The marching formations passed Zeuchfeld and swerved towards Pettstädt; here the advance was halted. Soubise and Hildburghausen held a hasty conference with their subordinates. Soubise wanted to encamp right where they were and await developments, but the other generals overruled him as this move would leave the army in a precariously exposed position with the bluecoats very close at hand. Hildburghausen was arguing, in vain it seemed, to persuade Soubise to modify his flanking march when suddenly movement was reported in the Prussian camp.13
While the Allies had been thus engaged, the king’s army had not been inactive. Earlier in the morning, at about 0800 hours, Frederick climbed to the roof of a large mansion in Rossbach (the Herranhaus) to watch the enemy maneuvering over near Müchelin. A portion of a westward facing wall had been removed so the monarch could get a better view of the proceedings. Frederick had observed the foe all morning, witnessing their shaky march past Zeuchfeld before making the turn towards Pettstädt.14 At first, the king assumed the enemy were retreating, either on Freiburg or to try to cut him off from the Saale at Merseburg. Reconnaissance patrols were forthwith dispatched to ascertain what the enemy actually intended. Simultaneously, Seydlitz and Mayr received instructions to saddle up their cavalry commands and await developments.
Shortly afterwards, St. Germain’s artillery began shelling the Prussian left (in Rossbach) and appeared to be forming up to attack. When he did not actually advance, Frederick ascertained—as he had all the while suspected—that this was a mere ruse to keep his attention. He believed by then that the Allies were trying to draw off to the rear while St. Germain kept the bluecoats busy. Meanwhile, some of the scouting parties penetrated the deserted Allied camp and learned from local peasants that the enemy were moving down the Weissenfels road.
The Combined Army was running into some real confusion on their march. At the wheel to the left near Zeuchfeld, a portion of the reserve infantry had become entangled between the main columns and was creating some problems among the artillery teams. Even worse, the swing meant the column on the outer side had a longer distance to cover than the inside one. Back at Rossbach, Frederick went to dinner downstairs about 1200 hours, leaving Captain Friedrich von Gaudi to continue the observation of the Allies’ march.
The king’s meal had lasted about two hours when Captain Gaudi came rushing into the room. Gaudi reported, with a tremor in his voice and with perhaps more urgency than was actually required, that the Combined Army was on a heading aiming for Reichardtswerben and was veering right straight at the Prussian left. The monarch, unperturbed, finished his meal and climbed to the roof in company with his staff15 to see to the matter himself. For a few minutes, Frederick earnestly surveyed the scene and came to the conclusion that battle, which had eluded the bluecoats until just then, was about to be offered by the enemy himself.
The king studied briefly how would be the best way to take advantage of the enemy’s impetuosity. He finally conceived of a sound plan. Off to the eastward, the rolling ground there could conceal a flank march from Soubise and his peers from behind the Janus and the Pölzen Hills to envelop the Allies by a flank sweep. Orders were issued to prepare for the movement, the army being given guidelines to pack up except for the tents (these were to be left standing until the last possible moment for the benefit of the enemy’s eyes). Meantime, at the Allied command, there was more confusion: Soubise wanted to cut across the plain and hem in the Prussians by occupying the line of the Saale, Hildburghausen, reminding the Frenchman that the army was by then desperately short on provisions, reluctantly agreed with this scheme.
The bluecoats marched at about 1430 hours, except for Mayr and a small cavalry force, left to oppose Laudon in Almsdorf. The Allied observers saw only the tents go down and Frederick’s men moving off at best pace behind the Janus and its neighbor, leaving no visible enemy except for Mayr’s little force.16 Then there was an urgent effort to get the roley poley formations moving before Frederick’s army could get away, and the Allies stumbled forward blindly towards Rossbach to force the issue. It was feared, for a moment, that the bluecoats had lost heart and were fleeing for Merseburg, while Mayr was left to guard the retreat. That the very aggressive Prussian monarch had suddenly, and uncharacteristically, become timid. This action “caused us to think the Prussians, in dread of us, were making for Merseburg.”17 As we have seen, quite the opposite was taking place.
Seydlitz had 38 squadrons of men (some 3,900 horse), which comprised the following regiments: Seydlitz’ own 8th Cuirassiers, the 7th, the 10th, the 3rd, and Blumenthal’s 13th Cuirassiers. Lighter equipped horse included the 1st, the 3rd, and the 4th Hussars. Seydlitz led this body of cavalry towards the Janus and the Pölzen. The marching enemy had 12 squadrons of the French cavalry on the left side acting as a protector in case the bluecoats suddenly put in an appearance. Behind the hills, meanwhile, Frederick was preparing to give the foe the encounter they seemed to desire.
The monarch managed a few words of encouragement for his men: “The hour is come, my friends, in which everything that is (or ought to be) dear to us depends upon our arms and our conduct. Time allows me to say little, and many words are unnecessary. You all know that you have suffered no fatigue, hunger, cold, or danger that I have not shared with you, and you see me now ready to sacrifice my life with you. All I desire of you is the return of my affection and fidelity…. I will only add, not just as encouragement but as proof of my gratitude for your past services, from this hour, to the day you get to winter-quarters, your pay shall be doubled over. Now! Go fight like Brave men, and trust for success in God!”18
Seydlitz, meanwhile, had been ordered behind the rolling ground thereabouts. He had pickets on the summit of the Janus to keep him informed of the enemy maneuvering and pinpoint when the Allies were ripe for an enveloping attack. He was given charge of the whole Prussian cavalry present for the battle. Seydlitz curtly dismissed the objections of senior Generals Peter von Meinecke and Baron Schönaich to his new appointment, which was right over their seniority. “Gentlemen! I obey the king, and you must obey me!”19 More of that quality called Gumption.
The king for his part knew what the Combined Army intended, to a reasonable degree anyhow, and how he would counter them. He would wait until the enemy had passed the hollows and the hills, then emerge, no doubt unexpectedly, on their left. If they had already deployed in order of battle facing northward, this blow would hit their right flank. But, if the Allies were still in their marching formation facing east or northeast, they would be struck head-on and, hopefully, rolled up in defeat before the rearward troops could come to their aid. Since deployment of eighteenth-century armies was generally slow even at best, the Allies just might be beaten before they hardly had time to properly prepare to defend themselves. In point of fact, that is just how the battle unfolded.
As Seydlitz compacted his cavalry behind the Janus, a Prussian battery of 18 guns (16 heavy cannon and two howitzers) under Colonel Christian Friedrich August von Moller was unlimbered and readied to open fire. Prince Henry (in charge of the Prussian center) steadied his infantry for the attack. Moller’s battery was to his right, with the fine formations of Seydlitz on the left. This was the order-of-battle.
Meanwhile, the Allies had rounded the flank position and were heading northward when the pickets signaled Seydlitz the crucial moment had finally arrived. The latter climbed up to see for himself, took out a clay pipe, fixed and lit it, then returned to his command. He then led his men into the view of the enemy, without awaiting the king’s instructions. It was approximately 1515 hours. The 38 squadrons had been divided in two for this attack, with 20 in the first line. Range was down to about 2,600 feet by that point; the Allies were becoming terribly discombobulated in their hasty effort at “pursuit.”20 Simultaneously, Moller’s guns opened a terrific fire upon the enemy’s cavalry. The ground miles away shook under the concussion.21 The latter were by then well northward of Reichardtswerben and took some severe punishment in the process. I
ncredibly, Soubise & Company now guessed Frederick was using his guns to cover a withdrawal.22 The Allies, still under their self-induced fog, hastened their pace to get out of Moller’s range and, thereby, promptly lost any cohesion they had gained in trying to pursue the foe. All doubt as to Prussian intentions were dispelled as Seydlitz attacked—at about 1530 hours.
His command surged across the gentle grade right at the Allied force. Some of the latter formations had just deployed, others were about to, when the blue-coated horsemen hit them in front and rear. Seydlitz’ right attacked the Austrian cavalry, which was still in column and unable to get more than two squadrons23 out of 33 into line. Seydlitz’ left charged the front of the enemy infantry head-on and broke their formation. The Battle of Rossbach had begun.
The Szėchėny Hussars, along with three crack regiments of the Imperialist cavalry—the 2nd Cuirassiers, the 1st Cuirassiers, and the 1st Dragoons—moved resolutely towards the action. Once and again, the bluecoats drew back to reform, more from becoming disordered themselves by their own actions than from any resistance the Allies were making. Again, for a total of four times, according to Hildburghausen, Seydlitz charged the astonished enemy. The head of the Allies was pointing at the Janus to seize it as Soubise intended, but the Austrian resistance was stiff enough to allow their comrades to move forward. Seydlitz’ first line was checked before the second group of 18 squadrons broke things wide open.
The 24 squadrons of Broglie’s second line, joined by those of Count Augustin Mailly’s cavalry mentioned above, wheeled out of line and came roaring up to the aid of their friends, under direct orders from Soubise, when the Prussian attack commenced. This move, though commendable under the circumstances, only served to heighten the confusion which was spreading fast through the army, besides increasing the size of the target the Allies were presenting to the eager bluecoats.
Later, Hildburghausen would claim (no doubt, wise after the fact) he had directed Broglie to shield the Austrian right with his horsemen.24 This move would have placed him in an excellent position to roll up Seydlitz’ first impressive, but momentarily unsupported, charge. Those units at the front of this charge25 had a hard way to go for a few minutes, in spite of the Allies being thoroughly surprised. But, then, Seydlitz’ second wave charged. Two French regiments, from Mailly and Piedmont, together with the two Austrian regiments mentioned, made a furious defense. This was in spite of the inevitable multiple languages being used by the various commanders. The French of their troops and some of the contingents, Italian, Hungarian, and the German of the Prussians and most of the Austrians.26 At length, the Allied horse was broken and began retiring in full retreat towards Freiburg, south and southwest of the field. The Prussian 8th Cuirassiers, which had fallen to Seydlitz’ charge after Rochow went down, took two flags and five standards. Katzler’s 10th Cuirassiers nabbed seven standards, and even Szekely grabbed four cannon from the flying enemy.27
This particular unit was of great help to the Prussian cause.28 It contrived to outflank the Allied cavalry at the site, the 1st Cuirassiers and the 3rd Cuirassiers. The formations, already hurting from the effects of the first charge, melted away as fighting forces. This left only the Szėchėny Hussars, who promptly did their part by hitting one of their friends, the Württemburgers, in the back. All of this took a while to straighten out, while the Prussians were effectively hewing their way through the two dragoon regiments, the 1st and the 2nd Dragoons, which were all the while trying to form an organized front. All in all, the cavalry attack at the very start threw the Allies off of their mettle.29
The success of this stroke (or at least the rapidity of it) exposed the Allied leaders and their entourage to great personal danger. Soubise came within a hair’s breadth of being taken captive, although he escaped serious harm other than a slight head wound. The same could not be said for Brigadier de Saluces. He had for a worthy opponent no less than the acting commander of the 10th Prussian Cuirassiers (Gens d’armės) Colonel Friedrich Albert von Schwerin. This conflict, hand-to-hand, ended with the Frenchman in captivity and his command thoroughly unnerved. Brettlache and Hildburghausen both received wounds, but neither was life-threatening. Hildburghausen might have been seriously injured but the enemy troopers hit him with the flats of their weapons rather than the sharp edges. To top this off, he then managed to get away before the bluecoats could take him captive.
In the retreat, meanwhile, the panicked cavalry nearly rode down their supporters who were marching up behind all the while. Seydlitz kept on their tail until it was clear they were no longer capable of effective resistance. The entire Allied vanguard, 57 squadrons strong, had been shattered and were not rallied for the rest of the day. The valiant Seydlitz, as soon as the enemy horsemen had fled, broke off the pursuit and drew his troopers off into the hollows of Tagwerben, just south of his position. Once there, Seydlitz proceeded to reassemble his mounted formations into order again, while Prince Henry carried on the battle with the Prussian infantry.
As Seydlitz carried out his attacks, the king (who had been riding on the Prussian left) directed the infantry down the Janus30 against the Allied infantry in oblique order from the left. Four battalions went to block the Allied advance. These were from the second line of the Prussian infantry, being the Grenadier Battalions 7/30, 13/26, and I/26 (Hülsen).31 Marshal Keith commandeered additional formations from the second line to go secure Reichardstwerben. In short order, this prolongation stretched out the whole line to more or less a single frontage.
Only the muzzles of the Prussian guns became visible to the enemy as the second charge of Seydlitz wound up, but Moller (helped out now by four of the superheavy guns from the walls of Leipzig fortress) gave them such a hammering they could not form up for battle. That is, even if time had permitted. Now Frederick ordered another battery set up just south of Nahlendorf, to pound the vulnerable Allied left. Using that point, the king ordered his soldiers to swing into line towards Reichardstwerben. The bluecoat advance, led by Prince Henry with his two battalions and the five under Keith, swept forward as Seydlitz worked to steady his men at Tagwerben.
Seeing this, Soubise (who had rushed to the front at Seydlitz’ first charge in a futile effort to rally the Allied horse) and Hildburghausen did what they could to steady the infantry. The bluecoats, who had deployed into a battle line as soon as the enemy got to within some 1,700 feet of Reichardstwerben, moved off rapidly towards the southwest to strike at their milling mass. Prince Henry condensed his available forces into a single line to encompass and outflank his foe. Meanwhile, Ferdinand of Brunswick’s 5th Infantry anchored the Prussian right wing in front of Lunstädt throughout the course of the battle. The losses of this unit were surprisingly slight, although the regimental commander, Colonel Johann Christoph von Priegnitz, was killed in the fray. The unit had a total of 15 Pour-le-Merite metals distributed among it, though.32
Meanwhile, Soubise hastily gathered what troops he could (the two French units mentioned above, joined by those of Poitau and Provence) into attack formation and led them forward (1600 hours) in an attempt to regain his flank position. As the troops moved up, Prince Henry’s men poured an incessant fire into the ranks of the now wavering French line.
This apparently point-blank exchange pretty much shredded the Piedmont regiment in particular, at Fürstermarker, forward of Reichardtswerben. Mailly’s column, to the right of the main effort, was really pounded by the Prussians opposite to it. Mailly himself was soon down with a wound. The Allied gunners tried to answer their opposite numbers as best they could. But, it was hopeless. The Prussian artillerists were better trained, organized, and had the angle on them. “The French guns tried their best effort, but the elevation … was [just] too sharp.”33 Thus, one of the three Allied arms was rendered ineffective almost immediately.
Meanwhile, the Imperialist infantry was busy making its way forward, led by Prince Georg. Seydlitz’ first blow had missed this body entirely, although they were subsequently treated to the unw
elcome sight of the panicked Allied cavalry riding right through their ranks to escape from Seydlitz’ minions. If this itself was not unnerving enough, the triumph of the bluecoat horse was clearly evident. The latter was more than a match for the polyglot Allied cavalry.
In retrospect, the decision to advance in column really presented the Prussians with every opportunity to exploit this mistake to the full. Moller’s guns were particularly effective against columns, it is worth noting. What was worse, the big guns of the Allies, basically trapped within the confused, tightly packed ranks of their infantry, nearly three dozen pieces, could not be immediately employed for obvious reasons.
Through it all, the Allied left tried to form for action. It ranged from the shattered Piedmont regiment to the stolid Swiss mercenary units of Reding and Planta. The latter unit managed to get off one massed volley, under the steadying influence of General Planta. The bluecoat reply was rather half-hearted, as fresh troops began to work their way around the valiant Swiss formations. Planta, with no choice left under these circumstances, ordered a hasty retreat. The Blue Würzburg regiment, at the front of Georg’s column, acquitted itself exceptionally well. A few battalion guns raked the advancing Prussian foot, and they successfully withstood Seydlitz’ second charge.
Directly behind the Blue Würzburg regiment, though, the 21st Infantry of Kronegk disintegrated under the enemy pressure, and their colleagues on their flank, the 25th of Major-General Sylvius Christian von Ferntheil, were driven into confusion by the frightened Allied horse which rode through their serried ranks. But none of this could match the poor performance of their near neighbor to the Blue Würzburg unit, the 20th Infantry of Trier. It was confronted by the same type of treatment meted out at the front, but too many green troops, coupled with too much attention from the Prussians, caused Trier to buckle under after just a few minutes of heavy musketry fire from the iron-steady bluecoat line. The regiment held together long enough to deliver one uneven volley. The alarmed men dispersed through the ranks of the Vorell Regiment just behind it in line. In the process, both units were effectively lost. The men, lacking sufficient training and without the cooly efficient Prussian officer corps, were just no match for their far better prepared opponent on the day of Rossbach. Incredibly, the Trier Regiment did not have a single battle fatality from their brief exchange.
Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War Page 27
