10 Tracks were merely laid on tamped ground in those days rather than on elevated rock ballast roadbeds, enhancing drainage.
11 Fuller claims they encountered numerous breaks, but the raiders maintained there was only this one.
12 Barricades were constructed by jamming two crossties in an X-form between crossties and under the rails. Others were erected by haphazardly stacking ties, branches, and fence poles. There was no time to make “Sherman’s bowties” by heating lifted rails and bending them around telegraph poles or trees.
13 Crossties were usually oak and were not treated with creosote or tar and turpentine at this time.
14 “Moccasin Rangers” – no other unit identification available.
THE RAIDERS’ FATE
Called spies, villains, and train thieves by Southern newspapers, within days the 20 raiders were transferred to the Chattanooga jail. They were under the charge of a despicable jailer named Swims, a drunken, uncouth individual who passed his sober moments harassing the prisoners. The small two-story brick building was surrounded by a wooden stockade. Entry was via exterior stairs to the second floor, which contained a holding cell and the jailer’s squalid quarters. The ground floor was reached by a ladder through a trapdoor and held a small kitchen and the filthy inmates’ cell. the “Hole,” as it was known, had also served as a jail for runaway slaves.
Andrews and others were personally interrogated by Brig Gen Leadbetter and all were accused of being Yankee spies. The widely-known Andrews made no effort to conceal his identity and a considerable amount of Confederate money was taken off him. Even though they had failed and caused no real damage, there was little doubt they would be court-martialed as spies. The prisoners considered all manner of escape plans, but it was virtually hopeless owing to the strength of the jail building and the guards.
All of the raiders were captured within days of the failed raid. Shackled, they were marched through towns with crowds shouting for the immediate hanging of the “engine stealers.” (Pittenger)
Pittenger and “Alf” Wilson took the lead in planning their defense. They would maintain they were merely US Army soldiers performing a military operation. They had not sneaked through Confederate pickets, lurked about encampments, or attempted to gain any information to pass back to their commander. They were to capture a train and destroy bridges – military targets – in support of their unit’s advance. During the trial they would further argue that Confederate raiders habitually lacked uniforms and were treated as prisoners of war. They all agreed not to reveal anything of Andrews’ rumored spying efforts, his earlier postponed raid, who had served as the engineer, and that Campbell was a civilian claiming he was in Company K, 2nd Ohio. There was no escaping the fact that they had volunteered for a secret expedition behind enemy lines, wore civilian clothes, and deceived Southerners about their identity. The newspapers were outraged at the train thieves and were soon calling it the “great railroad chase.” But at the same time they exhibited a grudging admiration for the audacity and boldness of the devious raiders.
Andrews, the mastermind, was tried first. His known background worked against him and there was little question that he would be branded a spy. He did argue that he attacked no Southerners, had not intended to burn bridges, had been a member of the Kentucky State Guard (a dubious claim which was intended to afford him a measure of military status), and had been pressed into performing service for the Union. Regardless, he was found guilty of spying and treason since he had conducted business in good faith in the Confederacy.
Accusations that they had “stolen” the locomotive were countered by claims that they “captured” it, and not deep behind the front lines, but immediately adjacent to a Confederate force. Such arguments fell on deaf ears.
Pittenger, probably because he had been so articulate and argued their case, was often segregated from the other prisoners and given some preferential treatment, much to the annoyance of the others. It was not long before some accused him of cooperating with the enemy to save himself.
The horrid Chattanooga Jail, also known as the “Negro Jail” or “Swims Jail” after its malicious and unsavory turnkey or simply the “Hole.” The prisoners were housed on the airless, squalid ground floor. The door on the ground floor was for the separate kitchen. James Andrews and John Wollam managed to escape a week before Andrews’ execution. They made a hole through the bricks under the roof’s eaves; having been moved to the second floor. Both were recaptured and Andrews was executed as scheduled. (Pittenger)
On May 1, the prisoners were suddenly removed from the Hole and loaded on a train for Atlanta, pulled by none other than the General. Mitchel was moving on Chattanooga. They could not help but notice the much increased presence of bridge and station guards and the passport system. The next day they went on to Madison, 70 miles east of Atlanta. But Mitchel’s “advance” had been nothing more than a move to secure his supply lines and the prisoners were sent back to Swims’ hellhole three days later, although they were incarcerated on the more tolerable second floor.
On May 31, 12 raiders – Brown, Buffum, Campbell, Knight, Mason, Pittenger, Robertson, Ross, Scott, Shadrach, Slavens, and George Wilson – were transported to Knoxville, Kentucky for trial. That same day, Andrews was given his death warrant to be executed on June 7. The only way Andrews could be saved was to escape. The nine prisoners began planning for their leader’s getaway. They miraculously managed to bust Andrews and Wollam out and they made it over the stockade with sentries blasting away. The two were separated and Andrews lost his boots. Wollam eluded his trackers, found a canoe on the Tennessee River, and paddled west. Andrews made it only 12 miles and was recaptured two days later, half dead.
In Knoxville only seven of the 12 raiders were tried, one a day: Campbell, Robertson, Ross, Scott, Shadrach, Slavens, and George Wilson. The conclusion was essentially predetermined. On June 14, all were sentenced “to be hung [sic] by the neck until he is dead.”
On the day of Andrews’ execution, June 7, he and the other raiders were quickly evacuated to Atlanta as the 3rd Division was again attacking Chattanooga’s outskirts. Andrews was taken to a gallows on the north side of Atlanta. But the public hanging was botched – when the platform dropped, his feet struck the ground. One guard shouldered him off the ground so that he was strangled. The crowd, which included William Fuller, was appalled. The spy was buried at the site.
Access to the jail’s ground-floor dungeon was via a ladder from the second floor, which was pulled up after letting prisoners in or out. Much of the time the prisoners were shackled together. There was barely enough room for all to lie on the dirt floor to sleep. (Pittenger)
The June 18, 1862 execution in the Atlanta Graveyard of raiders Campbell, Robertson, Ross, Scott, Shadrach, Slavens, and George Wilson. Wilson to the right made a brief speech maintaining they were only soldiers doing their duty. (Pittenger)
The remaining eight prisoners from Chattanooga were incarcerated in the Fulton County Jail in Atlanta. They were soon joined by the 12 from Knoxville and all began plotting their escape. On June 18, a detail appeared and announced that the seven condemned prisoners were to be immediately executed. They were taken by cart to the Atlanta Graveyard (today’s Oakland Cemetery). In spite of the lack of announcement, a crowd formed and Fuller was once again present. Mounting the gallows, George Wilson gave a moving speech regarding their fate and said that they had simply performed their duty. The platform dropped and two of the ropes snapped, letting Campbell and Stevens fall to the ground. The ropes were replaced and they were hanged an hour later. Even the guards were aghast, much less the civilian spectators. In desperation, the remaining 13 raiders sent a letter to President Jefferson Davis begging for mercy. There was no response.
At the end of the month the prisoners were surprised when John Wollam walked into the cell, having finally been recaptured after his escape with Andrews. In mid-August they sent another letter to Maj Gen Baxton Bragg. Some argued against this course
of action, as they appeared to have been “forgotten,” and this was better than facing the certainty of no reprieve. It was eventually forwarded to Davis who enquired if there was “a discrimination between these and the others who were executed for the same offense.” Enquiries went back down through the official channels. The other prisoners had not been yet been tried nor sentenced. No one knew what to do. Back in their Union units the men were reported as either being on “detached duty,” “secret service,” or “special duty.” Some were assumed to have been executed but no one, least of all their families, had any direct knowledge of their fate.
They planned to make a break on October 14, but rains postponed this until the 16th. A few other Union prisoners would accompany them, although they would not release civilian criminals. At dinnertime some forced their way out of their cell and surrounded the jailer, accompanied only by two sympathetic black servants. They opened the other cells, burst into the courtyard, and caught the guards by surprise. There was a general melee and shots were fired. No one was hit, but Buffum, Parrott, Pittenger, and Reddick were caught as the others made it over the wall and ran for the woods. One of the escaping Tennesseans was recaptured, and a Confederate deserter they released was eventually caught and hanged. Raiders Bensinger and Mason were caught within two days.
On October 16, 1862 the raiders surprised their guards in the Fulton County Jail in Atlanta and Brown, Dorsey, Hawkins, Knight, Porter, “Alf” Wilson, Wollam, and Wood made good their escape. Bensinger, Buffum, Mason, Parrott, Pittenger, and Reddick failed to make it out of the compound or were caught within two days. They were all later exchanged. (Pittenger)
Amazingly, even with cries of “Don’t take one of the villains alive” and the alarm raised, eight raiders made good their escape and undertook incredible adventures to secure their freedom, sometimes aided by Union sympathizers. “Alf” Wilson and Wood floated south down the Chattanooga and Apalachicola rivers to the Gulf of Mexico, where they were picked up by a Union blockade ship on November 7. Porter and Wollam went west-northwest, making Corinth, Mississippi on November 18. Dorsey and Hawkins headed north to Lebanon, Kentucky, reaching there on the same date, while Brown and Knight, also moving north, reached Somerset, Kentucky on December 2. All eventually rejoined their units.
Bensinger, Buffum, Mason, Parrott, Pittenger, and Reddick remained jailed and fearful of swift revenge. However, in the early days of December they were informed that they were to be part of a prisoner exchange and were sent to Richmond, Virginia. Here, protracted negotiations took place before they finally went home with other exchanged prisoners on March 17, 1863. They too returned to their units.
All returned raiders survived the war, although some were wounded. Most received promotions and seven were awarded officer commissions. Brown, Mason, Porter, Wollam, and Wood were again captured during the Battle of Chickamauga. All were exchanged or escaped except Wollam. He was recognized as an escaped raider and imprisoned until he escaped again before the war’s end.
In July 12, 1862 President Lincoln approved the Medal of Honor, the Army’s first and only medal for valor. When it was learned that many of the raiders had survived and returned, it was suggested that their exploits were suitable for the first presentations of the decoration. Most of the raiders, including those who had been executed, would receive the Medal of Honor, but there were exceptions. Andrews and Campbell were ineligible being civilians. Even Hawkins and Porter, who overslept, attempted to join a Confederate unit, were discovered and imprisoned, received the award. Llewellyn and Smith had been forced to join a Confederate unit en route. Llewellyn escaped, but Smith was jailed for disloyalty and later escaped. Neither received the award, until Smith’s father lobbied for its presentation to his son and it was granted. The executed Shadrach and George Wilson were never presented the award posthumously. It is not known why, other than perhaps they were overlooked. Their relatives never made an issue of it.
The raiders held occasional reunions, the last being in 1906.
ANALYSIS
The Chattanooga Railroad Expedition was a bold, if relatively minor effort in terms of the expenditure of manpower and resources. Two civilians, 22 soldiers and several thousand dollars were expended on an operation that had the potential of contributing a great deal to Gen Mitchel’s comparatively small-scale effort to seize Chattanooga. Its success would have contributed significantly to the campaign and possibly helped shorten the war, but its failure did not cause or even adversely affect the campaign’s attempt to achieve its goal. This, perhaps, is why Mitchel was willing to launch the raid. It would benefit him if successful, but the success of his campaign did not hinge on the success or failure of Andrews’ mischief. That might be a valuable lesson for modern-day mission planners.
One point is that if Andrews had been able to burn W&A bridges and close the line for days if not weeks, but was foiled in the final stages, it would still have aided Mitchel. However, he would not even have been aware of any success until after the fact, either because of the lack of rail traffic arriving in Chattanooga, through smuggled newspapers, or from knowledgeable and talkative prisoners. Even with modern technology, the same could occur today if there was a communications failure. It has been assessed that if Andrews had succeeded, Mitchel could have taken Chattanooga in five days.
It is easy to judge the mistakes and flaws of a mission plan and its execution with the benefit of hindsight – one should temper any criticism with that in mind. There were mistakes made by both the pursuers and the pursued, but it can be said for the most part they made reasonable decisionsin the heat of the moment in view of the information they possessed.
The most significant flaw was Andrews’ reluctance to set an ambush or avoid directly confronting groups with force. The first was the road crew at Moon’s Station. It is not recorded how many men were present, maybe 8–12, possibly fewer. Apparently, there was no one else nearby and they were, of course, unarmed and unaware of any danger. Rather than keeping up the charade as legitimate railroaders and “borrowing” a single claw bar, the raiders should have drawn their revolvers and taken all the tools (as well as their lunch). This would have given them the essential tools and the only damage done would have been to tip off Fuller that the locomotive thieves were organized and armed earlier than he later realized. Having these tools would have allowed them to remove rails completely in a matter of minutes, and this would have precluded further pursuit. Realistically, it would be expecting too much for Andrews to have the foresight to destroy the handcar.
The second mistake was at Etowah when Andrews decided to leave the Yonah undamaged. This provided Fuller with a locomotive. There were not many Southerners present and the few soldiers were unarmed. The Yonah could have been destroyed simply by opening the throttle, with the engineer leaping off and sending it at full speed down the 2½-mile dead-end spur; the direction it was facing.
Failing to steal more tools or disabling the Yonah, Andrews’ reluctance to set an ambush was a significant miscalculation. There is nothing in Andrews’ background indicating he had ever used force or was ever involved in gunplay. His experience and nature was to talk his way out of situations. Lacking military experience he balked at the idea of direct attack.
There were several opportunities to set an ambush: the exit of Tunnel Hill is the most often discussed, but this was rather obvious. An earlier ambush would have been more certain. The General could have halted around a curve and waited as the raiders set the ambush but there would have been a danger of the pursuing locomotive, with the cab crew gunned down, speeding into the rear of the waiting General. However, a close-range barrage of almost 20 .36-cal and .44-cal six-guns blasting into the Texas’ wooden cab would have been devastating.
The restored Texas today in the Cyclorama Building, Grant Park in Atlanta. (Allen Shoppe)
Andrews’ intelligence collection for the mission was exceptional. He knew the regular train schedules, where telegraph stations, woodyards, water towers
, and other facilities were, was familiar with W&A routines and with the necessary switches, had spied out military units, and was familiar with the local situation (he was known to have visited the Southern Confederacy reading room in Atlanta). He slipped up only by not considering the monthly militia drill date.
Andrews’ unilateral decision for a one-day delay was another factor contributing to failure, although it could not be helped owing to the unexpected incessant rains that slowed the raiders’ infiltration. Another flaw was providing the same Kentucky regiment cover story to every man, which exposed many raiders.
Materially, Andrews was poorly prepared. It would not have been possible to bring railroad hand tools, but he failed to aggressively obtain them. He could have brought a couple of wire-cutters for telegraph wires. The raiders had no food or water, no maps, other than possibly one in Andrews’ saddlebags; they had poor clothing for cool or wet weather, and only Andrews possessed a compass. He was overly confident on making his timely rendezvous west of Chattanooga.
The raiders could not have carried tins of coal oil (kerosene) aboard, but Andrews could have hidden a supply at an identifiable point outside a town. However, this would have required significant effort and time to prepare. They used up their machine oil by necessity on the General and the remainder thrown into the firebox. There is no mention of using the whale oil or coal oil in the General’s headlamp.
The first presentations of the Army’s newly established Medal of Honor were to the Andrews raiders.
In many ways the Andrews Raid was more of a benefit to the South than the North. There was little physical damage; no bridges, locomotives, or rolling stock were damaged, other than some easily repaired holes knocked through three boxcars. The few lifted rails and cut wires were repaired before the day was done. The momentary disruption of the W&A schedule and some confusion had no significant impact on military operations. It did provide welcome excitement and gave the militia some exercise and material for tall tales. There were, of course, some damaged reputations, bruised egos, and shake-ups among the authorities.
The Great Locomotive Chase Page 8
