2. Commanders had contradictory and uncoordinated orders–one written and one verbal.
3. Mackesy reported to the War Office while Cork dealt with Churchill via private code.
4. The two commanders sailed independently and never met until April 15.
5. The ships were loaded for an administrative landing–not tactically loaded.
6. Some equipment was on ships re-directed to Namsos at the last moment, and most of the equipment for the troops sent to Namsos arrived in Harstad.
7. The troops were not equipped or trained for operating in mountainous terrain under Arctic winter conditions. For example, they had no skis or snow shoes. However, since they did not know how to use them, it made little difference.
8. The troops had no transport, no artillery, very little mortar ammunition, no antiaircraft guns, and no landing craft.
Not only were the two component commanders independent of each other at the outset, but there was a vast difference in rank, age, and personalities. Mackesy was a relatively young Major General, an engineer with limited experience in field command, while Admiral Cork was the most senior naval officer on active duty. He was appointed commander of Allied operations in North Norway on April 20.
This was an unfortunate choice. Cork was undoubtedly a courageous officer with unusual connections and influence among Allied political leaders. However, he represented the generation that fought the Battle of Jutland and had not kept up with the advances in technology, particularly airpower, which had transformed naval warfare. He also lacked understanding of land operations, particularly in the arctic wilderness, did not have the right temperament to lead combined operations, and displayed indifference for Norwegian military and civilian authorities. Even British naval officers recognized that the Narvik expedition was predominantly an army affair and that the commander should have been an army officer.4
Ziemke and others who believe that the chances of a successful attack immediately after April 13 were good have not given sufficient weight to the condition of the three British battalions. The British units—as noted earlier—were not loaded tactically and they needed a period in a relatively secure area to organize and receive their equipment. The fault for this does not rest with General Mackesy but with the unrealistic planning involved in R4, the mass confusion caused when the Admiralty ordered disembarkation on the 8th, and with Churchill and the military services. They were so eager to do something after their humiliation on April 9 that they embarked on enterprises without any thoughts to either strategy or preparations.
The fact is that the Guards were neither trained nor equipped for Arctic warfare. The conditions are summed up in General Mackesy’s official report.
Although nobody without personal experience of Arctic winter conditions can possibly picture the climatic difficulties we experienced in the early days, a word or two of description may not be out of place. The country was covered by snow up to 4 feet or more in depth. Even at sea level, there were several feet of snow. Blizzards, heavy snowstorms, bitter winds and very low night temperatures were normal. Indeed until the middle of May even those magnificent mountain soldiers, the French Chasseurs Alpines, suffered severely from frostbite and snow blindness. Troops who were not equipped with and skilled in the use of skis or snowshoes were absolutely incapable of operating tactically at all. I had no such troops at my disposal when I first landed.5
Unless landed from destroyers or Norwegian fishing/coastal vessels directly in the harbor, British units would have to land under fire and advance against German positions through snow up to six feet deep. The two companies of Scots Guards landed behind the Norwegian lines in Sjøvegan were incapable of taking part in an offensive operation ten days after they arrived and the Norwegians gave them a symbolic defensive role.
Dietl’s forces in Narvik at this time were controlled by Major Arthur Haussels, the commander of the 2/139th Regiment. A reinforced company, not part of the 2nd Battalion, provided railroad security and it would soon be used against the Norwegians in the Bjørnefjell area. Haussels also had at his disposal the crews of the destroyers Anton Schmitt and Wilhelm Heidkamp, organized into a battalion commanded by Lieutenant Commander Erdmenger. The quality of naval personnel as infantry is questionable, but the combined German force operating from previously prepared Norwegian trenches and pillboxes presented a tough obstacle for a British landing force.
German sources give no indication that their troops were in a state of panic. The 3rd Division’s journal, which does not hide the fact that panic set in among the naval infantry during the landing at Bjerkvik about one month later, fails to mention any problems on April 13. The German losses were minor and not a single soldier was killed. Furthermore, Dietl did not consider it necessary to bring in additional forces from the two battalions in Group Windisch to shore up the defenses in Narvik. On the contrary, the following morning (April 14) he sent a reinforced company to clear out the Norwegians holding the railroad between Nordal Bridge and the Swedish border. This indicates that Dietl was not worried about the morale of his troops or their reliability.
Initial British/Norwegian Meeting
The British had still not contacted the Norwegian Army at the command level five days after the Germans captured Narvik. This is extraordinary in view of their knowledge that General Fleischer was in charge of both military and civilian functions in a 1,000 kilometer stretch of the country. Both Mackesy and Cork were apparently busy trying to bring some semblance of order to their activities in and around Harstad. Fleischer and his staff were in total darkness with respect to Allied plans. This changed somewhat on April 14 when he was asked to meet a British representative, Admiral John Cunningham. The meeting took place aboard the cruiser Devonshire in Tromsø. Cunningham, who operated directly under Admiral Forbes, had no authority over Allied operations in the Narvik area. His mission was to patrol the coast between Tromsø and Kirkenes. Cunningham was therefore primarily interested in discussing practical naval issues as they pertained to his own mission. He was unable to clarify for the Norwegians what the Allies were up to or to enlighten Fleischer about planned operations. The Norwegians came to the meeting with rather high expectations and Fleischer was both disappointed and annoyed at being called to a meeting with a British flag officer with no coordinating authority for future operations.
When Fleischer returned to his headquarters in the evening of April 14, his chief of staff, Major Lindbäck-Larsen, briefed him. The major told him about the British landing in Sjøvegan and that he had met Mackesy’s chief of staff, Colonel Dowler. Dowler and Lindbäck-Larsen had agreed that the major should come to Harstad on April 15 to meet the commander of British land forces in North Norway. Fleischer chose not to attend this meeting, in all likelihood because his honor was slighted by the meeting with Cunningham. Both sides would have benefited from the meeting, despite the fact that there was only a slim chance that Cork and Fleischer would get along. As it was, relations between the British and Norwegian militaries got off to a bad start.
Cork and Mackesy were now involved in a hot debate among themselves and with the Admiralty about whether or not to undertake an immediate attack on Narvik. Norwegian officers had seen the two companies of Scots Guards in Sjøvegan. While they were duly impressed with the professional bearings of these troops, they realized quickly that they were not experienced, trained, or equipped for arctic warfare. Fleischer had detailed knowledge of the terrain and climate and a better appreciation for enemy strengths and capabilities. While the same is true for his chief of staff, a personal briefing by Fleischer would have had a much more favorable impact on the reserved and tradition-bound British flag officers. It would have given them better arguments in their debate with the Admiralty about the wisdom of an immediate direct attack on Narvik.
Lindbäck-Larsen met a rather demoralized Mackesy in Harstad. Mackesy was obviously overwhelmed by the disorganized state of his own forces, the weather, terrain, the inconsistency in his orders, and doubts
about what Admiral Cork and the Admiralty were urging on him. Lindbäck-Larsen concluded quickly that it would be difficult to arrange any agreements for operational cooperation with Mackesy under the conditions in which he and his forces found themselves. He gave the general an orientation on the situation and outlined Fleischer’s plans for offensive operations. The orientation included a detailed description of the Narvik defenses now in German hands. He pointed out to Mackesy that even though the road conditions in the area were poor, they would become much worse in a few weeks because of the spring thaw. Operations that depended on road travel would be even more impeded by the thaw conditions.
General Mackesy gave some vague hints that he planned an advance on Narvik along both sides of Ofotfjord. The Norwegian major pointed out, tactfully, that the wild and roadless terrain, intersected by deep fjords and inlets, presented great obstacles to such an advance and suggested, in line with instructions from Fleischer, that an advance in close cooperation with the 6th Division held out greater promise of success. If, on the other hand, the British wanted to stick to their plan for an advance on Narvik from the west, a direct approach was better since amphibious landings would be required in any case. Lindbäck-Larsen’s overall impression was that the British did not have any clear objectives and were not operationally ready. In the end, the only positive result of the meeting was the exchange of liaison officers.
General Mackesy sent a message to the War Office on April 16 that included a description of the Norwegian military situation and the defensive installations in Narvik. Lindbäck-Larsen’s briefing undoubtedly influenced Admiral Cork to join in reporting to the War Office later in the day that a landing at Narvik was not feasible at this time.
The British Again Consider Landing in Narvik
Churchill and the Admiralty found it difficult to accept Cork’s message on April 16 that ruled out an immediate attack on Narvik. A message from the Admiralty in the afternoon of April 17 pleaded with both Cork and Mackesy to reconsider. The message explained that Warspite would only be available for the next two or three days and that the French alpine troops, planned as reinforcements for Mackesy, should not be expected for some time since they were held in Scapa Flow as reinforcements for Namsos. Cork, who probably did not want to disappoint Churchill, held a conference with Mackesy on April 18. Derry writes that he urged the general to take a “gamble on the chance” that the enemy’s morale would break under an overwhelming bombardment from a battleship, two cruisers, and eight destroyers. Mackesy agreed reluctantly to have a force ready for landing if the situation after the bombardment made the success of such an operation possible in his estimation.
Mackesy made a reconnaissance of the Narvik area in the cruiser Aurora on April 20 and his opinion had changed radically when he returned. He informed Cork that he was convinced that the operation could not succeed and that it would lead to the destruction of the 24th Brigade. He maintained that a bombardment of Narvik would only be successful if it led to a German surrender of the city before British troops landed. To achieve such a lofty goal it was necessary to bombard the city itself. This, in his view, would destroy future Norwegian cooperation and was a direct violation of the British Government’s instruction governing bombardment of shore targets. This directive could only be changed by a governmental order. The Admiral and General agreed to restrict the bombardment targets.
The final plan was based on the hope that the Germans would surrender the city after a powerful bombardment by British warships. Troops were not to be landed as long as German opposition could be expected, but only when the Germans hoisted the white flag. The bombardment was scheduled for April 24 and the radio station in Tromsø directed the civilian population in Narvik to evacuate the city.
Low cloud cover, a snowstorm, and poor visibility characterized the weather in Ofotfjord on April 24. These conditions precluded the participation of aircraft from the Furious but they also prevented the Luftwaffe from attacking the warships. The bombarding force consisted of the battleship Warspite, the cruisers Effingham, Aurora, and Enterprise, and the destroyer Zulu. The 1st Battalion, Irish Guards embarked on the old cruiser Vindictive, prepared to land in Narvik if the Germans surrendered the city.
The British warships bombarded targets in the Narvik area for about three hours but the results were disappointing. One pier in Narvik was heavily damaged and a ship tied up to that pier sank. Some railroad rolling stock was also damaged. Enemy defensive positions were not observed and the British concluded that they had not been neutralized. The Germans displayed no signs of broken morale or that they intended to surrender the city. In fact, they suffered no fatalities from the bombardment. In a report dated July 17, 1940, Admiral Cork states that the weather conditions on April 24 precluded any assessment of the bombardment’s effectiveness and this led to the decision not to land.
The 1st Battalion, Irish Guards, was put ashore in Bogen in the afternoon of April 24. Most British warships returned to Scapa Flow. Only ten destroyers remained in North Norway to support operations. By April 25, 11 days after the first British troops landed, they had not fired a shot in anger. In fact, they had not even seen a German soldier.
The First Crisis in the German High Command
The critical situation in Norway, particularly in Trondheim and Narvik, brought on a crisis in the German high command. German troops in those two cities were isolated because Operation Weserübung had failed to achieve a Norwegian surrender that would have given the Germans control of the interior lines of communications. Hitler was well aware that the responsibility for a defeat in Norway would fall on him personally since the political decision, the military planning, and the execution were carried out by the OKW under his direct supervision. The German Army had deliberately refrained from involving itself in the planning for and conduct of this operation. Its participation was limited to providing officers for the planning staffs and meeting the requirements for troops, supplies, and equipment that emanated from the OKW. A defeat in Norway could deal a fatal blow to Hitler’s prestige and could provide the army with the moral courage to depose him.
Hitler became agitated before he learned the fate of the destroyers in Narvik. By the evening of April 12, it became clear that the forces in Narvik were isolated and that the hoped-for link to the Swedish border and the capture of an airfield had not been achieved. It also appeared that similar situations were developing in Trondheim and Bergen and von Falkenhorst’s full-scale breakout from the Oslo bridgehead had not started.
It was decided at a strategy conference on April 13 not to force the issue in Norway by pouring in more troops in case of further deterioration. Instead, the Halder Diary notes that a decision was made to examine the possibility of launching the attack in the west within a week or two, in order to reduce Allied pressure in Norway. This, however, was a very problematic solution because of inclement weather forecasts and since units could not move into attack positions on short notice without alerting Allied intelligence.
The diaries of the participants depict Hitler in a state of near panic when word of the naval catastrophe in Narvik arrived in the afternoon of April 13. In what is described as “a state of frightful agitation,” Hitler proposed that Dietl be ordered to give up Narvik and withdraw southward. General Jodl tried desperately to persuade Hitler on April 14 not to give up on Narvik and not to order Dietl to break out to the south. The diary notes that he told Hitler, “…one should give something up as lost only when it is lost.”
General Keitel told Brauchitsch the following day that Narvik would be evacuated. The OKH was not about to be drawn into what they probably viewed as a trap by Hitler and the OKW. If they ordered, or acquiesced in an order, to give up Narvik, they suspected that the responsibility for this debacle would be shifted to their shoulders. Brauchitsch decided that they should not agree to an evacuation and he ordered Halder to talk to Jodl. Jodl answered that Narvik could not be held, that the troops were to withdraw to the surrounding mountains, but t
hat the question of the complete evacuation of the area was not yet decided. The OKW sent a message to Dietl discussing the possibility of evacuating Narvik and withdrawing into strong points in the mountains near the Swedish border.
The problem came to a boil again on April 17, despite the news that Dietl’s forces had reached the Swedish border. Hitler now insisted that Dietl’s forces evacuate by air or withdraw into Sweden. Jodl insisted that the mountains south of Narvik barred any possibility of retreat in that direction. He even brought along a professor from Innsbruck who vouched for the facts that the mountains between Narvik and Bodø were impenetrable even for mountain troops. With respect to air evacuation, Jodl pointed out that there were not enough long-range aircraft. Some German forces had to remain behind and the losses in aircraft would be heavy. He warned that any evacuation would have a shattering effect on German troop morale.
Despite Jodl’s efforts, a document showed up in OKW that afternoon giving Dietl discretionary authority to evacuate Narvik, cross into Sweden, and be interned. A gutsy young staff officer, Lieutenant Colonel Bernhard von Lossberg, delayed the dispatch of the document while Jodl reasoned with Hitler.6
OKH was concerned about how a withdrawal would affect the army but Brauchitsch avoided a direct intervention. The German situation in Narvik was not as dire as viewed from Berlin and General Dietl remained generally optimistic. He had been promoted to Lieutenant General and Brauchitsch used the opportunity to send a congratulatory message to Dietl that he hoped would counteract any idea of evacuation. The message read, “Congratulations on your promotion. I am certain that you will defend Narvik, even against superior enemies.”7
Jodl meanwhile argued his case strenuously. He finally convinced Hitler to issue a revised directive. The new document directed Dietl to hold Narvik as long as possible before withdrawing into the mountains along the Swedish border after extensive destruction of facilities in Narvik and the railroad between Narvik and Sweden. The written instructions were signed by Hitler on April 18 and sent by an air courier, Captain Schenk von Sternberg. They did not reach Dietl until April 22.
Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 Page 37
