Some bluecoats took up post where the enemy had been. Other small Prussian bodies probed forward, enough to convince Wied the enemy were vigorously trying to outflank him. He rose from Aussig on September 18, wending back towards Lobositz. The following day, although the Prussians were not pursuing after all, Wied withdrew further out of harm’s way to Budin. All of the scattered Austrian units then gravitated towards that post. This maneuver enabled the Austrians to reunite their forces. The army assumed a powerful sheltered position on the Eger before the Elbe.
The bluecoats were quite active. Late in the night of September 22, a Prussian task force, led by Lt.-Col. Strozzi, lit out to attack the castle of Tetschen. Resistance was spotty, and within hours, the Prussians had taken the castle with its garrison of six officers and 12 soldiers. Aussig was also captured, but the Prussians found Leitmeritz to be swarming with the Austrians, commanded by Colonel Graf Franz Moritz von Lacy. At Aussig, a pontoon bridge of 24 pontoons was put down so the Prussians could reach the other bank. Further up the stream, the Austrians occupied the Castle of Schreckenstein. For its defense, Browne had earmarked a force of about 400 Croats led by Lt.-Col. Peter von MacEliot. The Prussian efforts to seize the structure were half-hearted, since their interest was limited. September 28, a detachment led by Major-General Christoph Hermann von Manstein49 made one lone weak effort, but it was easily repulsed. On the flipside, the Croats conducted so many nuisance raids upon the forces holding the Aussig pontoon bridge that the king ordered it dismantled on September 29.
The plan which Frederick was employing here was similar to ones he had earlier used in the First and Second Silesian Wars, but the times had changed. Frederick did not yet understand how much times, not to mention his Austrian enemy, had changed. Even if only in the back of his mind, Frederick expected the often easy victories like he had enjoyed in the earlier Silesian Wars. Aside from the reports that filtered into Berlin about Austrian improvements in the intervening years, there was no way to “see” the refinements short of battle. It would prove a rude awakening to the king and the whole Prussian army.
But that was just a bit into the future. The more immediate problem involved the Saxons and their new camp and how to deal best with the developing situation. A brief description of the ground about Pirna may be desirable at this point. The land begins rising in gentle swells on both banks of the Elbe to the east from the Saxon capital curving to Tetschen—approximately 26 miles to the southeast from Dresden—while above the capital’s northern suburbs some 27 miles to the east rose the Falkenberg. The Schneeberg was about 24 miles from Falkenberg and a full 25 from Dresden, off to the north-northwest. Between these two heights lay the Prussians and the Saxons, in this autumn of 1756.
Within their lines, the Saxons had as their one important fortress the Königstein (itself just short of Schandau), but it was virtually impregnable to the siege guns of that age.50 The fortress of the Sonnenstein near Pirna was also formidable (with a garrison of 125 men), although not like the Königstein. Augustus’ headquarters were at Struppen, and he placed the most reliance on these forts, with their connecting lines. The first line of defense was the small outworks on the Gottleube stream, near the rises, the latter going away towards Leopoldshayn—itself only about four miles from the Königstein.
Between Langen-Hennersdorf, the Saxon lines extended as far in that direction as the little hamlet, and the Königstein. That was the extent of Augustus’ weaker force fronting on the brook hard by Königstein. The one between Langen-Hennersdorf and the Sonnenstein, where the majority of the Saxon army was positioned, protected behind lines of palisades, batteries, and natural obstructions, was stronger. Even the passes into that latter position were strongly guarded.
Frederick, after reconnoitering the Saxon position carefully, concluded there was little chance of assaulting the enemy’s position without suffering heavy losses. He decided to besiege the enemy in their lines and allow short rations and the idle moments a chance to weaken the Saxons’ strength and determination. But that left time for the besieged to receive relief, time for the Austrians to move to the aid of their beleaguered “allies.”
Meanwhile, Frederick made the best of a bad situation. The Prussian camp was positioned from Gross-Sedlitz to Dohna—a distance of about one mile—extending to the Müglitz River. Beyond this, Charles of Brandenburg-Schwedt’s command was deployed to Rothschenke, and that of Bevern from there to Gottleube. Beyond the latter lay scattered hussar bodies and artillery right up to the Elbe. On the upper bank of the river, the king was linked to the commands of Lt.-Gen. Johann Georg von Lestwitz and Lt.-Gen. Hans Karl von Winterfeldt.51 Lestwitz’s guns dominated the Saxon lines near the Sonnenstein, while Winterfeldt, from his command post at Lilienstein, sought to prevent the Saxons from escaping across the Elbe that way.52 Winterfeldt had a second grouping of batteries with him, while a third was at Welden and Neider.
Negotiations were broken off on September 19, following trips even by the esteemed Winterfeldt to hold unproductive talks with Augustus. The Prussian high command disdained the military assault option upon Pirna. The king, trading immediate action for more patient effects, was not playing this waiting game without purpose. He already cradled hopes the Saxons could be forced to terms with a minimum of casualties, as he wished to incorporate their army into his own.
And so the Prussian king bade his time and waited upon events. For this decision, he has been roundly assailed as overly cautious, both by some contemporaries (Winterfeldt, for one, believed the camp could be stormed), and by some of his illustrious successors, including Napoleon Bonaparte. Certainly, this behavior is curious when the Prussians acted as if they were forestalling a coalition when they barged into Saxony in the first place. Besides the cramped territory in which the Pirna post was situated, with its limited maneuvering room, contrasted greatly with the open plains of Bohemia, which were within easy marching distance. But the bluecoats stayed put.
The opportunistic monarch used the time to try to ingratiate himself into Saxon society as much as possible. Frederick attended worship in local Protestant churches, while his guards were careful to keep would-be troublemakers at bay. The king also threw festive balls, at which he “excited admiration by his excellent performance on the flute.”53 We are left wondering how much of this was genuine and how much just for show.
Meanwhile, disturbing events were taking place further to the south. Rumors that Browne had as many as 60,000 fighting men had reached Gross-Sedlitz, but his actual number was more like 45,000. On September 10, the Austrian commander marched, under strict instructions to relieve the Saxons as quickly as possible. However, he was deprived of support from Piccolomini, who had his hands full with Field Marshal Kurt Christoph Schwerin54 over in Silesia.
Piccolomini, about September 3, shifted into Bohemia to oppose Schwerin, encamped between Glogau and Neustadt. Buccow was sent, September 12, with two regiments of dragoons and one of infantry, to occupy the key post of Königgrätz. The prince took up temporary quarters the next day at Leutomischl. Schwerin moved promptly to oppose the Austrian move. On September 15, he was at Reinertz, at the foot of the Metal-Gebirge, and was developing the presence of Austrians at advanced posts along the ridge.
Early the next morning, Piccolomini’s main body was at Königgrätz, and reports were rife of the imminent Prussian presence. An exhausting march was fortified with one full day of rest. On September 17, Buccow, with a detachment of dragoons and Count Rudolph Pálffy’s hussars, galloped to Neustadt, there to contain the Prussians preparing to debouch into the plains. Schwerin had the advantage of the ground, not to mention of numbers, so he ejected Buccow’s forces and moved sedately with his main body on Geishubel.
This was a threat Piccolomini could not afford to ignore, still less when Schwerin suddenly rose on September 19 and marched the approximately 20 miles to Aujest. There, hidden behind three large ponds in front and the Elbe River on the right, the Prussian paused in a strong position. The Aust
rian commander had reacted to all of this by ordering entrenchments be made ready at and about Königgrätz. Advanced parties set up barriers to the enemy. On September 21, Prussian patrols probed these new works Piccolomini had constructed, alarming the Austrians that more sinister movements were at hand. But Schwerin was not really in earnest.
So the two sides spent a nervous, but brief, interlude, lasting only until September 25. On that date, General Pálffy was posted to Geishubel, trying to cut the Prussian line-of-communications and supply that was keeping Schwerin in business at Aujest. This was an obvious attempt to force the Prussians to recoil upon the Metal-Gebirge. Schwerin responded by sending out the Free Corps of J. A. K. du Verger55; the latter promptly sped in the direction of Richenau. Other Prussian raiding parties operated north and south of Königgrätz. Piccolomini answered with a detachment under Lt.-Gen. Marquis de Spada of 2,000 cavalry. Spada promptly repaired to Sadowa to block the Prussian incursions thereabouts, while Lt.-Gen. Gersdorf maneuvered towards Richenau to fend off enemy foraging parties. Throughout, Schwerin demonstrated a curious lassitude which can only be explained by his diversionary role of decoy designed to dominate Piccolomini’s attention.
Browne, for his part, made steady progress. By the end of September, he was consolidated at Budin. Keith, from his camp at Peterswaulde, had gradually extended elements of Ferdinand’s force to Aussig, the center being at Johnsdorf (thus holding lines nearly 15 miles in extent). So Keith’s Prussians were across the Eger only two days’ march from Browne, who now encamped, uncertain what to do next.
Under these circumstances, Browne knew that a march directly on Pirna was out of the question for the moment. The arrival of the Austrian relief force did compel Frederick to take counter measures to keep the Austrian “rescuers” from “spoiling” the party.
On September 28, the king, leaving Charles of Brandenburg-Schwedt in command of the siege forces, moved with a detachment of men to Johnsdorf. He took with him an advanced guard of eight battalions, eight squadrons of hussars and ten of dragoons, and moved off. The following day, Frederick and Keith marched directly at the enemy, who were already preparing to cross the Eger on their pontoons. The night of September 29–30 the Prussians reached Turmitz. From there, it was an easy saunter down the Töplitz-Dresden road on Budin, where Frederick’s scouts accurately informed him that Browne was encamped. Arriving at Kletschenberg, the king discovered the Austrians, who had crossed the Eger that very morning (September 30) and occupied Lobositz.
Major-General Graf von O’Donnell led the Austrian advanced guard, which probed gingerly for the nearby foe. Browne kept sending additional reinforcements to prop up O’Donnell during the course of the night. The light troopers crowded over against the bluecoats as much as they dared, and spent the entire night harassing them with light fire.
Marshal Browne had not been neglectful of keeping up active communication with the Saxons in Pirna. One of his staff, the French officer Major de Martagne, suggested Browne send an independent flying corps up through the country east of Elbe, where the Prussians would likely be vulnerable. Instead of the west of the Elbe, where the pathways held bluecoats in great strength. The task force was to appear before the Saxon camp, while Augustus was to bring his army across from Pirna and fall back on Bohemia along the eastern bank of the Elbe along with the task force.
Browne dispatched Martagne early on September 21 to make his way discreetly to Pirna to communicate this scheme to the Saxons. On September 28, a rider from Pirna confirmed the Saxons would prepare, by October 11–12, to fulfill their part of the bargain.
The Prussians made similar preparations. Duke of Brunswick-Bevern’s task was to solidify the Prussian post, while Major-General von Wickeradt Quadt took a force (the 5th Infantry of Ferdinand and the 3rd of Major-General Friedrich Franz of Anhalt-Dessau) to expel “some hundreds of Pandours.”56 These troopers were reluctant to retreat. During the night, the Prussian king received intelligence from some hussars that the Austrians were in motion. This would lead to the very erroneous conclusion the following morning that Browne was retreating without recourse to battle.
The Austrians were still hidden by the layered ground, so much so that only from the Kletschenberg itself could they be seen. Even that restricted view required an eyeglass. Browne’s army lay between Sullowitz through Lobositz to Wehlhoten, a long, divided front which the Prussians hoped to break. About 0200 hours, on October 1, advancing Prussian patrols were “ambushed” on the way to Welmina by some of Browne’s troopers. In one veteran’s crisp words, “there was some wild shooting.”57 The surprised marshal shook his men awake to prepare for action, and a couple of cavalry regiments were even shifted from Browne’s right to his left. Here he evidently thought the chance of an enemy attack greater. Still, the two armies did not yet come to blows, and Browne’s men spent the rest of the night nervously anticipating the dawn. Men on both sides no doubt spent an anxious night under arms. Thus the last night of September, the Prussians and their king waited on the daylight for a confrontation with the enemy.
Chapter Two
The Battle of Lobositz
A thick mist lay over the plain of Lobositz1 from the dawn on October 1, hiding the daylight, as well as the enemy, from Frederick’s view.2 The veil extended up the hills and thoroughly covered the ground. Most of what would become a battlefield that day was shrouded. The Prussian king could just make out the outline of the village of Lobositz in the distance, though little else. This time it was not caused by Frederick’s well-known myopia, but the weather.3
Reconnaissance parties were dispatched out, off towards the Lobosch Hill, where scattered groups of enemy light parties (some 2,000 Croats and grenadiers all told)4 could be barely discerned occupying the vineyards in front of—and on—the rise. These vineyards were intertwined with small stone walls, only a few feet high, with a limited view. But the handy structures would provide some shelter for the troops positioned there. In addition, the rocky condition of the ground provided some cover.
Browne deployed his forces to keep the backs of his men to the Homolka, where the Austrian horse was packed to the extent the marshal dared. Behind the front line, Browne had only the hussars of Lt.-Gen. Andreas Hadik Graf von Futal and the Baranyáy Hussars to help the forward troops in case Frederick’s cavalry struck.
About 0515 hours, the king, in the company of Marshal Keith, Duke of Bevern, and Prince Augustus Wilhelm,5 rode up closer to check on the enemy. Little could be identified even in this nearer view, although it appeared nothing was stirring in the enemy’s camp. But even while the entourage met with Lt.-Gen. Karl Christian Graf von Schmettau in the forward posts, scouts reported an undetermined number of the enemy close by. The king’s party returned to the main camp, and tried to piece together what the opposition might be up to. What was really going on beneath that mask of fog? There was some basis for believing the main Austrian force had retired during the night, and had left only a small screening force to delay the bluecoats.
About 0600 hours, Frederick took another look. Below, nearer to Lobositz, he could now make out small bodies of troops, probably hussars, through the haze.6 After that, Frederick began deploying his army to be better prepared for any eventuality on the part of Browne. Early on, the big guns of both sides apparently began to fire intermittently. Ulrich Bräker, a Swiss “volunteer” in the Prussian service, wrote of the “thunder of the cannon” from about 0600 hours on.7
Artillery would play an important role in this first European battle of the biggest war the world had yet seen.8 Frederick could dispose of approximately 17,500 infantry in 25 battalions, 10,500 horse in 59 squadrons, a small force of about 300 hussars, and 97 guns.9 In the space between the Lobosch and the Homolka, in rather cramped surroundings, the Prussian van deployed, while to the right on the Homolka itself (about 1,038 feet above the valley below), in a second group, the king put part of his infantry. Among the latter were some of Schwerin’s command, Major-General August Friedrich von I
tzenplitz’s 13th Infantry and Winterfeldt’s men with some 12 guns.10 Most of the army was deployed to the left of the Homolka along the Lobosch (which itself rose more than a quarter of a mile above the valley floor below). The first order of business here was to drive away those active enemy parties planted thereabouts.
As the Prussian scouting forces drew nearer, an intermittent fire was opened on them from the men crouched behind the wall. Frederick’s hopes for an easy victory were squashed instantly and for all. This much was clear: The enemy held the rise; it would be necessary to wrestle it from Browne as a condition to secure victory.
About 0700 hours, the army moved to the attack. The Prussian artillery of Colonel Karl Friedrich von Moller went straightway to work, a sustained effort this time, with some effect.11 Austrian guns, all set to go, replied with an intensity that belied the “calm” autumn morning.12 The reverberation of the guns was soon unnerving many a seasoned veteran. Some of the Austrian Croats promptly bolted to the rear, and even the experienced Browne could never remember hearing the like.13
As the Prussian regiments marched up, each battalion moving to the leftwards before making an oblique turn, they came under a sustained, accurate fire. Bevern’s 7th and the 17thof Major-General Heinrich von Manteuffel were sucked into the vortex of the developing action that was drawn against the Croats, supported by the 27th Infantry of Lt.-Gen. Franz Ulrich von Kleist. This included the contribution from five or six cannon which had been set up before Lobositz and were shooting quite energetically the whole time. The latter found their range rather quickly.
Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War Page 3
