Brig Gen Ormsby M. Mitchel (“Old Stars”), commanding general of the 3rd Division, 1st Corps, Army of the Ohio. It was this aggressive and insistent general who supported and launched the Andrews Raid.
Someone had taken particular notice of the fact that the two bridges burned on the W&A line by the November bridge-burners prevented any trains from arriving in Chattanooga for almost a week. This was the mysterious James Andrews, who had a reputation as a freelance “scout,” then the “courteous” term for a spy. While not privileged to any degree of official access, he worked in the North as well as the Confederacy and was sometimes rumored to be a double agent. Andrews had developed numerous contacts in the South and also read the Southern papers – an important source of information, as armies on both sides had difficulty controlling and limiting what the papers published. While not a military man, he was able to see the benefits of the destruction of railroad bridges and how this could be of advantage if coordinated with a Union offensive to take Huntsville and Chattanooga.
THE MYSTERIOUS JAMES J. ANDREWS
James Andrews was widely considered a man of mystery in his lifetime and there are still questions regarding his short life today – even his middle name is not known. It is believed that he was born in 1829 in Holliday’s Cove, Virginia (today Weirton, West Virginia). Nothing is known of his youth until 1859, when he appeared in Flemingsburg, Kentucky, and took on odd jobs before finally becoming a house painter and singing teacher. Handsome, amiable and possessed of a pleasant singing voice, he was known as a ladies’ man, described by some as sociable but with few close friends. Nonetheless it is said that by the time of the Civil War he was engaged to an Elizabeth Layton. His political views he kept mostly to himself, other than that he believed in the restoration of the Union, and he did not have any known military experience.
In 1861 he quietly traveled south and developed a lucrative trade in smuggling quinine (scarce in the South and necessary to treat malaria) and other contraband, mostly notions (needles, pins, thread, buttons) and hardware. He apparently used his smuggling efforts to develop trust among his Southern contacts and quietly collected information on Confederate activities, dispositions, and so forth, which he duly reported back to Federal forces. Even common rankers had heard stories of Andrews the “spy” or “scout” working both sides. Many thought he was a Southern citizen taking advantage of the Union army for self-serving purposes – there were a number of such shady line crossers passing freely back and forth. Andrews had also developed connections and trust among Federal commanders in Tennessee, even though some saw him as a freelance double agent for sale to the highest bidder. Regardless of his questionable loyalties, he proved otherwise by proposing and leading a failed train-stealing, bridge-burning raid into Georgia in March 1862. As harrowing as the unsuccessful raid was, Andrews was not discouraged from making another attempt the following month, putting his life on the line once again. Whether he did it for the Union, glory, or profit, he was undoubtedly willing to take the risks.
The 33-year old adventurer is generally described as 6ft tall, about 185lb, gray eyes, thick black hair, and a short curling beard. He typically carried a .44 Henry Winchester rifle, although he did not take this on the raid. Fellow raider “Alf” Wilson described Andrews’ demeanor: “He was a man who combined intelligence and refinement with cool dauntless courage that quailed under no difficulty or danger. He was a man deliberate in speech and calm in manner – a man fitted for the dangerous service he was engaged in, though I doubt his entire fitness to command men in sudden and unexpected emergencies. However, he shared his chances equally with us…”
James Andrews was eventually executed as a result of his raiding activities on June 7, 1862. He was buried at 3rd and Juniper Streets, NE, in Atlanta, and reburied in the National Cemetery, Chattanooga, Tennessee on October 16, 1887 alongside the other executed raiders.
Andrews arrived at the 3rd Division’s Shelbyville encampment the night of the Shiloh battle, April 6, and requested to speak to Gen Mitchel. Little is known of the relationship or any previous arrangements between Mitchel and Andrews, although they had concocted an earlier unsuccessful train-stealing, bridge-burning expedition. There are no known written records or orders showing dealings between the two men. Neither would survive long enough to write memoirs.1 It is likely that Andrews had already passed on valuable and verifiable intelligence information to Mitchel, otherwise the general would not have had the confidence and trust even to consider what he was about to propose. It is known that Andrews had previously offered his services to Gen Buell, who had taken him up on the offer and sanctioned Andrews’ proposal for an earlier behind-the-lines raid and turned him over to Mitchel for that attempt. He also provided intelligence information to Buell. After the war, Buell derided the raid and cast doubt on Andrews’ value as an agent, claiming his information was mostly useless and out of date, and that his loyalty and reliability were questionable. This is thought to be an effort on Buell’s part to sever any ties to the raid, which he felt was ill-conceived, poorly planned, and shabbily executed. It is doubtful that this was truly Buell’s opinion at the time of his dealings with Andrews. Northern commanders were hungry for information from the South, Southern intentions and capabilities, and ideas that would assist their efforts to defeat the Confederacy. Regardless of the real value they may have provided, many more traditionally-minded officers took a dim view of employing “scouts” and “line crossers.” They held these shadowy individuals in no higher regard than they did the equally “unsavory” partisans, guerrillas, and bushwhackers.
Andrews had proposed to Buell a follow-up to November’s poorly developed and coordinated bridge-burning raid, and it was passed to Mitchel. This one was to be coordinated with Union actions and would not be simply widespread random bridge-burnings without a definite objective – Mitchel liked precision, order, and coordination. He had planned his own bridge-burning campaign in Knoxville, Kentucky the previous September but the plan had been foiled by Brig Gen Sherman, who refused to allow Mitchel’s division to march through his area.
Andrews’ first attempted raid with Buell’s approval occurred in late March. Andrews took eight men, volunteer soldiers of the 2nd Ohio Infantry, to Atlanta. There is no record of who these men were (bar one), their route, or the degree of support provided by Buell. One, though, was a relative of Corporal Pittenger, himself a future raider. This Private Frank Miller described to Pittenger how they had exchanged their blues for civilian garb and had taken four days to infiltrate through Confederate lines by road to Chattanooga. From there they took a W&A train to Atlanta and spent three days staying in different hotels. He told of the cover story they used to explain their presence; they were Kentuckians seeking to join a unit fighting for the South. Miller also discussed the annoyance of having to pretend to agree with the Southern cause, praise Southern leaders, and criticize Yankees. The plan relied on a turncoat W&A engineer assisting with seizing a northbound train, however the treacherous engineer was a no-show. As they waited, Andrews made discreet enquiries and found the engineer had been transferred to the Mobile & Ohio RR to help run troops northward, as the battle of Shiloh was about to commence. Andrews considered stealing the train without the benefit of the engineer and asked if any of the men could run a locomotive. None could and he learned a valuable lesson. Heavy rains also hampered the effort. The plan had been to burn bridges, dislodge rails, and cut telegraph wires as the stolen train ran north, but Andrews was forced to release the men from the mission without achieving any of these objectives. The raiding party had no choice but to make their own way back to Union lines, no doubt facing difficult questions the further north they traveled. All the men eventually returned, rattled but safe, and Miller would later recount that he considered himself fortunate to be alive.
This stillborn mission proved to be a beneficial dry run for Andrews. Undaunted, he remained in Georgia, considered the difficulties he encountered, and developed a more ambitious plan
. In all probability he made additional trips up the W&A line to determine the most favorable station from which to steal a train, the locations of troops, which stations had telegraphs; he would have studied train schedules and learned the intricate working of the rail junctions at Kingston, Dalton, and Chattanooga, which they would have to negotiate. In addition, he found the locations of woodyards and water tanks, timed the actions of his planned raid, and studied his primary targets – the bridges. The two longest bridges crossed the Etowah and Oostanaula rivers.2 In total, eleven covered wooden bridges crossed the winding Chickamauga Creek and its branches. These covered bridges were mostly of the truss type, relatively short, and thus reasonably quick to repair. The roofed and sided housing cover was intended to protect the heavy and expensive wooden timbers from the weather. An unprotected wooden bridge might last nine years but covered bridges could last many decades. The cover also helped prevent ice from forming by keeping the rails dry as winter winds rushed beneath the bridge. The most effective targets would be the lengthy Etowah and Oostanaula river bridges. These were timber truss bridges resting on high stone pillars and abutments, with the latter covered. In all there were 17 bridges on the W&A. Andrews also coordinated and gained support of local contacts he had developed, but no information exists about who these people were or the extent of aid they may have provided.
The meeting ran late into the night as Mitchel and staff officers listened to Andrews, studied maps, considered options, worked out details, and integrated the timing into the coming advance into Alabama and then on to Chattanooga. Once the details were worked out and an agreement was made, funds were provided, and manpower made available to Andrews. There was little time to gather the men, make preparations, infiltrate overland to Chattanooga, and travel to Marietta. It was already the night of Sunday, April 6; the train was to be stolen on the morning of Friday the 11th and the raiders had to be in Marietta no later than the evening before.
It had begun to rain on the day of the meeting. It would rain for the next ten days and this would have a major impact on the raid and Mitchel’s advance. The high day temperature would be in the 80°F range and the night low temperature in the upper 30°F. Winds were generally light, but with occasional gusts and the skies overcast. Sunrise was about 7.00am and sunset at 5.30pm.
The north Georgia hills are densely covered by elm, buckeye, poplar, hickory, maple, ash, elm, sweet gum, and various pines and oaks with a generally thick underbrush. The terrain is gently rolling and becomes higher and steeper the further north one goes. Rivers and streams were slow flowing, usually with steep banks. The limited road system was crude and cross-country movement through the wooded hills and ridges was extremely difficult as the raiders would learn, and the rain did not help.
1 Gen Mitchel died of yellow fever October 30, 1862.
2 Many northern Georgia place names bear Cherokee and other Native American names.
THE PLAN
As already detailed, Andrews proposed his bold and much improved plan to Mitchel on April 6. Andrews had obviously chosen to make his proposal to Mitchel in preference to the foot-dragging Buell. He may also have thought that the dynamic and forward-leaning Mitchel would be more receptive and supportive of an unconventional strategy. Mitchel was in a hurry to make a name for himself, and the engineer, mathematician, and astronomer in him were drawn to such a plan. He liked the idea of coordinated action between the raiders and his division and, if successful, the unconventional effort would be extremely valuable in supporting his advance – it just might open the door to Chattanooga and contribute to shortening the bloody war.
Andrews proposed leading two dozen men, recommended for their steadfastness by their commanders, to Chattanooga after infiltrating over 70 miles by foot, horse, or wagon disguised as civilians. Fortunately there were no passport systems or travel restrictions in the area. From Chattanooga they would take a W&A train to Marietta only 12 miles north of Atlanta in the heart of Georgia; it appears Andrews had decided that it would be safer to await the train in a smaller town than run the risks of Atlanta. To reach Marietta they would travel south on the same rail line along which they would later withdraw. They would stay overnight at hotels in Marietta on the night of April 10 to board the Chattanooga-bound train at 5.00am on the 11th. A cover story would be provided, with the men responding to any queries about their business that they were from Kentucky and were en route to enlist in a Kentuckian unit fighting for the South (Kentucky was another border state with mixed alliances) – this would explain their Midwestern accents. They had just four full days to plan and organize the mission, select the men and ready them, and infiltrate to Marietta in poor weather. It’s likely that when Andrews approached Mitchel he had no inkling of how soon the fiery little general was going to move. If he had arrived a day later Mitchel and even Andrews himself may have deemed it too late to launch the raid in support of the upcoming advance. There was not a moment to lose.
The train they boarded would be stolen at Big Shanty, 8 miles north of Marietta. Andrews had picked this station with great care. Big Shanty (renamed Kennesaw in 1887) was merely a stopping place where the train would halt for breakfast at the W&A-built Lacy Hotel. There was no town, just the hotel, which doubled as the station, post office, and a few scattered dwellings. Andrews knew that at this stop the crew and passengers all unloaded for a quick breakfast, providing the ideal opportunity to seize the train unopposed. The other advantage of taking over the train at this location was that there was no telegraph station. However, directly across the tracks from the hotel was Camp McDonald.
The Georgia Western & Atlanta Railroad Station in Atlanta, the start point for the General’s morning run to Chattanooga, Tennessee. The General was the target of Andrews’ “locomotive thieves.” Confederate troops are loaded atop the string of boxcars.
Camp McDonald was opened in June 1861 and operated by the Georgia Military Institute in Marietta (an institution modeled after West Point). It served as a school for the 4th Brigade of Georgia Volunteers (Phillip’s Legion), the instruction being provided by the facility and cadets of the institute. Briefly closed in the late fall of that year after the training cycle was completed, it reopened in early 1862 to train six newly raised regiments. It would close for good in 1863. The institute’s presence appears to have lent a false sense of security to the train crew, resulting in few concerns about their leaving the train unattended for breakfast. Andrews, having already traveled the line on this particular run several times, was well aware of their schedule and the routine at Camp McDonald. Reveille at the camp was 6.00am, not long after the train arrived. The awakening troops would be cleaning up and preparing for morning formation while the train was unattended. Many of the guards were armed with unloaded muskets with fixed bayonets or 6ft pikes – known as “Joe Brown pikes,” as they were advocated by the governor of the same name, who was overimpressed with their low cost compared with rifles, and envisioned them able to halt mass infantry and cavalry charges. Both rifles and pikes would be relatively ineffective in the hands of green recruits against determined men armed with revolvers, and equally poor for stopping a wayward train. Nonetheless, it would still be unnerving for the raiders to undertake such a bold move with a large body of troops so near at hand, even if they were still rubbing sleep from their eyes and looking forward to their breakfast of “peanut coffee” (parched and roasted peanuts, rye, and cow peas) and cornbread.
There were two parallel sidings on the west side of the main line. If any unscheduled trains came in from the north – a common occurrence because of military needs – the intended stolen train would not be blocked. The unscheduled train could be shuttled on to a siding to allow the regular freight or passenger train to proceed north on schedule, or the southbound train could pass on through if the regular train was not yet ready after its breakfast stop.
Andrews’ assessment of his mediocre raiding attempt in March allowed him to improve and develop a more effective plan. He added more m
anpower to provide sufficient firepower if necessary, and recruited experienced engineers, to include backups in event of casualties, rather than relying on Southern turncoats. He may also have decided that, even though a smaller group would be less conspicuous when traveling, a larger group would be more resilient in a fight if casualties were suffered or some men simply abandoned the effort. Other than Camp McDonald there were no regular military units along the route, but there were local part-time militia and armed civilians who vividly recalled the November bridge-burnings. They would be more than willing to pursue train-stealers. The increased manpower was a wise decision; on that fateful morning four men failed to make the Marietta rendezvous, one of them the most experienced of the three engineers.
Andrews’ plan was for his men to step off the train and give the impression that they were simply stretching their legs as the crew and passengers went into the hotel for breakfast. He would then discreetly move toward the head of the train on its right side, the side opposite the hotel, but in plain sight of the camp. They would uncouple the passenger cars, some men would board a boxcar while designated brakemen simultaneously climbing atop the boxcars. Andrews and his engineers would then board the locomotive, and be on their way. They would need to be done as soon as possible after arrival so that the locomotive’s steam was still up; the less time spent there reduced any unexpected changes in events or the risk of attracting attention owing to any suspicious behavior.
The Great Locomotive Chase Page 2
