29 Hammond 1967: 561. See contra Treves 1942: 148; Errington 1975b; Heskel 1988. Hammond believed that Arybbas, rather than replacing young Neoptolemus as king, became co-king with him and that when Arybbas died, Aeacides succeeded him as co-king with Neoptolemus. There is no evidence of their shared kingship, but Aeacids before and after this did share kingship.
30 Cross 1932: 43. Plutarch ( Pyrrh. 1.4) says that Aeacides married Phthia, a daughter of Menon the Thessalian, an important leader of the forces arrayed against Macedonia in the Lamian War. This too would imply that when the war began, Aeacides’ family opposed the Macedonians.
31 Cross 1932: 44 continued to believe that Aeacides got the throne because Antipater hoped he would work against Olympias, though he recognized that Aeacides, in fact, pursued the opposite policy.
32 Hammond 1967: 561.
33 Cross 1932: 47, n. 1 suggests that Aeacides, rather than his older brother, became king because Aeacides was the son of Olympias’ sister Troas whereas Alcetas, Cross supposed, was the son of another wife. However, Pausanias (1.11.5) specifically says that Arybbas had banished his elder son because of his ungoverned temper.
34 By the time of the siege of Pydna, Olympias’ grandson Alexander IV had been
170 Notes
betrothed (or actually married) to Aeacides’ daughter Deidameia (Plut. Pyrrh.
4.2). This “marriage” not only confirmed the personal alliance between Olympias and her nephew but typifies the general dynastic loyalty of the Aeacids. Marriage within the dynasty had grown frequent: Arybbas married his niece Troas, Alexander his niece Cleopatra, and Deidameia was supposed to marry her cousin.
35 Since they could hardly count on the survival of the male line of the family, mother and daughter pursued marriage alliances for Cleopatra.
36 All three passages in Diodorus about her epimeleia (personal guardianship; see below) make it contingent upon her return to Macedonia, something that did not happen until the fall of 317. Hammond 1988a: 131 wrongly assumes that she accepted Polyperchon’s offer immediately but that she did not need to return to Macedonia to accept it.
37 See Heckel 1992: 188–204 for an overview of his career and Wheatley 1998.
38 On the meaning of Polyperchon’s offer and the significance of prostasia, see discussion and references in Carney 2000c: 138–9; Mirón-Pérez 2000: 36; and Bosworth 2002: 48–57.
39 O’Neil 1999a: 5 sees Olympias as “only reluctantly” taking up an important role in Macedonia at this point, because of the absence of a male defender for her grandson. She was certainly cautious, but nothing suggests that she did not want to exercise power. Her caution related to legitimate fears about safety (and, one suspects, success).
40 On the career of Cassander, see Berve 1926: 2:201–2; Fortina 1965; Adams 1977, 1979, 1984. Adams 1979 argues that Cassander did briefly participate in the early part of Alexander’s campaign, in Asia Minor.
41 Bosworth 2002: 246–78.
42 Since Antipater had not made his eldest son his successor, Cassander must have had mixed feelings about his father and his father’s policies. Initially, therefore, he may not have planned to continue his father’s hostility to Olympias, but events led him in that direction. His marriage to Thessalonice and his possible earlier marriage to a daughter of Amyntas and Cynnane (see Palagia 1999, based on a funerary inscription, and Tataki 1988: 85, n. 26 for references to the inscription) suggest that he was trying to exclude Alexander’s part of the Argead family from rule but ally himself with what was left of the other branches of the dynasty.
43 Gregory 1995: 27–8 concludes that Cassander had good relations with his siblings, in contrast to the murderous ways of many of the Successors. If so, Olympias’ elimination of one brother and disrespect for the remains of another would have been particularly offensive.
44 Most recently, see Carney 2000c: 132–7.
45 For Cynnane, see Carney 2000c: 69–70, 129–31.
46 Polyaenus 8.60. O’Neil 1999a: 6 suggests that his narrative may have been
“embellished” in order to make her seem less Greek. Polyaenus’ account of Cynnane, however, does not focus on her “otherness” (for instance, he never characterizes her actions as barbaric or unwomanly) but rather on her skill as a warrior. The substance of Polyaenus’ picture, as O’Neil concedes, is supported by Arr. FGrH 156 F 9.22–3. Cool 2005: 64–6 reports on burials of warrior women in Roman Britain who may have been Illyrian. See also Carney 2004: 184–7. Hatzopoulos 1994: 81, n. 3 is not convincing when he suggests stories about troops of Macedonian maenads possibly armed with daggers (Polyaen. 4.1) explain these accounts about the military training of royal Macedonian women. I am aware of no story about Olympias’ military training.
Cynnane and Adea Eurydice had multiple associations with the army and were not understood as Macedonian but Illyrian.
Notes 171
47 Arr. FGrH 156 F 9.23. Bosworth 2002: 12, n. 26, seems to believe that Adea Eurydice’s marriage was not her mother’s plan, contrary to the views of others (Macurdy 1932a: 49; Heckel 1983–4: 195; Carney 2000c: 129–30), apparently because he does not read the Arrian passage as others have. Granted the efforts of Antipater, Olympias, and Cleopatra, and the general surge in marriage alliances in the period immediately after Alexander’s death, it is hard to imagine why else Cynnane would have risked the dangers of her trip. Had she simply wished to avoid Antipater’s control, closer and safer havens were available, most obviously among Illyrian kin.
48 Hornblower 1981: 161 pictures Cassander as the catalyst, exploiting the existing hostility between the two branches of the Argeads by supporting Philip Arrhidaeus.
49 Heidelberg Epitome FGrH 15 F1 and App. Syr. 52 assert that Philip Arrhidaeus had been allotted kingship only until Alexander IV reached his majority. While this assertion is probably not literally true (see Carney 2001: 83, n. 108), it is likely enough that Philip Arrhidaeus would have ceased to be king if Alexander IV managed to stay alive long enough to rule without a guardian.
50 Hammond 1988a: 141 blames it on Cassander’s decision to stay in Tegea, suggesting that he may have wanted Adea Eurydice to fail, or at least expected her to.
51 Since Adea Eurydice accompanied her mother on the escape from Antipater’s forces, it is possible that she was involved in that small-scale military activity, but, if so, we do not know it. Diodorus (19.11.2) refers to it as “her” army but this need not indicate who commanded it. The sources mention various men throughout her career who assisted her, but none is given a military title and the only person mentioned in terms of this encounter is Polycles, whom Diodorus (19.11.3) refers to as an advisor. While it is possible that she did not even plan to participate in the battle, the desertion of her army is hardly proof that she did not (so, oddly, O’Neil 1999a: 7, n. 17) but rather the event that prevents us from knowing if she did. If Duris is right, both women presented themselves in the guise they thought would most impress their armies (and foes).
52 Macurdy 1932a: 41 suggests that Olympias may have recalled a story (Polyaen.
4.1) about how Macedonian maenads once turned away an opposing army.
See further Chapter 5.
53 Macurdy 1932b: 256–61 argues that Alexander IV and his mother remained in Polyperchon’s control until his forces and those of Aeacides met, on the Macedonian border. If so, Olympias would have met her grandson for the first time at this critical moment.
54 Adams 1984: 86 believes that they deserted because they did not want a battle
“without a competent commander.” Perhaps, but then one wants to know why they had followed them to begin with.
55 Carney 1993b and 1994b.
56 See Carney 1993b: 50–4 for discussion of forced suicide and suicide and royal women. Aelian ( V.H. 13.36) also briefly mentions the story of the choices offered her and her preference for the noose. See also Chapter 3.
57 See Appendix for a discussion of the contrast this passage presents to the rest of Diodorus’ material a
bout Olympias. Hornblower 1981: 121 surmises that Hieronymus, Diodorus’ presumed source, derived this account from “court gossip” and Hieronymus therefore included a reference to a servant (the presumed witness) to make a somewhat unbelievable tale less so. However, see below for the possibility that both Adea Eurydice and Olympias may have modeled their behavior at death on tragedy.
172 Notes
58 See ν σις in LSJ. Bartsiokas 2000: 513–14, in his recent reexamination of the male bones from Tomb II at Vergina, concluded that they showed physical signs of having been first inhumed for some time before being cremated ( contra Musgrave 1985), a conclusion that supports an identification of the male as Philip Arrhidaeus, not his father Philip II.
59 See Berve 1926: 2.274.
60 Arr. 7.27.1–3; Just. 12.13.6–9 (which includes a second cupbearer son of Antipater, Philip, in the plot); Curt. 10.10.14–19; Plut. Alex 77.2, Mor. 849F.
61 Kurtz and Boardman 1971: 197.
62 He attributes it to Hieronymus’ prejudice against kings, particularly Lysimachus. He argues that Lysimachus would not have treated the graves of Alexander’s ancestors so badly, nor would Pyrrhus later have allied himself with Lysimachus, had this really happened. Elsewhere, Pausanias (1.13.7) claims that Hieronymus gave a biased treatment of Pyrrhus because of his need to please Antigonus (Gonatas). Hornblower 1981: 17 considers that it is “less certain” that Hieronymus was dependable in his treatment of historical figures, though later (74) she says that, in this passage, Pausanias gave only a confused version of what Hieronymus said. My view is that it would be a mistake to prize Pausanias’ view over that of Hieronymus.
63 Edson 1970: 23.
64 Though manuscripts read “CCC,” editors have often emended this to “XXX.”
(See references in Carney 1993b: 49, n. 52.) However, Yardley and Heckel 1984: 255 reject the emendation.
65 See Billows 1990: 11, n. 26, and n. 27 for a useful list of atrocities by various Successors.
66 On Macedonian political trials, see O’Neil 1999b. Bauman 1990: 128–70 also discusses Macedonian political trials but his discussion is limited by lack of familiarity with Macedonian constitutional issues and a tendency to assume that the Macedonians acted like the Athenians.
67 O’Neil 1999b: 31, 46.
68 Unless, of course, our sources fail to mention it. Hammond 1988a: 140, n. 3
apparently assumes they did since he believes that Olympias got the assembly to condemn the supporters of Cassander. More likely, just as Alexander did not risk trying Parmenio in person (if he tried him at all) and Cassander did not take the risk for Olympias, Olympias feared a trial that would put the royal couple in front of a group of Macedonians. See further below.
69 Macurdy 1932a: 45 thinks so, but the sources do not compare her actions to those of the men.
70 Holst-Warhaft 1992: 118.
71 Mirón-Pérez 2000: 35 believes that the remark is authentic because Macedonians really did not like or accept female rule. The issue is not, however, the truth of the generalization attributed to Antipater, but whether he said it, especially on his deathbed. Long literary tradition attributes witty or memorably appropriate remarks to the dying famous. This particular deathbed remark probably originated in Cassander’s propaganda against Olympias, either while she was still alive, or after her death, when he needed to justify that death.
72 One could, perhaps, imagine that he was also thinking of Adea Eurydice since she too had opposed him, as had Olympias’ daughter Cleopatra (see above).
73 When Diodorus (19.35.1) speaks of Cassander’s reactions to events in Macedonia, he mentions the murders of Philip Arrhidaeus and Adea Eurydice and Olympias’ maltreatment of his brother’s tomb, but omits the deaths of Cassander’s supporters.
Notes 173
74 For instance, Bosworth 2002: 249, commenting on Lysimachus’ slaughter of five thousand Illyrian troops under his own command, says, “He was well advised to do so.” Lysimachus had reason to fear that his Illyrian troops might revolt and turn against him, so Bosworth considers the massacre appropriate because it makes pragmatic sense.
75 Carney 1993b.
76 Errington 1977: 478–504 and Billows 1990: 60, 86–105 (see further references in Bosworth 2002: 279, n. 1) support the more drawn-out chronology and date the siege of Pydna to winter 316/15. See Bosworth 1992: 55–81 for arguments for the chronology that puts the siege of Pydna in winter 316/15. Bosworth 2002: 280–4 provides a helpful chronology of events, reflecting his views.
77 See Heckel 1992: 193–9 for a detailed discussion.
78 Hornblower 1981: 225 understands Diodorus’ statement about the make-up of her entourage to be critical of Olympias. Since she was forced to withdraw to the city and hardly chose to have non-combatants with her rather than more soldiers, this seems to misread the passage.
79 To my mind, their disarray confirms the view that Cassander moved quickly north. His forces consistently arrived at critical points before their opponents.
Justin (14.6.4) says he reached Pydna by rapid or forced marches. As Adams 1984: 87 notes, his enemies were “caught utterly flatfooted.”
80 On Polyperchon’s subsequent inglorious career, see Heckel 1992: 200–4; Wheatley 1998.
81 Justin (14.6.2) attributes Olympias’ withdrawal to her “distrust of the Macedonians.” If his comment refers to civilian Macedonian opinion, it is incorrect (see below), but he may be speaking about Cassander’s Macedonians.
82 Diodorus (19.35.5) lists Roxane, Alexander IV, Thessalonice (a daughter of Philip II by another wife), Deidameia, daughter of Aeacides, the daughters of Attalus, and other kin of Olympias’ most important friends. Justin (14.6.2–3) has much the same list, though he confuses Alexander IV with his half-brother Heracles.
83 His behavior seems inexplicable, particularly granted that his subsequent actions suggest that he remained loyal. Even if he were waiting for aid from Eumenes (see below), that would not have signified if Olympias and her grandson fell into Cassander’s control. Perhaps he simply lacked sufficient troops to mount a defense of Pydna.
84 Olympias and officers loyal to her may have hoped for help, direct or indirect, from Eumenes. Aristonous’ position at Amphipolis, not helpful for confronting Cassander, might suggest an interest in connecting to reinforcements from the east. Similarly, Diodorus’ statement (19.50.8) that Aristonous was reluctant to surrender in part because he did not know of Eumenes’ death only makes sense if he thought that Eumenes’ survival would aid him. Although Olympias’
ability to get valuable intelligence, even over great distances, was generally good, Cassander’s blockade and siege may have prevented her from knowing about his situation, just as, apparently, it did Aristonous.
85 On Eumenes’ final campaign, see Bosworth 2002: 98–168. Although the absolute date of the deaths of Olympias and Eumenes is disputed because of the general chronological controversy (see above), there is general agreement that they happened at about the same time. See Errington 1977: 487.
86 Hammond 1967: 562 assumes that the Epirotes did not know that the enemy they were advancing against was the Macedonian army. Diodorus (19.36.3) contradicts this assumption since he says that the majority of Epirotes had set out for a campaign against the Macedonians unwillingly. Cassander’s control of the passes, however, rather than their more general discontent, seems to have been the trigger for their rebellion.
174 Notes
87 Pausanias may intend to attribute Epirote hatred of Olympias to her savagery in the fall of 317, but it is difficult to determine if that is his meaning, or whether he refers to more general dislike. Diodorus’ account focuses on policy—opposition to war against Macedonia—rather than hatred of either figure. Clearly all these factors could interrelate. For more on Olympias’
possible impact on subsequent Molossian history and the continuation of the Aeacid/Antipatrid feud, see Chapter 6.
88 Pausanias (11.3–5) also provides a narrative of these events but, a
pparently conflating Aeacides’ two campaigns in support of Olympias, asserts that Aeacides’ troops refused to accompany him on both occasions. This assertion is contradicted by the narratives of both Diodorus and Justin, as we have seen.
89 Adams 1977: 23 makes the excellent point that, while Cassander demonstrated skill as a general, his success also depended on a collection of very competent officers who, for instance, repeatedly reached critical mountain passes in time to command them.
90 Polyaenus and Diodorus offer differing accounts of an attempted escape by Olympias in a quinquireme, just prior to her surrender. According to Polyaenus (4.11.3), before the fall of Pydna, Polyperchon tried to arrange for Olympias’
escape, but Cassander thwarted the plot and this in turn convinced Olympias that Polyperchon could not be trusted, so she surrendered. In Diodorus (19.50.4–5), Olympias herself tried to launch the ship, was betrayed by a traitor, Cassander seized the quinquireme, and Olympias then recognized that she had no choice but to negotiate for surrender.
91 Diodorus offers this explanation of Cassander’s failure to honor his promise: Aristonous’ reputation as a royal bodyguard of Alexander and Cassander’s eagerness to eliminate any able to revolt. See below on identity of the agents of his death.
92 Pausanias (9.7.2) does not clearly describe a trial.
93 Briant 1973: 298–9; Bauman 1990: 162; O’Neil 1999b: 45.
94 Curtius (6.11.38) describes stoning as an ancestral Macedonian custom, but, though Curtius twice reports that the Macedonians stoned Philotas to death (6.11.38, 72.1), Arrian (3.26.3) says they killed him with javelins. Stoning may have been a common but not exclusive punishment (see O’Neil 1999b: 31–2). Elsewhere in Greece it was not a legal punishment but a common mob action.
95 Women, even at the point of death, still needed to maintain sexual modesty.
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