by Kershaw, Ian
296. See Heinrich August Winkler, ‘Extremismus der Mitte? Sozialgeschichtliche Aspekte der nationalsozialistischen Machtergreifung’, VfZ, 20 (1972), 175–91. Harold James, ‘Economic Reasons for the Collapse of the Weimar Republic’, in Ian Kershaw (ed.), Weimar. Why did German Democracy Fail?, London, 1990, 30–57, here 47, points out that in the 1928 election, a quarter of the total vote went to parties with an individual share of under 5 per cent.
297. James, ‘Economic Reasons’, 32–45. The underlying structural economic weaknesses of the Weimar Republic were most emphatically outlined by Knut Borchardt in his Wachstum, Krisen, Handlungsspielräume der Wirtschaftspolitik, Göttingen, 1982.
298. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 297.
299. RSA, III, 245–53.
300. See Baldur von Schirach, 17–25, 58–61, 68; Fest, The Face of the Third Reich, 332–54; and Michael Wortmann’s pen-portrait in Smelser-Zitelmann, Die braune Elite, 246–57. Figures for the Nazi successes in student union elections are given in Tyrell, Führer, 380–81.
301. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 299–301; Hitler’s own accounts, in articles published in the VB, are printed in RSA, III/2, 105–14. Orlow, i.154, referred to them as among ‘the few humanly moving articles [Hitler] ever wrote’. The vivid, and rich, descriptive style is not, however, typically Hitlerian and suggests considerable editorial embellishment of the text. For ‘Wöhrden’s Night of Blood’ (Blutnacht von Wöhrden), see also Gerhard Stoltenberg, Politische Strömungen im schleswig-holsteinischen Landvolk 1918–1933, Düsseldorf, 1962, 147; and Rudolf Heberle, Landbevölkerung und Nationalsozialismus. Eine soziologische Untersuchung der politischen Willensbildung in Schleswig-Holstein 1918 bis 1932, Stuttgart, 1963, 160.
302. For use of the term ‘crisis before the crisis’, see Dietmar Petzina, ‘Was there a Crisis before the Crisis? The State of the German Economy in the 1920s’, in Jürgen Baron von Kruedener (ed.), Economic Crisis and Political Collapse. The Weimar Republic 1924–1933, New York/Oxford/Munich, 1990, 1–19.
303. RSA, III/2, 202–13, 233–6, 238–9, 260–62.
304. RSA, III/2, 210.
305. RSA, III/2, 238.
306. Orlow, i.161–2; Stachura, Strasser, 69. Some support for the suggestion that Himmler was responsible for the tactic of ‘speaker concentration’ is offered by two letters from Gauleiter Kube to Himmler from 23 June and 4 November 1928 in BDC, Parteikanzlei, Correspondence, Heinrich Himmler.
307. See Ellsworth Faris, ‘Takeoff Point for the National Socialist Party: The Landtag Election in Baden, 1929’, Central European History, 8 (1975), 140–71, here 168. The penetration of social networks by the Nazis is emphasized by Rudy Koshar, Social Life, Local Politics, and Nazism: Marburg, 1880–1935, Chapel Hill, 1986; and, for Catholic districts in the Black Forest, by Oded Heilbronner, ‘The Failure that Succeeded: Nazi Party Activity in a Catholic Region in Germany, 1929–32’, Journal of Contemporary History, 27 (1992), 531–49; and ‘Der verlassene Stammtisch. Vom Verfall der bürgerlichen Infrastruktur und dem Aufstieg der NSDAP am Beispiel der Region Schwarzwald’, Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 19 (1993), 178–201.
308. Orlow, i.162.
309. See Faris, 168.
310. Falter et al, Wahlen, 108.
311. Falter et al., Wahlen, 98; Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 302.
312. RSA, III/2, 275–7, 277 n.3; Pridham, 85–6.
313. Falter et al., Wahlen, 90; Faris, 144–6.
314. RSA, III/2, 291 n.10.
315. Winkler, Weimar, 346 ff.
316. RSA, III/2, 290 n.1; Winkler, Weimar, 354. Hitler took the decision to join without consulting other leading figures in the party (Orlow, i.173).
317. RSA, III/2, 292 n.1.
318. Orlow, i.173. Goebbels claimed to be on the scent of a plot by Otto Strasser and his supporters against Hitler in early August 1929. Though this was a reflection of Goebbels’s paranoia, Hitler’s dealings with the ‘reaction’ had indeed sharpened the growing antagonism of the ‘national revolutionary’ grouping around Otto Strasser (TBJG, I.1, 405 (3 August 1929); Tb Reuth, i.393–4, note 54).
319. Winkler, Weimar, 354–6. Nine out of thirty-five electoral districts returned over a fifth of votes in favour of the plebiscite proposal.
320. The VB’s circulation was still only 18,400 (for a membership of around 150,000) (Tyrell, Führer, 223).
321. Albrecht Tyrell, IV. Reichsparteitag der NSDAP, Nürnberg 1929, Filmedition G140 des Instituts für den wissenschaftlichen Film, Ser.4, Nr.5/G140, Göttingen, 1978, 6–7; Orlow, i.173; RSA, III/2, 313–55, 357–61.
322. Otto Wagener, Hitler aus nächster Nähe. Aufzeichnungen eines Vertrauten 1929–1932, ed. Henry A. Turner, 2nd edn, Kiel, 1987, 16–17 (and 7–21 for a description of the Rally and the deep impression it made on Wagener). See also the description in TBJG, I.i, 403–6(1–6August 1929).
323. Tyrell, Reichsparteitag 1929, 6, 14.
324. Orlow, i.167, 169.
CHAPTER 9: BREAKTHROUGH
1. Abel, 126–7.
2. Abel, 126.
3. For the social structure of the party membership, see, among an extensive literature, Kater, Nazi Party, and Detlef Mühlberger, Hitler’s Followers. Studies in the Sociology of the Nazi Movement, London, 1991 (containing, in ch.1, a detailed survey of the historiography).
4. Abel, 119.
5. See Juan J. Linz, ‘Political Space and Fascism as a Late-Comer: Conditions Conducive to the Success or Failure of Fascism as a Mass Movement in Inter-War Europe’, in Stein Ugelvik Larsen, Bernt Hagtvet and Jan Petter Myklebust (eds.), Who Were the Fascists?, Bergen/Oslo/Tromso, 1980, 153–89.
6. Orlow, i.175 and n.166.
7. See, amid a vast literature, Harold James, The German Slump. Politics and Economics, 1924–1936, Oxford, 1986; and Dieter Petzina, ‘Germany and the Great Depression’, Journal of Contemporary History, 4 (1969), 59–74; Petzina et al., 84, provide the bare statistical indices of the economic crisis and social misery. See also Peukert, Die Weimarer Republik, 245–6. Wilhelm Treue (ed.), Deutschland in der Weltwirtschaftskrise in Augenzeugenberichten, 2nd edn, Düsseldorf, 1967, esp. 245–53, provides some contemporary reflections of the social distress.
8. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 305–6.
9. RSA, III/3, 63.
10. Tyrell, Führer, 383; Falter et al., Wahlen, 90, 97, 107, III; Martin Broszat, Die Machtergreifung. Der Aufstieg der NSDAP und die Zerstörung der Weimarer Republik, Munich, 1984, 103.
11. RSA, III/3, 59–60; Fritz Dickmann, ‘Die Regierungsbildung in Thüringen als Modell der Machtergreifung’, VfZ, 14 (1966), 454–64, here 461.
12. See Dickmann, 460–64.
13. RSA, III/3, 6o.
14. RSA, III/3, 61–2. Günther was appointed to the Chair of Social Anthropology at Jena in 1930.
15. Broszat, Die Machtergreifung, 108. See Donald R. Tracy, ‘The Development of the National Socialist Party in Thuringia 1924–30’, Central European History, 8 (1975), 23–50, esp. 42–4, for Frick’s period of office.
16. Tyrell, Führer, 352; RSA, III/3, 62 n.22. It has been estimated that real membership was probably some 10–15 Per cent below the level given by the party. See ch.8, n 250.
17. For the following account, see William Sheridan Allen, The Nazi Seizure of Power, revised edn, New York, 1984, here esp. 28–34.
18. Allen, 32.
19. Allen, 33.
20. Allen, 84. See Donald L. Niewyk, The Jews in Weimar Germany, Louisiana/Manchester, 1980, ch.3, esp. 79–91, and Sarah Gordon, Hitler, Germans, and the ‘Jewish Question,’ Princeton, 1984, ch.2, esp. 88–90, for studies supporting this assertion.
21. Tyrell, Führer, 308.
22. See Allen, 32–3, and the works by Koshar and Heilbrunner indicated in ch.8 n.307.
23. Rudolf Heberle, From Democracy to Nazism. A Regional Case Study on Political Parties in Germany, Baton Rouge, 1945, 109–11.
24. See Bessel, ‘The Rise of the NSDAP’, 20–29, esp. 26–7.
25. RSA, III/3, 63.
26. Tyrell, F
ührer, 327.
27. Wagener, 126–7.
28. Tyrell, 310, 327–8 (Hierl Denkschrift, 22 October 1929).
29. See Wagener, 127, reported comments of Gregor Strasser.
30. Winkler, Weimar, 366–71.
31. Broszat, Die Machtergreifung, 109–10; Winkler, Weimar, 367, 371.
32. Winkler, Weimar, 368–71.
33. Winkler, Weimar, 363.
34. Quellen zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien, ed. Karl Dietrich Bracher et al., Bd.4/1, Politik und Wirtschaft in der Krise 1930–1932. Quellen zur Ära Brüning, Teil I, Bonn, 1980, 15–18, Doc. 7, here 15 (Aufzeichnung von Graf Westarp über eine Unterredung mit Reichspräsident v. Hindenburg, 15 January 1930); Broszat, Die Machtergreifung, 110–11.
35. Kolb, Die Weimarer Republik, 127–8; Winkler, Weimar, 378–81; Broszat, Die Machtergreifung, 111.
36. See Mommsen, Die verspielte Freiheit, 320.
37. Tyrell, Führer, 383. The election was held on 22 June 1930. The Nazis won fourteen of the ninety-six seats in the Saxon Landtag.
38. TBJG, I.1, 577–82 (18–29 July 1930).
39. Nyomarkay, 98 n.67; Tyrell, Führer, 312. With Gregor Strasser so heavily committed as Organization Leader of the NSDAP, Otto had become the effective head of the publishing house.
40. Tyrell, Führer, 312–13; Nyomarkay, 96–8.
41. TBJG, I.1, 492–3(30–31 January 1930), 496–503 (6–22 February 1930). See also Lemmons, 44–7; Reuth, 163–5.
42. TBJG, I.1, 492 (31 January 1930).
43. See Reuth, 164–5 and Tb Reuth, ii.451 n.14 for the suggestion that this was possibly because of the prospect of spring elections, given the crisis of the government.
44. TBJG, I.1, 507 (2 March 1930). On the death of Wessel, see Thomas Oertel, Horst Wessel. Untersuchung einer Legende, Cologne, 1988, esp. 83–105. For Goebbels’s irritation at Hitler’s refusal to attend Horst Wessel’s funeral, on 1 March, see ΤΒJG, l.1, 507 (1–2 March 1930); see also Reuth, 161. Hitler was dissuaded by Göring, despite Goebbels’s pleas, from attending the funeral because of the tension and threat of violence (Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 204). Despite heavy police cordons, there were indeed disturbances between Communists and Nazis leading to a number of serious injuries (Oertel, 101–3; TBJG, I.1, 507–8 (1–2 March 1930)). The ‘Horst-Wessel-Lied’ became, under Goebbels’s influence (though he privately thought little of its musical qualities) the party’s own anthem and, especially after 1933, was frequently sung on major representative occasions after ‘Deutschland, Deutschland über alles’, the national anthem. Horst Wessel had provided only the text of the tune associated with him; the melody derived from an old army song (Oertel, 106–13).
45. TBJG, I.1, 507 (2 March 1930), 515 (16 March 1930).
46. TBJG, I.1, 515 (16 March 1930).
47. TBJG, I.1, 524 (5 April 1930).
48. TBJG, I.1, 528 (13 April 1930).
49. TBJG, I.1, 538 (28 April 1930); RSA, III/3, 168–9; Tyrell, Führer, 331–2.
50. TBJG, I.1, 538 (28 April 1930).
51. Strasser, Hitler und ich , 101 .
52. Strasser, Hitler und ich, 105–6. The discussions are summarized by Patrick Moreau, Nationalsozialismus von links, Stuttgart, 1984, 30–35.
53. Strasser, Hitler und ich, 106.
54. Strasser, Hitler und ich, 104–7. An earlier version, which can be taken as authentic, since it was based on notes made at the time and was not disclaimed by the Nazis, was published by Strasser, in the form of a polemical pamphlet, immediately following the meeting: Otto Strasser, Ministersessel oder Revolution?, Berlin, 1930. See Moreau, 205, n.48. The pamphlet contained Otto Strasser’s version of his dialogue with Hitler in May, which later served as the basis of his book Hitler und ich. Hitler’s comments on socialism were similar to those he had made at the meeting of party leaders in Munich on 27 April (RSA, III/3, 168 n.4). At his meeting with Otto Strasser, there were also serious disagreements about foreign policy, on which Hitler upheld the notion of an alliance with Britain (Otto Strasser, Hitler und ich, 108–9; Nyomarkay, 99). See Gregor Strasser’s comments – critical of his brother and of his ‘One-sided’ account of the meeting – in his letter to the Sudeten leader Rudolf Jung of 22 July 1930 (Tyrell, Führer, 332–3).
55. Strasser, Hitler und ich, 104. The diffuseness of the party’s programme meant that total subordination to the Leader was the only device to prevent fragmentation. As Baldur von Schirach pointed out, with reference to this period, ‘practically every leading National Socialist had his own National Socialism’ (B. v. Schirach, 87).
56. Strasser, Hitler und ich, 107.
57. Strasser, Hitler und ich, 112–14.
58. TBJG , I.1 , 550 (22 May 1930).
59. Tyrell, Führer, 333.
60. TBJG, I.1, 561 (14 June 1930).
61. TBJG, I.1, 568 (30 June 1930); Otto Strasser’s published account was in his pamphlet, Ministersessel oder Revolution?
62. TBJG, I.1, 564 (23 June 1930).
63. TBJG, I.1, 565–6 (26 June 1930).
64. TBJG, I.1, 567 (29 June 1930). Goebbels wanted Hitler to attend a meeting of the membership of Gau Berlin at which he planned a showdown with his enemies. (See Reuth, 167–8;Tb Reuth, ii.493 n.54.)
65. RSA, III/3, 250 n.15.
66. TBJG, I.1, 568 (30 June 1930).
67. RSA, III/3, 249–50; TBJG, I.1, 568 (1 July 1930);Tb Reuth, ii.493 n.54·
68. RSA, ΠΙ/3, 264 n.4; Moreau, 41, and 35–40 for the build-up to the expulsion.
69. TBJG, I.1, 569 (I July 1930).
70. TBJG, I.1 570 (3 July 1930).
71. TBJG, I.1, 572 (6 July 1930).
72. TBJG,.I.1, 576 (16 July 1930), with reference to the suggestion – which in the event did not materialize into anything – that Gregor Strasser should become Minister for the Interior and for Labour in Saxony.
73. TBJG, I.1, 582 (29 July 1930). The former Barlow-Palais in Briennerstraße had been bought by the NSDAP on 26 May 1930 – the earlier headquarters in Schellingstraße had become far too cramped, given the party’s expansion – and was soon known as the ‘Brown House’. A special levy of at least 2 Marks per head for party members (though not SA and SS members) was imposed to help fund the purchase. (See RSA, III/3, 207–9, and 209 n.17.)
74. TBJG, I.1, 581 (28 July 1930).
75. RSA, III/3, 249 n.4.
76. Orlow, i.210–11; Tyrell, Führer, 312; Nyomarkay, 102.
77. RSA, III/3, 264; TBJG, I.1, 566 (26 June 1930).
78. Tyrell, Führer, 332–3. See TBJG, I.1, 571 (5 July 1930): ‘Gregor ist voll Sauwut auf seinen Bruder’ (‘Gregor is in a steaming rage at his brother’).
79. See Benz/Graml, Biographisches Lexikon, 333, for a brief summary of Otto Strasser’s subsequent political career.
80. Thomas Childers, The Nazi Voter. The Social Foundations of Fascism in Germany, 1919–1933, Chapel Hill/London, 1983, 138–9, 317 n.72, cit. VB, 20–21 July 1930; Orlow, i.183.
81. A brown uniform, based on the khaki shirts and trousers of the German colonial troops in East Africa before the war, had been worn by stormtroopers as early as 1921. It was officially adopted by the party in 1926, after which the term ‘Brownshirts’ was used to depict the NSDAP, especially by the opponents of the Nazis (Benz, Graml, and Weiß, Enzyklopädie des Nationalsozialismus, 403).
82. Wilfried Boehnke, Die NSDAP im Ruhrgebiet, 1920–1933, Bad Godesberg, 1974, 147, cit. Dortmunder General-Anzeiger, 5 May 1930.
83. Rainer Hambrecht, Der Aufstieg der NSDAP in Mittel und Oberfranken (1925–1933), Nuremberg, 1976, 201.
84. Hambrecht, 186–7.
85. Childers, Nazi Voter, 139; RSA, III/3, 114 n.9, 322; Gerhard Paul, Aufstand der Bilder. Die NS-Propaganda vor 1933, Bonn, 1990, 125.
86. Orlow, i.183; RSA, III/3, VIII-X. The following analysis of the speeches is based on the texts of the twenty speeches held from 3 August to 13 September 1930 in RSA, III/3, 295–418.
87. RSA III/3, 408 n.2. According to
the police report, which gave the estimated attendance, Hitler made a tired impression at first, and his audience showed signs of being bored, at least by the first part of his speech. Goebbels’s record was quite different. ‘For the first time in Berlin really big,’ he wrote (TBJG, I.1, 601 (11 September 1930)). Hitler had to cancel a further speech the same evening through exhaustion.
88. RSA, III/3, 413 n.1.
89. See Thomas Childers, ‘The Middle Classes and National Socialism’, in David Blackbourn and Richard Evans (eds.), The German Bourgeoisie, London/New York, 1993, 328–40; and Thomas Childers, ‘The Social Language of Politics in Germany. The Sociology of Political Discourse in the Weimar Republic’, American Historical Review, 95 (1990), 331–58.
90. RSA, III/3, 368, for example. See also 391.
91. RSA, III/3 , 317.
92. RSA, III/3, 411.
93. RSA, III/3, 355, for example. See also 337, where Hitler indicated that the only way out was through the re-establishment of foreign-political power.
94. RSA , III/3, 410.
95. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 314. Carl von Ossietzky suffered imprisonment for his attacks on the Reichswehr even during the later years of the Weimar Republic. He was arrested by the Nazis at the end of February 1933 and spent over three and a half years in concentration camps. Following an international campaign, he was awarded at the end of 1936, while still in the hands of the Gestapo, the Nobel Peace Prize for 1935. He died in May 1938 of tuberculosis brought on by the conditions he endured in the concentration camps. (See Benz/Graml, Biographisches Lexikon, 244; Elke Suhr, Carl von Ossietzky. Eine Biografíe, Cologne, 1988.)
96. See, for example, Martin Broszat, ‘Zur Struktur der ΝS-Massenbewegung’, VfZ, 31 (1983), 52–76, esp. 66–7; Michael H. Kater, ‘Generationskonflikt als Entwicklungsfaktor in der ΝS-Bewegung vor 1933’, Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 11 (1985), 217–43; Jürgen Reulecke, ‘“Hat die Jugendbewegung den Nationalsozialismus vorbereitet?” Zum Umgang mit einer falschen Frage’, in Wolfgang R. Krabbe (ed.), Politische Jugend in der Weimarer Republik, Bochum, 1993, 222–43; Ulrich Herbert, ‘“Generation der Sachlichkeit”. Die völkische Studentenbewegung der frühen zwanziger Jahre in Deutschland’, in Frank Bajohr, Werner Johe and Uwe Lohalm (eds.), Zivilisation und Barbarei, Hamburg, 1991, 115–44.
