Manteuffel, in mid–November, moved out from Angermünde to go to Gramzow. The Swedes, some 250 cavalry at Gustow, fell back a short distance on Bietkow. November 18, the Swedes under General von Lingen attacked the Prussian force occupying Gustow, but were beaten back. As the main force of Manteuffel was in close proximity, Lingen wisely kept back his cavalry (some 500 strong), and sent forward the Meijerfelt’s Grenadiers and the Västgota Dal Infantry17 first to probe the Prussian force. A high stonewall surrounded the town’s chief physical locale, a church. As the Swedes advanced into town, the Prussians were waiting crouched behind a local stonewall. Despite fire support from a couple of guns, and infantry reinforcements, Lingen was simply unable to make headway. Worse, Manteuffel was alerted by the sounds of the fight, and he unleashed some hard riding cavalry which promptly rode down the Swedish horse, scattering it, while the Swedish infantry were saved only by their own firmness from destruction.
The Swedes fell back towards Pasewalk, hastily constructing defensive posts about the village of Werbelow. It was Manteuffel’s avowed intention to capture the Swedish post. Platen was sent out on November 25 to do what he could. Platen surprised a small Swedish patrol outside of Werbelow, which fell back directly on the post. Some 200 men were in garrison, and Platen unleashed artillery fire and attacked the post. Swedish reinforcements soon made Platen’s position untenable, and he fell back on Manteuffel, having lost some 50 men. Meanwhile, Dohna marched from Eilenburg to the Northern Front to reinforce Manteuffel. This compelled the Swedes to fall back upon Stralsund, leaving small forces to hold Demmin and Anklam. Those posts were abandoned to Prussian patrols. This essentially ended the campaign on the Northern Front.
The king was relieved to hear the news that the Swedes had been foiled from Berlin, and that they were again driven back into their own area. But Frederick’s sister Wilhelmine was ill again, and that weighed heavily upon his mind. He had not as yet recovered from the loss of his mother.
While the other fronts had been busy, in the Western theater, Ferdinand had been occupied with the French. He had pushed their front across the Rhine in late March and early April and had himself advanced more than 40 miles across the great river. He encountered the enemy drawn out in front of him at Crefeld, in a strength of 47,000 men, while he could dispose of only 33,000.
Richelieu had proven to be a bitter disappointment and was summarily recalled, by his own request, on February 7, 1758. His replacement, Count Louis de Bourbon-Condė Clermont, was an entirely independent individual. A living embodiment of the “Squeaky wheel gets the grease” hyperbolic expression, Clermont had tried to secure a command position from the start of hostilities. With Richelieu’s eclipse, Clermont seized the opportunity. He did not take long to demonstrate, unfortunately, his unfitness to command.18 Quite convincingly, we might add.
Clermont barely had a chance to settle in before Ferdinand attacked. The latter knew his opponent was not a skilled commander. But he was temporarily thwarted in crossing the Rhine by the duplicity of some Dutch boat operators, so that determined man ordered a bridge built and so accomplished his mission. June 12, at Rheinsberg, in a localized, limited fight, Clermont was alerted to the allied advent.19 He promptly withdrew from an exposed position. But Ferdinand was in a mood to fight, and was too close not to.
He followed after the retreating French, which did not set well with Clermont. Ferdinand’s men undertook a general advance at that point, causing Wagenheim to draw in and Holstein-Gottorp fanned out with the advanced guard. The suspicion was strong the French left would be more liable to turning than Clermont’s right. Thus it was against this side that the allies would concentrate. Allied patrols seized the important town of Kempen on June 18. Ferdinand immediately claimed this post for his headquarters. The French were close-by and Ferdinand was satisfied that Crefeld was held by only a small force of French. The Ernprinz was given the job of taking a large force with him with which to outflank the French and seize Crefeld.
Ferdinand divided his army into three assault groups: one to attack the front of the French position; the second and third to go against each flank. The frontal and attack against Clermont’s right were duly launched (June 23), but that which was intended to strike the French left, instead attacked the French rear, quite by accident. This forced the enemy to retire hastily with the loss of some 4,000 men. Ferdinand, who had suffered himself suffered some 1,700 casualties, was inactive for a time. The French, vowing to hold Weser and regain the line of the Rhine, were stunned, and the government relieved Clermont of his position (July 8), placing General Louis George Érasme Marquis de Contades in his place.20
Contades did not have an auspicious start either. Ferdinand tried to readjust his front towards the village of Allrath so he could force a fight on the French. But the allied army fragmented on the march, and was exposed to defeat in detail. Contades, in trying to react to Ferdinand’s move, planted himself firmly at Allrath right in Ferdinand’s path. Part of the latter’s men were trapped directly in front of the French, thanks to an unavailable bridge. For the whole of July 13, Contades could have inflicted a major defeat on his foe. He was advised to do just that, by some junior officers who fully realized what was being offered.
Contades chose to wait overnight and Ferdinand was able to pull his army together in the meantime, and withdraw. There was a sharp little action at Sandershausen on July 23, between Ysenberg’s men and Broglie’s. Isenburg with 7,000 men encountered the advanced guard of Soubise (12,000 men under Broglie)21 and managed to hold his ground against the more numerous foe. Isenburg and Oberg had been sent with two separate detachments to bother Soubise. Broglie’s intention was to attack the enemy’s left about 1300 hours. The advance was carried out with some dexterity, and, about 1500 hours, the action became general. Although the entire French force was ultimately employed, the allies proved strong. Isenburg finally had to pull back (1900 hours), with losses of 1,477, leaving the field to the French. The allied loss, mostly in prisoners, was 2,394. This news caused the Hanoverian government to pack up and move to Stade.
At the same time, our old friend Soubise (who in spite of his defeat at Rossbach, had been made a Marshal of France) and who had previously marched with 24,000 men to go aid the Austrians, was ordered to return and rejoin the main army. Soubise had been making his way slowly into Ferdinand’s rearward areas. Quite surprisingly, the French, who had Ferdinand in about the biggest bind of the war, failed to take advantage of the situation. Fighting paused until July 24, and this gave Ferdinand just the time he needed to prepare a better effort against the enemy.22
Ferdinand’s withdrawal completely surrendered the initiative to Contades. He crossed the Rhine, deciding the time was ripe to finish off Ferdinand. He had the opportunity to trap the allied force. The French commander moved to take full advantage of the situation. August 2, he sent a sizable detachment to Wesel. This with the avowed intention of cutting Ferdinand’s men off away from their “safe” areas. This move by the French caused the allied commander to immediately abandon his own plans and he started his army back towards the rear. Seizing a handy little pass near Brüggen, the allies performed a retrograde movement designed to bail them out of their dangerous position.
Nevertheless, the wily Contades felt he had a pretty good chance at mauling, if not outright bagging, Ferdinand’s men. Fortunately for the allied cause, Ferdinand’s men were well on their way over the bridge at Brüggen before the French could even effectively interfere with the withdrawal. Ferdinand himself went over to the offense again. A force of 12,000 English troops had landed in Hanover beyond Soubise’s area. He hoped to be able to attack the enemy that very day (August 2). Unfortunately, the allied army could not be brought together for this effort before nightfall. As soon as Contades realized what Ferdinand was doing, he moved on Dulken, which had an important defile through which the allies would have to pass. He put out a small force to try to draw Ferdinand into an ambush.
After the sun rose, Fer
dinand’s patrols discovered Contades had flown the coop.23 Immediately the general sent Holstein-Gottorp to follow on the enemy’s heel. He was to act as the advanced guard of the main army. Ferdinand, with the main body, continued to withdraw. He did not withdraw on Einbeck until his force had been largely decimated. Following this, the allies and the French were in need, apparently, of some time to refurbish their strength. Although Ferdinand was just then in desperate straits, the French in front of him did not appreciate any weakness on his part. Soubise rather feared for the safety of his army in its exposed “forward” post.
Contades was in no more of a hurry to seek further action.24 He took command at Recklinghausen, his army close-by, while Soubise kept stance at Kassel. Ferdinand, relieved of much trouble by the inactivity of the French, was so close at Dulmen that the rival army’s pickets were almost touching each other. Joined by the English force on August 20 at Soest, Ferdinand’s position was improved.
The French plan for the campaign vaguely stated Soubise and Contades were to cooperate in their operations against Ferdinand. But neither man was anxious to get started. They seemed to concede the offense to Ferdinand. The French court was not quite so charitable in their assessment. Belle-Isle tartly informed Soubise he needed to “make better use of … [his] superiority.”25 Soubise fired back that Contades was the one dragging his feet, so to speak. And Ferdinand’s men had captured an enemy courier who had the whole French plan as it was finally worked out. So the Prussian was aware of what was afoot.
Soubise had hitched into Göttingen on September 9, and Northeim on September 11. This move directly threatened Isenburg and he withdrew on Hameln. Ferdinand, now knowing what the French were up to, immediately pushed out Oberg to Paderborn (September 15). Allied reconnaissance patrols were sent towards Warburg. This caused Soubise to pull back on Göttingen, which Ferdinand had thought would occur. Isenburg, acting on Ferdinand’s order to join forces with Oberg, moved to join him, who on September 26, reached the outskirts of Kassel. This threw panic into the French force. Soubise, paused momentarily at Munden, rose immediately and made a break for Kassel. He apparently intended to keep that post.
September 27, Oberg and Isenburg joined forces. The consolidated force took post at Obervellmar (a bare four miles northwest of Kassel). This could have been desperate for Soubise, although reluctant Contades finally sent reinforcements. This body of men, under Chevert and a second auxiliary force under Charles Duc de Fitz-James, quickly made for Kassel. The allied patrols discovered this new enemy body close-by and feared for the outcome of any flanking effort against them. This caused the allied force to shift forward to a better post over by Landwehrhagen. Oberg continued to change his front and, on October 9, occupied the high ground near Sandershausen.
Meanwhile, Soubise had been pleased with the new reinforcements; he now had about 42,000 men. With this force, the marshal was determined to go over the attack against the allied lines. Soubise hoped to outflank the enemy over hard by Munden. He hoped to compel Oberg to surrender. The latter now detected the new French effort, and, night of October 9–10, withdrew on Lütternberg, which was a better position from which to resist Soubise’s efforts. But the effect was lost, for French artillery, placed beforehand on the heights close by Landwehrhagen, started to shell Oberg’s men as soon as they appeared about 0800 hours. This move forced on Oberg the virtual necessity of fighting, especially as the ground towards Munden might present grave difficulties under cover of enemy fire. Oberg deployed his right at Speele, with his left flank on a rise called the Kleine Staufenberg. Broglie, with the advanced guard, had pressed after Oberg.
The French deployed their forces, and, finally about 1300 hours, Chevert (14,000 strong), with preparations complete, stormed forward (October 10). The ground so delayed their efforts that a general attack could not be made until about 1500 hours. The fighting, after long indecision in battle, was intense when it started. Oberg had enough of a time with Chevert. Then, suddenly, Broglie and Fitz-James’s men put in their appearance.
The newcomers had to work their way uphill against an allied force that was already tiring out from fighting Chevert’s forces. At that point, a rather desperate Oberg gave the order to pull back before the French attack up front could make itself felt. The allies retreated quickly, but Fitz-James, coming up behind, pressed after Oberg. Just when it seemed Oberg would be compelled to retire across the narrow bridge at Munden, the French broke off a sustained pursuit. The French lost 600 men killed and wounded, while Oberg had 600. With his effort spent, Oberg pulled back on Moringen and then across the Weser.26
Most ironically, the recently arrived British contingent appears to have had little actual military action in the later stages of the campaign. The next little drama occurred as Contades suddenly erupted upon Hamm. He meant to help out Soubise before Oberg could put in his appearance. Ferdinand, whose ardent desire was to prevent the French from following up their advantage at Lütternberg, moved to Lippstädt (October 17). The enemy before him, thanks to Chevert’s rather independent operation chiefly, was still divided into detachments, and Ferdinand greatly benefitted from Contades’ ignorance as to his destination.
Contades heard some rumors (true as it turned out), that Holstein-Gottorp was operating rather clandestinely near Werl. So, he rose and moved that way. The allies promptly retired, on October 19. Ferdinand hitched back on Herzfeld (October 22). The French still had the initiative firmly in their hands. To demonstrate this, Contades suddenly made for Münster. He had the inside track on the place and was in better spot to nab it. Part of the French force put the place under blockade on October 25. Ferdinand sent off Imhof with a quick moving force to reinforce his body at Münster and moved the main force out on October 26. Two days after, the main allied force, rejoined by Imhof, arrived at Münster. The enemy force, under Armentieres, had reacted to the approach of the main allied force by skedaddling. The fact Contades did not move with his entire force on the city seems to indicate the effort was half-hearted at best. There had been some hard campaigning, and the French were suffering from some serious shortages of equipment and material.
Ferdinand’s men were also suffering some hardships that could only be settled by resort to rest and recuperation. The sure sign that the campaign was nearing its end was the abandonment by Contades of his positions on the eastern side of the Rhine, in the middle of November. As for Soubise, he pulled back behind the Lahn River on Hanau (November 22). Ferdinand followed suit, and the campaign came to a reluctant, but not premature, conclusion.
Ferdinand had acquitted himself well.27 He had taken over, in about one year, a beaten army, trapped against the coast by a much more numerous French force. The allied army itself had been threatening to fragment around the same time. The French forces had not been as effectively handled. In spite of superior numbers, they were often on the defense, and their army commanders were, for the most part, markedly inferior to Ferdinand in talent and in poise. Clermont was incompetent, Soubise showed only flashes of competence, and Contades kept his army too spread out for its own good. Ferdinand had acted as an independent commander, despite his ties to Prussia and his concern with the way the war was going in that country. Frederick kept some of his cavalry, in particular, with Ferdinand; although he missed their deployment in actions in Prussia itself his cause benefitted greatly by their being utilized by Ferdinand. And, at the end of the campaign, the allied condition was, overall, greatly improved, while the fortunes of the French had somewhat deteriorated. To wit, the French occupation of Hanover, which had been complete when Ferdinand first arrived, had entirely evaporated by the end of 1758.
The war, on all their fronts, had gone sour for the French in 1758. They were having real problems with the British not only in North America, but also in respect to India. This was threatening to become a total wash even as early as this stage in the war. Had the war been confined to just Western Germany, the French would have been tempted to pack it in before they finally did.
Frederick’s continuing problems convinced the French to continue, at least for a while.
We left Laudon and Riese holding off the Prussian attack from Retzow on September 12. When the Prussian attack was renewed in the wee hours of September 13, Riese was compelled to abandon his post and withdraw on Weissig. Prussian losses were 19 men, while Riese had 24 casualties.28 Frederick’s arrival really changed the face of the war in Saxony, though.
Frederick came on with a small escort (including Seydlitz with the Normann Dragoons and Ziethen’s Hussars), entering Dresden on September 12, where he had a no doubt joyous reunion with his brother Henry. Henry’s men continued to hold Dresden and detachments guarding the bridges over the Elbe, to prevent Zweibrücken from moving his Imperialists across from Pirna to join Daun, or vice-versa.
Frederick was therefore given just the reprieve he needed to rest and recuperate his army and decided to try to draw Daun out of Stoplen, or, if failing this, to move up and attack him there. The king was aware that, if he could maul the main Austrian army, then Zweibrücken and Dombâle could certainly not stand against him. He put his army out of camp and drove it round Daun’s post looking for a soft spot in the Austrian lines to put in his stroke.
Speaking of the king, the sun was up by the time he ordered a new campsite laid out from Triebenberg to Weissig. This position directly menaced Daun’s post, especially the formations of the Austrian right. Daun was taking no chances in this mess.29 He pushed out troops, on September 14, to lay hold of a hilly post between Dobra and Sturza. In other developments, the marshal reinforced his camp at Stolpen and Baden-Durlach made for Putzkau. As for the Prussians, they had not been idle by any means. Retzow had failed to drive Laudon from Radeberg. Nevertheless, Laudon readjusted his lines, occupying Arnsdorf and leaving Radeberg to be garrisoned by Major-General Karl von Nauendorf with a body of light Croats. As for Zweibrücken, Frederick’s arrival in the vicinity had really dampened his enthusiasm for the whole business. To be frank, the Imperialists were still having supply difficulties. Any “needless” offensive would merely exacerbate the problem. It was his desire to have Daun’s army alone deal with the whole mess.
Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War Page 47
