The Romanov Empire, established in 1613, was a more conventional, dynastic, entity. It survived for three centuries, during which time it expanded its territory significantly - not only in Europe and Central Asia, but in the Far East too. This was a more difficult task for a land-based empire than for its latter-day rivals Britain, France or even Germany, which had easier access to the sea. Yet all these empires continued to expand until they encountered rivals and limits were imposed by agreement or by force. Only the United States succeeded in creating an imperial space for itself on the two continents of the western hemisphere without the need to expand territorially and to control alien populations directly. It also secured immense markets for itself, trade, preferably exclusive, having always been an imperial goal.
But though Russia was not so advantaged, the Romanovs made impressive enough gains, extending their territory into central Europe and the Balkans, across the Caucasus, and to the heights of Central Asia. This empire too fell eventually, partly because its autocratic ruler, Nicholas II, was incompetent, but also because its economy had developed relatively late in comparison with its rivals’ and was insufficiently industrialized to sustain participation in a modern total war. The same might be said of Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire, both of which collapsed soon afterwards, along with their supporter, Imperial Germany. The First World War also impoverished France and Britain, ending their prospects of maintaining imperial status far into the future. But events were to show that ruined Russia was not done yet.
The Soviet regime which built Russia’s fourth empire noted the lessons of its predecessor’s failure. This new emergent empire was more deeply ideological than any of its predecessors, and therefore better equipped to build a great sphere of influence. It was based on the novel principle of a centrally planned economy and followed the practices of a wartime economy The organizational core of the state hierarchy was supplemented however by an efficient Party organization that was ramified into every town, village, enterprise and professional organization. Like the modernizing precedents of Ivan IV and Peter I, the revolution presided over by Stalin was immensely costly in human life and happiness. But it worked in terms of world power. The economy was transformed, a powerful military machine was constructed, its enemies were defeated, and an empire created which was more extensive than any of its predecessors. Moreover, in addition to extensive territorial gains, the Soviet regime also ran an informal empire, the Communist Bloc, which embraced the Balkans, east-central Europe and half of Germany as well as Mongolia and Cuba; and it exerted immense influence in the world beyond through the Communist Party, and among many non-aligned countries both as a nuclear superpower and as a model of how to escape the toils of economic backwardness.
It eventually fell partly because the burdens of empire became too expensive to maintain; partly because the planned economy, which had helped to make the Soviet system so successful, eventually proved insufficiently supple to accommodate the new technology; and partly because its leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, under pressure to provide ever greater social benefits and beset by misfortune, made unnecessary mistakes. He promoted galloping inflation by default, and realized too late that the bureaucratic and Party hierarchies played essential roles in co-ordinating the system and ensuring that central policies were implemented. Once regional administrators were invited to make their own decisions without reference to Moscow, the system collapsed into chaos. The collapse was both hastened and exploited by nationalist politicians who inherited the ruins of the once mighty state. Russia itself was reduced in Europe and the Caucasus to the frontiers of c. 1600, and in Asia to those of the mid eighteenth century. Under Boris Yeltsin (1992—9) Russia’s remaining strengths continued to flow away. The state weakened, its authority eroded and Russia’s voice in the world faded.
Russia has been reduced territorially. In Europe it is contained by NATO; 2in Asia it is contained albeit rather less securely by China and the local allies of the United States. But though Russia is no longer a superpower, it remains formidable in terms of nuclear power as well as conventional forces, and continues to occupy the vast region of northern Eurasia which makes it virtually impregnable. Invading Swedish, French and German armies, all of them rated superior to the Russian army of their time, have advanced far into the interior, but to their own destruction. No power today is likely to contemplate another attempt. Russia is most vulnerable strategically in sparsely populated eastern Siberia - to peaceful infiltration by the burgeoning Chinese population. Indeed, Russia generally has become demo-graphically weak. Nevertheless, though its empires have gone, Russia and Russians remain. To assess their prospects we need to consider their historical experience as well as current indicators and developments.
The natural conditions with which they have always had to contend have had a profound effect on them. The harshness of the climate has made them hardy and enduring; the immensity of their landscape and the low density of settlement, as well as the brevity of the growing season, have encouraged both co-operation and coercion in social relationships, for Russians have needed a greater degree of organization than most peoples in order to survive and prosper. In the past this need has favoured centralized, authoritarian forms of government and discouraged more participatory forms.
Whether or not Montesquieu’s judgement that very large countries need authoritarian government still holds in the technologically advanced twenty-first century, recent attempts to graft Western institutions and managerial methods on to the Russian polity and economy have proved disappointing. This is partly because their proponents have failed to take sufficient account of Russian conditions and the traditions deriving from them. They have applied theoretical solutions to a country and a people they did not understand sufficiently well. Outsiders from a different habitat with different historical experience should not expect prescriptions which work in the worlds they know to succeed anywhere else even if they have the help of a few enthusiastic helpers in the country concerned. The attempt to impose a Western form of liberal democracy on Russia in conditions of economic and social collapse merely had the effect of making liberal democrats unelectable. Democracy may best suit comparatively rich countries, but if that is the case what are the prospects of an economic recovery which might provide more fertile ground for it?
After Yeltsin they were distinctly unpromising. In Putin’s first five years of office, however, the annual growth rate was in the region of 8 per cent a year, thanks largely, though by no means completely, to burgeoning oil revenues. If such a rate were to be maintained, GNP might well double within a decade. Since Yeltsin’s departure progress has been made to bring order to the disorderly state of affairs that was his legacy. The ruble has been stabilized, and Russia’s credit ratings have risen; corrupt localism has been restricted, social conditions have improved, and the new regime has committed itself to the rule of law. But problems remain. The media are not as free as they were, the limits of centralization have yet to be established, and the as yet unresolved Khodarkovskii case has raised doubts about the relationship between government and big business, between the state and the forces of free enterprise. Though often presented as incompatible, these are in fact complementary. Russia needs investment capital which only the world market can provide; but companies need to operate within a legal framework which only the state can maintain. If an accommodation between them is reached, the economic recovery should continue. If not, Russia will face unpleasant alternatives: either a return of the over-mighty state or untrammelled corporate greed.
In the long term, Russia’s economic power is contingent on the extent of its market and the size of its population. Perhaps the most serious consequence of the collapse was demographic weakness. Russia’s population continued to fall for more than ten successive years at the end of the last century. The climbing death rate of the Yeltsin years eventually eased off, but the birth rate failed to recover. According to the preliminary results of the 2002 census, the population in Octob
er of that year was 145.2 million — almost 2 million fewer than in 1989. 3 And there is a qualitative as well as a quantitative problem. Russia has been suffering from a ‘brain drain’. Many able young Russian scientists and economists, entrepreneurs and engineers who might otherwise have contributed to the new Russia now live and work in the West.
Not since the first Time of Troubles, at the beginning of the 1600s, have Russia’s fortunes been so low. Yet its recovery then was amazingly rapid, and it was soon on the expansionist path again. What, then, of Russia’s prospects now?
Emerging from their second Time of Troubles, the Russians themselves have been less interested in empire than in political stability, economic regeneration and the elimination of social distress. Putin has understood this. In his address to the country on 26 May 2004 he stated his priorities: ‘A stable democracy and developed civil society … the strengthening of Russia’s international positions. But … [above all] substantial growth in the well-being of our citizens.’ 4 The social objectives at least may soon be attained. Even if they are not, Russia’s status as a major power, though not as a superpower, will be maintained.
In the opinion of a Western analyst, the idea that the collapse of the Soviet Union implied the end of Russia’s great-power status is mistaken. All that happened was that ‘One of the world’s undisputed great powers temporarily subordinated its foreign and domestic policies to the West’s capricious preferences. This state of affairs was never likely to last long.’ 5 Russia is still the only power that stretches right across the land mass of Eurasia, and it is vital to the stability of every country situated there. 6 The prospects of building an empire of the dimensions of its last two predecessors lie far beyond its present reach, of course. Nevertheless the Russians still possess a number of advantages that could lead to their building a new sphere of influence, and even territorial enlargement, in the more distant future.
One obvious advantage Russia has over most countries in the modern world is its large reserves of every kind of strategic commodity from diamonds to natural gas, and from aluminium to uranium. Another lies in the superior quality of its educational system, which is geared to detect special talents in young children and develop them in special schools. Despite the brain drain, Russia will not lack for learning and expertise to exploit its material advantages, and with its tradition of careful planning it should make the best of them. However, a strong state cannot be based on a shrinking or static population and until now, as we have seen, Russia’s demographic situation has been very weak indeed. Only in 2003, for the first time since the collapse, did Russia’s birth rate rise, and then only very slightly 7 If this should mark the beginning of an upward demographic trend, however, the prospects for longer-term revival will be strengthened. Furthermore, Russia’s strategic position has been improving fast of late, thanks partly to circumstances, partly to Moscow’s adroit exploitation of them.
The collapse of the Soviet Union left some successor states even worse off than Russia. Belarus has ever since been seeking reunion, and Ukraine, despite chances of being accepted into NATO’s protective embrace, needs the Russian market and therefore remains ambivalent about the West, keeping its options open. Both states have large numbers of Orthodox communicants as well as other historic ties which make many of their citizens sympathetic to Moscow. Russia may yet prove the preferable option for Ukraine both for trading purposes and to ensure energy supplies. Russia’s ability to interrupt or cut off the flow of oil and natural gas not only to what Russians call ‘the near abroad’ but to Western Europe and the Balkans too gives it considerable clout. So does its continuing occupation of Kaliningrad, the Baltic port once called Konigsberg which it acquired in the eighteenth century and contrived to hold on to both in 1945 and in 1991.
This powerful naval base wedged in between Lithuania and Poland on the Baltic frightens its neighbours and is a serious nuisance for NATO, but when the withdrawal of Russian troops from Lithuania in August 2003 prompted demands for its demilitarization Moscow refused. The retention of the enclave provides it with a powerful lever, and it is not the only one at Moscow’s disposal. The presence of large Russian-speaking minorities in the Baltic states provides another. The states which host them distrust them, and, as we saw in Chapter 15, there have been charges that Russians in the ‘near abroad’ are denied civil and political rights. Moscow can exploit and even manipulate this situation to its advantage.
Russia’s position in the Caucasus is no less strong, though the commitment is expensive because of the need to contain Chechen extremism. Since 11 September, however, the Western Powers have become more sympathetic to Moscow’s point of view. The troubles will eventually subside for a time when the insurgents tire, as has always happened in the past. Meanwhile, despite the dreadful costs, no Russian government dare give in. The safety of the northern Caucasus, of oil pipelines from the Caspian Sea, and of communications to the south is an interest which Moscow cannot afford to jeopardize.
Georgia has become an American client - though an unstable one — but with allies in the Georgian provinces of Abkhazia and Ossetia, which dislike rule from Tbilisi, Russia can still exert influence there. Armenia, to the south of Georgia, still aligns with Russia and, thanks to careful nurturing over many years, Russia’s relations with Iran are good. Along with the other states bordering the Caspian Sea, the two countries have agreed the bases of exploiting its oil and gas reserves, but Russia’s position is stronger than the rest because of its pipeline facilities.
In Central Asia Russia’s position is stronger still. Kazakhstan, the largest state in the region, is a firm ally, and Russia maintains test sites, an air base and a cosmodrome on its territory. The Uzbeks and the Kyrgyz as well as the Kazakhs know the Russians well and trust them more than other outsiders. Turkmenistan exports its natural gas through Russia, and Tajikistan has so far allowed Russian troops to patrol its frontiers with Afghanistan. A common concern to combat Islamic fundamentalism and to stabilize Afghanistan have recently brought Russia and the United States closer than for decades, but Russia now seems to be the preponderant strategic influence in Central Asia once again.
In May 2003 Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, as well as Belarus and Armenia, agreed to set up a collective security organization with headquarters in Moscow, a rapid-reaction force for Central Asia under Russian command, and a common air-defence system. They also agreed to co-ordinate foreign policy and security. 8 The Collective Rapid Deployment Force was set up within a year, and, in return for rescheduling part of that country’s sizeable debt, 9 Russia also obtained a permanent lease on a military air-base at Kant in Kyrgyzstan, at the heart of the region and within range of Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and China.
Russo-Chinese relations since the collapse have prospered. Trade between the two countries almost tripled during Putin’s first term. Both powers are involved together with three Central Asian states in the ‘Shanghai Forum’, and their common interests include anti-terrorism and counter-insurgency (China approves of Moscow’s policy in Chechnya, Russia of Chinese policy in Taiwan and Tibet), international conflict management, and Iraq. China implicitly recognizes Russia’s leading role in Central Asia. Divergent interests may divide them in future, but for the moment the Russo-Chinese entente holds. 10 Furthermore, as in the Soviet period, relations with India are good, and India remains a major importer of Russian arms and military technology. In Asia, then, Russia’s power and influence have been growing again.
The United States is the world’s only superpower, but even a superpower’s ability to control territory and peoples has its limitations, as the intervention in Iraq has demonstrated. Russia lacks the strength to challenge America in the foreseeable future, yet nothing is immutable. The world changes, and the strategic order will change with it. Russia has begun to recover. Its military capability is considerable albeit much reduced, and its tradition of careful diplomacy based on superior intelligence, realism and understanding of other cu
ltures gives it advantages which others lack, and will stand it in good stead. History provides no sure guide of things to come, but, as I write in September 2004, it would be unwise to write off Russia’s chances of future power.
Chronology
Geology/climate
and selected events in Russian history and
Date European/world history imperial development
* * *
Before present
20,000-26,000 Age of mammoths Sungir remains
24,000 Onset of the Ice Age
7,000-8,000 Global warming; ice retreats Aspen, birch, hazel, willow,
hornbeam, linden, oak, elm,
etc.
Animals, wildfowl
6,000 Palaeolithic era Agriculture and animal
husbandry
4,000 Babylonia Tripolye settlements
3,5oo Hunter-gatherers in Finland
3,000 Iron Age Swidden agriculture
Persian Empire Cimmerians, Scythians,
Alexander the Great Sarmatians
2,000 Roman Empire
Common Era (CE)
330 CE Constantine the Great founds Constantinople Khazar kaganate
c. 650- Spread of Islam: Baghdad Caliphate
c. 856 Riurik at Ladoga
858 Askold and Dir take Kiev
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