ENTRAPMENT
The Soviets often work on the principle that to get a man to do what you want, you try to catch or entrap him in something he would not like to have exposed to the public, to his wife, to his employers or to his government, as the case may be. If the potential victim has done nothing compromising, then he or she must be enticed into a situation set up by the KGB operatives which will be compromising. Two of the recent cases I have mentioned, that of Irvin Scarbeck in Poland and John Vassall in the Soviet Union, are examples of entrapment for intelligence purposes.
Within the Soviet Union itself, or in a bloc country, where the Soviets can set the stage, provide the facilities, a safe house, hotel or nightclub and furnish the cast of male or female provocateurs, tactics of entrapment are commonly used.
The sordid story of Vassall, the British Admiralty employee who spied for the Soviets for six years both in the Soviet Union and in London, is a typical one. In my own experience, I have run across a score of cases where the scenarios are almost identical with this one. The KGB operatives assigned to the task, after studying Vassall’s case history from all angles and analyzing his weaknesses, set up the plan to frame him, exploiting the fact that he was a homosexual. The usual procedure here is to invite the victim to what appears to be a social affair; there the particular temptation to which the victim is likely to succumb is proffered him, and his behavior is recorded on tape or on film. He is then confronted with the evidence and told that unless he works for the Soviets the evidence will be brought to the attention of his employers. Vassall succumbed to this.
If the target individual is strong-willed enough to tell the whole story to his superior officer immediately, then the Soviet attempts at recruitment can be thwarted with relatively little danger to the individual concerned—even if he is residing in the Soviet Union. Sometimes his superior officer, particularly if the approach has been made in a free country, will want to play the man back against the Soviet apparatus in order to ferret out all the individuals and the tactics involved. Sometimes if the man approached does not seem qualified to play such a role, he is merely told to break off from his tormentors after telling them that he has disclosed everything.
The fact that the Soviets have no comeback when this is done is shown by an instance which came to light in the course of the official investigations into the Vassall case. The same Soviet agent employed in the British embassy in Moscow as a factotum who had originally drawn Vassall into a homosexual trap later attempted to recruit through blackmail a maintenance engineer of the embassy who had committed some black market offenses. The KGB expected that this victim, too, would rather cooperate with them than be exposed. The engineer, however, reported the recruitment attempt to his superiors, was promptly sent home from Moscow and the Soviet agent who had caused all the trouble finally lost his job with the British Embassy. At that time it was, of course, not known that he had also been responsible for the ploy which led up to the recruitment of Vassall.3
3 It is possible that someone who has been or may be approached will see these lines; and this may help him to recognize the procedures. It can be hoped that he will take the path of full and frank disclosure advised here. If so, the ease with which the Soviet and sometimes the satellite operatives are able to effect recruitment will not be quite the same in the future.
Interestingly enough, we have found that some of the KGB operatives become so disgusted when forced to play the roles assigned to them in these recruitments that they become more willing candidates to break with it all and leave the service of the Soviet itself for a better life.
While homosexuality has played a prominent role in the most notorious recent cases, such as Vassall’s, adultery or promiscuity is the more usual lever. Here, however, the Soviet and satellite intelligence services have learned over the years that blackmail based on the threatened exposure of illicit sexual acts is a powerful instrument when applied to men of certain nationalities, not so when applied to others. It depends on the mores, on the moral standards of the country of origin. The citizens of those countries where a certain value is placed on marital fidelity and where social disapproval of infidelity is strong are naturally the most likely victims.
I will refrain here from naming those countries which fall into the one category or the other in the opinion of the Soviets, since I would like to avoid opening an international debate on such a touchy subject. I cannot refrain, however, from passing along a story which was related to me some years ago at a time when the officials of a certain European satellite of the Soviets were still a little naïve about the attitudes in sexual matters of some of their Western neighbors. The secret police of the country in question had succeeded in taking some very compromising pictures of a certain diplomat which they hoped to use in order to force this gentleman to collaborate with their intelligence service. They invited him to their office under some pretext and showed him the pictures in their possession. They implied that the diplomat’s wife as well as his superiors might be rather unhappy about him if they were shown the photographs. Contrary to their hopes and expectations, the diplomat didn’t even wince at the implication but continued enthusiastically to study the photographs. Finally he said: “These are wonderful shots. I wonder if you fellows would be kind enough to make me some copies. I’d like two of these, and two of those. . . .” Either he was quite sophisticated or else he knew well how to handle blackmail.
An entirely different sort of pressure is that which the Soviets, as well as the satellites, bring to bear on refugees and expatriates who have close relatives behind the Iron Curtain. A refugee in the West may one day receive a visit from a stranger who will make the proposition clear to him: “Cooperate with us or your mother, brother, wife or children will suffer.” However, since the refugee might just be courageous enough to complain to the local authorities, which could lead in turn to the apprehension of the agent who brought the message, the operation is more often run in less crude fashion. The refugee receives, instead of a visit, a letter from one of his close relatives at home which indicates in a veiled way that the local authorities are making inquiries about the refugee and that some unpleasantness may be in store for his relatives. This letter may be a forgery which the intelligence service has produced, especially if it is known that the refugee is not in frequent correspondence with any of his relatives. On the other hand, it may be authentic and the actual result of a visit which the police have paid to the relative. The refugee begins to worry and eventually writes a letter home asking how things are going. The relative, again under police direction or dictation, answers that things are going hard for them now but could be helped if the refugee would just do one or two little favors, one of these being to drop in at the embassy of his country for a chat. The intelligence service obviously gauges the likelihood of a successful recruitment by the tone of the letters the refugee writes back to his relatives and is not likely to risk the embarrassment of his exposing their tactics to authorities in the country of his adoption unless they see that he is falling for the game. Sometimes this technique is used to induce persons who have fled from Iron Curtain countries to return “home.”
THE CHANGING PATTERN OF SOVIET OPERATIONS
The success of Soviet intelligence in the past and the depth of its penetration against its main targets are nowhere better evidenced than in its operations during World War II which have been uncovered. We must assume, however, that there were many such operations that have not come to light. Those that have are sufficient proof of an ability to establish and maintain clandestine contact with high-level sources under adverse conditions and to guide them in such a way that vital Soviet intelligence needs were fulfilled.
The key to many of these operations was the pro-Communist inclination of the people drawn into the networks and the important positions they occupied within their own governments or in sensitive installations. Klaus Fuchs, the atomic spy, is of course, a
prime example of a case where the Soviets had an optimum intelligence advantage. Fuchs was employed in key British and American research installations and was a convinced Communist. Today, as we shall see, at least in the countries of its major opponents, the Soviets can no longer rely on finding such ideological collaborators in key positions. Hence they are forced more and more to turn to other tactics, chiefly entrapment or promises of sizable financial or other reward.
Soviet operations in World War II can be divided into two categories: those against its enemies and those against its “allies.” In both areas Soviet intelligence had to fulfill Stalin’s order “to get the documents,” to reach directly into the places where decisions were made and literally to ferret out the facts and figures. The Soviets have never relied to the extent that Western countries have upon overt collection and expert analysis. Soviet intelligence, having developed within a highly secret and conspiratorial political atmosphere, naturally has an intense suspicion of the freely spoken or written word. The latter is of value to it only insofar as it serves to confirm or help interpret the intelligence produced by clandestine means—notably stolen documentary materials. In a country like Germany, even before the latter invaded Russia, and in Japan, with whom the Soviets were at peace until close to the war’s end, it was the main aim of Soviet intelligence to find out what military preparations were being made which would affect the defense of the U.S.S.R.
In Japan, the major Soviet network run by the German Richard Sorge consisted almost entirely of Japanese officials and newspapermen close to the Cabinet, most of whom had been sympathizers with the Communist cause since their student days. The main achievement of the Sorge ring was to give Stalin by mid-1941 definite evidence that the Japanese then had no military intentions against the Soviets and were going to concentrate their forces against Southeast Asia and the Pacific—the Pearl Harbor tactic. This information was worth many divisions to Stalin, and he acknowledged his debt to Sorge but did nothing to save him once he was caught. Stalin was able to leave his eastern flanks only lightly fortified, confident that he would not have to fight on two fronts. The Sorge ring was rounded up shortly after this intelligence was received in Moscow, but it had done its job.
Against the Nazis and particularly the nerve centers of the German Army, Air Force and diplomatic service in Berlin, the Soviets ran a spy ring called the Schulze-Boysen-Harnack group. It was comparable to Sorge’s ring in its makeup and mission. However, this group was by no means as professional in security techniques as Sorge’s and was doomed to be found out sooner or later because of the carelessness of its members. It consisted of some thirty to forty anti-Nazi and pro-Communist sources scattered throughout Nazi ministries, the Armed Forces and the aristocracy.
Schulze-Boysen was an intelligence officer in the Air Ministry in Berlin. Harnack, whose wife, Mildred Fish, was an American (she and all of the ringleaders were executed), was an official in the Economics Ministry. The widely ramified contacts of these two men served the Soviets well. Of the hundreds of reports they passed in the period 1939–42, those of the greatest significance to the Soviets contained detailed information on the disposition of the German Air Force, German aircraft production, movements of ground troops and decisions of the German High Command—for example, the decision to encircle Leningrad and cut it off rather than attempt to occupy it.
The Gestapo unit that finally apprehended this group and other Soviet networks in Western Europe called them the Rote Kapelle, or Red Orchestra. After they were put out of operation by late 1942, the Soviets developed a fantastic source located in Switzerland, a certain Rudolf Rössler (code name, “Lucy”). By means which have not been ascertained to this day, Rössler in Switzerland was able to get intelligence from the German High Command in Berlin on a continuous basis, often less than twenty-four hours after its daily decisions concerning the Eastern front were made. Rössler was that unusual combination, a pro-Communist Catholic. Alexander Foote, who operated one of the secret Soviet radio bases that transmitted Lucy’s information to Moscow, said of him:
Lucy . . . held in his hands the threads which led back to the three main commands in Germany, and also could, and did, provide information from other German offices. . . . Anyone who has fought a battle from the general staff angle will know what it means to be able to place the flags of the enemy on the map and plan the disposition of one’s own troops accordingly. . . . Lucy often put Moscow in this position, and the effect on the strategy of the Red Army and the ultimate defeat of the Wehrmacht was incalculable.4
4 Alexander Foote, Handbook for Spies (New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1949), p. 75.
The Sorge, Rote Kapelle and Lucy operations are the three best known of many Soviet penetrations in the war days. Altogether, the information which their intelligence work was able to collect through clandestine operations in World War II useful to the defense of the Soviets was about as good as any nation could hope to get.
In Allied countries the Soviet aim was essentially twofold. Stalin did not trust either Roosevelt or Churchill, and early in the game realized the coming clash of interests in the postwar world. Hence one aim of Soviet intelligence was to penetrate those offices of the American and British governments concerned with the “peace” settlements. The other targets were scientific and technological, in particular, nuclear. The Soviets knew that a great joint effort was being made in atomic research, and they wanted the benefits of it—hence Fuchs, Alan Nunn May, the Rosenbergs, Greenglass, Gold and a list of further names which came to light in the postwar years.
In the field of political intelligence, the cases and the agents have perhaps remained less fixed in the public memory, with the exceptions of the Hiss and Burgess-Maclean-Philby cases. The fact is, however, that in pursuit of their aim to learn what their ally the United Sates was planning for Germany, Central Europe and the Far East after the war, the Soviets had over forty high-level agents in various departments and agencies in Washington during World War II. At least this number was uncovered; we do not know how many remained undetected. Almost all of them, like the atomic spies, were persons of pro-Communist inclination at the time. Many have since recanted.
The Burgess-Maclean case, which broke in 1951 with the sudden flight of the two British officials to Soviet Russia, has perhaps been given too much the coloration of a defection. Also, its lurid angles have beclouded the real issues. This was no ordinary defection. The two men fled because they had timely warning from the “third man,” Harold (Kim) Philby, that British security was hot on their trail. These three men in positions of trust in the British foreign service had been working for Soviet intelligence for years. All three were Communist sympathizers while students at Cambridge in the 1930s. They eventually became long-term Soviet penetration agents. Their value to the Soviets was increased as each served a tour of duty in the British embassy in Washington in the early 1950s. Philby’s espionage activities were disclosed only in 1963, shortly after he had followed the other two behind the Iron Curtain.
In retrospect, it is Philby, less well known to the general public than his close friends, the notorious Burgess and Maclean, who deserves the closest scrutiny as perhaps the outstanding example of Soviet success in achieving high-level penetration through men who belonged to the generation of pro-Communist intellectuals of the twenties and thirties. Philby was not only a diplomat, useful as he and Burgess and Maclean may have been to the Soviets in this capacity; he was also a high-ranking intelligence officer.
In the postwar period, if we can judge from the cases that have been coming to light in the last ten years, Soviet intelligence in its pursuit of agents in sensitive positions in the U.S.A. and Britain began to run out of Communists and Communist sympathizers of the Fuchs-Rosenberg-Burgess-Maclean-Philby variety. There are a number of reasons for this. The hostile and aggressive intentions of Soviet Russia could no longer be masked by outwardly friendly diplomatic relations. The spectacle of
the United States or Great Britain soft-pedaling a case of Soviet espionage because existing policy called for maintaining diplomacy on an even keel with the Soviets, a situation which prevailed from time to time in the late thirties and during the war, was unthinkable after about 1947. Instead, security precautions of a kind unprecedented in Western history began to be taken in our country and elsewhere to safeguard government offices, military establishments and sensitive scientific and industrial installations against penetration by employees who might be agents or potential Soviet agents. Secondly, the disillusionment with the once supposedly idealistic aims of Communism began to reach the intellectuals in the postwar period so that the late forties and fifties saw no groups of well-educated pro-Communists coming from the campuses of our universities and colleges, as had been the case from the depression days up to World War II.
The Soviets turned to other kinds of helpers, people who had other reasons for collaborating with them, willingly or unwillingly. Perhaps the most typical trend in the early postwar period, which illustrates the rapid adaptability of Soviet intelligence to new conditions, as well as the basic cold-blooded pragmatism of Communist tactics, was the massive recruitment by the Soviets of former SS and war criminals in both East and West Germany for intelligence work. The Soviets saw two strong factors they could exploit in dealing with such people. They were, first of all, by agreement of all the Allies, in the “automatic arrest” category. Under military government we had imprisoned many of them. The Soviets shot some of them. But what better way to force the recruitment of an agent than to stay his execution or excuse him from long imprisonment if he will consent to commit espionage in return for the favor? This was the line the Soviets took in East Germany. In West Germany, the de-Nazification procedures made it very difficult for former members of the SS, Gestapo and similar Nazi organizations to get decent jobs. Many of these men who had shortly before been riding high under the emblems of Nazi power were ostracized, unemployed and in dire straits. Their attitude toward the American and British occupation authorities was, to say the least, negative. They were ripe for the Soviet invitation to treason. They hardly felt it to be treason, since in their opinion there was with Germany under foreign military rule no real authority to which they felt any direct loyalty.
The Craft of Intelligence Page 14
