At the same time, the king discussed the new move he had planned. He was marching against the Russians, who had by then nearly advanced into Brandenburg. That night a fierce bombardment of Olmütz was opened, for two very good reasons: (1) To cover the preparations of the Prussians to withdraw; (2) To rid themselves of the surplus shells which had not been used there.4 Early on July 2, Keith assembled—under orders from the king—the remaining wagons from the convoys that had made the trek successfully (a total of hardly 4,000 wagons) and loaded them. From about 0200 hours, Keith took off with his wheeled charges towards the rear. The army being hastily gathered, the next morning Frederick’s army, dejectedly, turned its back on Olmütz and retired. The siege of Olmütz thus ended.
Ironically, about the same time, General Marschall was preparing to make his final stand. All of the activity in the Prussian camp spawned rumors that Frederick was about to attack with a select assault force either during the night of June 30–July 1 or during the daylight, which caused Marschall to make preparations to receive the attack. When it did not occur, scouts were sent out which soon discovered the Prussian lines empty.
The retreating troops went by various routes, with the enemy magazine base at Leutomischl as their point of rendezvous. The main force with the king moved through Gewitsch on Mährisch Tribau, while Keith angled his retreat by way of Littau, and then on to Tribau. These circuitous routes served to take their forces past the still roving bands. Keith had to repel an Austrian force which had snuck up on him, but Frederick, whose force passed Tyrnau and Zwittau, reached Leutomischl (July 5). Buccow followed at a safe distance. Basing his force at Oppatowitz, the Austrian sent a light body to try to interrupt the enemy at Zwittau. When this effort proved futile, the irregulars left off the active pursuit. Buccow started on a different errand.
Daun was left the task of going after the enemy. He crossed the Morawa on July 4 and took camp at Drahanowitz. The marshal was confronted with what steps to take next. With Olmütz secure, he really should not have hesitated to attack the retreating enemy, just when they might be at their most vulnerable.5 Nevertheless, it was July 6 before Daun pressed forward. Lacy, leading the advanced guard, moved on Konitz. No Prussians except deserters or prisoners were near by then, and when Daun with the main army arrived, he rested his men overnight. On July 7, the Austrians reoccupied Gewitsch. Just ahead at the village of Krenau, Lacy’s scouts detected a force which turned out to be the rearguard of Keith’s force. Wasting no time, Lacy sent troopers (at 1100 hours) galloping into them.
The Prussians did not have time to deploy for a full-scale action, and they withdrew beyond Krenau. The Prussian commander, seeing the rear of his formation in danger, dispatched some reinforcements and guns. The aim of Lacy’s force was limited, and Keith had no interest in bringing on an engagement then and there. So a desultory shelling and long-range sniping ensued until darkness put an end to the matter. All the while, Keith continued his move, while the Austrian pursuit was temporarily blunted. This was one of the reasons the Prussian retreat could continue, without interruption.
The king, rather infuriated with his artillerymen as a whole, summoned Balbi into his presence and proceeded to thoroughly hurl every possible profanity at him reducing the poor man almost to the point of tears. Even Ziethen did not escape the royal fury. Frederick blamed him for the one day halt to allow the wagons to close up.6 The king never did own up to his own shortcomings at the conduct of the siege, preferring, instead, to blame the defeat at Domstadl.
Any other course would have been out of character. Meanwhile, the marshal hitched into Politschka (July 9), and Frederick reacted by moving on Hollitz—July 10. The Austrian army paused for a day to pick up some of the straggling detachments, as there was the distinct possibility of a battle presenting itself. Königgrätz itself was close at hand, and an important point it was. General Buccow, with a force of 7,000 men, laid hold of the fortress before the bluecoats could draw near (July 12). He had the bridges over the Adler River knocked down, and the process of destroying the ammunition stores was started. Marshal Keith, having migrated to Leutomischl, passed through rather succinctly on Hollitz. The weary Austrians descended upon Leutomischl, with the plan of attacking Keith’s men there. The Prussians having moved on, Austrian patrols occupied the place.
It would be appropriate to take a look at what had been transpiring elsewhere while the Prussians and Austrians were occupied in Moravia. First we will look at the Eastern Front. Fermor, under authority of Czarina Elizabeth, had invaded East Prussia on January 16, 1758, against only slight resistance. Lehwaldt had left a mere two battalions (from Garrison Regiment #1), with a bare 50 cavalry, in East Prussia. Fermor plowed forward and entered Königsberg on January 22 with some 34,000 men. Little difficulty was presented by the presence of the Russians, whom the locals accepted largely with indifference. The invaders promptly issued a manifesto that promised to keep Russian troops in restraint and as “normal” a life as possible for the citizens of East Prussia, so long as they “behaved themselves.”7 Even the students of the University of Königsberg could move around and continue to matriculate in relative freedom.8
Frederick was furious with his East Prussians, although he did not attempt to send a rescue force to the province, and vowed that he would never again set foot in the old country there. This was a territory that had once been so key to what became the Prussian state. The ancient dilapidated castles of the Teutonic Knights gave moot testimony of East Prussia’s importance in earlier times. By the 1750s, that was no longer the case. The king coldly realized that. By the time Frederick was standing before Olmütz to put it under siege, Fermor’s army had consolidated its hold on East Prussia and was preparing to advance against Prussia’s vitals, namely Brandenburg.9 Dohna himself had sent Platen to do what he could to delay the Russian advance across Poland. Platen was unable to contain Fermor, whose Cossacks made for a formidable screen to interference.
Meanwhile, Frederick had been busy. Keith reached Leutomischl safely with the Prussian baggage train on July 8, and the army was again ready to move. The ensemble was divided into several columns to make better passage; on July 14, Frederick drew up on Königgrätz, and surprising Buccow, whose force beat a hasty retreat, entered the formidable lines of entrenched works. He would report, without foundation, that his main army had lost but two men on the march.10
Keith had command of the Prussian rearguard during this maneuver, no easy task because of the energetic Laudon. The latter’s forces followed after the retreating Keith, and occasionally picked fights with the Prussians. There was no serious try on the retreating force though. At Hollitz (just a short distance from Königgrätz) Laudon’s troopers did attempt to intercept the train in the tradition of Domstadtl. The Austrians might have accomplished something had Keith, hearing the sounds of the engagement, not rushed up and, with a valiant rush, cleared the hills of the enemy, driving Laudon off rather handily. The Prussians thus repelled (July 12) the impetuous Laudon, with the loss of only about five wagons of flour, for which the Austrian loss, according to Marshal Keith, was “about 500 dragoons.”11
After this one genuine effort, Laudon could do no more. He was opposed by capable leaders. Fouquet had command of the van of the train, while Retzow managed the center and guided the wagons forward. At one point, the bold Retzow barged into Fouquet’s men prematurely in order to save his force from the enemy. Fouquet was less than pleased.12 Nonetheless, the Prussians wound up in the intricate, formidable works that Daun had built for his own army. Meanwhile, the latter was slowly approaching with the main Austrian army. He came marching into the region on August 20, posting his men about Pardubitz to watch the Prussians in the valley below. Daun had more than twice the number of men at the king’s disposal, roughly 75,000 men against only 30,000. But, as was typical of Daun, no attempt was made to interfere with the Prussian king,13 and he confined operations to sending out detachments of Croats for harassing/annoying the enemy. A force of about a th
ousand of these broke in upon the Prussian bread houses outside Königgrätz in the dead of night, and were expelled only with some difficulty. The Austrian commander never got bold enough to risk battle.
Prince Henry, in the interim, had been withdrawing slowly into Saxony. The allies had guessed, correctly, even during the course of the effort, that Henry’s effort would be limited at best. The Metal Mountains helped more or less to head off any major encounters between the two armies.
Problems in the Imperial service continued to be most acute. Unqualified or under qualified men filled the ranks of officers, nepotism in a disgusting state was rampant. There never seemed to be agreement on a common goal, and some treated the entire thing as an adventure and as their own private means of getting ahead. This took precedence over the defeat of Frederick’s Prussia, a goal which should have been priority. A few officers even went home on leave, while drawing their full pay all along. Others were in the opposite situations; they served in the ranks faithfully while their pay was in arrears. Moreover, the supply situation itself was miserable. Few remounts were available and basics like flint for the muskets and food for the soldiers were in short supply. And the various states of the Empire were often in arrears on payments to their various contingents and to the general command structure.
Still, this was an army and so occasionally it embarked on something of a military nature, resolving to attempt a diversion into Saxony, specifically against Pirna. General Hadik was to lead the force. This consisted of some 3,600 men with ten guns of varying size and type. Much effort was made to keep the assembly of the men secret as well as their purpose. It was feared the bluecoats would immediately reinforce Pirna and Dresden if they knew. The scheme was rather involved, and Hadik, with little otherwise to distract him, worked out the elaborate plan. Two separate advanced attack groups were involved. The first, most critical for success, was led by Major-General Joseph Ritter von Campitelli, and consisted of 170 Croats and 1,000 infantry under the direct command of Colonel Adolph von Gernerth. This latter force was to move from Krietschwitz on Struppen, while a second body, led by Major-General Franz Prince Sulkowski, was to launch a diversionary attack.
The Prussian force in the town was 1,200 strong; but of this number some 700 were Saxons of doubtful loyalty with about 300 deserters from the Austrians.14 In the event, the main attack (night of June 5–6) miscarried when Campitelli’s scaling ladders went missing, while Sulkowski’s men, under darkness of night and in unfamiliar territory, were delayed long enough that the prince sent back to Hadik, who was moving up with his men on Rabenstein, to enquire what to do. This was after 0230 hours, and, when Hadik received word that his attack groups had fragmented, and that the assault, if carried forth, would have to be made in daylight, he had no choice but to order a withdrawal. The Prussian garrison within had been unaware of these events and were in a state of “drunken partying.”15
If this were not bad enough in and of itself, the Imperialists were receiving virtually no support from the French. Soubise was supposed to form an auxiliary army of some size to help aid his allies. This force was to be built up around Hanau, but had made little progress. We have already observed, during the Rossbach Campaign, a marked temerity of the French to stay as far west in Germany as they could. In the campaign of 1758, this situation would little change. Whatever military plans were discussed, between the French in the immediate field and the Imperialists, was of a defensive nature. The French would be happy to go about their merry way; if that resulted in Frederick’s defeat, that was all well and good.
Meanwhile, Frederick was not going to neglect Saxony and its defense against the allies. If Prince Henry’s operations earlier in the campaign were not enough, General Hülsen, at Annaberg, was not content to sit still either. He sent a detachment towards Plauen. Austrian marauders were encountered at Joachimstahl. They alerted General Ujházy, at Caaden, that the bluecoats were at hand. July 2, the exposed Prussian forward post was abandoned and Hülsen pulled back on Presnitz. The allies pressed up against General Hülsen’s old post, into which the Prussian retired.
The Austrians wanted a more active participation by the Imperialists in the war effort. Dombâle was ordered to move up from Bohemia. On July 11, Luzinsky bundled forward to, first on Reichenbach, where he found General Itzenplitz’s advanced post. The following day, Dombâle prepared to move against Prince Henry’s right flank position. He lost no time in advancing—from Würzberg—forward on Mübltroft and Gefell. This forced Henry’s hand. Dombâle camped out at Hof, his posts touching Luzinsky’s command, now near Oelsnitz. Hardly had Dombâle’s men entered Hof when his scouts reported the advent of Prince Henry’s men. Itzenplitz barged through Reichenbach, while the resourceful Mayr took direct aim on Reitzenhain. Meanwhile, Wunsch took a small force against Ullendorf. None of these forces were strong in number, but Dombâle, deciding that discretion was the better part of valor, retreated on Münchberg. Heavy seasonal rains rendered this move most difficult, and contributed in misery for all in the field.
Dombâle’s belated move exposed Ujházy, who had, meanwhile, advanced with General Kleefeld (July 19) towards Reitzenhain. The rains delayed this marching force, which consisted of some 8,000 men. Mayr stuck to his post at Reitzenhain. On July 20, the Imperialists launched an attack on the town, but got repulsed for their trouble. However, Prince Henry had other fish to fry and he ordered his outlying detachments to pull back from their forward posts.
This situation left a vacuum in the region into which Dombâle and the Imperialists moved to the camp between Laun and Saatz. When Prince Henry was compelled, by circumstances, to retract his lines, his enemies reacted. A reinforcement of some 8,000 men sent by Henry to help Frederick provided the impetus. This substantially weakened the Prussian force. In any case, the Imperialists would have to do without the cooperation of Daun, at least for the moment. It was clear the main Austrian army would have more pressing business to deal with. Even those on the allied side feared how well the Imperialists would do without a leaven of “good” Austrian units. Karl Georg Friedrich von Flemming, Saxon delegate in Vienna, wrote: “I fear the consequences should the Combined Army march … to expel the Prussians.”16
Nonetheless, come July 20, the Imperialists did just that. There was no resistance from the Prussians, but the weather and the unsteadiness of the troops made even this march an adventure. July 21, Hadik with the advanced guard burst upon Töplitz, where there was already a holding force under Lt.-Col. Nostrowski posted. Major-General Maximilian Joseph Freiherr von Mitrowski, with the vanguard, reached Breitenau on July 27, while Hadik’s patrols energetically felt out the town of Streckenwalde-Schönwald. There was a legitimate effort by Hadik to prepare for trouble with the bluecoats. On July 28, under continuing doubt about his army’s steadiness, Hadik redeployed his men near Töplitz, his left hugging Turn while the right wing was staggered along the road to Kulm. While the Imperialists encamped there, General Serbelloni arrived with a detachment of Austrians.
Meanwhile, the Prussian king was busy figuring out how best to deal with the situation in Saxony. Briefly, there was talk of pulling Prince Henry’s army out of Saxony altogether to go oppose the advancing Russian mass. With the Prussian failure before Olmütz, Saxony assumed a greater importance. But Henry continued to gradually withdraw from as much of Saxony as he could, while sending Belling with his fine cavalry to go help Frederick before the Russian threat. Still Dombâle’s force was unfettered by his great opponent.
The main Prussian force pulled back from Zschopau-Garnau, which the weakened force was felt too weak to hold safely. Henry was not certain about the size of the Imperialist force confronting him, although he estimated it at no more than 38,000 men.17 The actual size of Zweibrücken’s scattered force was more like 50,000 soldiers, but of dubious quality.
There was some rearranging of his detached forces, most importantly the posting of General Knobloch from Freiberg up to a more advantageous camp near Dippoldiswalde. Prussi
an General Itzenplitz was deployed to Freiberg, where the enemy was close at hand. Prince Henry’s army was weak, but that would be the last thing he wanted the enemy to suspect. To help conceal that fact, an attack was planned against Sebastienberg. Here Kleefeld was in command, and he was on the watch. A deserter from Henry’s army tipped his hand. Then the skies opened up, and the heavy summer rains drenched everyone and everything. Nevertheless, the Imperialist commander wasted no time, considering the quality of his opponents. Kleefeld had promptly requested reinforcements, as he knew the deed was coming.
So when the delayed attack was opened on July 31, Major-General Asseburg, leading the march, had a terrible time with Kleefeld’s men. Asseburg had five battalions, including two of the Free Corps (from Mayr and Major Chossignon—who would be mortally wounded in the affair), 400 horse, and 12 guns. He should have had an advantage here, but the wet conditions and a lack of reconnaissance as a result really negated any advantage. Worse, Kleefeld benefitted from an exceptionally able crew of artillerymen; there were four heavy Bavarian guns ready to serve. The crews, under Artillery Ensign von Forstner, deserved commendation for doing an effective job under very miserable conditions.
The initial Prussian effort overthrew a Croat screen, but Forstner’s gunners hammered away at the attackers. Mayr barged into the enemy’s right, but this effort was broken up by a counterattack led by General Kleefeld himself. Asseburg retreated, with the Imperialists launching a surprisingly effective pursuit. Colonel von Ried bundled forward, and drove Asseburg back upon Hülsen’s men, posted now at Marienberg. There the pursuit ended. The miserable effort had cost the bluecoats 44 dead, 88 wounded, and 106 missing. The Imperialists lost some 68 men.18 Kleefeld, in his mistaken enthusiasm, reported Prussian losses as high as 800 men.
Meanwhile the Imperialists could not proceed further in efforts to conquer Saxony so long as Prince Henry made the maneuvers he did. Though Dombâle was brash enough to occupy Plauen on July 30, and Luzinsky was not too distant at Reichenbach, there still seemed the possibility of failure while the Prussians yet had resources. Henry was preparing for another offensive in the meantime. Again, he was putting his best foot forward, trying to mask the weakness of his army, even utilizing the tactics of “little war.”19 August 6, the Prussians marched on Chemnitz, a move enemy scouts quickly detected. Since this move might uncover Leipzig, Finck detached a force under Colonel von Klitzing to press on Waldenburg. There Klitzing joined Asseburg, in order to help hold Leipzig. Prussian artillery was driven through Öderan (August 7), while Henry moved out for Freiberg. He judged this would be the key to keeping Saxony.
Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War Page 40
