The first contact with the enemy was made at 0630 hours on April 12. The fighting lasted most of the day. The Norwegians were forced to destroy the tourist station and make a hasty withdrawal to Lapphaugen when a double German envelopment threatened to cut their line of retreat. The southern German envelopment was within 400 meters of cutting the Norwegian route of withdrawal but they managed to slip through since visibility was severely reduced by a heavy snowfall.
The fighting around Gratangen Tourist Station was a minor engagement with light casualties. The Norwegians had no losses while the Germans had two killed and three wounded. However, this small engagement had a substantial impact on future operations. It gave the Norwegians another 24 hours to organize and prepare. The Germans noted the stiffening resistance and realized that any attempt to push past Oalgge Pass with the limited forces at their disposal would be very hazardous as their flanks became increasingly exposed.
Forseth’s company reached Lapphaugen about 2100 hours on April 12 where it linked up with a platoon from Co 5 and a mountain howitzer from Battery 8. Captain Forseth received a report from brigade at 0430 hours on April 13 that a large German force was advancing on Fossbakken from Vassdal. Forseth considered it possible that this was the same force reported at 0100 by a security patrol but he was unable to confirm this by reconnaissance since it was dark and near blizzard conditions. There were no Norwegian forces at the important road junction at Fossbakken and Captain Forseth decided to withdraw from Lapphaugen and occupy the road junction before the Germans captured it.
Lapphaugen and the mountain pass immediately to the west (Oalgge) are located along the most elevated part of the road leading north from Gratangen—Route 50. Faulty intelligence caused Forseth’s company to abandon this excellent defensive position, an important objective in the German plans. Forseth’s men had operated continually for 72 hours in severe weather and it was beginning to tell. The exhausted troops were beginning to hallucinate, heavy fire was opened several times during the night at imaginary targets, and one soldier was killed by friendly fire. The company was finally relieved by the 2/15th Inf on April 14 but remained attached to that battalion until April 30.
By April 14 the Germans had not managed to secure the railroad to the Swedish border. The capture of Narvik would lose its value unless this was achieved. The German northern thrust had reached a point about 30 kilometers north of Bjerkvik against stiffening Norwegian resistance. They were still 30 and 57 kilometers respectively from their objectives at Setermoen and Bardufoss.
The Second Naval Battle
The Admiralty, operating on the assumption that there could be one or possibly two German cruisers and five to six destroyers in Narvik, decided on April 12 to launch a far heavier attack on those forces. Forbes’ main force was concentrated south of the Lofoten Islands, knowing that the German battleships had returned safely to Germany. The Admiralty ordered Forbes “to clean up enemy naval forces and batteries in Narvik by using a battleship heavily escorted by destroyers, with synchronized dive-bombing attacks from Furious.”6 No mention was made about landing forces to capture the city.
The detailed order issued by Admiral Forbes also makes no mention of a landing in Narvik although Forbes knew that the recapture of that city was a high British priority. It was to be purely a naval operation, a continuation of the action begun on April 10. The decision to send in a battleship may not have been taken so lightly had the British known that five German submarines were present in the area. Some writers point out that it would have made more sense to delay the operation until a suitable landing force could take advantage of the naval bombardment to capture the town. The same critics maintain that it made little sense to risk a battleship in these restricted waters solely to eliminate the German destroyers since they could be bottled up until a landing force was available.
However, the problems associated with carrying out immediate landing operations were more difficult to overcome than the critics would lead us to believe. First, the troops headed for Harstad were not ready to make a landing on a hostile shore and it would take weeks before they were operational. Second, the inter-service coordination and cooperation was entirely lacking and the service component commanders were responding to uncoordinated orders and directives. Admiral Cork and General Mackesy were still operating independently.
In the meantime, the British launched air attacks against Narvik. Nine British aircraft from the carrier Furious conducted a bombing raid on Narvik between 1800 and 1900 hours on April 12. They launched from the carrier in bad weather while the ship was 150 miles from Narvik. The British were apparently impressed with the German dive-bombing of their fleet in the North Sea and decided to try this method after the failure of torpedo attacks in Trondheim. The slow double-decker Swordfish aircraft were unsuitable and their crews untrained for this type attack. Despite releasing some bombs from an altitude of only 400 feet, the German destroyers were not hit. The captured Norwegian patrol vessel Senja was sunk and another captured Norwegian patrol boat, Michael Sars, was damaged and sank the following day. The British pilots reported intense and accurate antiaircraft fire and two aircraft were lost in the attack. A third aircraft was lost in the night landing on the aircraft carrier.
A second wave of nine British aircraft from the Furious ran into a snowstorm and forced to return to the carrier. The attack did slow the repairs on Erich Koellner and prevented it from taking up its floating battery position that day. U64 arrived in Narvik in the evening of April 12 and reported hectic British naval activity in the Vestfjord.
German naval intelligence again proved to be excellent, but it was not much help to the trapped German destroyers. By listening to British radio signals, the Germans concluded that the British would attack in the afternoon of April 13. Two messages from Naval Command West to Commander Bey at 0044 hours and 0900 hours on April 13 gave a rather accurate order of battle for the British forces assembling off Narvik.7 The 0044 message read, “German aircraft report the following warships in the Vestfjord near Tranøy on the afternoon of April 12. One large ship with two smokestacks, a smaller ship with one smokestack, four torpedo boats and three destroyers further out.” The 0900 hours message related that an enemy attack on Narvik was expected in the afternoon of April 13. It reported that the battleships Warspite and Repulse, nine destroyers and one aircraft carrier would take part in the attack.
The report from Naval Command West was wrong in only one detail. Repulse did not take part in the attack. Admiral Forbes’ heavy units south of Lofoten consisted at this time of the battleships Rodney and Warspite, the aircraft carrier Furious, and the battle cruisers Repulse and Renown. He had detached a part of the Home Fleet to provide security for the troop transports on their way to Harstad.
There was no longer any doubt in Commander Bey’s mind that a major attack was imminent and he issued the following orders, but apparently failed to insure that they were carried out in a timely manner:
1. All seaworthy destroyers are to be disposed in such a manner that they can surround the lighter British naval forces as was done on April 10.
2. The destroyers that are not seaworthy are to be at battle stations by 1200 hours.
3. Erich Koellner is to proceed immediately to Tårstad (east of Ramnes) and placed in position as a floating battery.
Admiral Forbes ordered Whitworth to carry out the Admiralty orders in the afternoon of April 13 with a force consisting of the battleship Warspite and nine destroyers. Whitworth transferred his flag to Warspite and assembled his force in Vestfjord that morning. The weather was squally but the visibility was good.
The April 13 operation made no attempt at surprise and relied instead on massive force. The passage through Vestfjord took place in full daylight, within easy observation from shore. The aircraft from the carrier were ordered to bomb the coastal fortifications that the British still believed existed in Ofotfjord as well as targets in Narvik harbor.
A reconnaissance aircraft launched from
Warspite managed to provide exceptionally good service for the approaching fleet. It not only reported two German destroyers behind a small island near Hamnes but managed to dive-bomb and sink U64 at the mouth of Herjangsfjord with a 100-lb bomb. This was the first sinking of a German submarine by aircraft during World War II. Eight German sailors died in the attack.
The British fleet narrowly escaped what could have been a disaster at the entrance to Ofotfjord. U46, commanded by Lieutenant Herbert Sohler, spotted the British armada as it entered its patrol sector east of Barøy. Sohler had promised Bey on April 11 that the submarines would provide better service to the destroyers in the future and he now had an opportunity to make good on his promise. Sohler managed to slip in behind the British destroyer screen and was in a perfect position to launch torpedoes against Warspite. The range was approximately 700 meters as the giant 32,000-ton battleship appeared in Sohler’s periscope. Warspite had a deep draft and the problem with the depth-seeking mechanism on the German torpedoes was therefore not as crucial as in the case of attacks on destroyers. U46 was ready to launch its deadly salvo of torpedoes when the submarine collided with an underwater ridge. The impact interrupted the firing and forced the submarine to surface. It managed to dive before being spotted. It was not until after the war that the British learned how close they came to possibly losing a battleship.
The German destroyer Erich Koellner, which was capable of a speed of only seven knots and carrying only enough personnel to operate the ship as a floating gun platform, was escorted by Hermann Künne in Ofotfjord on its way to Tårstad when it spotted a British aircraft to its west. The destroyers were still three miles short of their goal. A short time thereafter, Hermann Künne spotted nine British destroyers near Barøy and reported to Commander Bey that the British were entering the fjord.
The German destroyer turned around immediately and headed for Narvik. The British opened fire but the shells fell considerably short of their target. The 1913-vintage Warspite also opened fire with its 15-inch guns, but the slow firing guns were ineffective against a fast moving destroyer steering a zigzag course.
Commander Alfred Schulze-Hinrichs, Erich Koellner’s skipper, realized immediately that it was too late to reach his designated location and decided to take his ship to Djupvik, on the southern shore of the fjord. He picked an excellent flanking position that was hidden in view from the fjord. Schulze-Hinrichs’ intention was to open a surprise barrage against the British destroyers with guns and torpedoes as they passed his position.
Erich Koellner opened fire at a range of only 1,500 meters as the first British destroyer came into view. The British were not surprised since they had been warned about the ambush by Warspite’s reconnaissance aircraft. The German destroyer also fired torpedoes against the British ships but those failed to hit their targets or malfunctioned. Bedouin, Punjabi, and Eskimo had their guns and torpedoes trained to starboard as they rounded the Djupvik Peninsula and concentrated their fire on the lone German ship. Many hits were registered but the Germans continued to fire and it was not until Warspite fired several 15-inch salvos that the enemy was silenced. Erich Koellner sank at 1215 hours after a number of devastating hits. Thirty-one crewmembers were killed and 35 wounded. Norwegian forces captured the survivors.
Hermann Künne had meanwhile continued towards Narvik on a zigzag course at 24 knots. She laid smoke in an effort to shield those German destroyers exiting Narvik harbor to meet the British but the fresh wind quickly removed the smoke. Kohte, seeing the size of the approaching enemy force, must have realized there was little he or his friends could do to save the situation. The German destroyers had not taken their designated defensive positions in the side fjords, despite intelligence warnings of an imminent attack. Bey’s orders came too late or were not executed swiftly.
Commander Bey exited Narvik on a westerly course at 1215 hours to meet the British. His force consisted of Hans Lüdemann, Wolfgang Zenker, and Bernd von Arnim. Hermann Künne also reversed course to join its friends in their futile attempt to halt the British advance. Georg Thiele and Erich Giese remained in Narvik since they were not ready to get underway.
Knowing that the attacking force included a battleship, Commander Bey would have been wise not to meet the British in the relatively open waters of Ofotfjord where Warspite’s massive guns could be used. A withdrawal into one or more of the narrow side fjords where Warspite could not follow would have reduced the odds and made German fire, especially the torpedoes, more effective since the enemy’s maneuver room would be restricted.
The British force was within range when the three German destroyers came abreast of Ballangen Bay and Hans Lüdemann opened fire at a distance of 17,000 meters against the British destroyers that were preceding Warspite by three miles. The long-range gun battle that followed was generally ineffective on both sides. Commander Rechel tried to carry out a torpedo attack against Warspite but was driven back by overwhelming firepower.
The engagement in Ofotfjord lasted approximately one hour, and five of the German destroyers—Hermann Künne, Hans Lüdemann, Wolfgang Zenker, Bernd von Arnim, and Georg Thiele—eventually participated. The results of this relatively long engagement were surprisingly minor. The British fire did not hit the German destroyers. The aircraft from Furious were even less effective. They dropped more than 100 bombs but these fell in the sea without doing any damage to the German ships. Two British aircraft were shot down.
The German destroyers were slowly forced further into the fjord and soon found themselves near the junction of Herjangsfjord and Rombakfjord. By 1315 hours, they had exhausted almost all their ammunition. Their main objective became one of saving the lives of the crews and preventing their ships from falling into British hands. Bey ordered the destroyers to withdraw into Rombakfjord. Four destroyers withdrew as ordered under a smokescreen. Hermann Künne failed to receive Bey’s order and withdrew under pressure into Herjangsfjord. According to Assmann, the Germans scuttled the destroyer after it had fired its last rounds.
Erich Giese exited Narvik harbor at the same time as the other destroyers were withdrawing into Rombakfjord. She met the concentrated fire of six British destroyers and was attacked aggressively by Bedouin and Punjabi. The intense bombardment resulted in 22 heavy caliber hits, which caused uncontrollable fires aboard the German ship, and she began to sink. Lieutenant Commander Karl Smidt, Erich Giese’s captain, ordered the ship abandoned at 1430 hours. The destroyer sank quickly in deep water, taking 85 of its crew with it. There were many wounded and nine were captured. Before she sank, Erich Giese managed to score a torpedo hit on Punjabi, forcing that warship to withdraw from the battle.
Diether von Roeder had engine problems and remained tied up to a pier in Narvik. Warspite and a group of British destroyers approached the harbor while Erich Giese was sinking and were fired on by Diether von Roeder. The British destroyers Cossack, Foxhound, and Kimberley entered the harbor and opened fire on the immobile German destroyer at distances that varied from 2,000 to 8,000 meters. Shells from the three destroyers and Warspite struck the German ship repeatedly. Diether von Roeder continued to fight despite the many hits and managed to place seven shells into Cossack, forcing that ship to beach. It was only after her crew had exhausted all ammunition that Diether von Roeder was scuttled with demolition mines. Foxhound, who was coming alongside for boarding, narrowly escaped the explosion.
Two of the four German destroyers retiring into Rombakfjord, Wolfgang Zenker and Bernd von Arnim, had exhausted their ammunition and continued southeastward to the end of the fjord, called Rombaksbotn. There the ships were scuttled. Georg Thiele and Hans Lüdemann still had some ammunition and torpedoes left and took up good positions immediately east of a narrow strait, to use their last ammunition to inflict a final blow against the British as they tried to enter through the narrow strait. This delay also allowed their comrades in Wolfgang Zenker and Bernd von Arnim to make their escape up the cliff-like side of the inner part of the fjord. Warspite did not foll
ow the German destroyers into Rombakfjord.
Eskimo, Forester, Hero, Icarus, and Bedouin followed the German ships, with Eskimo in the lead. Warspite’s reconnaissance aircraft informed the attacking British destroyers that Hans Lüdemann and Georg Thiele were waiting for them just inside the narrow strait. Hans Lüdemann’s bow faced east and it was in position for a rapid departure in case the ambush failed. The fire control system on both German destroyers was damaged and the guns were operated under local control. After firing its last shells against the approaching British warships, Hans Lüdemann followed Wolfgang Zenker and Bernd von Arnim. Friedrichs fired his last torpedoes at the British destroyers as he headed eastward. Hans Lüdemann was abandoned and scuttled when it reached the end of the fjord.
Lt. Commander Wolf, so instrumental in the destruction of Hardy and Hunter on April 10, again played a key role in the last minutes of this battle. Georg Thiele remained behind to confront the five British destroyers by herself when Hans Lüdemann retired. This gave the other destroyers time to scuttle their ships and the crewmembers time to escape capture. Eskimo, under Commander Micklethwait, was the first British destroyer to make the daring dash through the narrow strait, followed closely by the Forester, under Lt. Commander Tancock.
Georg Thiele took repeated hits and she had almost exhausted her ammunition. However, she continued to fight as the British were closing. Micklethwait tried to position his ship for a torpedo attack on its stubborn foe, but had to take a sudden evasive maneuver to avoid one of the torpedoes fired by the departing Hans Lüdemann. The maneuver resulted in Eskimo presenting its broadside to Georg Thiele at a very short range. Wolf seized the chance and fired his last torpedo. The torpedo hit the forward part of the British destroyer and the explosion tore off Eskimo’s forecastle, killing 15 sailors. Micklethwait reversed engines and managed to retire through the narrow strait where the destroyer was grounded in rather deep water because the sunken wreckage of its forecastle was still attached. The path of the destroyers following Eskimo was temporarily blocked.
Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 Page 35
