Thus closed the story of the Battle of Zorndorf, the hardest fought battle of the Seven Years’ War, and one of the worst of the entire eighteenth century.29 The casualties reflected that singular fact: Fermor lost 7,990 killed/13,539 wounded and missing; a total of 21,529, nearly half of the army he had dragged to Zorndorf.30 The beaten side also lost 103 guns31 and 27 standards, meaningless compared to the human suffering.32 Frederick’s army suffered as well, although not as severely. Prussian losses were 3,680 killed, above a thousand men missing from the ranks (presumed dead /deserted/captured); along with the wounded, approximately 11,390 men from all causes. Thus nearly four in ten of the Prussians present at Zorndorf were casualties.
Chapter Twenty-Five
Prussians Follow up on Fermor; Frederick Marches for Saxony
The withdrawal of the Russians was followed up by the Prussians, although the king himself had other irons in the fire. On August 27, Dohna ordered off Major-General George Karl Gottlob von der Gablenz to move to Damm. From there, he was to do all he could to “help” the enemy on their way, while Ziethen’s men moved to Lusatia to fend off reports of Austrian light forces under Laudon trying to link up with the Russians. September 1, Fermor withdrew on Landsberg. The next day, Manteuffel was detached with a force of 20 squadrons and ten battalions to follow Fermor. Frederick marched on September 2, bound for Saxony.1
Manteuffel ran into a Russian light cavalry patrol, but the Prussians beat back the foe rather handily. Manteuffel then continued on to take a post between Liebenau and Ratzdorf, which was close to the enemy array. Dohna, meanwhile, sent a force to retake Soldin from a Cossack patrol, and ordered out parties to fan into the countryside to round up stray Russians. Manteuffel’s forward post was one the Russians really wanted back. Early on September 10, a large force of Cossacks attacked, overrunning advanced posts but failing to seize the camp.
The following morning, Rumyantsev’s missing force finally made its appearance. This raised Fermor’s effective force to about 38,000 men, substantially larger than Manteuffel’s command. A plan to attack the latter was accordingly hatched, but the wily Prussian learned of the scheme in time and hastily retreated back upon Dohna’s main force, now ensconced about Blumenberg. Russian patrols at first light on September 12 discovered that the Prussians near Liebenau had flown the coop.
While the Prussians were encamped near Blumenberg, Fermor was busy trying to reform his base about Landsberg. Meanwhile, there was some excitement as the Swedes were finally showing signs of life. Dohna crossed the Oder to take post at Manschnow, from where he could better support General Wedell, who had already marched to confront the Swedes, as well as safeguard Berlin in case the Swedes got that far. Fermor sent a detachment to Soldin, which also acted to scout out what the bluecoats had going on. Dohna dispatched the Malachovsky Hussars on Soldin, following this up (night of September 18–19) with Manteuffel probing the enemy, still encamped about that place. Manteuffel lacked the strength for an outright assault, but the point became moot when Fermor quitted Landsberg on September 20, falling back on Kartzig, Dicko, and finally Pyritz (September 22). Fermor was at the latter, planted firmly on the road to Stargard, a major concentration point.
A force under Major-General Dietz burst upon Stargard on September 25, the Prussians retiring as was their want. The campaigning season for the Russians waning, Dohna determined to give them a good send-off. Intelligence was received on September 25 that Fermor had left Landsberg, leaving only a small detachment to hold the post. Wobersnow was sent with a force, including the Schorlemer Dragoons, to grab Landsberg. In the pre-dawn hours of September 26, the wily Prussian boldly wrestled Landsberg from the Russians. Encouraged by this success, Dohna moved to Neu-Damm, while Manteuffel bundled forward to Wustewitz. A Russian detachment under Palmbach made for Colberg. Fermor moved to Stargard, while Dohna took up a little post at the town of Lippehne (October 2).
It was clear that, barring a successful siege of Colberg, the Russians were about to make for Poland for the winter. Moreover, any fears the Swedes and the Russians would operate together had proven baseless, for by the first of October, the Swedish army’s southward advance towards Berlin had been checked. Still, there were Russian forces about, and the king knew his eastern front was not yet secure.
Nor were the Prussians through yet. Manteuffel burst upon a little Russian garrison holding Pyritz, snagging 46 of them before the remainder absconded. Dohna determined to root out any isolated Russian holdouts, but it would have been impossible to keep such garrisons supplied over the winter anyhow. Dohna took his main body to Pyritz, while Colonel Hordt was sent to Kolbatzch to hold the lines of communication with the Prussian posts in the north. Manteuffel probed to Gross Riche, and Fermor could do little except await the outcome of Palmbach’s effort on Colberg.2
The capper for the Russians for the campaign of 1758 was in the Siege of Colberg.3 Even as early as the beginning of the campaign, it was obvious the Russians would need a port/post closer than deep in Poland or East Prussia if they were to maintain themselves in a forward posture. Colberg was an obvious choice for such a post, and what is really surprising is the unexplainable disinterest by Fermor in occupying the port. Certainly as desirable a goal as a Russian invasion of Brandenburg proper. But it was relatively late in the campaigning season before the Russians set to work before Colberg, and even then with a force too weak to complete the task.
Colberg in 1758 was a strongly fortified fortress surrounded by thick brick-covered earthen walls complete with what amounted almost to a mote. There were a number of swampy posts nearby, which readily lent themselves to defense. Colberg’s principal weakness lay not in any physical shortcomings as a fortress, but in the small size of its garrison. Only some 700 men, much smaller than it could accommodate with some degree of “comfort.” With the Prussian field armies in bad manpower straits, this was hardly surprising. Even that number was smaller at the beginning, although the Duke of Brunswick-Bevern (over at Stettin) was aware of Colberg’s plight and did all he could to help out.
Palmbach finally began to move towards Colberg on September 28, from the area of Stargard, which was nearby. The reinforcements sent by Brunswick-Bevern were not immediately able to enter the fortress because of the presence of the Russians. October 3, after repelling a weak Prussian effort to reinforce Colberg, Palmbach drew rein near Colberg on the heights of Sellnow.4 An effort to obtain the port’s surrender was refused outright, and the Russians forthwith got down to business. A battery was advanced to bombard Colberg, and, on October 4, after a good deal of shelling, Palmbach once more called upon the garrison to surrender. Russian guns were advanced into the Maykuhle Woods, which brought pressure to bear on the small Prussian force. Commandant Heinrich Sigismund von der Heyde5 subsequently withdrew a small force holding a redoubt in the harbor, while the enemy sent forces which occupied some of the environs of Colberg. The greencoats commenced constructing lines of trenches to seal off Colberg from outside aid.
Heyde’s lines were subjected to sporadic heavy doses of artillery fire, including from the famed unicorns. The Russian guns continued to blast away until late in the afternoon of October 8. Palmbach had received orders to abandon the attempt to capture Colberg. Raising the siege, the Russian commander started to withdraw to join the main army. While en route, Palmbach was met by a Colonel Jakoblev with a reinforcement of 1,200 men and orders to return to finish the siege.
The Russians returned to their old lines and immediately went to work digging for new batteries to be constructed closer upon the port to put the garrison under additional pressure. There followed a constricting of the Russian lines about the port. The Russian effort was such that Heyde ordered all outlying forces into Colberg on October 13, destroying the drawbridge thereabouts in the process. The following day, a Russian attempt at an assault was blasted to pieces by Prussian battery fire, combined with a heavy, soaking rain. Moreover, there was a developing shortage of ammunition for the Russian guns and th
e intensity of the besiegers was beginning to waver. Compounding their difficulties, an attempt to supply the besiegers by water backfired when a storm wrecked the supply fleet.
Through it all, the garrison persevered, although Palmbach’s men were working on breaching the water barriers to Colberg’s defenses. October 18, roving Russian forces stormed Lauenburg (a suburb of Colberg), but renewed demands for Prussian surrender were met by a determined pounding from Colberg’s guns. The Russians made an effort to launch an assault against Colberg from the Lauenburg side. But the Prussians at the spot, under Colonel Schmeling, were nonplused.
For a couple of days, the intense bombardment and counter-bombardment between the two sides continued. By this point, Russian supplies of ammunition for their batteries were running low, and they were fired only at limited intervals. Fermor, in the meanwhile, who had advanced to Reetz in an attempt to prop up Palmbach, fell back. He retired on Dramburg as was his want. Dohna and his men about this point took up post at Stargard. It was resolved to make a concerted effort to relieve the beleaguered garrison of Colberg. Especially as Russian attempts at success elsewhere had proven elusive.6 A Prussian relief force under General Wobersnow, composed of a combined infantry-cavalry task force, was dispatched towards Colberg on October 25. He probed rather carefully from Mossow with a view towards the Russian force ensconced at Greifenberg. Wobersnow, upon discovering a force of the enemy at the latter, promptly divided up his force. He sent Colonel Gustav Albrecht von Schlaberndorf towards Plath, while Platen strode with the rest from the front. Schlaberndorf’s intentions were to outflank and then cut off the Russian line of retreat. About 0300 hours on October 27, Platen bundled into a Russian outpost, and a considerable little action promptly broke out. The enemy fled from Greifenberg towards Palmbach’s lines.
This caused Palmbach to become convinced he was facing an imminent attack from the entire force of Dohna; which was not the case at all. Fearing he was running out of time with the whole enterprise upon Colberg, Palmbach resolved on one last effort. Early on October 28, Russian batteries opened in full fury, while Wobersnow groped forward from Greifenberg to try to draw the Russians out. Prussian horse attacked some of the enemy outposts near the village of Spie, although Wobersnow, with his effort spent, pulled back on Treptan to regroup.
No major effort, in the event, had been made, but Palmbach was now convinced his mission of capturing Colberg was an abject failure. During the night of October 29–30, the Russians as quietly as they could raised the Siege of Colberg and fell back towards the Persante River. Heyde sent forces out to dismantle and destroy the now largely empty Russian siege lines before Palmbach could truly discover the size of the Prussian relief force. Finally undeceived, but far too late, the Russian sent a force to try to surprise Colberg from the direction of Lauenburg. This last-ditch effort was broken up by a Prussian force which sortied from Colberg to head it off. A spirited action ensued. The greencoats, their efforts spent, fell back, on October 31. The next day, Palmbach took the high road to rejoin Fermor’s main body. Colberg was saved.
To help contain the on-coming Dohna, Fermor ordered a force holding the Pass of Passkrug to make improvements to the defenses there—October 5. It became clear that the Prussian advance and the impending bad weather would render such advanced posts untenable, so, October 15, Fermor ordered Passkrug evacuated and the army fell back on Zachan, Reetz, Springfield, and finally Dramberg (October 22). Dohna hitched into Stargard, while Prussian detachments kept the rear at Landsberg guarded from any Russian incursions. Other than sending some reinforcements with supplies for the forces besieging Colberg, Fermor disdained any major moves.7 When word was received on October 30 that the siege of Colberg had ended in abject failure, Fermor made ready to depart for Poland. November 3, the Russians finally left the main Prussian heartland, other than an isolated toehold, and fell back into Poland.
In the meantime, the Northern Front had not been inactive. In Pomerania, there were a few noteworthy operations before Dohna’s departure to face the Russians. In early March, Dohna assembled a force to tackle the Swedish port of Peenemünde. The Prussian progress against Peenemünde was systematic, and not until March 13 did the garrison submit, and then only after a punishing bombardment. Dohna detached a force of more than 285 men to garrison the port under Captain Reibnitz. Good thing, for the Swedes, in early April, tried to recapture Peenemünde, without success.8 Dohna moved on Mecklenburg-Schwerin, but not before detaching Major-General Platen with a force of dragoons/infantry to go block Russian incursions in the vicinity of Stolp. By mid–June, it was clear that Dohna would have to march to confront the on-coming Fermor and his Russians. June 26, he pulled up stakes and marched off. The force left to oppose the Swedes were the hussars of Grabowski and Puttkammer’s Garrison Regiment #1 (which had lately been stationed in East Prussia).
Rosen was replaced as the commander of the Swedish forces at the beginning of July by Lt.-Gen. Gustav Hamilton, a far less lethargic man than Rosen. It did not take long for Hamilton to react to Dohna’s withdrawal. In July, Hamilton’s main Swedish army once more breached the Peene River, seizing Anklam and Demmin, while Hessenstein went to lay hold of Usedom with 2,000 men.9 In early August, Hamilton moved forward to Ferdinandshof, while the more energetic Hessenstein had laid hold of Peenemünde and Swinemünde, aided by the Swedish navy, which sent ships sailing into the Haff basin. General Count Adam Graf Lowenhaupt led a Swedish force that pilfered supplies from Mecklenburg, ostensibly an “ally” of the Swedes. Hamilton moved to take advantage of the enemy’s absence. He seemed genuinely interested in cooperating with Fermor. The Austrians even entertained the idea of moving on Berlin in cooperation with the Swedes while Frederick was occupied with the Russians.10
There were few Prussians left in front of the Swedish formations. Half of the Swedish army, under Lt-General Fersen, was deployed at Wodarch, while Graf Lieven with a corps of 6,000 men at Spantikow.11 On August 29, Hamilton’s advanced guard moved through Strasburg, and fanned out, immediately. One writer composed a note from Stralsund saying the Prussians had vanished like foxes.12 Hamilton’s army lacked even pontoons to bridge the rivers, but the utter lack of resistance left the Swedes free to raid far and wide. Roaming parties made it to Fehrbellin. Hamilton even reached Rheinsberg, which was the limit of the advance. But, most significantly, there was no effort made to conquer the countryside in a military sense. So the invaders confined themselves to burning homes, pillaging, raping inhabitants, and the like. Since they lacked a chain of supply, part of the Swedish actions were due to necessity. In the event, much of the Swedish difficulty in conducting military operations was due to this lack of a reliable line-of-supply, which ultimately made their advances agonizingly slow. The rest was due to cruelty, or depraved indifference.
Whatever the reason, this gave the Prussians time to react. Wedell was dispatched on September 14 with six full battalions of infantry and five squadrons of hussars, some 11,000 men, from Frederick’s main army.13 By that time, Swedish patrols had reached Pasewalk, so Berlin breathed a real sigh of relief when Wedell marched into the city on September 20.
Hamilton heard of Wedell’s arrival, and started to retire. He detached some 1400 men, under Major Karl Konstantin De Carnall, with instructions to barricade Fehrbellin and hold it secure against all comers. Undoubtedly, this was a delay to impede Wedell. Nevertheless, the Swedes were told to stay put and they were not inclined to go. Meanwhile, Prussian troopers had been detached from Stettin to impede the Swedes. With a force not large enough to face the enemy in the open, the bluecoats laid an ambush in a thick forest between Lychen and Boitzenburg. The Swedes failed to send out any patrols. The Prussians stayed silent as the main body of Swedes passed by, they then opened up on what were new recruits guarding the Swedish rear elements. Eighty men were killed or wounded before the Swedes could send reinforcements to break up the ambush. Nor was that all. The Duke of Brunswick-Bevern, from Stettin, continued to send patrols to harass the Sw
edes.
At Fehrbellin, Carnall had barricaded the western-facing Mühlentor Gate and the southeast facing Berlinertor Gate. The force at the former, hit by the fury of Wedell (September 28), caved in and the Swedes fell back toward the Berlinertor. Wedell pressed the enemy through the gate and across the Rhine, and the enemy there halted their retreat after some timely reinforcements of cavalry arrived. Wedell pounded the town with his big guns, and, in hand-to-hand street fighting, finally overwhelmed the Swedes. The fighting was tough, weighing in the balance for a while.14
But the Swedish defeat was a wash. Prussian losses were approximately 80 killed and wounded.15 Not only this year, though, but throughout the war, the Swedes never displayed any real military competence. Even their leaders were only fairly competent. The Swedish soldiers were reasonably skillful, but their officers left a lot to be desired. September 29, Wedell unleashed his force into an attack on the nearby Swedish post of Tornow. The Swedish horsemen were soon driven from the field, by the 3rd Hussars of Major-General Christian Möhring16 but the infantry were resilient enough to withstand six different attacks by the aroused Prussians. Another Prussian probe towards Fehrbellin was beaten back. The day ended with Wedell withdrawing from the field, leaving the Swedes free to claim a rare victory. Prussian losses were 153, while the Swedes lost 162 men.
Nevertheless, the Swedish posts in this area were far too exposed in a forward area to maintain. When Prussian marauders cut off the lines-of-communication and supply, Hamilton ordered his men to withdraw from Fehrbellin and the forward posts. On October 10. Wedell followed up the retreating enemy, and, surprising a force of the Swedes at Boitzenburg, snagged 170 men and 300 horses. Then Wedell, with the Swedes apparently having no aim other than winter quarters, was recalled to help Dohna at Berlin on November 1. The only force left to oppose the Swedes was Manteuffel, who marched there after Fermor withdrew into Poland. The rest of the Swedish campaign was not long in the relating.
Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War Page 46
