Bevern bypassed Liebenau and discovered Schwerin’s advanced elements at Turnau on April 24. This was about ten miles from Münchengrätz and roughly 23 miles from Jung-Bunzlau. Marshal Schwerin assumed command of both columns. His force now increased to 68,000 men, Schwerin advanced promptly upon Jung-Bunzlau and captured it on April 26.88 A Prussian force under Major-General George Ludwig Henning von Puttkammer had been blockading the place since April 8. The Austrians had been so paralyzed by the recent events that, incredibly, they did not try to destroy the supply stores at Jung-Bunzlau.89
The day before, Frederick had sent riders with orders for the Schwerin-Bevern force to march for Melnik to close Browne’s escape route towards Prague. Unfortunately, enemy light troops were at it again, intercepting the orders. So Schwerin, after seizing the main Austrian magazine, stayed there, oblivious for the moment of the king’s directives. Browne barely arrived at Budin, quickly realizing his vulnerable position. This was a view merely confirmed when he saw the intercepted royal order. The king had heard the news of Bevern’s success at Reichenberg, and was inspired to press forward all the faster on Prague.
On the first of May, the various Austrian field forces began concentrating at and around Prague. Prince Charles moved his forces under the cover of night. About 0300 hours, his men filtered into a camp near the city. The left sauntered through the defile at Tuchomirschitz, through Schlan across the Moldau. Browne, with the right wing, had a harder task. His withdrawal was directly in the face of the bluecoats; he bypassed the defile across the Moldau. Frederick selected Browne as his special target.90 Twenty squadrons of Prussian cavalry pressed the Austrian hussars as they retreated through the defile. The timely arrival of a body of Croats helped stave off the Prussian pursuers. The marshal (who had graciously refused the proffered dual command of the army as impractical) was fully involved in placing forces in the way of the enemy advance. In a rather difficult defile at Horomeritz, Browne was compelled to fight. This occurred as he was taking the Austrian left through Tuchomirschitz. A battery of six cannon with grenadier/dismounted cavalry support, placed on a commanding height beforehand by Browne, smashed down the limited Prussian advance. The action was swift, but Browne lost some 17 men, the bluecoats about 20.
Charles called a council-of-war on the last day of April. Browne spoke out with a firm resolve that the Prussians should be attacked at once, before they could reach Prague. They were vulnerable in crossing the Elbe and the passages thereabouts. As no one concurred with Browne (in what was a wise course), the marshal asked for a 4,000-man detachment with which to strike the enemy himself. This request was refused outright. May 1, Prince Charles split his army into two, taking the right himself and marching succinctly through the narrow streets of Prague. The ailing Browne coolly directed the withdrawal across the Moldau and into the broken country near Prague. By late afternoon, the men were filing into their new camp. However, Prince Charles had abandoned Browne’s wise plan of keeping Königsegg at Brandeis91; he had been ordered to join the main army. Charles also rescinded Serbelloni’s instructions to join the main army. The latter stayed unmolested at Königgrätz.92
Königsegg marched with his main body towards Prague on May 2, leaving only Lt.-Col. MacEliot with a force of Croats to keep a tenuous hold on the Elbe, interspersing between Schwerin and the king. At 1600 hours, MacEliot’s stunned men (1,500 Croats) were savaged in a fight with a more numerous enemy and forced to retreat. Marshal Schwerin showed his very human side here. When General Hartwig Carl Friedrich von Wartenberg93 was killed in the action, Schwerin “bemoaned his death crying, ‘My Wartenberg … [H]e is dead.’”94 His place was taken by promoted Colonel von Warnery. Wartenberg had the capability to be a Ziethen or a Seydlitz.95 Even the king was much affected. “The brave general … was universally regretted.”96 The Croats fell back towards the Elbe bridges, in a firefight during which the infuriated Prussians captured guns, supplies, and baggage, burning the bridges behind them. The next day, the unwelcome news reached the Austrian headquarters; the blocking force between Schwerin and the king was rooted out of the way. The two main bodies could now unite.
On May 2, Frederick’s men reached the Weissenberg. The vanguard arrived early in the morning, followed shortly by the king and the rest of his command. Before the sun set that evening, the bluecoats were massing on the Weissenberg, five miles above the old city of Prague. Prussian headquarters were set up in one of the largest buildings in the region, the old Jesuit dwelling at Tuchomirschitz (night of May 1–2), late the headquarters of the Austrians. The locals had a good time regaling the Prussians about the two Austrian commanders nearly getting into a fist fight before moving out for Prague on April 30–May 1.97
Frederick had intended to fight a battle at Weissenberg (according to a letter to Schwerin on May 1), but that was not to be. The prospective targets had moved. Browne and Arenberg had already fallen back beyond the walls of Prague, under Charles’s orders. A new council-of-war (May 2) firmly dismissed Prince Charles’ idea of retreating deeper into Bohemia to join up with Serbelloni; a stand would have to be made here, just beyond Prague. If the Austrians were to maintain hold on the city, they would have to fight. The Austrian camp, deployed on the Žižkaberg, could be rather clearly seen from the Weissenberg spread out for miles eastwards of Prague.
Meanwhile, the Prussians were weighing their options for the forthcoming battle. The weather had turned wet, and the troops were forced to spend a miserable time under heavy rains in early May. Moreover, topography would play a key role in this upcoming battle.
A brief survey of the ground might be desirable at this point. The main Austrian force was clear. At the western end of the old city, lay the high Hradschin (the highest slope in that region), which dominated the ground. From it, the various streets ran towards the Moldau River and the bridge thereabouts. Here the land leveled off and roads branched off to the front, north and south. To the eastwards, the streets crossed the bridge, through Prague and on to the Žižkaberg. Between Weissenberg and the Žižkaberg, the distance was about five miles, the Hradschin to the latter, at a northwest angle, about 21⁄2 miles. Here Prague was at its greatest stretch, restricted as it was by the rises.
The city itself was no strong fortress, but the nature of the country about Prague rendered it very strong, in a secondary sense. The Moldau Valley surrounded it, and the city was divided in two by the Moldau itself. On the western bank, a peninsula or neck of land, known as the Belvedere Park, jutted out above Prague and just beyond the hamlet of Seltz. Up the Moldau, the land was generally flat and pleasant near the river bank, but as one moved away from the river the terrain gave way to hills and rocky enclaves.
Frederick’s chief worry was to set the rendezvous with Schwerin and Bevern, both still in a single formation. Had the Austrians possessed the likes of a Laudon in high command at this stage of the war, the bluecoats might have had additional concerns. Attacks against one or more disunited forces could then have been expected. But Prince Charles and Browne were too busy feuding with each other to worry much about Frederick and his army. They should have taken the offensive before the juncture took place.
The king wanted to link his men up just south of the Žižkaberg, but this was now impossible, as Austrians were close-by in great strength. Frederick should then have moved across the Moldau, and performed this juncture on the opposite bank below Prague. Schwerin and Bevern had been delayed a day, perhaps the only substantial contribution Konigsegg had accomplished for the Austrian side.
May 3, reconnaissance parties were sent to find a better place to perform the coming juncture between the main Prussian forces. By this point, the rain was beginning to ease just a bit, and alternating with partly sunny skies. With weather conditions brightening, the king was most anxious to link up with his subordinates. But the army was given a well-deserved breather on May 3.
It was just as well. MacEliot’s withdrawal left Schwerin free to cross the Brandeis, which was quickly accomplis
hed. In addition, the improving weather pattern raised the spirits of the soldiers for the coming battle. Everyone in the army had to suspect by then there would be a battle to win Prague.98On May 4, the king marched his force up the Moldau into the rises to find a place to link-up.
The Austrians kept busy reconnoitering the countryside for Prussian movements. Major-General Prince Joseph Lobkowitz was active in scouting with his force of some 500 cavalry. The bluecoats captured a few of these men. Otherwise, the prince stayed out of harm’s way, all the while warily observing the Prussians. The overall direction of the Austrians was still responding to what the Prussians were doing, rather than the other way around.
Frederick left Keith with half of his men (30,000 strong) to hold the Weissenberg, and keep the Austrians hemmed into Prague from that side. The supply/ammunition wagons had come forward from Leitmeritz. Keith was entrusted to hold them secure. The king’s marching column got to Lissoley (behind where the tributary from the Elbe broke off and fell towards Welleslawin) late in the evening of May 4. The next day, scouts reached Seltz, and found the lower rise to be on the eastern side of the river. Time was precious, and the king knew he was outnumbered by the enemy in Prague.
The intelligence on the Schwerin-Bevern force was encouraging. The king heard, in addition to the action at Reichenberg, of their successful juncture, of their capture of the big magazine at Jung-Bunzlau, knew they were across the Elbe. A day later than was planned, but across all the same. They were even then waiting for three cannon shot; this was to be the signal to Schwerin that the king was crossing the Moldau. The engineers were ordered to get a bridge built as well as set up batteries to cover the Prussian crossing. A few Austrian Pandours tried to interfere, but they were well dealt with. Three shots sounded out, and Schwerin’s scouts, recognizing the signal, alerted the marshal. Colonel Seydlitz and his hussars were sent at once to see to the matter. When the crossing was underway, the king’s scouts reported a force of riders. The enemy? To mutual delight, the newcomers happened to be none other than Seydlitz’s men, coming up behind.99 Three cheers were let out, to the displeasure of the enemy patrols hovering about. But the crossing was completed, and the bluecoats marched up and encamped on the low eastern hills for the night. They could be grateful for an interlude of peace following their labors.
Browne, for his part, was not inactive. The lethargy of the late winter had vanished in the Austrian camp; ironically, the very ill Browne showed more energy in trying to come to grips with the Prussians than Charles, his erstwhile superior. May 5, about 1600 hours, with no thought in mind other than to secure a better campsite, Browne took to horse in company with Luchessi. They were accompanied by four companies of mounted grenadiers, riding out to find the best spot available for the coming battle with the bluecoats. Definitive word had arrived the king was across the Moldau and that Schwerin was across the Elbe. Browne found a suitable topographical locale, beyond Gbell, but Charles overruled him. Prince Charles likely feared an attack at a possible new sight before defensive preparations could be completed.100 This could lead to disastrous results. By then, a battle was inevitable.
All parties realized this. The Austrians operated under another handicap. In light of Browne’s energy and abilities, nepotism was entirely responsible for Prince Charles’s appointment as army commander.101 His commission can probably only be justified by Browne’s terminal condition. Even then, other qualified generals could have been found; admittedly, not without some effort. It is significant that Charles was able to keep his command until the end of campaign 1757.
For the latter, meanwhile on this self-same afternoon of May 5, possibly the most unnerving thought was the knowledge that the united enemy throng was right on top of his position.102 From the Austrian lines, the bluecoats were plainly visible. After the evening meal Charles finally began to look over his virtually neglected army. He was shocked to find a note—its origin never determined—that freed a goodly portion of each cavalry unit to go roam into the city of Prague on personal business. Before the “order” could be countermanded, the deed was done.
Because of this note, nearly 5,000 men were absent from the battle the next day or, for all intents and purposes (late arrivals, confusions, etc.), might as well have been. We cannot rule out the possibility the Prussians had something to do with this whole business. Just this one factor, while beyond Charles’s ability to immediately redress, contributed to the reverse that followed, exacerbating Austrian difficulties.
The prince, because of his tardy arrival at the front, was still largely a stranger to his own army. His lighter, easier-going manner contrasted with the fiery Irishman Browne. The men were familiar with the gruff behavior of Browne. Most of the Austrians wished that Browne were still calling the shots. Even the ordinary soldiers knew the formidableness of the enemy before them, and realized the task just ahead. They were on the defensive, in every sense of the word; reacting, rather than initiating, being dictated to, rather than compelling. Finally, the men were privy to the worst kept “secret” of the day: Prince Charles and Browne did not enjoy working together. As it turned out, “their noisy squabbles were overhead by the troops.”103
The troubling situation in Bohemia and news of the still advancing Prussians had unnerved the Austrian high command. Kaunitz himself determined to go see for himself just what was happening. May 5, the minister set off, in the company of his chief ministerial assistant, Friedrich von Binder, and a host of other tag-alongs, bound for Prague to try to settle down the situation, as much between Browne and Prince Charles as with the Prussians. The trip by carriage was largely uneventful until the caravan reached Böhmisch-Brod, where Marshal Daun’s men were discovered. There the unpleasant news arrived that Kaunitz could no longer reach Prague. The Prussians in large numbers were present in the immediate area; they had the main Austrian army trapped near to Prague. There was nothing to do but turn for home.104
Back at Prague, the Austrians were not aware of Kaunitz’ impending business, and the bickering between the two chief commanders was most disturbing. All of this boded ill as the morning of May 6 arrived, and so did another altercation with the formidable bluecoats of Frederick.
Chapter Six
The Battle of Prague
Over on the Prussian side, Frederick posted himself on the high hilltops north of Prague, at Czimitz. Clearly, his main (and most pressing) worry had to be the complete rendezvous with Schwerin’s main body, planned to take place before 0600 hours the next morning, May 6.1 The place of union, Prossik, was just north of the highway between Prague and Königgrätz. It was closer to the enemy’s lines than the king’s current post. It was no accident this dangerous maneuver—especially in view of the proximity of the Austrians—was to be finished under cover of darkness.
Schwerin got underway with that singular objective in mind a little after midnight. Before daylight, the meeting of the two forces was accomplished, Austrian reconnaissance patrols reported. The king, accompanied by Winterfeldt, Schwerin, along with Lt.-Col. Oelsnitz, Captain Platen, and Adjutant-General Friedrich Albrecht Graf von Schwerin, went galloping out to inspect the enemy’s camp, once the clear morning light was well established. The Prussians wanted to know what Charles was preparing for them. Enemy gunners, watching for visitors, sighted the king and his scouting party, firing off a shot or two at them. The king pulled up short, sending Marshal Schwerin galloping towards the Austrian right to see if it was vulnerable to attack. Schwerin, with a keen eye for such things, discovered that the Austrian right was “in the air, resting upon small hills … [which] offered easy access to infantry.”2 None of this, however, answered the Prussians’ biggest question at the moment, “What was the enemy commander up to?”3
Prince Charles was doing nothing to head off the rendezvous of the Prussian forces.4 He did not appreciate the seriousness of the situation. On the other hand, Browne was again a bundle of energy. As soon as he returned to the main army from his search for a new campsite, the marshal
plunged into making the best of what the Austrian army had to work with in their present quarters. A numerical superiority on the part of the enemy was readily apparent, enough to prevent cautious Prince Charles from thinking in offensive terms. But Marshal Browne took the time left to prepare a better defense.5
What was already a strong defensible post was made even more so by artificial means. The marshal repaired to a slight elevation before Kej. It could be of great importance in the coming fight. Work was at once started, so that an entrenchment was on the ridge before daylight, along with an area sufficient “to harbor twenty seven pieces of heavy artillery”6 which had been hewn out of the freshly turned earth. The Austrian efforts were at least partially accomplished on the day of the battle.7 The bluecoat victory later that day was one bought at greater cost due to these last-minute measures.8
It was clear the marshal was trying every trick he knew to make the ground work to the advantage of the Austrians. Access from the roads into the hills must have been difficult, but once atop the steep mountains the land became a rolling plain hardly accessible on any side but the east side facing Prague or on the north facing the Moldau. The position selected for the Austrian army to hold was not a bad one, and held by an army only slightly inferior in numbers compared to the king’s forces. Unfortunately, the incessant bickering had the effect of paralyzing the whitecoats at a crucial time when they could have made some successful, more effective countermeasures. The Prussians were given virtually a free run of the area forward of the camp, giving them the room they needed to perform necessary—and rather involved—measures before coming to battle.
The immediate area was virtually devoid of timber or heavy woods, although there were two prominent rises. One jutted between the Sterbohol and Unter-Michelup, while the second rose up just north of the Sterbohol, blocking any meaningful view of the region towards Hastowitz and Kej. The Austrian army was positioned between the Žižkaberg, eastwards to Kyge and Hlaupentin, a distance of some four miles. Then back opposite the Taborberg (itself less than a mile from Maleschitz), another rise on the eastern edge of Charles’s position. The Austrian right extended back en masse on Kyge, and Charles’s center/left directly forward of it, headquarters at Nussel.
Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War Page 10
