Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War

by Herbert J. Redman

  As a result, the encroachment upon Schweidnitz proceeded with more than the usual slowness. The first Austrian block posts appeared before Schweidnitz on September 26. But these were light troops, and in no shape to impede people coming or going. The whitecoats began to enclose the series of forts under blockade in the end of September, and within two weeks the Prussians were hemmed in. Then, with the march of Arenberg’s men on October 20–21, the forces heading for the showdown at Schweidnitz greatly increased. By October 24, the trap had been fully set, and Seers knew straightaway he was in for it.

  Trenches were opened as soon as possible, facilitated by the efforts of Captain di’ Hauteville, a Frenchman who was apparently brought to the site for the sole purpose of expediting the opening of the trenches. He had hundreds of workmen at his disposal. The trenches were partially constructed before the bluecoats discovered as much, on the night of October 26–27. The reaction from the garrison was to lay down a barrage to try to drive off the engineers, but the Austrians were already taking shelter from the effort.

  The Prussian fire did not substantially slow down the construction of the enemy works. There were some skirmishes going on, which were necessary to push up close enough to the Prussian fortresses, but the workmen suffered a disturbing shortage of tools with which to do the constructions.17 On the night of October 29–30, the defenders of Schweidnitz decided to try to upset the constructions. Three battalions of the Prussians, led by Colonel Ludwig Philipp von Roebel, supported by some grenadiers and hussars, erupted against the workmen and their guard forces near Hartlieb, which were commanded by Major-General Schröger. The latter had hundreds of Croats and hussars at his disposal. The workmen, for the most part, fled at the approaching bluecoats, momentarily causing much confusion before reinforcements were pressed forward by the Prince of Stolberg. For a moment, Roebel had it his own way. But the weight of the reinforcements compelled the Prussians to retire. Nevertheless, Roebel was able to destroy part of the enemy trench thereabouts, losing a handful of men in this stroke. Austrian losses were put at 181 men killed and wounded.18

  Nevertheless, this whole effort was too little and too late; for by that point, the Austrian blocking posts were mostly complete (or at least well underway). Colonel Seers found his post largely intact, although some of the houses in the town of Schweidnitz had been damaged by Austrian shelling. Seers was trying to put the best face on matters. He sent a letter to Nádasti, inquiring whether the officers might be released from the garrison on parole, assuming a surrender, with the express understanding they would not serve again in the present war. There was no reply by letter, except Nádasti indicated any individuals who were prisoners could be exchanged for others in captivity. During the night of November 1–2, Austrian shelling caught Schweidnitz afire and it burned mostly until the next day. This was most disturbing to the bluecoats, for the amount of destruction inflicted upon the town and the distress of the citizenry went a long way towards showing the Prussians up.

  Hundreds of deserters, a large portion of whom were former Saxon soldiers impressed into Prussian service against their will, openly sought shelter with the Austrians. The whitecoats, in fact, constructed many lines of siege, but, in at least one case, they miscalculated. Nádasti ordered the construction of a large battery on a rise overlooking the southern part of Schweidnitz, but the effective range turned out to be too great for a useful employment of the guns, and the battery was then largely dismantled.

  Prussian counterbombardment varied from heavy to light, but the determination not to lose Schweidnitz without a valiant struggle was clear. And, thanks to Neipperg’s “oversight,” the actual “siege” of Schweidnitz was delayed. In reality, the whitecoats failed to do the requirements for a proper siege, much like the Russians of this period; both preferred to batter the opponent’s towns into submission.

  Colonel Warnery thought of breaking out of Schweidnitz before escape became impossible. But the enemy, spurred on by rumors that such an attempt might be forthcoming, strengthened their own cavalry units to prepare for such an eventuality. Bevern did try to press reinforcements forward. About November 9–10, about 1,000 Prussian riders tried to make a connection with the besieged, but they got no further than Ober-Winschau. The garrison in Schweidnitz was on its own. Meanwhile, with Austrian requests for surrender refused, plans were laid to try to force the issue by an assault. This would be preferable to a formal siege that could take weeks, even months. Prince Charles was anxious for the return of the big guns, which he really needed for the coming battle for Breslau. Besides, there were no guarantees the Prussian king and his army might suddenly appear in Silesia.

  A council-of-war decided the attack would take place under cover of darkness on November 11–12. The troops earmarked for the assault were assembled during the daylight of November 11. This was a total of three corps of three companies each. Scaling ladders were prepared for each group, and the signal for the attack was the cessation of the artillery fire, which pounded Schweidnitz that whole day, while mortars so designated would open fire to a coordinated three-prong attack. The targets were: the Bögen-Fort, the Garten-Redoute, and the Garten-Fort. The troops making the main assault would be accompanied by other forces in charge of removing obstacles to the attacks, and filling in the voids in the Austrian lines. There was even a diversionary assault to be mounted by Colonel von Vehla, with about a thousand Croats to be launched against the river side of the fortress.

  Seers was sharp enough to ascertain something was afoot, but he was not in a position to do much about it. As night approached on November 11, he ordered his men to stand-to with their weapons along the ramparts. Just about 2200 hours, the Austrian artillery fell silent, as previously arranged, and the mortars to the Austrian right started belching their shot. This caused the troops on that side to go over to the attack, but the other two formations had to be directly ordered forward by Arenberg. The first force entered the Garten-Redoute and, after a short fight, “overcame” the defenders (or, at least the Prussians pretended to surrender to draw the Austrians closer). Then the men who had just given up blasted the attackers with everything they had. The Austrians, led by Major Johann Rhedy, drove forward, forcing the bluecoats to recoil, and when a fresh Austrian body led by Colonel Franz Guasco, came forward, the bluecoats fell back to the main rampart, where they finally held. This sequence of events did throw alarm into the entire Prussian garrison. Meanwhile, on the right, Colonel Carl Freiherr von Amadei, leading his force, but starting later because of the misunderstanding, moved against the Bögen-Fort.19

  This latter body fragmented as they pressed forward, with great resistance in front of them. A drawbridge in front of the Bögen-Fort had been raised, so a direct approach would be impossible. The attackers worked their way around, led on by the grenadiers of Pálffy (who were spearheaded by a daring major named Di Vins) trying to find a point of weakness to press forward. Scaling ladders were brought forward, and some of the men worked their way over into the main part of the fort. After a short tussle, the Prussian defenders ran up the white flag in that bastion. Then, in an interesting aside, a fusilier unit led by Lt.-Col. Maximilian August Baron Zorn von Plobsheim—from the regiment of Leopold Daun—in trying to lend support, ran into the person of Colonel Amadei in the darkness. Plobsheim, with the job inside the fortifications largely done, marched to the rear of the place to protect it from any counterattack by the bluecoats coming from the main fort. Arenberg and Nádasti ordered forward additional formations into the gaps to protect the captured works against anything Seers might attempt by way of reprisal.20

  The third attack, the last, started so late the Prussians were able to open a heavy, sustained fire, the direct result of which was the attack was broken up before it could become effective. By about 0200 hours on November 12, Arenberg and Nádasti were aware most of their efforts had been successful. However, any further advance against the main fortress was met with heavy fire, in spite of the Austrians being so close at hand,
and the fact that Vehla’s “diversionary” assault made inroads on his side of the Schweidnitz fortress. About 0500 hours, Arenberg called off the attacks to await further developments that morning. Austrian casualties had been heavy, more than 1,000 men.21

  When daylight revealed to Seers he had little wiggle room and no hope left, he became very discouraged. Then, when the Austrian guns now ensconced in the stormed outer works, began firing at very close range, Seers sent an officer to parley terms of surrender. Negotiations were quickly concluded, and, at 1500 hours, Seers and his second-in-command, Major-General Philipp Wilhelm von Grumkow, surrendered Schweidnitz to the enemy.22

  The Austrians captured 180 guns, 48 colors, a total of 333,600 taler, and 5,971 prisoners in this successful siege of Schweidnitz.23 Austrian losses were about 3,000, and not the least of the Prussian losses was in the harvest of 911 deserters, most of them undoubtedly impressed Saxons.24 Also lost were enough rations to feed Prince Charles’s army for 60 days. The damage to Prussian prestige and the overall situation in Silesia remained very grave indeed.25

  With the fall of Schweidnitz, Nádasti rejoined the main army on November 19, raising the latter to some 80,000 men (approximately 60,381 infantry, 23,220 cavalry). Plans were laid out by Major-General Lacy. These were to march on Breslau directly to force the issue with Bevern. Haste was of the essence.26 The Austrians knew they only had a limited amount of time, for word of the Prussian victory at Rossbach had reached the Austrian headquarters by November 12. The royal army could not be far off. Still, Prince Charles was none too eager to be drawn into a battle in front of Breslau, and in this he was supported by the normally-offensive minded General Luchessi. Others of the entourage urged on at attack at once, including Daun. Prodding from Vienna, including a letter from Maria Theresa sent on October 11, was also clearly urging on a battle. The arrival of the siege train from Schweidnitz, with its cadre of heavy ordnance, sealed the deal for battle.

  The Austrian attacks were to be preceded by a cannonade of the Prussian lines. During the night of November 20–21, four batteries were set up before Pilsnitz, while five other batteries were set up along the Austrian lines. Then Prince Charles ordered seven potoon bridges laid across the Lohe (all the while under the shelling of Prussian artillery); three northwest of Schmeidefeld and four “between Klein Möchbern and Grabschen.”27 During the night of November 21–22, the Austrian army rose and moved into attack position. Bevern was using the Lohe River to protect his forward lines from encroachment, but there had been an unusually prolonged dry spell so the ground thereabouts and the streams were both more solid underfoot and more shallow, respectively. The Prussian commander had really encamped with his army between Neudorf in the south and Pilsnitz in the north.

  Nádasti’s post beyond the Austrian right near Operau pushed some light troops across the Lohe on Hartlieb. Near to Nádasti, the Austrian right stood refused, screened by grenadiers in and about Gross-Möchbern. The left deployed near Gross-Masselwitz, with a sizeable reserve of infantry on that end of the formation. The Austrian baggage train was sent towards Schweidnitz to await the end of the battle, safe away from the bluecoat raiders.

  As soon as Bevern espied the enemy, he shook part of his army into motion aiming at the Lohe and the rises of Kleinburg and Kreiten.28 His objective was to gain the advantage over Nádasti, although the role of decoy was actually the latter’s job in the coming battle. Bevern’s move here was less reckless than might be imagined, since this action still kept his men shielded by the unsteady footing on the side of the Lohe away from the more numerous Austrians. Ziethen was positioned opposite to Nádasti; he moved at once to ensure the Austrians would not simply waltz into Breslau.

  Bevern’s right was anchored against the Lohe by the heavily fortified position of Pilsnitz, which literally bristled with firepower. As this post reached right to the water, there was little fear of being outflanked so long as Pilsnitz held. Nor was that all. The wily Prussian, fully aware of his obvious inferiority in numbers, had packed the nearby villages of Hunnern, Protsch, Rosenthal, Simsdorf, and Weida with infantry, while Prussian cavalry patrolled the front between these places.

  Some accounts put the Prussian strength for this battle at over 40,000, but Groehler sets Prussian might at 20,700 (in 401⁄2 battalions) of infantry, 7,700 cavalry (in 102 squadrons), and 80 guns, or not quite 30,000.29 The bluecoats also utilized additional fortified posts, but, in this battle at least, they would be forced to react to, rather than to dictate, the terms of the action. In addition, the line they held was much too long for the numbers at Bevern’s disposal.30

  The Austrians of Beck, directed by Nádasti, commenced the battle. At about 0830 hours, Beck took Prussian positions on the Kleinburg under fire. While the whitecoats menaced from Beck’s quarter, Bevern was kept busy trying to shore up his lines. An enemy attack carried Kleinburg temporarily, but the Prussians (among whom were Angelelli’s light troops), seeing the danger, launched a determined counterattack which drove the Austrians back from whence they came. In due course, we will look in on them again.

  The day started off in a misty fog, and neither side could clearly distinguish the lines. The pounding by Beck’s formidable batteries upon the enemy opposite to him lasted until 1200 hours.31 Around 1245 hours, the deadly struggle was taken up with the infantry, as the artillery took a well-deserved breather. Not to be lost in all of the confusion was the fact Prince Charles finally had an opportunity to gain some renown, if the battle were successful and he could capture Breslau before Frederick could interfere.

  About this same time, General Sprecher, urged on by Marshal Daun, led his first assault wave across the bridge at Gross-Möchbern. His booster was provided in the form of Andlau’s infantry units, with Colonel Karl Pellegrini leading the way. The latter’s forces were the Kaiser and Neipperg units of Duke d’Ursel, Botta-Botta, and Leopold Daun, all from Major-General Ferdinand Freiherr Baron von Unruhe’s sector. Sprecher’s potent attack wave boasted 35 full companies of grenadiers, while Löwenstein brought 12 companies of mounted grenadiers to the mix. Andlau’s supporting force, about 1400 hours, entered the firefight. The bluecoats made a very furious defense here, but in vain.

  About 1330 hours, Sprecher had pressed the Prussians of Major-General Hans Caspar Ernst von Schultze’s battalion out of Grabischen. Schultze himself was mortally wounded, and had to be carted off. The Austrian attack also expelled the bluecoats from the great battery behind.32 The Prussians tried to hold the line behind Klein-Möchbern. General Kyau led the 6th Cuirassiers, supported by Pennavaire with the 1st and the 9th Cuirassiers, in valiant counterattacks. Kyau’s attack was most aggressive, but the brave Pennavaire fell severely wounded during this fresh struggle. This was not helped by the greatly superior number of the enemy, and, besides, the charge fizzled when the horsemen strayed into a hollow hard-by. The Prussians were hard pressed.33

  Prince Ferdinand, seeing the fall of Schultze and the consequent withdrawal of his men, scooped up a standard and “led the [34th] Regiment forward into a bitter counterattack.”34 Its neighbor, the 18th Infantry, to the south lost more men in a hard, savage fight, among them Lt.-Col. Christoph Wilhelm von Belling.

  The firefight had not been brief, and it put Bevern into a real bind when the next major assault erupted next, this time courtesy of MacQuire and Lt.-Gen. d’Arburg. Behind their foot soldiers, stood the formidable horse formations of Count Stampatch, 23 full squadrons strong. The new wave smashed against the weakened Prussian lines near Schmieldfeld and Höflichen. The Austrians moved across ground pock-marked by the fire from their big guns. The newcomers came barreling across the Lohe, and, at about 1500 hours, directly they attacked an abatis at Schmieldfeld. The Prussians, of General Lestwitz, present here, boasted a strength of ten full battalions. The latter’s line was anchored by the 2nd Battalion of the 27th Infantry (Major-General Moritz Wilhelm von Asseburg), which offered a furious defense.35

  Wied hammered Höflichen with a strike from the stre
ngth of the Austrian reserves, 13 full battalions. While all of this was going on, Arberg, having now committed his forces to the fight, finally forced the very stubborn bluecoats out of Schmieldfeld. This particular little struggle was most sanguinary. In addition, Wied’s formations, managed to capture Höflichen after a furious fight, in spite of the salient fact that place was literally dotted with breastworks, abatis and the like.

  Then the struggle was taken up anew against those Prussian formations still in Pilsnitz. This new blow was headed by none other than our old friend General Kheul, commanding the left flank of the infantry, while the second line of cavalry, led by Serbelloni in that immediate vicinity, propped up the assault. Serbelloni’s riders encountered great difficulty of ground, since the village was sliced in two by the tortured course of the Lohe. This factor and the advantageous position of the Prussian defenders in and immediately about Pilsnitz contributed to the initial repulse of the Austrian attack. An inspired Prussian defense also greatly helped out. Serbelloni’s cavalry and Kheul’s infantry renewed their effort. Twice more after the first tussle, the Prussian defenders in and about Pilsnitz threw back the stubborn Austrians, delivering heavy losses amongst their number in the process. By the final stroke, it was past 1800 hours. Under cover of darkness, the Austrian formations, which had been reinforced in the meantime, pressed forward, one last time, successively expelling the Prussians from the nearby works and the village, driving them back in the process. This last effort was, again, attended with great loss of life on both sides.

  But Bevern’s forces gave way at last, and here was the key of the battle. Kheul was out of commission with a severe wound to the arm, and Major-General Karl Wenzel Graf von Würben was killed in the desperate fighting at the head of his troops.

  The occupation of Pilsnitz finally enabled Brentano to wrap up his assault on the banks of the Lohe. Prussian retention of the works at Pilsnitz guaranteed Brentano’s efforts would not succeed at the abatis, and the initial occupation did not last. Now Beck finally passed the Oder, bringing a large force with him in the process. This latest effort pressed the bluecoats out of several neighboring villages. General Beck brought up some big guns which pounded the enemy’s lines near Kosel. Once Pilsnitz was gained, the Austrian advance in that neighborhood could continue unabated.