Meanwhile, Nádasti stepped out of his role of “diversion/decoy” to launch his force against the Prussians opposite. The attackers were in three columns, which swept across the Lohe against the Prussian left wing. The Austrians, led by Major-General Joseph Freiherr von Wolfersdorff at this point, had taken one Prussian gun, but the next move was a probe at Woischwitz. By then it was already dark, and the bluecoats were still present nearby in organized strength. By then, Bevern had shifted the entire 31st Infantry of Lestwitz, together with the Grenadier battalions 35/36 straight from Grabschen. This body succeeded in tossing the Austrians from the place, in the process decimating four companies of Austrian grenadiers, and taking 13 cannon. Ziethen led this stroke. How successful it truly was seems to be a matter of conjecture, although Ziethen’s faithful biographer puts the best face on it.36
But Nádasti would not suffer to let the foe keep the place. About 1600 hours, he again renewed the effort to reoccupy this southernmost tip of the Prussian position. The new endeavor was nothing less than a bayonet charge straight at the waiting Prussians. A short but furious struggle ensued, with Prussian losses amounting to about 300 men, 15 officers, plus four big guns.37 That marked the extent of Nádasti’s fine efforts on that day. Kleinburg burned, while Angelelli’s unit retired to the shelter of a nearby ditch and there stood its ground waiting on relief from Bevern.
About 2100 hours, the long battle finally ended more or less in a draw along the whole front. Bevern’s men, even after many hours of exertion, still held the greater part of the battlefield; the right flank and center had been driven in some, but on his side, Ziethen was the master of the field. The bluecoats even counted themselves the victors of the battle.
Bevern, during the night of November 22–23, called a council-of-war at which there were discussions of surprise night attacks to ‘drive the enemy back across the Lohe,’ but Bevern saw that the matter was not that rosy and decided to pull out.38 Before dawn, Bevern got his army together and withdrew from his remaining lines into Breslau and from there marched across the Oder to Protsch. The Battle of Breslau thus accomplished its purpose. The two sides lost heavily in relation to their numbers: the Prussians lost about 6,350 total (5,500 wounded, some 800 killed), along with some 80 guns; the Austrians had 4,703 wounded, 692 dead, and 459 M. I. A. It was a tragic state of affairs for both sides.39
Prince Charles, with his opponent Bevern across the Oder—largely as a result of his own misgivings—could proceed at will with the reduction of the Silesian capital. The walls of the city were not ready for any prolonged siege, and the Prussian army, though battered, was still close-by to provide some real problems if it saw the need.40 Moreover, Bevern had just heard it from the king on the fall of Schweidnitz. It was the monarch’s belief Schweidnitz should have been able to hold out for six months.41
Bevern himself, riding out in the early dawn of November 24, with just one attendant, ran into a fog on the “safe” side of the Oder and rode right into a Croat patrol and was taken prisoner. The outpost had been pushed across to keep an eye on the Prussian movements after the Battle of Breslau. It was an intentional thing, thought the king when he heard of it, but that was never proven.
Bevern was taken to Vienna, and, because he was a relative of the royal family, was released. (This episode gives us a good idea of just how gentlemanly war was often practiced in that era). In due course, Bevern would find his way back to Prussia, and will be heard from again in these pages.
In the meanwhile, the situation in Silesia for the Prussians was more critical than ever. Bevern being now out of action, the army under his command had fallen to General Kyau, and as a result the bluecoats at once abandoned any hope of salvaging the Silesian capital. Preparations being made to depart, on November 25, Kyau ordered the army (save for a garrison of some 4,000 men in the capital under the command of General Lestwitz) to withdraw on Glogau. Prince Charles lost no time moving at once upon Breslau, and laid “siege” to the place. Lestwitz knew that the defenses were undermanned and so when the Austrians offered him a chance to retire from the place without interference, he gladly took them up on their offer.
But of the garrison only about 500 men marched with Lestwitz, the others deciding to remain behind (hardly surprising in view of the fact that the majority of the latter were “home recruits” from Silesia).42 Prince Charles occupied the Silesian capital and sent word to Maria Theresa of his accomplishment. Charles had no way of knowing he had reached the zenith of his career; in a few short weeks, he would be back at the bottom again. For the moment, though, all seemed good. This appeared to close the campaign for the Austrians, but Frederick sure had different ideas brewing.
With the fall of Breslau, the Prussians lost 98 guns, along with considerable stores of ammunition and provisions of all kinds. All was accomplished without a shot being fired. While Kyau fell back upon Glogau with what remained of Bevern’s tattered army, and General Lestwitz was marching away from Breslau, the king had been busy indeed. In the first of November, the troubled monarch issued an order preparatory to a concentration of all available troops at Leipzig before moving on to Silesia.
Prince Henry, who was recovering from the wound he had received at Rossbach, was to be detached and given responsibility for maintaining the line of the Saale and of guarding Saxony from the enemy.43 Keith, meanwhile, with an entirely separate command, was to make a sweep into Bohemia to levy contributions for the Prussian cause from a hostile population,44 as well as make a nuisance of himself upon the line-of-communications of Charles with the interior of the Austrian Empire.45 The king even hinted at a possible foray against Prague beyond even that, to help wipe away the indignity of Kolin.
All of this Frederick managed to arrange within a week of the Battle of Rossbach. The monarch gathered together the army, some 13,000 men (in 18 battalions and 23 squadrons), and marched from Leipzig on November 13, bound for Silesia. The next day, Torgau was reached, and, November 16, the fast moving body got to Mühlberg, in the vicinity of Grossenhayn—making about 22 miles a day on bad roads, which was really an exceptional pace for the era.
To help complicate matters, the cold weather was setting in, compounding the suffering of men who were wearing down from the constant rigors of the past few months. A roving band under the ever vigilant Laudon,46 consisting of some 1,200 men who were encamped at Freiberg, were a threat, while Marschall was close by at Zittau. Prussian scouts quickly informed Frederick about the existence of these two forces. Field Marshal Keith, with a good sized force, was sent off towards Bohemia. His mission was really nothing more than a diversion to get Laudon and Marschall rooted firmly out of the way. The trick worked quite well, for the natural reaction of these two forces was to go head off Keith.47
This left the crafty king’s path clear into Silesia. Keith moved on Chemnitz, while the rumor mill said for the whitecoats to look after the security of Prague. At first, Laudon and Marschall feared the main royal army was going into Bohemia to take advantage of Prince Charles’s absence with the main Austrian army in Silesia. In a bolder age, this might have been a distinct possibility. The dynamic duo did not hesitate to fall back towards Prague, which Laudon reached on November 26. Simultaneously, Keith occupied Commatau, detaching Itzenplitz to make for Leitmeritz at top speed. This latter move reaped unexpected benefits. Not only was Itzenplitz able to seize and to ransack the great Austrian magazine located there, but more rumors flew about a major Prussian effort in that direction or thereabouts. It was all just smoke and mirrors, for Marshal Keith promptly took up at Postelberg, while Laudon was in Prague, Marschall ensconced at Brandeis, and the belated Hadik, finally coming back to the fore after the Berlin incident, patrolled the roadways leading towards Keith’s post. Rumors about the approach of the Prussian king with the main army continued for a time, but most of this truly originated with Keith (who must have gotten some comedic relief out of the whole situation).
General Hadik, with some 2,000 men, pulled back from Grossenha
yn to Königsbrück. One of his detachments was savaged on the “wrong” side of the Bober. Some 40 Austrians were captured in the whole process. This announced the king’s presence in a big, dramatic way (November 17). The next day, the renewed Prussian advance forced Hadik to fall back towards Marschall’s quarters. The latter did not intend to be trapped into a major fight with Frederick’s force fresh from its triumph at Rossbach. There were too many different scattered bodies of Austrians throughout the area. Marschall therefore stepped up the number of patrols to ensure he did not get forced into what could be a dangerous situation for his men.
The king heard at Grossenhayn on November 18 that Schweidnitz had been lost, but that Bevern was resolved to attack the Austrians; now Frederick sent letter after letter ordering Bevern to do something, else “all is lost!” But this prodding was in vain, for by this time Bevern was entrenched in front of Breslau. From Grossenhayn, Frederick marched his army past Bautzen and Weissenberg, across the Bober and the Quiess towards Silesia.
At Görlitz (November 23) he heard the first rumors of a battle before Breslau and they erroneously gave credit for victory to Bevern. The king’s first thought, based entirely upon this faulty bit of intelligence, was to move on Liegnitz and from there head for Breslau to sandwich the enemy army in a net at Neumarkt between his army and the victorious Bevern issuing forth from the Silesian capital in triumph. Then, just as the bluecoats reached Naumburg, November 24, the sad truth was learned. Bevern’s army had been beaten and driven over the Oder, forsaking southern Silesia entirely to the Austrians. Then Frederick sent word for Breslau to be defended to the last man. Next, he received the worst news: Breslau had fallen!
The king resolved to press on with his march into what had nearly become an enemy-held province. Most of Silesia south of Glogau was then under firm Austrian control. Prince Charles, as soon as the Silesian capital was his, had turned round to deal with the Prussian king and his small army. November 18, firm word arrived that the main Prussian army was on the move. Initial reports indicated Frederick was going to trail Marshal Keith into Bohemia, but this intelligence soon proved unfounded. Two days after, Prince Charles heard that the bluecoats had been sighted near to Bautzen. This removed all doubt. The king was making for Silesia.48
Despite this disturbing bit of news, Charles (ignoring the advice of junior officers who suggested he move the main army to Liegnitz on the double, a strategically important post) decided to try setting up for winter quarters. Had the move been made to the Katzbach, Frederick should then have found it very difficult, if not impossible, to force the main Austrian army from that position. Especially in view of the superior numbers of the Austrian force. As it worked out, the king would think similarly in 1760 when he took up that same post at Liegnitz, under circumstances far more unfavorable than confronted Prince Charles in late November 1757.
There was plain intelligence that the Prussian monarch was bringing only a small body of men with him. This may have induced Charles to conclude his great foe meant nothing more than going into winter quarters anyhow. After all, December was at hand. And the weather was doing its part by beginning to turn nasty.
There were other considerations. At Breslau, the commissariat was on the verge of collapse. This meant that the main Austrian army should be able to be kept adequately supplied. No problem. That is, as long as it stayed close at hand. The main army did, indeed, try to hibernate just to the west of Breslau, but Prince Charles had still other forces scattered throughout Silesia. The Silesian capital itself had a garrison of some 6,000, while Beck was still diligently patrolling beyond the Oder near Glogau. Colonel Jahnus had gone off to put Glatz under siege, and, on Charles’s left bordering on Bohemia-Moravia, there were a couple of powerful detachments. Largely for the purpose of stalling and/or holding off a Prussian irruption to spoil the re-conquest of Silesia by the bluecoats. One of the main Austrian goals should have been retaining control of the Katzbach. Specifically for this purpose, Charles pushed out a body of Croats and hussars under Lt.-Gen. Anton Kalnoki, which planted its main post at Jauer, stretching off towards Striegau.
The little garrison thrown into Liegnitz was intended to block the “Potsdam Guard Company,” which was what the Austrians, in their euphoric state, had nicknamed the small Prussian force that the king was bringing with him. The main Austrian army lay in Bevern’s old posts below the Silesian capital even then, entrenching itself with Breslau at its back. Prince Charles could dispose of some 70,000 men, and his strong posts were complemented by an abundance of artillery, with plenty of shot, and lots of cavalry.
As the king entered Silesia, meanwhile, he began issuing orders designed to save it from the Austrians: Kyau was to be removed from his command and placed under arrest, no doubt unjustly; Ziethen was to be given charge of all of the battered forces at Glogau. He was to gather all of the men and material at his disposal and bring therm forward to rendezvous with the king at Parchwitz on December 2. Frederick just brushed past Liegnitz and its garrison on the right. Sending a garrison to hold Liegnitz was not at all wise, according to Henry Lloyd. Especially if it was not going to be done in anything like full strength. To quote from Lloyd’s rather lengthy analysis, with the disposition of the whole province of Silesia at stake “the king would [not] amuse himself with a siege of that miserable place.”49 This was a real mistake on Prince Charles’s part by Lloyd’s reckoning. This was one of the several options Frederick considered before the advance of the main enemy army made it a moot point.
November 28, the king, after passing Schönberg, drew reign at Parchwitz after the grueling march from Saxony. The exhausted men were given a well-deserved rest, while Frederick composed a little testament of instructions in the event of the situation worsening. He was now grimly resolved to seek death in a desperate battle with the Austrians rather than yield Silesia to them.
In the Austrian sphere, Kalnoki’s duties encompassed holding Hirschberg, and there was the garrison at Liegnitz, after all. Colonel Friedrich von Bülow, the commandant of the town, was more than acquainted with Austrian efforts to keep the Katzbach against a Prussian advance. Bülow had only 2,000 men to hold Liegnitz, and Prince Charles pressed out a thousand more troops to help him. The Prussian advance was too swift for Prince Charles’s good. The Prussians moved on Parchwitz, and the hoped for reinforcements could not reach Liegnitz after all.
This seemed to Charles a signal Frederick may be, after all, moving to Glogau. Under the cover of that fortress’s guns, he could be free to gather the remnants of the Prussian forces still left in Silesia. But, as insurance against the continued further Prussian irruption, Prince Charles sent Major-General Luzinsky to go help Bülow with his most important task. As the main Austrian army was to stay about where it was, Luzinsky’s additional force was all that could be expected for Liegnitz. On the other hand, Lloyd’s comment is not only pertinent, but likely true. This force, two full regiments of hussars and 2,000 Croats, was able to reach Bülow’s lines early on December 3.
Ironically, although Charles figured the king might be aiming for an end run on Glogau, the Austrians did not push out a guard force of sufficient size to block the highway leading to the great fortress. Frederick’s vanguard smashed through Parchwitz on November 28. The only resistance, Commander Gersdorf with some 500 Croats, was rather quickly driven away. Gersdorf, leaving some 80 killed and 150 wounded,50 made off posthaste. Now Frederick had his assembly point. Even at this point Prince Charles had not entirely ruled out a Prussian march into Bohemia. And he kept the scattered detachments in place ready for such a contingency.
Frederick’s Prussians stayed at Parchwitz for four days (from November 28 to December 2) before Ziethen arrived. During that time, Prince Charles had a perfect opportunity to wrap the war up, since he could have attacked and no doubt beaten the Prussian king and his army while they were as yet unsupported. If there was ever a time when being timid had a big pricetag, surely this was that time. Frederick’s situation, despite th
e singular success of Rossbach, was still nothing less than desperate. In his front, he had the victorious, confident and well-rested main army of Prince Charles; his flank was open to an attack from the enemy ensconced in Liegnitz; and there was no guarantee that Ziethen would be able to bring a substantial force with him. Had the Austrians only taken the offensive now, Frederick and his nation would have lost the war. There were great contrasts.
Prince Charles had a large, well-equipped army. Frederick, before the arrival of Ziethen, hardly 13,000 tired, but confident, men. The memory of Rossbach was a fresh one. However, Charles had won the last three rounds with the Prussians in Silesia: (1) The capture of Schweidnitz; (2) The mauling of the Duke of Brunswick-Bevern’s army before Breslau; (3) The occupation of Breslau. The Austrian troops, their confidence raised tremendously since their days of idleness at Eckartsberga, had renewed faith in their leaders and they had, along with overwhelming superior numbers, the knowledge that the enemy would have to fight a battle on their terms and their turf. Time was on Charles’s side. He had precious little to gain, and had much to lose, from forcing the issue here. The campaigning weather was fast running out, especially now that December had arrived. The open question really was, ‘Why would Prince Charles force the issue, even if he did not really mean to?’
Moreover, even if the big Austrian army won the encounter, just how much pursuit or further damage could he inflict on the Prussians at that late time of year?’51
Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War Page 31
