Great Powers

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Great Powers Page 56

by Thomas P. M. Barnett


  11. Expect a challenge to your best-laid plans.

  136. By making clear to the Soviets what behavior . . . starting with Truman’s second term. Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 727.

  12. Selling grand strategy is one thing, executing it is quite another.

  138. As Acheson himself put it in his memoirs . . . amid the smoke and confusion of battle.” Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 727.

  138. Also, like any good grand strategist, Kennan . . . the hand of time a chance to work.” George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), p. 364; see his chapter on the “X” article, pp. 354-67.

  139. Here, the narrow orthodoxy of Nitze’s . . . “loss” of China to Communism; and so on. Quoted in Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), p. 395.

  13. If you want to make it stick, then the boys are never coming home.

  140. What largely defined America’s status . . . about 300,000 troops in Europe at all times.

  For details, see Kane, “Global U.S. Troop Deployment, 1950-2003.

  14. Nukes killed great-power war.

  143. Gallup polls at the time indicated . . . would run for and win the presidency in 1952. See McCullough, Truman, p. 848.

  The Global American System Becomes Globalization

  144. The market’s “hidden hand” . . . dismember losers on a continuing basis. On this, see James Surowiecki, The Wisdom of Crowds: Why the Many Are Smarter Than the Few and How Collective Wisdom Shapes Business, Economies, Societies, and Nations (New York: Doubleday, 2004).

  145. We also allowed ourselves, as Kennan himself . . “allies” in many instances. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950, p. 322.

  148. In this instance, as eminent Soviet . . . their infamous wall the previous year. See Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1973 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), pp. 667-77; and Ulam, Understanding the Cold War: A Historian’s Personal Reflections (Charlottesville, VA: Leopolis Press, 2000), p. 112.

  149. By agreeing for the first time ever to limit . . . as Ulam states, “was finished.” Ulam, Understanding the Cold War, p. 152.

  150. Read the White House memoirs of both Nixon . . . America off the gold standard. Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990); Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979).

  150. Nixon was intent from the start . . . and then under Johnson to the Vietnam war.” Nixon, Memoirs of Richard Nixon, p. 343.

  151. Like Nixon, Kissinger was wholly unsatisfied . . . assumes to have perfect vision.” Kissinger, White House Years, p. 522.

  151. Not given, as he put it . . “sentimental conciliation” to “liturgical belligerence.” Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 120 and 123.

  151. With Nixon, he would establish concreteness . . . as the principles for engagement. Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 128-29.

  151. Linkage, in Nixon’s mind, was most important . . . compartmentalize areas of concern.” Nixon, Memoirs of Richard Nixon, p. 346.

  151. But as Kissinger points out . . . would be arranged by the superpowers alone. Kissinger, White House Years, p. 57.

  151. In the piece he stated that America . . . cherish its hates and threaten its neighbors.” See Richard Nixon, “Asia After Viet Nam,” in Hamilton Fish Armstrong, ed., Fifty Years of Foreign Affairs (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), p. 395. The message was received, notes Margaret MacMillan, as Mao instructed Zhou to read the article; see her Nixon and Mao: The Week That Changed the World (New York: Random House, 2007), p. 166.

  151. He put it more expansively . . . live in angry isolation.” Find the entire address online at www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/presiden/inaug/nixon1.htm.

  152. Once Nixon publicly announced . . . accomplished in Moscow than in Peking.” Kissinger, White House Years, p. 766.

  152. As Brezhnev later quipped, Nixon went . . . but to Moscow to do business.” Kissinger, White House Years, p. 836.

  152. Through the Helsinki Accords . . . “within as well as across national borders.” Borgwardt, New Deal for the World, p. 6; see also her chapter “Forgotten Legacies of the Atlantic Charter,” pp. 250-84.

  152. As historian John Lewis Gaddis argues . . . with Moscow’s official sanction. John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin, 2006), pp. 204-7.

  154. In that sense, as Ulam noted, SDI was a wonderful psychological weapon. See Ulam, Understanding the Cold War, pp. 242-43.

  155. In his idealism, Gorbachev mistook . . . somebody they “could do business with.” On this, see Nicholas Wapshott, Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher: A Political Marriage (New York: Sentinel, 2007), pp. 226-50.

  157. But of course that was a wildly . . . The Return of History and the End of Dreams. See Kagan, Return of History, pp. 3-10.

  CHAPTER 4. THE ECONOMIC REALIGNMENT: RACING TO THE BOTTOM OF THE PYRAMID

  161. If our fifty members . . . Republic (VT) and Uzbekistan (WY). This listing comes from a map (“US States Renamed for Countries with Similar GDPs”) created by The York Group International; it can be found online (with neat annotation) at the Strange Maps site (strangemaps.wordpress.com/2007/06/ 10/131-us-states-renamed-for-countries-with-similar-gdps/).

  The Undeniable Trajectory: Deng Chose Wisely

  165. Deng’s dream for China in 1979 . . . by the middle of the twenty-first century.” Michael E. Marti, China and the Legacy of Deng Xiaoping: From Communist Revolution to Capitalist Evolution (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 2002), p. xiii.

  166. Deng’s ultimate dream, as Marti notes . . . a Chinese system for an Asian union. Marti, Deng Xiaoping, p. 3.

  166. As Marti writes: “With a weak Russia . . . must be pushed to the limit.” Marti, Deng Xiaoping, p. 153.

  167. But China is also nowhere near becoming . . . and remain a single-party state. For the most dark view, see James Mann, The China Fantasy: How Our Leaders Explain Away Chinese Repression (New York: Viking, 2007).

  The American System Perturbed: 3 Billion New Capitalists Register Their Demand

  169. That’s how Wal-Mart, the single biggest . . . export market), keeps its prices so low. Burton G. Malkiel and Patricia A. Taylor, From Wall Street to the Great Wall: How Investors Can Profit from China’s Booming Economy (New York: W. W. Norton, 2008), p. 254.

  169. Now, thanks to significant flows . . . great majority of China’s hardware IT exports. See Malkiel and Taylor, Wall Street to the Great Wall, pp. 248-49.

  170. China’s explosive economic growth . . . suck in resources from all over the world. For a good overview of this phenomenon, along with its long-term environmental impact, see Jared Diamond, Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed (New York: Viking, 2005), pp. 358-77. See also Edward McBride, “China’s Quest for Resources: A Ravenous Dragon; China’s Hunger for Natural Resources Has Set Off a Global Commodity Boom,” The Economist, March 13, 2008.

  170. As a longtime China-watcher, James Kynge . . . possess the natural resources of one. James Kynge, China Shakes the World: A Titan’s Rise and Troubled Future—and the Challenge for America (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2006), p. 133.

  170. Take, for instance, China’s relationship . . . Hezbollah as it faces Israeli forces. For a sense of how such technology flows begin, see Parag Khanna, Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order (New York: Random House, 2008), p. 208.

  171. When bad things happen . . . you should fear, because it needs that oil. See Anita Powell, “Ethiopian Rebels Kill 74 in Oil Attack,” Associated Press, April 24, 2007.

  171. You know that Thomas Friedman . . . America funding both sides of the “war on terror”? See Thomas L. Friedman, “No Mullah Left Behind,” New York Times, February 13, 2005.

  172. According to longtime observer Edward Luce . . . like driving an unlicensed taxi. Edward Luce, In Spite of the Gods: The Strange Rise of Modern India (New York: Doubleday, 2007), p. 47.
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  173. Shanghai already has twice as many skyscrapers . . . and plans another thousand. See David Barboza, “China Builds Its Dreams and Some Fear a Bubble,” New York Times, October 18, 2005.

  173. There’s also a sexual revolution . . . Father Knows Best to Sex and the City. For examples, see “China Discovers Hot Sheets Motels,” Newsmax.com, March 2, 2008, found online at www.newsmax.com/international/chinas_sexual_revolution/2008/03/02/77153.html; and Maureen Fan, “Too Much Information?: A Radio Advice Program Tests China’s Taboo on Talking Sex,” Washington Post, September 11, 2006.

  173. As the writer and political scientist Ian Bremmer says . . . all those camera phones! Ian Bremmer, The J Curve: A New Way to Understand Why Nations Rise and Fall (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), p. 18.

  173. In terms of corruption, Beijing remains . . . nineteenth century, and that’s not good. For the best analysis of how corruption limits further economic development in China, see Minxin Pei, China’s Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).

  173. Citizens are simply growing angrier . . . downtown Shanghai to the suburbs. For example, see Howard W. French, “Shanghai Rail-Line Plan Fuels Middle-Class Protest,” New York Times, January 27, 2008.

  174. The Sichuan earthquake of 2008 . . . Communist Party scrambled to accommodate. For example, see Andrew Jacobs, “Parents’ Grief Turns to Rage at Chinese Officials,” New York Times, May 28, 2008; and the New York Times online slide show found at www.nytimes.com/slide show/2008/05/28/world/20080528QUAKE_6.html.

  174. A couple of decades ago, China’s courts . . . more than 5 million cases a year. Cited in Mure Dickie, “A Potential Threat to Stability?: The Government Has Created Popular Expectations Without Fulfilling Them,” Financial Times, November 8, 2005.

  174. Corruption already consumes upward . . . China’s gross domestic product. An OECD report estimate, cited in James Kynge, China Shakes the World, p. 201.

  174. The 2008 Beijing Olympics was . . . they had sold to foreign broadcasters. See Peter Burrows, “Why China Is Finally Tackling Video Piracy: Beijing Wants to Prove It Can Protect the Lucrative Broadcasting Rights for the Summer Games,” BusinessWeek, June 9, 2008.

  174. As sociologist Juan Enriquez writes . . . so many people out of poverty as quickly.” Juan Enriquez, The Untied States of America: Polarization, Fracturing, and Our Future (New York: Crown Publishers, 2005), p. 67.

  The New Rules: China Breaks the Mold or Merely Recasts It?

  175. As business academics William Baumol . . . four types of capitalism operating today. See William J. Baumol, Robert E. Litan, and Carl J. Schramm, Good Capitalism, Bad Capitalism, and the Economics of Growth and Prosperity (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007), pp. 60-92.

  176. In their book, Baumol et al. argue . . . once their innovations mature. See Baumol et al., Good Capitalism, Bad Capitalism, pp. 85-92.

  176. Thus, China’s strategy seems clear . . . one-third of China’s gross domestic product today. Baumol et al., Good Capitalism, Bad Capitalism, p. 165.

  177. This strategy of “incremental change . . . entrepreneurial small firms. Baumol et al., Good Capitalism, Bad Capitalism, p. 165.

  177. As Fareed Zakaria notes in The Post-American . . . that the country has defied this trend.” Zakaria, Post-American World, pp. 100-101.

  The New Normal: Defaulting to the Beijing Consensus

  177. Neo-Marxists have long argued . . . budget deficits over the course of the Cold War. A classic recent historical account in this vein can be found in Giovanni Arrighi, Adam Smith in Beijing: Lineages of the Twenty-first Century (New York: Verso, 2007); see especially Part II: “Tracking Global Turbulence” and Part III: “Hegemony Unraveling” (pp. 99-274). To read it is to visit another universe of economic interpretation.

  181. This is especially true for China . . . all those workers coming into the mix. By 2030, China will have 400 million senior citizens, according to Chinese government estimates cited in Sheng-Wei Wang, China’s Ascendancy: An Opportunity or a Threat? What Every American Should Know About China (Washington, DC: International Publishing House for China’s Culture, 2007), p. 269. As for the job-creation estimate in the Middle East/North Africa, I attended a Jordanian FDI conference at the Dead Sea in February 2008, where that number was repeated by speakers more times than I can remember, indicating that—true or not—that’s the expectation among business and political leaders.

  183. Not surprisingly . . . and, in particular, al Qaeda’s brutality. See “Global Opinion Trends 2002-2007: A Rising Tide Lifts Mood in the Developing World; Sharp Decline in Support for Suicide Bombing in Muslim Countries (47-Nation Pew Global Attitudes Survey)” at the Pew Global Attitudes Project site, found online at pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/257.pdf. The general rule is, the poorer the country, the more positively globalization polls.

  183. The World Bank recently recalculated the . . . 40 percent smaller than we imagined. On this, see Walter Russell Mead, “The Great Fall of China: Revised GDP Calculations Show That Beijing Isn’t the Giant We Thought It Was,” Los Angeles Times, December 30, 2007.

  184. The so-called Washington Consensus of the 1990s . . . emulate our success of that era. On this, see George Lodge and Craig Wilson, A Corporate Solution to Global Poverty: How Multinationals Can Help the Poor and Invigorate Their Own Legitimacy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Pres, 2006), pp. 37-38 and 122-25.

  185. In many ways, then, the so-called Beijing Consensus . . . “consultative” approach. On this, see Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power Is Transforming the World (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007), pp. 1-12 and 56-58.

  185. Some globalization experts, such as Parag Khanna . . . consensus-style rule. Khanna, Second World, pp. xvi-xviii.

  The Global Accelerant: Rushing to Settle Frontiers

  187. Europe, or more to the point . . . the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. On the Dutch influence in early America, a fantastically entertaining history can be found in Russell Shorto, The Island at the Center of the World: The Epic Story of Dutch Manhattan and the Forgotten Colony That Shaped America (New York: Random House, 2005). During my last trip (June 2008) consulting with the national security elements of the Dutch government, I was given the book as a gift—and perhaps a none-too-subtle hint that I need to increase my appreciation for the Netherlands’ role in creating American “exceptionalism” (especially on religious tolerance)!

  187. In these sparsely populated . . . indigenous populations to assimilation or death. On the original iteration of globalization, see Tim Blanning, The Pursuit of Glory: Europe 1648-1815 (New York: Viking, 2007).

  189. Looking back over the spread of modern capitalism . . . lagging India by example. On the Anglosphere concept, see James C. Bennett, The Anglosphere Challenge: Why the English-Speaking Nations Will Lead the Way in the Twenty-first Century (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004).

  189. There are roughly 300 FTAs in the world today . . . negotiating upward of 30 FTAs. Cited in the editorial “Trading Without America,” Wall Street Journal, August 7, 2007.

  190. By most calculations, China has . . . any nation has ever aged in human history. Again, see Wang, China’s Ascendancy, p. 269.

  190. Toyota and Honda were forced . . . that source local, build local, and sell local. Samuel Palmisano, “Multinationals Have Been Superseded,” Financial Times, June 12, 2006.

  191. If you tell me that Asian religious . . . let’s facilitate that process the best we can. See Rob Moll, “Missions Incredible: South Korea Sends More Missionaries Than Any Country but the U.S.: And It Won’t Be Long Before It’s Number One,” Christianity Today, March 1, 2006, found online at www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2006/march/16.28.html.

  191. If you tell me Chinese farmers . . . homesteaders once helped trigger in America. See “Landless Chinese Farmers Migrate to Africa in Search of Agricultural Opportunities,” BioPact, December 2, 2007, found onl
ine at biopact.com/2007/12/landless-chinese-farmers-migrate-to.html.

  191. Finally, if you tell me the global economy . . . globalization’s networks faster. See Sarah Childress, “Investors Go to Treacherous Places Seeking Returns: Funds Pour Money into Zimbabwe on the Theory Mugabe Can’t Rule Forever, Nation Will Rebound,” Wall Street Journal, November 17-18, 2007; Joanna Chung, “Investors in Push into Africa: Commodities Boom Flags Growth Potential; Private Capital Flows Triple Since 2003,” Financial Times, November 19, 2007; and Joanna Chung, “Investors’ Enthusiasm Grows for the New Frontiers,” Financial Times, November 20, 2007.

  191. So can greed save Africa, as one BusinessWeek story asked a while back? Roben Farzad, “Can Greed Save Africa: Fearless Investing Is Succeeding Where Aid Often Hasn’t,” BusinessWeek, December 10, 2007.

  192. Economist Paul Collier, for example . . . more than periodic “profit-taking” exercises. Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 99-123.

  192. As far as where to direct . . . that specifically targets those issues is most warranted. See Jeffrey D. Sachs, The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time (New York: Penguin Press, 2005), pp. 188-209.

  193. Longtime aid expert William Easterly . . . difficult choices up to Africans themselves. William Easterly, The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good (New York: Penguin Press, 2006), pp. 249-58; on aid “vouchers,” see his point on pp. 376-79.

  193. As Francis Fukuyama has argued . . . attract foreign direct investment. Francis Fukuyama, speech to annual Society for International Development conference (Washington, DC, chapter), February 6, 2007.

 

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