8 PRO, FO 371, 24834, N4326, April 13, 1940; Otto Ruge, Felttoget. General Otto Ruges erindringer fra kampene april–juni 1940 (Olav Riste, ed.; Oslo: Aschenhoug, 1989), pp. 29, 37, 43, 53, and 55; and PRO FO 371, 24834 N4339 and N4579, April 14, 1940.
9 O. Lindbäck-Larsen, Krigen i Norge 1940 (Oslo: Forsvarets Krigshistoriske Avdeling, 1965), p. 77.
10 This committee had been in existence since 1923 and in April 1940, it consisted of Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord, General Sir Edmund Ironside, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and Air Chief Marshal Sir Cyrice Newall, the Chief of the Air Staff.
11 PRO, CAB 79/3 C.O.S.C. 9.4.1940 and Lord Ismay, The Memoirs of Lord Ismay (London: Heinemann, 1950), p. 120.
12 This committee was formed at the outbreak of war in 1939 and consisted of the three service ministers along with their chiefs of staff. The Prime Minister was the chair and Churchill was the deputy chair.
13 United Kingdom, Parliamentary Debates. House of Commons, vol. 359, col.511.
14 Kersaudy, Norway, p. 86. 17, “Copy of a message written out in Manuscript by C.I.G.S. for General Mackesy 2330 hours 10th April, taken by Brigadier Lund,” (Derry, The Campaign in Norway, Appendix A, pp. 247-248).
18 Loc cit.
19 Churchill, The Gathering Storm, p. 612.
20 Ismay, Memoirs, p. 111.
21 Kersaudy, Norway, p. 91 and PRO, FO 371, 24834, N4317, April 13, 1940.
22 As quoted in Kersaudy, Norway, p. 92.
Chapter 8
1 Derry, The Campaign in Norway, p. 104.
2 Ibid, p. 105.
3 Ibid, p. 106.
4 As quoted in Hubatsch, p. 128.
5 Information received from knowledgeable individuals in Norway–including long-time residents–indicate that Ramsund had a depth of 10–15 meters and that ships with a length of 120 meters could not transit safely without the use of a knowledgeable pilot. The German destroyers were about 120 meters in length and had a draught of approximately 12 meters. Others have written that the Ramsund-Kjeldsundet-Vågsfjord route can take civilian cargo ships up to 40,000 tons. The fact that the Norwegians established a coastal artillery battery of two 105mm guns at the northern entrance to Ramsund–Forholten during World War II is a further indication that the strait was navigable for warships. Even if Ramsund was not sufficiently dredged or the service of reliable pilots could not be obtained, there was the option of turning right just west of Barøy, into the more navigable Tjelsund and from there north to Vågsfjord. Large ships, such as Jan Wellem, used this route on a regular basis.
6 Dickens, Battles in the Fjords, p. 108.
7 Kurt Assmann, The German Campaign in Norway (Admiralty: Naval Staff, 1948), p. 41.
8 Munthe-Kaas, Krigen i Narviksavsnittet 1940, p. 66.
9 As quoted in ibid, p. 64.
10 Message from Admiral Whitworth to Admiral Forbes at 2210 hours on April 13 and forwarded by Admiral Forbes to the Admiralty in Derry, The Campaign in Norway, p. 51.
11 Message from Whitworth, loc cit.
Chapter 9
1 Despatch by Lord Cork, Section I, (6), as quoted in Derry, The Campaign in Norway, p. 147.
2 Kersaudy, Norway, p. 125.
3 Ziemke, The German Northern Theater, p. 90.
4 See, for example, L. E. Maund, Assault from the Sea, 29-30.
5 Report found in Despatch by Lord Cork, Appendix A, Section 6, as quoted in Derry, The Campaign in Norway, p. 151.
6 Bernhard von Lossberg, Im Wehrmachtführungs-stab. Bericht eines Generalstabsoffiziers (Hamburg: H. H. Nölke, 1949), p. 70.
7 3. Gebirgsdivision Kriegstagesbuch (hereinafter 3GDKTB), April 17, 1940.
8 Major Omdal, one lieutenant, one sergeant, and seven soldiers managed to escape on May 19. Two soldiers were caught trying to cross into Sweden. Major Omdal rejoined Norwegian forces further north on May 20 and took command of the 1/15th Infantry on May 24. The other seven apparently made good their escape to Sweden.
9 Olof Sundell, 9. april (Stockholm: Sohlmans, 1949), p. 227.
10 3GDKTB, 04261130. These, and later specialists, were mostly camouflaged military personnel. A message from Group XXI (Nr. 298 dated May 22, 1940 at 1900 hours) reads, “40 machinegun and mortars specialists are leaving Berlin for Narvik via Sweden at 1000 hours on May 23. A further 80 specialists will follow in about 3 days. Appropriate attire will be worn for the purpose concealment.”
11 Büchner, Narvik, p. 52.
12 Reports by Major General Dahl in 1946 and Captain Olav Løvland in 1941 as quoted in Sandvik, Operasjonene, vol. 1, p. 240.
13 Arne Dagfin Dahl, Med Alta bataljon mot tyskerne (Oslo: H. Aschehoug & Co., 1945), p. 60.
14 Ibid, p. 53. He writes, “… A determined advance by the hitherto un-noticed concentration of three rested enemy battalions in the Elvenes area would have encountered a precarious Group Windisch and could have opened the road to Bjerkvik. It is thanks to the determined attack by the 1/139, under the command of Major Stautner that this did not happen. Because of his surprise attack, the Norwegians were forced into a more careful tactical mode that was noticeable repeatedly until the end of the fighting and thereby he secured for Group Narvik a gain of decisive significance.”
15 Hovland, Fleischer, p. 126.
Chapter 10
1 Lindback-Larsen, Kriegen, p. 66.
2 Ziemke, The German Northern Theater, p. 70.
3 Bernard Fergusson, The Watery Maze (London: Collins, 1961), p. 44.
4 Dudley Clarke, Seven Assignments (London: Jonathan Cape, 1948), p. 88.
5 Derry, The Campaign in Norway, Appendix A, p. 251.
6 Ibid, p. 99.
7 Kersuady, Norway, p. 116.
8 Tamelander and Zetterling, Niende april, p. 164.
9 Jørgen Jensen, Krigen på Hedemark (Oslo: Tanum, 1947), p. 138.
10 See, for example, Tamelander and Zetterling, Niende april, p. 165 and Derry, The Campaign in Norway, p.111. Morgan was not present when the Germans attacked. He had traveled to Åndalsnes where the 15th Brigade was landing the following day.
11 Gudbrand Østbye, Krigen i Norge 1940. Operasjonene på Vestsiden av Mjøsa–Follebu-Gausdal (Oslo: Forsvarets Krigshistoriske Avdeling, 1960), pp. 231-233, 250-251 and Lindbäck-Larsen, Krigen, p. 95.
12 Tage Ellinger, Den Forunderlige Krig (Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1960), pp. 27-28
13 As quoted in Derry, The Campaign in Norway, p. 122.
14 Lindbäck-Larsen, Krigen, p. 94.
15 Kersuady, Norway, p. 154.
16 As quoted in Tamelander and Zetterling, Niende april, p. 165.
17 MacLeod and Kelly, Time Unguarded, p. 287.
18 As quoted in Kersuady, Norway, p. 167.
19 Ibid, p. 176.
20 Norwegian Broadcasting System (NRK) interview with Major General Roscher-Nielsen on January 18, 1965 as quoted in Kersuady, Norway, p. 170.
21 Ash, Norway 1940, p. 100, after describing the troops’ lack of essential equipment, notes how they were issued lavish personal kits “to make up for everything…” which they had to carry due to lack of transportation and “General Carton de Wiart declared with some heat that the men could not carry all their kit, while if they put it on they looked like paralysed bears and were unable to move.”
22 Since ammunition for Norwegian weapons was not produced outside Norway and because they were cut off from their source in southern Norway, the solution was to supply them with British weapons. About 7,000 rifles and 250 Bren guns with ammunition finally arrived in the transport Chobry on April 28 but off-loading priority was given to French antiaircraft batteries (despite that day’s evacuation order). The Norwegian weapons and ammunition sailed away on the transport. This may have been deliberate since the British did not want these weapons to fall into German hands.
23 Ole Berg Getz, Fra krigen i Nord-Trøndelag 1940 (. Oslo: Aschehoug & Co., 1940), p.139.
24 Ibid, p. 144.
25 Kersuady, Norway, p. 181.
26 As quoted in K
ersuady, Norway, p. 125.
Chapter 11
1 Karol Zbyszewski, The Fight for Narvik: Impressions of the Polish Campaign in Norway (London: L. Drummond, 1041), p. 3. While styled Chasseurs de Montagne or Chasseurs du Nord, many of the troops had never seen any mountains and they were definitely not trained for arctic winter warfare.
2 Raymond Sereau, L’Expedition de Norvège 1940 (Baden-Baden: Regie Autonome des Publications Officielles, 1949), p. 48.
3 Ibid, p. 51 and an 11-page manuscript in Norwegian titled “Rapport–General Bethouart,” p. 3.
4 3GDKTB, 04281945, 04300930, and 05011900.
5 Ibid, 05020330, 05030230, and 05031420.
6 Munthe-Kaas, Kriegent, p. 109, note.
7 Ibid, p. 109 and Johan Helge Berg and Olav Vollan, Fjellkrigen 1940. Lapphaugen-Bjørnefjell (Trondheim: Wennbergs Trykkeri A.S., 1999), pp. 142-143.
8 3GDKTB, 04290930.
9 “Rapport–General Bethouart”, p. 3.
10 Sereau, L’Expedition, p. 54 and “Rapport–General Bethouart”, p. 3.
11 As quoted in Sandvik, Operasjonene, vol. 2, p. 54.
13 3GDKTB, 05042010.
14 Trygve Lie, Leve eller dø. Norge i Krig (Oslo: Tiden norsk forlag, 1955), p. 206.
15 Quoted in Sandvik, Operasjonene, vol. 2, p. 67.
16 Hovland, Fleischer, p.157.
17 Ibid, p. 227.
18 Sandvik, Operasjonene, vol. 2, pp. 114, 69.
19 Ruge, Felttoget, p. 130.
Chapter 12
1 Sandvik, Operasjonene, vol. 2, pp. 60-61, n. 4.
2 Lindbäck-Larsen, Rapport, Section 8:3-4 and Getz, Nord-Trøndelag 1940, pp. 115-116, entries for 1225 hours on April 28 (Message 329 from 6th Division) and 1330 hours same day (letter Nr. 125 from Getz to Fleischer).
3 Getz, Nord-Trøndelag 1940, pp. 122-123, entry 1130 hours April 29.
4 Ibid, p. 116, entry for 1300 hours April 28 and Sandvik, Operasjonene, vol. 2, pp. 60-61, n. 4. Ruge was in the process of relocating his headquarters from Åndalsnes to North Norway and had no communications with Colonel Getz until May 3, by which time the situation had changed.
5 Getz, Nord-Trøndelag 1940, pp. 117 and 122. Getz notes that he sent messages to the 6th Division direct, via Sweden, and through the Allied headquarters but received no explanation for the orders. Sandvik relates that General Fleischer sent a letter to Getz on April 30 confirming that the order was genuine but that Getz never received the letter (Operasjonene, vol. 2, p.61).
6 Lindbäck-Larsen, Rapport, Section 8:4.
7 Getz, Nord-Trøndelag 1940, p. 140, entry for 0850 hours May 2.
8 Valentin Feurstein, Irrwege der Pflicht 1938-1945 (Munich, Verlag Welsermühl, 1963), p. 73.
9 Hovland, Fleischer, p. 150. He points out that the military investigating committee, in its review of Colonel Getz’ surrender, gave special weight to the fact that road connection to the north was severed by Fleischer. He goes on to state that Getz should have been the first to know that the destruction of the road northward had not been carried out. Getz, however, claims that the destruction had already started and this is why the 1/14th Inf left the battalion trains behind when it began its retreat into Nordland Province.
10 Sandvik, Operasjonene, vol. 2, pp. 100, 106.
11 Quoted in Lindbäck-Larsen, Krigen, p. 124. The order read: “Send as many troops as possible back to Mosjøen. Seek connection with units of the 6th Division in that area. The forces will thereafter come under General Fleischer. Destroy the roads thoroughly as the troops withdraw. Roadblocks must be defended.”
12 Quoted in Sandvik, Operasjonene, vol. 2, p. 63.
13 Macleod and Kelly, Time Unguarded, p. 289.
14 Derry, The Campaign in Norway, p. 178 and Moulton, A Study of Warfare, p. 235.
15 Maurice Gustave Gamelin, Servir, (3 vols; Paris: Plon, 1946-47), vol. 3, pp. 366-367.
16 Macleod and Kelly, Time Unguarded, p. 292.
17 Churchill, The Gathering Storm, p. 648.
18 Marie Emile Béthouart, Cinq années d’espérance. Mémoires de guerre, 1939-1945. (Paris: Plon, 1968), pp. 31-32.
19 The 2nd Mountain Division, like the 3nd, was formed from units in the Austrian army after the incorporation of Austria into the Third Reich. The 2nd was formed from units of the 6th Austrian Mountain Division and German mountain troops in April 1938 and mobilized on August 26, 1939. Like the 3rd, it participated in the Polish Campaign as part of Army Group South. It was transferred to Germany at the conclusion of that campaign.
20 Karl Ruef, Odyssee, p. 54.
21 Feurstein, Irrwege der Pflicht, p. 71.
22 Derry, The Campaign in Norway, p. 167.
23 London Gazette Supplement, 10 July 1947, 3173 as quoted in Jack Adams, The Doomed Expedition. The Norwegian Campaign of 1940 (London: Leo Cooper, 1989), p. 71.
24 Macleod and Kelly, Time Unguarded, p. 297.
25 Derry, The Campaign in Norway, p. 180; Moulton, Study of Warfare, p. 237; Adams, The Doomed Expedition, p. 73; and Sandvik, Operasjonene, vol. 2, p. 84, n. 74.
26 HOK 916/40 quoted in Sandvik, Operasjonene, vol. 2, p. 88.
27 Hovland, Fleischer, p. 150.
28 Sandvik, Operasjonene, vol. 2, pp. 88-89.
29 Hubatsch, 215.
30 Ellinger, Den Forunderlige Krig, pp. 65-66. The morale in Ellinger’s company had deteriorated and some of the troops tried to leave on May 13. Ellinger decided it was better to operate with people who wanted to fight. He spoke to each platoon and told those who wished to leave to step forward and turn in their weapons. In the end, he had only 52 men left. The disarmed soldiers were sent to Mo where Roscher-Nielsen put them to work on a road-gang.
31 Lindbäck-Larsen, 6. division (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1946), p. 118.
32 Ruef, Odyssee, p. 63.
33 John Connell, Auchinleck (London: Cassell, 1959), pp.119-120. The instructions read, in part: “You will have had my telegram telling you that I wish the detachment at Mo to hold on to its position, and not withdraw. I think it most important that we should give up no more ground. I know the detachment is somewhat isolated at present, and I know the Germans may be in superior force to the south of you, but I am pretty sure that they are groping in the dark very much as we are, and I hope that when they come up against really determined opposition they will sit back and think about it.” 34 Macleod and Kelly, Time Unguarded, p. 292.
35 Connell, Auchinleck, p. 115.
36 Connell, Auchinleck, p. 119; Derry, The Campaign in Norway, p. 184; and Adams, The Doomed Expedition, p. 69.
37 Adams, The Doomed Expedition, p. 70.
38 Report to the Naval Court of Inquiry, D.3A Reports of Losses of H.M. Ships. Effingham 17/5. Prepared on H.M. Transport Sobieski at Sea on May 20, 1940, paragraph 6.
Chapter 13
1 As quoted by Adams, The Doomed Expedition, p.17.
2 General Béthouart’s Journal de Marche, chapter 3, p. 38, as quoted in Sandvik, Operasjonene, vol. 2, p. 30.
3 Sandvik, Operasjonene, vol. 2, p. 31 and Loben E. H. Maund Assault from the Sea (London: Methuen, 1949), pp. 52, 58.
4 Instructions from the Secretary of State for War to Lieutenant General Auchinlek, found in Derry, The Campaign in Norway, Appendix A, pp. 259-260.
5 Derry, The Campaign in Norway, pp. 169-170.
6 Macleod and Kelly, Time Unguarded, p. 295.
7 Maund, Assault from the Sea, p. 40.
8 Béthouart, Cinq années d’espérance, p. 51.
9 Moulton, Study of Warfare, p. 225.
10 Hovland, Fleischer, p. 162.
11 Büchner, Narvik, p. 93.
12 Sandvik, Operasjonene, vol. 2, p. 116.
13 Ruge, Felttoget, p. 209.
14 Sandvik, Operasjonene, vol. 2, p.116.
15 Büchner, Narvik, p. 103.
16 In his letter of May 12, Lieutenant Colonel Berg wrote, “An attack to the south is difficult from Læigastind-Gressvann. The mountain area is even without the possibility of cover and is under effective fire fro
m German machinegun positions…. The brigade still has maneuver possibilities in the area Nævertind-Isvann-Swedish border, provided we don’t lose our chance as the Germans move their positions eastward.” Berg and Vollan, Fjellkrigen, p. 257.
Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 Page 76
