Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War

by Herbert J. Redman

  It remained for Fersen, who did not wish to hasten matters, to order a set of batteries built to plaster the West Redoubt. Twin groups, one of six guns and the second of four, aided by complimenting twin batteries of howitzers and mortars (two pieces apiece), left little leeway for the defenders. By design, the batteries were positioned “between 6 A. M. and 4 P. M.”12 September 1, the Swedish batteries opened up on the West Redoubt. The following day, Major Menardier and a 400-man Prussian garrison marched into captivity, victim of no backup and overwhelming Prussian attention in other theaters of the war.13

  Flushed with a surprisingly easy time, the Swedish batteries were rolled forward, and commenced blasting away at Mövenhaken. Again, the bluecoats abandoned a position behind the Swine thereabouts, as the Mövenhaken works burned. When Fersen tried to exploit a further gain by trying to cross the Swine near Caseberg (September 4) the Prussians were able to bar him from this, largely because alert patrols uncovered the move. In other theaters, the war went on.

  Meanwhile, August 16, Frederick marched to Fürstenwalde to cover Berlin from the south against Soltikov, who had now no plan for marching on the capital city. This gave the Prussians the time they needed to recover from the defeat. The main Russian army was now at Lossow, emplaced there to be contiguous with the Oder and his supply routes, although Soltikov’s magazines were in Posen.

  The allies had suffered their share of losses and the Russian commander was angry because his men and not Laudon’s had borne the brunt of the heavy fighting at Kunersdorf. And yet the latter had reaped most of the resulting credit for the victory. Soltikov was reinforced in his distrust of the Austrians by Fermor, as well as the subordinate officers of the Russian army. In the Austrian Empire, Laudon was regarded as the true victor.14 The Russians had wanted Daun and his whole army to join them, but he had only sent Laudon, they had wanted the Austrians to provision their forces, and this request had been thoroughly ignored. Now Laudon wanted Soltikov to march in and take Berlin, but the Russian leader was tired of what the Austrians wanted and stubbornly refused to budge from his prepared positions on that latest mission. Without the cooperation of the Russians, Laudon and his men could not by themselves hope to capture the Prussian capital.15

  Part of the Russian’s reluctance was the relishing of the heavy casualties, more specifically the greencoats, had suffered in order to beat the Prussian army. Austro-Russian losses at the Battle of Kunersdorf had been approximately 14,181 for the Russians and 2,215 for Laudon’s contingent (425 dead, 1,343 wounded, 447 presumed dead or captured), a total of nearly 16,500. Thus Soltikov’s army, which had carried by far the greater share of the fighting, also had by far the greater proportion of losses for that privilege. Frederick’s losses were the worst he had ever (or would ever) suffer on a field of battle, both in relation to his army’s strength as well as in overall losses. He lost some 6,200 men killed, 12,000 wounded (2,000 of them severely wounded as prisoners), added to the other casualties (about 1,350 missing presumed captured), which amounted to approximately 20,000, almost half of the army under his command.16 Also 165 guns, added to 13 further heavy pieces, for a total of 178 guns lost.17 The Prussian officer corps had been hard hit, as usual. General Itzenplitz had been killed at the head of his men, Hülsen and Knobloch, besides Seydlitz (capable leaders all), were among the wounded. One of Prussia’s best literary talents, the celebrated poet and soldier Major Ewald Christian von Kleist18 (commanding a battalion of men), was mortally wounded at the battle.19

  The rout at Kunersdorf left Frederick temporarily without an army. During the retreat, he had been informed that the organized part of his army consisted of just 5,000 men with about four dozen cannon. After the battle, the Prussian king entered what was probably the blackest, most dejected mood of his life. Had the battle been followed up, there is no doubt that the fate of Prussia would have been sealed. But he was allowed to recover, regroup his remaining forces and the war could go on. The fact of the matter was that although the allies could maul and defeat the Prussians they were paralyzed by jealousies and rivalries among themselves. This is an example of the weaknesses inherent in a multi-national coalition. If this makes little sense to the reader, let him consider the following.

  Soltikov, by linking up with Laudon, had expected a steady flow of provisions from Daun. He had so far received little more than an unwanted body of troopers, of Laudon, that were likewise in need of supplies. He had therefore refused to cooperate with the Austrians, until he should be appeased. There was nothing wrong with that, in his view; he was merely protecting the best interests of his army and of his country. Daun and many of the Austrians, on the other hand, believed that their allies should bear a heavier burden of the war and simply could not justify supplying an army that “wasn’t pulling its own weight.”20 Ergo, the Austrian point of view. So the allies were literally halted in the tracks, mostly by themselves.21

  Chapter Thirty-Four

  Allies Spring to Life

  Soltikov for one refused categorically to take one more step towards Berlin until Daun sent reinforcements and provisions. The Austrian marshal did little more than move his army to Preibus on August 13. Just after arriving, he received word of the Prussian defeat, so the next day Daun marched to Treibel to be nearer at hand. It would appear that the marshal wanted to be ready to march when Soltikov was ready for marching on Berlin. August 22, Daun rode up to the Russian headquarters in an attempt to get more cooperation from Soltikov, without any tangible success.1 The marshal pointed out to him that only one major enemy formation—Prince Henry’s army—remained in being to be disposed of and Prussia would then be wide open for the taking. Soltikov, however, did not share the marshal’s enthusiasm.

  He pointed out that the king had actually led Henry’s army to defeat at Kunersdorf, and that Prince Henry actually was commanding Frederick’s army at Schmöttseifen. Soltikov also postulated that Daun’s plan was based on being able to defeat Prince Henry with what were the best units left of the Prussian forces. The losses the allies could expect to incur in this task would undoubtedly and could only be excessive. This did not appeal to Soltikov. In short, it did not appear to be a feasible plan. Without Russian help, the deed was clearly impossible.

  The Swedes, meanwhile, pressed up against Wollin, which was held by Lt-Colonel Schafstädtt. The latter had the services of Garrison Regiment Puttkammer and Wasmer’s unit2 as his defense force. Under increasing pressure from Swedish patrols, Schafstädtt fell back entirely within the confines of Wollin (September 15). The following day, the attack against Wollin commenced. The Meherfeldt’s Grenadiers struck at the Swine Gate, while the Drottningen’s Life Regiment rolled over the Wicker Gate. Another unit, the Jönköpings Infantry unit3 cut off the enemy from retreat across the sole bridge at the Divenow. Not to be outdone, irregulars bushwhacked the posts beyond on the wall between the Swine and the Wicker Gates, and the Älvsborgs supported the effort with everything within. A strong fight ended in the complete defeat of Schafstädtt and his men. Prussian losses were roughly 500 dead, wounded, captured, while the Swedish loss was approximately 115 men and seven officers.4

  Meanwhile, back in Saxony, matters had been moving right along. After Finck was ordered to march to join the main Prussian army, he left Torgau to the care and keeping of Colonel Wolfersdorfe, with three battalions and 12 12-pounder guns at his disposal. The latter did all that he could to make Torgau as defensible as possible. August 7, Kleefeld sent a raiding party which probed gingerly at the enemy’s defenses of Torgau; a reconnaissance force of some 1,200 men, including Luzinsky’s command and some hussars. The effect was limited, and August 10, Kleefeld’s men arrived in force and summoned the defenders. Wolfersdorfe managed to stall off answering, hoping to get time for reinforcements. Kleefeld was also wanting additional forces. Two Prussian battalions, along with four additional 12-pounder guns, arrived to stiffen Wolfersdorfe, although Schmettau, comfortably ensconced in the Saxon capital, could only send his regrets.

/>   As for Luzinsky, he hitched into Belgern while some patrols edged on Reisa. About 1200 hours on August 11, Kleefeld, animated by the knowledge that the circumstances seemed right and the Imperialists should be getting their due just about then, appeared suddenly at the Leipzig and the Spital Gates. A force of bluecoats sortied to try to fight off the attackers beyond the confines of the city walls, although the weight of numbers pressed the defenders back right up to Torgau. An enveloping counterattack upon front and rear broke up the Imperialist effort.

  To help Kleefeld, Prince Stolberg now arrived on the scene with more men, but the valiant Wolfersdorfe (who was himself a Saxon by birth and hated by many of his people) stuck by his guns. An additional attack was beaten off, although the Imperialists did gradually crowd over against Torgau. Stolberg, who had now charge of the forces near Torgau, presented Wolfersdorfe generous terms to vacate his post. This offer was snubbed outright.

  About 0430 hours, August 13, the Imperials struck again, with an intensity that belied that army’s shaky reputation. The bluecoats turned back this latest enemy effort. Stolberg shifted the attack pressure to the bridge across the Elbe, as well as against a small bridgehead redoubt on the opposite bank. However, Wolfersdorfe countered with a flank maneuver that spoiled the effort. Snubbed again, Stolberg withdrew a short distance to the rear.

  Thus stymied, the Imperials, who all along had been constructing big batteries (on the banks of the Elbe, which included both 12-pounders and the enormous 24-pounders), went to work. These commenced blasting away at Torgau. Luzinsky was closing up Torgau on his side. The position of Wolfersdorfe had now deteriorated, and when Stolberg offered even more generous terms (with the extraordinary provision of allowing Wolfersdorfe to set his own terms), the incredible offer was accepted. By high noon on August 15, the Prussians, keeping their weapons and their artillery as well, marched out, heads held high. Total losses of the bluecoats had been 31 killed and 46 more wounded. The Imperialists still managed to snag supplies valued at some 200,000 thalers, including 7,524 hundredweight of hay and 3,163 full barrels of flour. In addition, there was said to be 170,000 florins in specie in the military chest.5

  The Imperialists next took encouragement of the encouraging news about Frederick’s defeat at Kunersdorf. But Zweibrücken remained timid, only altering his position to a new camp fronting Möckern and leaning over towards Entritzsch. None of the various Imperialist forces moved up, except Kleefeld. The latter forthwith advanced on Wittenberg. The town boasted a small garrison of about 1,000 men under Major-General Friedrich Magnus von Horn. The Prussian commander was not confident in his ability to hold Wittenberg, largely because he mistrusted his men. He hesitated only briefly and set fire to the suburbs when Kleefeld drew near on August 20; destroying some 30 houses and several barns loaded with supplies.

  The enemy, under Colonel Losy von Losenau, made a legitimate effort to break into Wittenberg, while General Horn was openly castigated by officials of the famous university located at Wittenberg to cease the destruction of the town. The Prussian leader saw the futility of further resistance, and, when the enemy offered ‘Free Withdrawal,’ Horn embraced it. He extracted his garrison with its equipment intact (August 23). Once Horn withdrew, the Imperialists left the Trier Regiment, along with Baden Baden, to man the lines in and about Wittenberg.6

  Brentano had hitched into Sedlitz, and there was indeed a gradual swaying of power forward and back in Saxony. The Saxons, through the good auspices of the government in Warsaw, were demanding the Austrians step up to the plate and drive the despised Prussians from Saxony finally. The amount of devastation wrought by the bluecoats in Saxony up to this point had to be enormous, but it is hard to imagine the king’s men inflicted more overall damage than the Imperialists. Marshal Daun responded to orders from the Hofkriegsrath and the urgings of Maria Theresa, who saw the reconquest of Saxony as being able to take away a chief source of the enemy’s supply and bases.7 Both the Austrians and the Imperialists were soon swinging themselves towards the Saxon capital as the most significant physical prize still left on the table. Zweibrücken moved out on August 24. His men hitched into Würzen, reaching Hubertusburg on August 25. Now the commander, on his arrival in the vicinity, dispatched his Adjutant-General, Colonel Joseph von Churfeld, to go see Schmettau in Dresden about securing the surrender of the city.8

  Zweibrücken’s men moved to Meissen on August 27. Disturbing rumors to the effect that General Finck was coming at him with some 14,000 solid Prussian troops were floating about. MacQuire stood before the Saxon capital on that day with nearly 5,700 men, advancing straight from the army of Marshal Daun.

  As for Prince Henry, from early August, he had heard nothing from the king. However, rumors indicated that things had not gone right with Frederick’s enterprise on the Eastern Front. By the week of August 25, he heard for sure that Prussian arms had suffered defeat in the east, but that Frederick was resolved to do what he could.9 Same day, Prince Henry wrote a letter to his brother. But we are getting ahead of the events. The king, meanwhile, had been facing Soltikov. On August 28, the Russian commander did finally march, but headed his Russian army southward instead of northwest on Berlin. Soltikov occupied Müllrose, while his adversary, now following on his heels, started out in pursuit on August 30. Moving down the Spree Valley, Frederick reached Waldau, where he paused. His army now numbered 31,000 men (including Kleist and the rallied survivors of Kunersdorf), but on August 21, he detached Wunsch with a body of 6,000 men to go to Saxony, where he had received word that the Imperialists were marching.

  Wunsch started off from Fürstenwalde, after assembling the loose amalgamation of forces in that vicinity. He quickly encountered an enemy outpost at Zahna, some eight miles northeast of Wittenberg. The bluecoats rode down the surprised enemy, capturing about 150 men and scattering the rest to the wind.10 Thus emboldened, Wunsch lost no time in moving on Wittenberg, where Colonel von Losenau was encamped. The latter did not even think of offering up a defense in the face of such long odds, and he promptly surrendered the post. The Imperialists marched out at 0200 hours on August 28. Wunsch, no doubt delighted at the capitulation, provided horses to transport Losy’s men to Leipzig via Düben. The king was pleased to hear of the speedy recovery of Wittenberg, and subsequently ordered the promotion of Wunsch.

  The latter lost no time in making for Torgau; he arrived near there on August 30. The allies sent reinforcements to the aid of the garrison of Torgau. General Ried marched past Düben aiming for Torgau, supported by Colonel Vecsey, from Schmiedeberg. But the Prussian move was far too quick to defend against. The Szėchėny Hussars, being apprised of the approach of a superior enemy body of cavalry, fell back, in the process exposing Torgau. Wunsch, through Wolfersdorfe, immediately summoned the garrison to surrender. General Kleefeld, with the Trier Regiment and some 300 of the Croats, tried to stall for time. The approach of the relief force was known at Torgau, but even Wunsch realized time was not on his side in this endeavor.

  He wheeled his guns into position, and started pounding the enemy with a heavy bombardment. The men formed up for an attack, which was launched about midnight on August 30–31. Some 400 infantry and 600 jägers attacked with such intensity that Kleefeld surrendered in a short while. The latter marched out for Leipzig, leaving Torgau to be reoccupied by Grolmann and with Wunsch, fresh laurels from his march.

  However, the latter momentarily neglected his first, chief order of business, which was to go to the aid of Schmettau in Dresden. Instead of pressing on immediately, which Wunsch should have done without delay, he hesitated. Wunsch chose instead to await the arrival of some new guns from Berlin, which delayed his march by three days. He finally left for the Saxon capital about 1500 hours on September 3. As a direct result, Dresden was to fall to the enemy before Wunsch ever could interfere.

  On August 31, meanwhile, St. André hitched into Eilenburg. The presence of so many bodies of the enemy was unnerving to Wunsch, but, September 2, St. André fell back on Grimma
, and thus helped ease the Prussian anxiety. A march to Grossenhayn, by Wunsch, which he reached on September 4, was made. Wolfersdorfe himself, with a body of some 200 hussars, galloped down the bank of the Elbe and received some disturbing news. He heard, from boat handlers on the Elbe, that surrender negotiations were underway at Dresden. It was too late, for the moment, to save the Saxon capital for Prussia.

  As for Frederick, Wunsch’s departure cut his army. This reduced him to 25,000 men, while Henry had nearly 40,000 with him. The allies, with the troops that Laudon, Lacy, Daun, and Soltikov could muster, deployed from Hoyerswerda to near Crossen (some 80 miles of posts) with about 120,000 troops to man the front. Could the Prussians, with a force not above half as numerous, hope to prevent their reconquest of Saxony and the outright conquest of Brandenburg/Silesia?