The operational directive issued by the Norwegian 6th Division on May 22 resulted in a complicated and time-consuming regrouping of forces, dictated in part by logistic considerations and in part by the perceived need to give the troops a chance to rest before resuming operations. The directive, parts of which appear to have been written before the extent of the German withdrawal was known, anticipated that the Germans would be able to hold the Kuberg Plateau against attacks from the north for a lengthy period.
The Alta Battalion’s rear depot had been moved to Skoglund, about two and a half kilometers north of Bjerkvik. The farm road from Bjerkvik to Gamberg was improved to support truck traffic. Engineers had constructed a provisional bridge over the Vassdal River and supplies were moved along a track suitable for horse-drawn wagons to Fiskeløsvann, where the battalion’s forward depot was located after the repositioning of forces. The battalion’s own supply personnel brought the supplies from this point to the forward units.
The two battalions of the 16th Inf were supplied over two parallel routes from their rear depots at Lund and Lapphaugen. The 1/16th Inf had its depot at Lund. From there, the supplies were trucked to Bonnes and by wagons from there to the eastern end of Rauvann where a forward depot was established. A track usable for wagons led to the battalion receiving point at the western end of Rauvann. The battalion supply personnel brought the supplies to Bratbakken by horse-drawn wagons and from there to the front; they were carried by soldiers or, in some cases, by packhorses.
The 2/16th Inf was supplied from its rear depot at Lapphaugen. Wagons or sleds brought the supplies from there through Gressdal to the foot of Storebalak where a distribution point was established. From there, everything had to be carried by soldiers up the steep northern slope of Storebalak and on to the southern edge of the plateau. The terrain was too steep for packhorses. It was this supply route that Fleischer wanted changed and which must have been the primary factor for the strange rearrangement of forces that was made without consulting the battalion commander or his quartermaster.3
The 6th District Command had planned for some time to simplify the division’s supply operations by using the main road through Gratangen to Bjerkvik. From there, it was intended to bring the supplies by sea transport to Trældal on the north side of Rombakfjord. An adequate road led from Trældal to Cirkelvann, where battalion distribution points were to be established. However, this plan was based on two assumptions that had not been realized by May 22. First, Narvik was still in German hands and this prevented all boat traffic in Rombakfjord. Second, the French had failed to secure the road from Trældal to Cirkelvann. In the end, the supply route for the two battalions of the 16th Inf remained as before but the route for the 2/16th was extended from the old distribution point at the base of Storebalak through Vassdal via Gamberg to Fiskeløsvann. This westward extension became necessary when the 2/16th was moved off the mountains.
Military operations cannot be carried out successfully unless they can be supported logistically. To that extent, logistic considerations often dictate strategy. However, this was not the case on May 22. While the old supply lines were long and cumbersome in the roadless mountain terrain, the 6th Brigade was successfully supported during its long drive to secure the high plateau and there were no apparent reasons why this could not have continued now that the weather was improving. The middle of an offensive operation was the wrong time to experiment with new supply lines, particularly those that were dependent on circumstances that were outside General Fleischer’s control. The validity of Lindbäck-Larsen’s claim that supply difficulties “made it impossible to bring sufficient forces to bear to pursue the enemy when he withdrew from the Kuberg Plateau” is at least questionable.4
It appears that Fleischer allowed logistic considerations and an overly negative assessment of the abilities of his troops to continue the offensive to dictate operations. The operational directives on May 19 and 22 left the 6th Brigade to make the main attack against Bjørnefjell, but the movement of the main supply line through Vassdal appear to have caused Fleischer to decide that the initial main effort be made against Jernvannene from the Hartvigvann area. It was decided to bring part of the 6th Brigade’s troops off the mountains, leaving one battalion to hold the captured area. The rest of the brigade was withdrawn to the area southeast of Hartvigvann and readied for operations against Jernvannene.
The selection of Jernvannene as the area of main effort had unfortunate results that should have been anticipated by officers as thoroughly familiar with this area as those in the 6th Division. The watershed in this area was at flood-stage because of the thaw and all likely crossing sites were dominated by the bastion-like high ground to the south. The terrain to the east, along the Swedish border, did not present the same obstacles and the main effort was eventually shifted to that area after considerable lost time and effort.
The Norwegian troops had succeeded in driving the enemy from the high plateau and they were eager to continue taking the fight to their opponents. The Norwegians knew that the Germans had suffered considerable losses, that their own were rather low, that the Germans had practically no reserves left, that their opponents’ morale must have suffered as a result of their setbacks, and that they had not had time to prepare new positions. Time was of the essence since the German flow of reinforcements into the Narvik area increased daily and General Feurstein was uncomfortably close in the south. This was the wrong time to rest the troops, redeploy them, or alter supply lines. The troops should have been encouraged to make one last super-human effort to defeat Windisch before he could organize his defense. Both the 6th Brigade Commander and his battalion commanders (Munthe-Kaas and Hunstad) disagreed with the pause in operations and the relocation of the 2nd Battalion, 16th Inf.5 Less than three weeks later, Lieutenant Colonel Berg (later Lieutenant General) made the following statement, which Birger Godtaas includes in his book:
I can never forgive myself for not following my first instinct to continue the advance (in May) without interruption when we first started. I believe we could have cleared the whole Rundfjell area quickly. However, the division insisted that it could be dangerous. If we met with a setback, our lines of communication were too long and difficult. I will never be convinced whether or not I made the right decision when I allowed the units to take a break.
Munthe-Kaas viewed it as a mistake to give up the high ground and recommended that his battalion be given the opportunity to rest in its positions and thereafter move eastward to join the 1/16th Inf in a decisive attack on the German positions near the Swedish border. He recommended the establishment of a forward supply point with four days of provisions and ammunition on Storeblank to support such an operation. Lieutenant Colonel Berg turned down this suggestion. It is not known if Berg discussed this with General Fleischer.
Munthe-Kaas writes that the battalions did not require more than 48-hours rest and that the units were focused eagerly on a continued and rapid advance against the Germans. If the battalion was allowed to rest in its positions, it would have been ready for continued operations on May 24. Instead, the evening of May 24 finds most of the battalion arriving at Fiskeløsvann after a stressful and dangerous march from the Kobberfjell area.
General Fleischer directed a redeployment of forces and an initial shifting of units to prepare for a resumption of the offensive. The 2/16th Inf moved laterally to the far right of the Norwegian sector while the Alta Bn moved forward to rest positions near Cirkelvann.
The 2/16th Inf began its move from the Kobberfjell area to its new assembly area at Fiskeløsvann at 2300 hours on May 23 and completed this redeployment by 2200 hours the following day. Not only is the wisdom of the move open to serious questions, but the battalion was badly split in the process. One reinforced company was left on the plateau to serve as flank security for the 1/16th Inf. The Headquarters Company moved to the south end of Hartvigvann where a depot for provisions and munitions was established. Since the battalion was now located at a lower altit
ude where skis were not required, these were sent to Setermoen. This action was sorely regretted when the battalion later moved into the snow-covered mountains. The 2/16th Inf was subjected to heavy German air attacks during the move.
To cover the movement of the 2/16th Inf, the 7th Brigade was ordered to send the Alta Bn forward to occupy the high ground west of Cirkelvann during the night of 22-23 May. The division directed that this battalion remain in its positions when the 6th Brigade attacked past Cirkelvann. The 2/16th Inf was ordered to advance its outpost line forward to where it made contact with the Alta Bn south of Skitdalsvann and to reconnoiter a route of advance and attack positions against Hills 456, 615, 625 and the stream junction west of Hill 529, in the area east of Øvre Jernvann. The 6th Brigade was not permitted to advance across a line between Skitdalsvann and Nedre Jernvann without orders.
The length of the new German front was approximately 21 kilometers, six kilometers shorter than it had been when they occupied the high plateau. However, some of the mountainsides of the dominant terrain on which the Germans established their new front are almost vertical, unsuitable for both offensive and defensive operations. Outside these inapproachable areas, the Germans had a front of less than 10 kilometers that they needed to occupy in strength.
The new German line was located directly south of a deep watercourse that formed a veritably impenetrable moat in front of their positions. The river between the junction of Karenelven and Holmelven varies in width from 20 feet to 150 feet and the current is rapid, particularly during the spring thaw. The Norwegians had no bridging equipment since all was lost when the Germans captured Elvegårdsmoen on April 9. A reconnaissance of possible crossing points on June 1 led the division to conclude that the river between Cirkelvann and Nedre Jernvann was so wide that it would take one full week to construct a footbridge. As Munthe-Kaas writes, this was “an unfortunate belated discovery!”
The German flanks were now more difficult to assault and roll up than they had been when they occupied the high plateau. Their right flank was anchored on the Swedish border and their left flank on Rombakfjord. The cliffs on the German left leading to Rauberget south of Lakselv are extremely steep. Dietl had little to worry about on this flank. A French attempt to advance in this area on May 25 was repelled easily by the Germans. The French lost eight killed and seven were captured.
While the new German front presented the Norwegians with what seemed a mountain bastion, the best approach was still in the area along the Swedish border, defended by Group Schleebrügge. This group consisted of a mixture of a few mountain troops, some paratroopers who were not equipped and trained for mountain warfare, and naval units of questionable reliability. Furthermore, in the first days after the withdrawal, these units had not had a chance to prepare their defensive positions. A quick thrust at the German right flank as recommended by Munthe-Kaas on May 21 presented the best chance of success and it may well have led to the collapse of the German northern front. Instead, Fleischer chose to attack the enemy bastion from the lower terrain further west via an approach that was under easy observation by the Germans on the high ground to the south. Furthermore, the attacking forces would have to find a way to cross the raging river, without bridging equipment and in the face of German fire.
Dietl was desperately trying to win time for meaningful reinforcements to reach his forces. The Norwegians and the Allies handed it to him by suspending offensive operations in the north for over a week. The number of reinforcements reaching the Germans around Narvik in the first half of May amounted to only 133 officers and men. From May 15 to May 22, the flow increased to 239 and during the last week of May, it grew to 671. In the south, Feurstein’s forces were brushing aside delaying forces and approaching Bodø.
Finally, the events that were unfolding in France and the Low Countries, should have instilled a sense of urgency in the Norwegian military leadership. It had become imperative to complete the destruction of Group Windisch before the possible transfer of Allied ground forces to the west. Dietl admitted forthrightly that he was saved from having to enter Sweden by the German attack in the west.
Fleischer could not have anticipated the frequent postponements in the operations against Narvik between May 21 and May 28. However, there was no reason to delay his operation against Bjørnefjell pending the capture of Narvik. Ziemke notes that this relative quiet on the northern front “facilitated the German withdrawal from Narvik.”6 This is an understatement. A strong attack by Norwegian and French forces on the northern front simultaneously with or leading up to the attack on Narvik was General Dietl’s worst nightmare. An offensive on the northern front would have prevented the Germans from rushing all incoming reinforcements to the Narvik Peninsula to stem the French and Polish advance. The inactivity also allowed them to pull units away from the northern front for the same purpose.
By May 26 Fleischer, who was unaware of the reasons for the postponements of the attack on Narvik, directed an urgent appeal to Béthouart, pointing out that time was now working in Germany’s favor. He also sent his chief of staff to Allied headquarters in Harstad in an attempt to speed up operations against Narvik.
Béthouart informed Fleischer that his intention was to attack Narvik the following night but he refused to enter into any agreements about future operations after Narvik was captured. He also told the Norwegian that the 14th Bn, CA was not capable of an offensive south of Cirkelvann. Cork and Auchinleck had briefed Béthouart earlier in the day about the evacuation decision, which limited Allied operations to the capture of Narvik.
Polish Operations on the Ankenes Peninsula
The 12th Bn CA took over on Ankenes Peninsula from the British in early May. This battalion operated initially in Håvikdal but in the period May 6-9, it occupied a number of heights overlooking Narvik harbor. Hill 295 was occupied on May 6, Hill 405 on May 8, and Hills 677, 734, and 668 on May 9. In the end, the Germans occupied only the high ground on both flanks: the hillside to the south and west of Ankenes and the area from Hill 606 to Skarvtuva.
Two Polish battalions were moved by sea from Bjerkvik to Ankenes Peninsula on May 14 to replace the South Wales Borderers, who were sent to Bodø. At about the same time, a Polish battalion from Harstad was to relieve the 12th Bn CA. The 4th Polish Bn and 2nd Half-Brigade Headquarters were brought south from Sjøvegan on May 19. This made Ankenes Peninsula a Polish area of operations except for a section of British field artillery and some antiaircraft guns.
Major General Zygmunt Bohusz-Szyszko commanded the Polish forces. He started his career in the Tsarist army and was wounded while commanding the 16th Polish Infantry Division in 1939. Lieutenant Colonel Benedykt Chlusewiez, who also started his career in the Tsarist army, commanded the 1st Half-Brigade consisting of 1st and 2nd Battalions. Lieutenant Colonel Józef Kobylecki, another Tsarist army officer, commanded the 2nd Half-Brigade, consisting of the 3rd and 4th Battalions. The troops were a mixture of escapees from Poland, Poles residing in France, and volunteers from other countries, including a detachment of veterans from the Spanish Civil War.7
General Bohusz-Szyszko’s orders were to defend Ankenes Peninsula after relieving the British and French forces. The planned relief of the 12th Bn CA was delayed because of a strong German infantry attack on May 17 against its positions on the ridgeline overlooking Narvik harbor and Beisfjord. The Germans had two companies in this area: Co 6 in the north, holding a bridgehead around the village of Ankenes; and Co 7 in the south, holding Hills 650 (Skarvtuva), and Hill 773 (Hestefjell). The Germans attacked Hills 605 and 668. The surprise attacks almost succeeded in driving the French from the mountain ridge. The Germans reached within 100 meters of the summit of Hill 605 when the attack faltered under heavy French fire. The attack against Hill 668 was only stopped after the French committed all available resources, including a counterattack by the battalion reserve, the 12th S.E.S. The Germans lost six killed and five seriously wounded.
The South Wales Borderers were still located on Ankenes Pe
ninsula, apparently in a defensive perimeter from somewhere southwest of Hill 405 to Haavik. The French occupied the area from Hill 405 to Hill 668. The only information about the enemy situation that the South Wales Borderers could give to Lieutenant Colonel Wladyslaw Dec, commander of the 2nd Polish Bn, was “The Germans are up there somewhere.”8
Dec occupied a line of almost five kilometers along the ridge from Baatberget to, and including, Hill 405. The 1st Polish Bn, commanded by Major Waclaw Kobylińsky, occupied the ridgeline from Hill 677 to Hill 668. Lieutenant Colonel Chlusewiez was the overall commander of these forward forces. His reserve consisted of the 4th Polish Bn, which was moved from Sjøvegan to Tjeldebotn, west of Ballangen, on May 19. It was moved to Ankenes Peninsula in the period 22–24 May. The 3rd Polish Bn remained in the Ballangen area along with the headquarters of the 2nd Half-Brigade.
The Ankenes Peninsula became an area of bitter positional warfare until May 27. The 2nd Polish Bn tried to move its positions forward in the evening of May 17 and on May 18. With the exception of a minor forward adjustment by the left flank company, the Germans repelled these attempts at the cost to the Poles of nine killed and 15 wounded.
Biegański writes that during this period, the Germans constantly improved their positions and their strength grew to two battalions. This is a considerable overstatement of the actual forces involved. The Germans only had one battalion of mountain troops and some naval units in the whole Narvik area.
Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 Page 61
