Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940

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Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 Page 39

by Henrik O. Lunde


  Mobilization and Deployments

  The forces called for in General Fleischer’s plan were not yet available. The units envisioned for the drive through Fjordbotneidet against the German left flank, the 1/12th Infantry and the Alta Bn, were still in Finnmark, more than 300 miles from where they were needed. The distance itself fails to tell the whole story. Road communications were virtually non-existant at this time of the year, and the troops had to be transported to their new operational area by sea. Most Norwegian naval forces in Fleischer’s area of responsibility were destroyed or captured and this presented a problem. The 1/12th Inf, commanded by Major Nils Bøckman, was transported from Kirkenes to Sjøvegan in two echelons, arriving there on April 17 and 20. British warships escorted the transports. The Alta Bn, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Arne D. Dahl and consisting of 830 officers and men and 112 horses, was transported in two coastal passenger ships and one cargo ship, without naval escorts, and disembarked in Sjøvegan on April 21. The battalion arrived in the Tennevoll area in Levangen in the evening of April 23. The 2/15th Inf was located in the Fossbakken area. The 3rd Mountain Artillery Bn was also ordered to that area. The road through Salangsdal was impassable and it was not until April 22 that the 9th Battery (motorized) of the battalion reached its destination. The plan called for half of Battery 8 to support the advance of the 1/12th Inf while the other half was located in Fossbakken along with Batteries 7 and 9.

  Except for the 15th Regiment and some smaller units that had their depot at Elvegårdsmoen fall into enemy hands on the first day of the German attack, the mobilization in North Norway proceeded in an orderly manner. The 1/15th Inf had problems mobilizing. Most of the weapons, equipment, and supplies required had to come from reserve depots located some distance from the new place of mobilization near Setermoen. Mobilization day was April 18 but due to equipment and personnel problems, the battalion was not fully mobilized until May 20. Major Omdal assumed command on April 24 and the partially mobilized battalion moved to Bardufoss Airfield for security on May 5. One ski platoon acted as security for the British and Polish troops in Bogen. The Reserve Battalion, 15th Inf had the same problems as the 1/15th since Elvegårdsmoen was also its mobilization depot. Attempts were made to mobilize, with a planned completion date of June 10.

  The 1/16th Inf (less one company), commanded by Major Nils Hunstad, departed its mobilization depot at Setermoen on April 15 for the Lund-Bones area in Salangsdal. Nevertheless, the unit was not fully mobilized until April 21, when it numbered 720 officers and men. Co 3 was ordered to Fossbakken where it was attached to the 2/15th Inf. It reverted to the control of its parent battalion in the morning of April 22. The 1/16th Infantry’s missions were to secure the valley between Lund and Bones and prepare to take part in the upcoming offensive by moving against the German right flank through Gressdal and Raudal.

  The 2/16th Inf completed mobilization on April 20 when it had 802 officers and men present for duty. This battalion had not participated in the neutrality watch and it was therefore necessary to give it some training before it was committed. The Reserve Battalion of the 16th Inf assembled at Setermoen on April 18 and it remained there until April 30.

  Lieutenant Colonel Nummedal was acting commander of the 14th Infantry Regiment in the area south of Narvik. The commander of this regiment, Colonel Løken, was detached to command the 6th Field Brigade and the executive officer, Major Halfdan Sundlo, commanded the 1/14th Inf on neutrality duty in East Finnmark. This battalion returned to Mosjøen after the middle of March and was demobilized. The battalion was remobilized and ready on April 13. Fleischer, as already noted, attached this battalion to Colonel Getz’ forces in Trøndelag. The Reserve Battalion of the 14th Inf completed its mobilization on April 21. Many of its personnel participated in the Lofoten fisheries and their absence slowed the mobilization effort. The battalion, with units both south and north of Mosjøen, needed training. Nummedal was left as the local commander with orders to prepare for a possible German northward drive if the defenses in Trøndelag failed.

  The Hålogaland Air Group was ordered to concentrate its aircraft at Bardufoss Airfield. One Fokker aircraft, with the group commander aboard, was captured at Bjørnefjell on April 16 and two Fokker aircraft were wrecked on April 20 and 25. Except for the 22-lb type, the availability of bombs was very limited as was ammunition for aircraft and antiaircraft machineguns. An airfield in Salagen was later expanded to support combat operations.

  The 6th Brigade was partially reorganized to make it more suitable for mobile operations. Some organizations were modified for operations in the roadless wilderness on both sides of Route 50. Parts of the heavier supply organizations were transferred to District Command where they served a useful purpose as additional combat groups were organized.

  Except for what was in the depots, weapons and ammunition were not available in North Norway. Ammunition for the mountain howitzers was in particular short supply; the whole inventory was limited to about 6,500 rounds. The 75mm ammunition was more plentiful. Ammunition for machineguns and individual weapons became a serious problem as the campaign progressed.

  Modifications to the Offensive Plans

  The final directive for the offensive was issued on April 17. Fleischer worried about the effects of the spring thaw and wanted to start the operations as quickly as possible. The 1/12th Inf was in position in Levangen on April 20 and the Alta Bn arrived shortly thereafter. From Levangen, these two units were in position for an advance through Fjordbotneidet. The 2/15th Inf was located in the Fossbakken area, prepared to attack Lapphaugen. The 1/16th Inf (minus one company) was in Salangsdal between Lund and Bones, ready to begin the envelopment through the mountains southeast of Route 50.

  The deteriorating weather compelled the Norwegians to modify their earlier plan. The revised plan increased the weight of the direct drive against Lapphaugen by making it a two-battalion operation, with the 2/15th Inf on the right and most of the 1/16th Inf on the left. These battalions were to drive the Germans from their positions by frontal attack and local envelopments. Having driven the Germans from their positions, the plan called for cutting their retreat by advancing to Hill 509.

  The battalion-size envelopment from the south was scrapped and the forces operating in this area were reduced, first to two and later to one company. The 1/16th Inf, minus one reinforced company, left Bones for Fossbakken at 2300 hours on April 23. The weather was so bad that even local guides did not know where on the road the battalion was located at any one time. Thoroughly exhausted, the battalion reached the woods near Fossbakken early in the morning of April 24. The revised plan made no changes to the right envelopment over Fjordbotneidet, and the Alta Bn remained as the brigade reserve. Another reserve, Co Forseth, was located behind the brigade’s left flank. The two companies from the Scots Guards landed in Sjøvegan on April 14 were placed at General Fleischer’s disposal, but only for defensive operations. More or less as a symbolic gesture, they were positioned behind the Norwegian lines at Fossbakken.

  General Fleischer decided on April 22 to launch the offensive at midnight on April 23, but the launch was delayed. The brigade commander briefed his subordinates on April 22. For security reasons, the order to the companies was delayed as long as possible. This secrecy resulted in little time for the companies to prepare for action. The commander of Co 5, 2/15th Inf received his order at 2330 hours on April 23, and he was not able to brief his platoon leaders until midnight. The battery commanders in the 3rd Mountain Artillery Bn did not receive their orders until 0040 hours on April 24.

  Company 1 from the 1/16th Inf still remained in Raudal and at 1910 hours on April 23, it was ordered to advance cross-country towards Lapphaugen and establish contact with its parent battalion. A blizzard prevented it from making its way through the mountains and at 1230 hours on April 24, it was ordered to remain in its position to provide security in the Raudal/Stordal area. However, that same evening the company was ordered back to Bones and the following morning it was
directed to join its battalion in Fossbakken. It arrived in Fossbakken, totally exhausted, at 1400 hours.

  The Envelopment

  The 1/12th Inf started its move from Levangen in the afternoon of April 23. The troops labored incredibly hard to ascend Fjordbotneidet at night, in a raging snowstorm on the steep roadless incline that rose 1,200 to 1,500 feet from the valley bottom. They carried loads of 60 lbs as they struggled forward in snow that was chest deep at times. The wind blowing in their faces made it difficult to see and a large number suffered from snow blindness. It was particularly difficult to bring the artillery forward. Major Bøckman moved the battalion with two companies forward in order to maximize his firepower if he should encounter the enemy. This meant that numerous tracks had to be made through the snow over a relatively broad area. Local guides noted that the winter storm was one of the worst they had experienced in an area where snowstorms are frequent and severe.

  There was a misinterpretation of orders from the very start within the right envelopment force. The 1/12th Inf had no contact with the Alta Bn after leaving Tennevoll. The brigade order directed the Alta Bn to provide security for the 1/12th’s right flank and rear. Bøckman interpreted this to mean that the two battalions should advance together across Fjordbotneidet. The brigade commander also understood the division’s directive to mean that the force advancing over Fjordbotneidet consisted of the 1/12th Infantry, the Alta Bn, and half of a mountain artillery battery.

  The snowstorm became so bad during the day that Fleischer considered calling off the attack. However, he allowed the operation to proceed since he concluded that it would be more difficult to bring the 1/12th back over the mountains than to allow it to proceed. Fleischer, his chief of staff, and the British liaison officer arrived in Levangen by car in the afternoon of April 23 and Lieutenant Colonel Dahl briefed them. Fleischer planned to spend the night at the 6th Brigade’s CP and left the Alta Bn around 0200 hours on April 24. The weather had turned vicious, the general and his party were snowed in at Levangen, and the house of a merchant in Soløy became the division CP for the rest of the operation. The 1/12th Inf had left a communication relay station in Soløy and this allowed Fleischer to communicate with the Alta Bn, the 1/12th Inf, and the 6th Brigade CP.

  Communications problems plagued the operation from the beginning, as did the lack of maps. The radio communication equipment promised the 1/12th Inf in the operational order failed to materialize and the detachment laying landlines as the unit advanced failed to keep up in the storm. Major Bøckman sent his adjutant to the rear to inform the brigade that the battalion, because of the weather and limited visibility, could not accomplish its mission of preventing traffic on Route 50 from Gratangen to Lapphaugen. Brøckman’s orders called for blocking Route 50 by fire from the hills to the north. He was not permitted to enter the valley. Hovland’s explanation for Fleischer’s decision that the 1/12th should not enter the valley but should cut the German line of retreat and reinforcement by blocking-fire from afar is that he wanted to give the battalion a “careful baptism of fire.”

  Bøckman now requested brigade permission to enter the valley and physically cut Route 50. This request came to Fleischer’s attention and he concluded that it was inappropriate for Colonel Løken to direct the operation over Fjordbotneidet since the brigade no longer had reliable communications with the 1/12th. After a short telephone call to the brigade, Fleischer assumed direct control of the two battalions in the envelopment. The frontal attack on Lapphaugen and the envelopment were two parts of the same operation but now those two parts answered to two commanders.

  It appears that the brigade CP had no great difficulties communicating with the 1/12th Infantry’s communications relay station since Fleischer, who was located near that station, communicated regularly with the brigade by telephone. The difficulty was with communications between that station and the battalion. Therefore, Fleischer’s assumption of control failed to solve the communications problem.

  General Fleischer approved Major Bøckman’s request to cross into the Gratang Valley to the Fjellhøgda Farm and ordered him to send security into the south mountains, including Hill 509, if that was possible. The lead elements of the battalion cut Route 50 around 0600 hours on April 24. This severed the road between the reinforced German company at Lapphaugen and the rest of the battalion in the Gratangen area. The half battery of mountain artillery supporting the 1/12th remained on Fjordbotneidet, in a position where it could fire into the valley.

  No German units were sighted except for a three-man patrol that was captured. Major Bøckman concluded that the German battalion had withdrawn its forward line to the high ground in the pass between Gratangen and Bjerkvik. He planned to send reconnaissance into the mountains south of Route 50 but the soldiers were too exhausted after their overnight advance in the blizzard.

  The troops needed shelter and food and the adjutant skied back to the communications relay to brief the division and ask for permission to go into quarters on the farms near Route 50. This request was approved provided the battalion employed strong local security. According to the adjutant, Major Lindbäck-Larsen told him that the Alta Bn was advancing across Fjordbotneidet to secure the 1/12th Infantry’s flank and rear and that a conclusion of operations at Lapphaugen was expected within a couple of hours. This indicates that the division was aware of the movement of the Alta Bn despite later claims that the battalion had moved without authorization prior to the order to do so that evening.

  The 1/12th took up quarters in the valley between 1700 and 1800 hours, with the rifle companies in the built-up area north of the river and the battalion CP and headquarters’ company in the area between the river and Route 50. The machinegun platoons were attached to the rifle companies. The positions astride Route 50 that the battalion had spent the day preparing were abandoned with the intention of reoccupying them at 0600 hours on April 25. As at Bjørnefjell, no security forces were left in the defensive positions. This was an indefensible breach of elementary rules for military units in proximity of the enemy.

  The unit’s 15-hour march over mountains in a howling blizzard and a further 12 hours preparing defensive positions stretched the soldiers’ physical and mental capabilities to their limits. It would have been wise to rest the troops in shifts as soon as they reached the valley. However, physical exhaustion does not explain why Majors Omdal and Spjældnes allowed a similar thing to happen at Bjørnefjell.

  Because of the storm and limited visibility, the companies were ordered to establish only close-in security and to maintain unit cohesion as they took quarters. It is obvious, based on subsequent events, that the security measures were inadequate. The Germans noted, “The Norwegians did not figure on any German counterattack because of the storm and the deep snow and were so negligent that hardly any sentries secured their nightly rest area.”11

  The Frontal Attack

  Another reason for Fleischer assuming direct command of the enveloping force and for allowing the 1/12th to take quarters in the valley may have been his belief that the attack against Lapphaugen was going well. In fact, it was not launched according to plan and was not going well. The heavy snowstorm was the primary factor for the faltering attack, but the way it was executed and the determination by which it was pursued by the brigade contributed to its failure.

  The 2/15th Inf advanced with two companies forward, but in a rather disorganized fashion due to the blizzard. Company 5 advanced along Route 50 while Co 6 tried to make a curve-like advance to the right of Co 5, allowing it to approach the German positions from the northeast near the eastern point of Lake Lapphaugvannet. Company 5 had to shift to the left in order to give room for Co 6. The battalion reserve, Co 7 with an attached machinegun platoon, followed behind and slightly to the north of Co 6.

  The attack started shortly before 1000 hours on April 24, ten hours later than planned, after Battery 7 fired a 20-minute preparation. The heavy weapons company’s mortars and machineguns fired on the German positions
for five minutes during a momentary clearing in the weather. The advancing Norwegian troops had snow driven by gale force winds in their faces, resulting in near-zero visibility. The German defenders had the wind at their backs, making it much easier to observe to their front. The Norwegians struggled to make headway through heavy snow. Their skis sank into the loose snow up to their knees. The attack came to a halt in the bad weather, and the forward troops dug in and fired at the Germans during the brief moments of visibility.

  It was much the same story with Co 6. Its attack was stopped by German fire and the troops sought concealment by digging into the snow. One soldier was killed. Company 7 attempted a flanking movement, approaching the German positions from the north, but was caught in the open by German machinegun fire and two of its soldiers were killed before the unit withdrew into the wood line. The 2/15th Infantry’s attack came to a halt by noon.

  The Norwegians made the mistake of not maintaining contact with the enemy. They even failed to keep the German positions under observation after the initial attack failed. Consequently, they were unaware that the Germans withdrew from Lapphaugen around 1500 hours.

  Colonel Løken had a significant superiority in numbers with almost two battalions supported by two and a half batteries of artillery and heavy mortars. However, he used his resources in a piecemeal and hesitant manner. The 1/16th, minus one company, was scheduled to advance on the left flank of the 2/15th. That battalion arrived in Fossbakken at 2300 hours the previous night after a tortuous march from Bones. It went into bivouac in the woods a short distance south of Fossbakken. For reasons that are not obvious, the 1/16th did not participate in the initial attack.

 

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