to see where mistakes were made. The plan to mount the defense of the Ofot Railway in Narvik, particularly before all defensive works were completed, ignored a number of basic defensive principles.
An attacker would have dominance of the fjords and every part of the defense would be exposed to the devastating effects of close-range naval gunfire. The forces in Narvik were separated from the areas north of Ofotfjord and therefore from any reinforcements. There were no lines of communications through the mountain wilderness to the south. The positions in Narvik could easily be enveloped by enemy landings on the south side of Rombakfjord. These landing forces would isolate Narvik from the outside world. From the landing sites, an attacker could advance to the Swedish border virtually unopposed. He could also occupy the high ground east of Narvik, eliminating any realistic possibility of holding the town. If these military objections were not sufficient, there was the humanitarian factor. Why turn Narvik, with its 10,000 civilians, into a bloody battlefield when that was not necessary for defending the Ofot Railway?
The considerations enumerated above, along with the knowledge that the capture of Narvik was only important militarily to an enemy if it also included control of the railroad to the Swedish border, should have dictated a defense that did not involve trying to hold the town. It was not a prudent decision to meet an attack by an enemy with naval dominance at the water’s edge. The attacker would have the advantage of selecting the point of attack, forcing the defender to spread his forces to meet threats from all directions. A fixed forward defense is usually unwise unless the defender has strong fortifications and sufficient reserves that can be moved quickly in response to a dangerous development. The inability of the Germans to move their reserves quickly to counter the landings in Normandy, because of Allied air dominance, virtually eliminated the value of their defensive works. In Narvik, there were neither strong defensive works nor any reserves.
A defense in the interior, along the railroad, would have had several obvious advantages. It would have spared the civilian population in Narvik, removed Norwegian forces from the reach of naval gunfire, made envelopment difficult, and forced an enemy to operate in a severe climate and unfamiliar terrain. From an interior position, contact could be established and maintained with Norwegian forces to the north.
Approximately 450 Norwegian troops were located in Narvik on April 8, but there were few infantry among them. The
railroad gun had a crew of 8-10, the antiaircraft battery consisted of about 120 men, and the engineer company strength in Narvik was about 110. There was also a supply depot detachment of nine men. After making allowances for the skeleton regimental staff, Colonel Sundlo had approximately 190 infantry under his command in Narvik, but many of these were ordered away on April 8.
Naval Activities on April 8
April 8, 1940 was a busy and confusing day for the 3rd Naval District, as it was for the rest of the country’s political and military leadership. The events started with British violations of Norwegian territorial waters early in the morning. The Norwegian patrol vessel Syrian, patrolling the outer area of Vestfjord, spotted several foreign warships on a southerly heading. These warships turned out to be eight British destroyers. Captain Kaaveland, Syrian’s skipper, challenged the warships and demanded that they leave Norwegian territorial waters.
There was not much the 298-ton Syrian, with its crew of ten men armed with one 3-inch gun, could do to enforce its demands. The British destroyer Hunter answered the Norwegian challenge. The Hunter’s signal read, “We will not leave territorial waters. You are heading towards a minefield. Stop immediately and await my further instructions.”9
The British sent an officer aboard the patrol boat and the Norwegians were told that a minefield had been laid in the area and that British destroyers would remain in territorial waters for 48 hours to warn merchant vessels. Kaaveland received a map of the rectangular shaped minefield and a request to keep civilian vessels from approaching the minefield from the south. Kaaveland repeated his protest and stated that the mining operation would undoubtedly bring Norway into the war.
Syrian sent several messages to the 3rd Naval District about the British activities in Vestfjord and Captain Askim issued orders to stop all traffic in the area. The patrol boat Svalbard II, located in Bodø, was sent to guard the southern approaches to the minefield while the patrol boat Kvitøy was dispatched to Tjeldsund to stop southbound traffic. One ship stopped by Kvitøy was the German tanker Jan Wellem. The German plan called for this ship to sail from “Basis Nord” near Murmansk with fuel for the German destroyers. The ship was allowed to proceed to Narvik after the patrol boat skipper conferred with his superiors. Askim also directed that four patrol boats proceed to Ramsund Naval Depot to take aboard minesweeping equipment and prepare to sweep the British minefield.
The two coastal defense ships Norge and Eidsvold were anchored in Narvik on April 8. The submarines B3 and B1 were also in Narvik along with the submarine tender Lyngen and the patrol vessel Senja. The patrol boat Kelt was on patrol at the Ofotfjord entrance and the patrol vessel Michael Sars was in Lødingen, at the southern entrance to Tjelsund.
The British mining led Captain Askim to conclude that Norway would soon become involved in the war between Germany and Great Britain. He suspected that the British mining operation was only a first step and he expected a naval attack on the German ore ships in Narvik. Askim ordered his ships in Narvik to prepare for action. He also ordered Captain Brekke, the 3rd Submarine Division commander, to take his submarines and Lyngen to Liland on the north side of Ofotfjord. Brekke suggested that the submarines take their assigned positions in the fjord to launch torpedoes at any intruder. This suggestion was turned down and Brekke was later ordered to position the submarines inside Bogen to insure that they were not seen from the fjord.
The 3rd Naval District received the various intelligence reports discussed in Chapter 3. These reports were passed to subordinate units and to the 6th District Command. The report from the British Naval Staff that German naval forces were northbound and could reach Narvik by 2200 hours on April 8 had the greatest significance for Norwegian forces in North Norway. However, the report was passed to the 3rd Naval District with the comment that no one on the Norwegian Naval Staff believed it to be accurate.
Narvik was not a restricted area10 and Askim contacted Admiral Diesen at 2345 hours to find out if there were any special instructions, particularly with respect to a possible British raid on the merchant ships in Narvik. Diesen’s answer at midnight stated that force should be used to defend Narvik and the ships in the harbor. Askim sent this information to his subordinates. He also had a conference with Captain Odd Isachsen Willoch, Eidsvold’s skipper.
The two captains decided that the coastal defense ships should meet an eventual attack on Narvik outside the harbor because of the many merchant ships located there.11 This was a deviation from plans and the 3rd Naval District staff, 6th District Command, and Colonel Sundlo continued to assume that the two coastal defense ships were near the Ofotfjord entrance. The bad weather and very limited visibility appear to have been the reasons for this change in plans. Eidsvold took up a position outside the harbor entrance, about 500 meters from the Framnes shoreline, while Norge remained in the harbor. Both these senior naval officers realized that a fight between the two coastal defense ships and a substantial force of modern warships would be short.
Between 0130 and 0300 hours, the 3rd Naval District received several reports about shore batteries in the approaches to Oslo, Bergen, and Trondheim engaging foreign naval forces. The report from Bergen identified the warships as German. Captain Askim again called Admiral Diesen and asked if there were any instructions in case of a German attack on Narvik. It had finally become obvious to Diesen that such an attack was underway and, at 0420 hours, he amended his earlier instructions by ordering Askim to engage German warships but not to fire on British ships.
Askim increased the number of patrol craft at the Ofotfjord entrance from one to two after darkness on April 8. The patrol vessels had orders not to fire on foreign warships, only to report their sightings to the Ofot Division. At midnight, it was blowing a southwest breeze with frequent snow showers at the entrance to the fjord. Visibility was limited but the two patrol vessels maintained visual contact and had radio communications with Norge.
Army Activities on April 8
As already mentioned, General Fleischer and his chief of staff, Major Lindbäck-Larsen, were in East Finnmark, several hundred kilometers from Narvik on April 8. At about 1000 hours, the District Command notified the general by telephone that the British had mined Vestfjord. Fleischer took some tentative steps to prepare his command for possible war. He directed that quarters be requisitioned in Øyjord, which was across the fjord from Narvik, for a motorized mountain artillery battery. Øyjord was the planned position for an artillery battery to support the troops in Narvik. Fleischer also asked the District Command for an estimate of how soon the 2/15th Inf at Setermoen could be ready to move to Elvegårdsmoen.
Fleischer decided to remain in East Finnmark despite the gathering war clouds and the most serious breach to date of Norwegian neutrality. As previously planned, he went on maneuvers with the Varanger Battalion. In doing so, Fleischer removed himself from any means of communicating with his headquarters and subordinates during this crisis-filled day.
Major Lindbäck-Larsen left the maneuver in the afternoon and drove to Gornitak from where he was able to contact the District Command in Harstad. He was briefed on the situation, including the steps taken by the 3rd Naval District. Lindbäck-Larsen was informed that Askim had conferred with Colonel Sundlo.
The term “confer” may have given the recipients a false sense of security since it seemed to indicate that the army and navy were working closely together in Narvik. In fact, Askim was apparently not aware of what was happening in Narvik and Sundlo did not know that the coastal defense ships remained in or near the harbor instead of at the Ofotfjord entrance. Lindbäck-Larsen made several decisions on his own authority and communicated these to the District Command.
First, he directed the motorized artillery battery to move to Øyjord on April 9. It appears that this order did not reach the artillery battalion until 1750 hours. Second, he ordered the 2/15th Inf from Setermoen to Elvegårdsmoen as quickly as possible. It was assumed that this move would take place on April 9. Colonel Sundlo was not notified
and learned about the order to reposition the battalion shortly before 0400 hours on April 9 when Colonel Løken called to coordinate the move.12 Third, he ordered the deployment of sufficient machineguns and crews from Elvegårdsmoen to man all the bunkers in Narvik. Fourth, he gave a “be-prepared” order for the District Command to move from Harstad to Målselv. Finally, he requested an estimate on how quickly the Hålogaland Air Group could deploy to Bardufoss and ordered preparations for that move. General Fleischer arrived in Gornitak at 1800 hours and approved Lindbäck-Larsen’s actions. The only change he made was to order the move of the District Command to Målselv on April 9. Thereupon, the general and his chief of staff drove to a hotel in Vadsø.
The District Command was informed around 1400 hours that German naval forces were northbound in the Kattegat and about the sinking of Rio de Janeiro. Lindbäck-Larsen does not mention receiving this intelligence when he talked to the District Command around 1600 hours. Captain Steen, in the official naval history, states that all important information received by the District Command from the 3rd Naval District, including the reports cited above, was forwarded immediately to General Fleischer and his principal subordinates. Furthermore, Captain Løken, the District Command’s chief of staff, states that these reports were communicated to Major Lindbäck-Larsen in their telephone conversation at 1600 hours.
Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 Page 19
