General von Falkenhorst issued a special directive for the attack on Narvik. In summary, it called for the 139th Mountain Regiment to capture Narvik, the army depot at Elvegårdsmoen, and the fortifications that the Germans mistakenly believed existed on both sides of Ofotfjord near Ramsund. Steen writes that the Germans had been informed, by Quisling among others, that shore batteries existed here. This information was allegedly given to Colonel Piekenbrock when he met Quisling in Copenhagen on April 4, 1940 (see Chapter 2, note 31). This is an unlikely scenario and Steen gives no source for his claim.5 First, Quisling and his followers certainly had accurate information and if the intelligence had come from them, von Falkenhorst would have known that there were no coastal batteries covering the approaches to Narvik. Second, von Falkenhorst’s operational directive for the occupation of Narvik is dated March 12, 1940, almost a month before the meeting between Quisling and Piekenbrock in Copenhagen.
Von Falkenhorst’s overall goal in the Narvik operation was to secure the Norwegian part of the railroad to the Swedish iron district. After reaching the Swedish border, the troops were to be prepared to continue their advance to Kiruna. As far as possible, the operation was to have the character of a peaceful occupation. However, any resistance was to be met with all available resources. The communications and economy in this part of Norway were not be disrupted or interfered with unless necessary to accomplish the missions. The same applied to people’s individual freedom and official duties. The fortifications near Ramsund were to be made ready for use by the German forces as quickly as possible. To strengthen the Norwegian coastal fortifications, antiaircraft weapons and a 6-inch battery were to arrive by transports. General Dietl was to establish contact with the German consul in Narvik and with the “reportedly pro-German” commandant, Colonel Sundlo.6 The Norwegian Army depot at Elvegårdsmoen was to be occupied, peacefully if possible. Weapons and ammunitions at the depot were to be seized only if the loyalty of the Norwegian troops was suspect. The directive stressed that the honor and pride of the Norwegian defense forces should be respected and safeguarded. Norwegian troops were to be demobilized and allowed to return to their homes if they did not show hostile intent.
In case the destroyers could not force their way past the Norwegian fortifications, the landing was to take place at Elvenes, 18 miles north of Narvik, and the objectives were to be seized by overland movements, including the District Command headquarters in Harstad. Contact was to be established with the 6th Division in an attempt to secure its loyal support. Norwegian forces that threatened the area occupied by the Germans were to be neutralized or destroyed. Norwegian units along the Finnish and Soviet borders were to continue their missions. Tromsø was not to be seized until von Falkenhorst gave the order, but Bardufoss was to be captured and made operational for German aircraft as quickly as possible.
Units earmarked for reinforcements were first the two battalions of the 138th Mountain Regiment landed in Trondheim. They would be sent to Narvik by sea or air. The rest of the 3rd Mountain Division would move from Oslo to Trondheim by train. Transport from Trondheim would be by sea or air, unless transit through Sweden was permitted.
The naval operational orders, applicable to all task forces, also stipulated that the operation should be carried out by peaceful means, if possible. The orders emphasized that naval guns and other weapons were to be used only if the Norwegians fired the first shot. The German Navy’s operational order left no doubt about this matter, stating that warning shots by Norwegians were not sufficient grounds to open fire. The destroyers in TF 1 were to depart Narvik for their return to Germany as quickly as the situation allowed. It was expected that they would rendezvous with the two battleships and the ships from TF 2.
The German Approach and Norwegian Reactions
Admiral Lütjens released TF 1 at 2000 hours on April 8 for its run up Vestfjord. A northwest gale was blowing, with snow squalls, and the ships had great difficulties in the turbulent seas. At times, the heavy seas virtually buried the German warships and washed overboard much of the weaponry and ammunition stored on deck. The high-speed run up the long and treacherous fjord under gale conditions in total darkness, relying mainly on dead reckoning, was a navigational feat of the first order. Captain Peter Dickens of the Royal Navy is not alone in his admiration for the German accomplishment:7
Given the highest navigational skill it was still a courageous act to press on into evermore confined waters, and Bonte’s heart must have been in his mouth. How could he be sure that the right allowances had been made for factors such as leeway, increased distance traveled when the gale had been astern and a reduction now that it was on the port bow and the ships were straining into it? There would also have been inaccuracies in steering and engine revolutions that were unavoidable in heavy weather and incalculable. Nevertheless he made for the entrance, as the British in no more difficult circumstances, did not.
The conditions improved as the destroyers came leeward of the Lofoten Islands, but it was still blowing a gale with heavy snow squalls and it was not until they had a sure fix on the land that the nightmarish navigational situation was somewhat alleviated. The fact that the navigational lights in Vestfjord remained lit was of considerable help as the German ships neared the entrance to Ofotfjord. Nevertheless, there were times when violent evasive maneuvers were necessary to avoid colliding with cliffs along the route.
Task Force 1 entered Ofotfjord at 0310 hours on April 9. The ships were traveling in column at 30 knots with Captain Bonte’s flagship, Wilhelm Heidkamp, in the lead. Dawn was breaking but visibility was still severely limited by snow squalls. Both Michael Sars and Kelt, patrolling the waters between Barøy and Tjeldøy, observed the lead German warship and informed Captain Askim by radio. In the span of ten minutes, another eight German destroyers passed the patrol boats. This information, along with the observation that the warships were German, was also reported to the Ofot Division. The two patrol boats sent separate messages and this caused some unfortunate confusion. Kelt identified the ships as German while Michael Sars referred to them only as foreign warships.
Kelt gave an accurate report when it identified nine German destroyers. The Erich Giese became separated from the rest before the encounter with Glowworm. The toppling waves had flooded her gyro room and navigation was by a magnetic compass that gyrated violently as the ship was tossed around in the violent seas. In the afternoon of April 8, Lieutenant Commander Karl Smidt, Erich Giese’s skipper, brought his ship around to pick up a soldier who had washed overboard. The soldier was saved but the rescue operation caused Erich Giese to fall even further behind the rest of the task force. The destroyer was running low on fuel and the ship’s violent movements in the northwesterly gale caused the pumps to lose suction sporadically. Speed was reduced to conserve fuel and Erich Giese had fallen about 50 miles behind when the rest of the task force entered Ofotfjord.
The reports from the two patrol vessels at the entrance to Ofotfjord reached Captain Askim at 0310 hours, with the last message from Kelt coming in at 0320 hours, and he ordered battle stations on Norge. Askim also alerted Captain Willoch in the other coastal defense ship. The 3rd Naval District was informed by radio via the communications center in Tromsø at 0320 hours. The message from Norge to the communications center identified the force simply as “foreign warships.” The 3rd Naval District informed District Command in Harstad at 0337 hours. The message to District Command read, “From the commanding officer Norge. Michael Sars reports foreign warships entering Ofotfjord. Norge and Eidsvold are casting off.”8
Captain Askim, located about two kilometers from Colonel Sundlo, knew around 0310 hours that foreign warships had entered Ofotfjord. Askim reported that he tried to warn Sundlo but was unable to make contact since the telephone line from ship to shore was broken when the aft lines were cut loose. He did ask a harbor official to warn Norwegian ships in the harbor but neglected to ask him to warn the army.9 Captain Steen observes,
As a result of thi
s [failure to notify Colonel Sundlo directly], valuable time was lost. If the captain had managed to give this report, the colonel would have received it approximately 40 minutes earlier than he did, and he would also have received it in the correct version, that Germans ships were approaching in the fjord.10
The one-hour warning time the army expected was reduced to 10–20 minutes.
The exact time Colonel Sundlo learned that foreign warships were approaching is somewhat uncertain. Steen and Hovland give the time as about 0400 hours. Sandvik writes that Sundlo was informed at 0337 hours. It was probably later, since the District Command received the message from the 3rd Naval District at 0337. Sandvik writes that the 6th Division was informed at 0400 hours, although Lindbäck-Larsen claims it was 0345 hours, and it is logical to assume that Sundlo received the information about that time. Whatever the exact hour, the slow pace of passing information cost the forces in Narvik valuable preparation time.
Shortly after 0430 hours, Colonel Sundlo received another message that caused uncertainty and that gives some insight into the intrigues going on in the 6th Division. Lindbäck-Larsen writes that the District Command reported that it had received an order from the General Staff at 0330 hours not to fire on British and French warships. The same report stated that when informed about the order, Sundlo had commented, “in other words, the Germans are to be fired on but not the British.” Sandvik writes that Colonel Mjelde reported this conversation to General Fleischer “in view of Colonel Sundlo’s well-known attitude towards the Germans.” According to Lindbäck-Larsen, the decision was made to relieve Sundlo of his command after this comment. Lindbäck-Larsen writes that before they were able to contact Narvik to carry out the decision, the report arrived (0345 hours according to him) that foreign warships had entered Ofotfjord. This made it too late to make a command change.
Some claims in Lindbäck-Larsen’s report on this event fail to stand up to close scrutiny. Sundlo admitted having made the above statement when Captain Knudsen at the District Command relayed the General Staff message, but only for the sake of repeating the order to make sure he understood it correctly. Navy Captain Siem, Chief of Sea Transport at District Command, who was present when the conversation took place, also concluded that Sundlo was only trying to clarify the order.11 The naval history and a report by the District Command, backed by telephone logs, show that the order from the General Staff arrived at 0430, not at 0330. This time is undoubtedly correct since the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy sent out a similar order to the 3rd Naval District, where it arrived at 0420 hours.12 If Fleischer decided to relieve Colonel Sundlo prior to 0430 hours, he could not base or justify that decision on Sundlo’s reaction to a General Staff order that had not yet arrived.
Fleischer and his chief of staff assumed they would have a quiet night at their hotel in Vadsø after receiving a message from the General Staff around 2200 hours. District Command received the message at 2125 hours. It announced that a decision on mobilization would not be taken until the following morning.13 Based on what Lindbäck-Larsen writes, both he and Fleischer concluded that this message from the General Staff meant that the earlier British warning about Germans reaching Narvik by 2200 hours was false. District Command did not forward this message to Sundlo.
Lindbäck-Larsen was awakened around 0300 hours (0315 according to Sandvik) by a telephone call from District Command, which related that foreign warships were attacking Oslo, Bergen, and Trondheim. Lindbäck-Larsen requested District Command to insure that the battalion from Elvegårdsmoen had reached Narvik and that all bunkers were occupied. He also directed that the movement of the 2/15th Inf and the motorized artillery battery from Setermoen be expedited.
The 3rd Naval District’s chief of staff notified General Fleischer around 0345 hours that foreign warships had entered Ofotfjord. This message was followed 15 minutes later by a similar report from the District Command. At the same time, District Command reported that all was ready in Narvik. This statement was apparently in answer to Lindbäck-Larsen’s request 45 minutes earlier for confirmation that the battalion from Elvegårdsmoen had reached Narvik and that the bunkers were occupied. What the District Command used as a basis for the claim that all was ready in Narvik is not known. Colonel Sundlo tried unsuccessfully to contact District Command from 0300 until at least 0330 hours. It is true that the machinegun crews had occupied the bunkers the previous evening but the movement of the battalion was not completed. Fleischer decided to return to his headquarters and two naval aircraft were placed at his disposal for transport from Vadsø to Tromsø.
The patrol vessel Senja left Narvik at 0135 hours to escort merchant ships past the British minefield in Vestfjord. At 0340 hours, the patrol boat sighted a warship, believed to be a British destroyer, near Ramnes. This report reached Captain Askim but it was interpreted as a British cruiser. His reaction, according to Steen, was, “Thank God, there are also British ships in the Fjord.” As Senja approached to challenge the warship, it turned out to be German. A second German destroyer was also sighted. This information was transmitted to Captain Askim by radio but, for unknown reasons, he did not receive the report. The Germans sent an armed boarding party aboard the Norwegian ship, put its radio out of commission, removed critical parts from the 76mm gun, and ordered the skipper to proceed to Narvik. Captain Askim had ordered the patrol vessels at the Ofotfjord entrance not to engage foreign warships. This was a sensible order in view of the disparity in size and armaments between these small vessels and destroyers. Senja arrived in Narvik at 0630 hours.
Search for Shore Batteries
The German forces approaching Narvik were divided into three groups: Group West, Group Narvik, and Group Elvegårdsmoen. These groups were to carry out nearly simultaneous attacks on the three main objectives.
Group West consisted of the 3rd Destroyer Flotilla (Hans Lüdemann, Anton Schmitt, and Diether von Roeder) and the troops aboard these destroyers. Captain Bonte detached the 3rd Destroyer Flotilla at 0340 hours. Group West’s mission was to land two infantry companies to capture the non-existent Norwegian shore batteries at Ramnes and Hamnnes. Anton Schmitt was to land the reinforced Co 1 on the south side of Ofotfjord, in a small side fjord called Vargfjord. The plan called for the company to advance across the narrow peninsula and attack the imaginary Hamnnes battery from the rear. Thereafter, the company would continue along the north shore of Vargfjord and attack a battery the Germans believed was located at Jevik. Company 1 belonged to the 1st Battalion, which landed at Bjerkvik.
Hans Lüdemann was to land the reinforced Co 6 at Skarvik, just east of Ramnes. The company would advance westward and attack the Ramnes battery from the rear. Company 6 belonged to the 2nd Battalion, which landed in Narvik. The two destroyers remained in the fjord, prepared to support the operation with naval gunfire. These were the two destroyers encountered by Senja. The reserve for these two landings was aboard Diether von Roeder. This destroyer positioned itself near Barøy where it would be near enough to the landing sites quickly to land the reserve and at the same time be in position to assist Erich Giese when she arrived, should that be necessary.
The German troops exhausted themselves in a fruitless search in six feet of snow for the non-existent guns. They reembarked on destroyers around 0700 hours and landed in Narvik.
Capture of Elvegårdsmoen
Elvegårdsmoen was a major mobilization center as well as the training area for the 15th Infantry Regiment, the Hålogaland Engineer Battalion, and several smaller units. It was a major weapons, ammunition, and supply depot. Among the items at the depot were 4,000 rifles, 2,000 carbines, 600 handguns, 222 machineguns, 14 mortars, 1.5 million rounds of ammunition, and huge stores of uniforms, supplies, and food.
It was Group Elvegårdsmoen’s mission to capture this depot. The group consisted of the 4th Destroyer Flotilla (Wolfgang Zenker, Hermann Künne, Erich Koellner, and Erich Giese) carrying 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 139th Mountain Regiment, commanded by Colonel Windisch. The 1st Battalion
was short one company, which was part of Group West. The landing force was also short about 200 men who had embarked on Erich Giese, which had still not arrived. Bonte released the 4th Destroyer Flotilla at 0410 hours and the three destroyers proceeded on a northeasterly course. The troops were landed at a wooden pier in Bjerkvik from the destroyers’ boats. The landing was unopposed and the troops advanced towards Elvegårdsmoen as soon as they came ashore.
When Major Spjeldnæs took his battalion to Narvik, he left a guard detail of 17 men from Co 3 at Elvegårdsmoen. In addition, there were about 150 non-combat personnel at the depot. It appears that Spjeldnæs failed to appoint a camp commander when he departed and the senior officer failed to assume command. Steen and Sandvik write that Spjeldnæs viewed the repositioning of the battalion as an administrative move and neglected to brief those left behind. The two authors claim that this behavior evidently stemmed from Colonel Sundlo not giving Spjeldnæs a reason for moving the battalion to Narvik.
However, it seems unlikely that Sundlo failed to give a reason for the move or that Spjeldnæs failed to ask why the colonel deployed his battalion with live ammunition and a battle train, on short notice, at night, and in a snowstorm. Spjeldnæs’ own testimony fails to support the claim. Sundlo talked to Spjeldnæs at 2000 hours when he ordered the machinegun company and mortar platoon into Narvik and again around 2100 hours when he ordered the major to bring the rest of the battalion. While Spjeldnæs could not recall the details of the conversations, he was sure that the colonel gave the reason for the move during the second call.14 Thus, he had no reasons to view the deployment as an administrative move.
The Norwegians at Elvegårdsmoen were warned about the approaching Germans 15 minutes before they arrived. The officers left behind at the depot spent those 15 minutes discussing whether they should issue live ammunition to the 17 troops. They could not reach a decision and the arrival of the German troops interrupted their discussion. Elvegårdsmoen was captured without a shot being fired. General Hovland writes that the depot commander surrendered the place after a telephone conference with Colonel Sundlo. This telephone call, which must have been made in the 15 minutes between the time Elvegårdsmoen learned about the approach of German troops and their arrival, a period when Sundlo was apparently away from his headquarters, is not mentioned in the official histories. In the end, it does not matter since there was little 17 soldiers could do against two battalions of elite troops.
Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 Page 21
