It appears that, at both the Russian and the Austrian headquarters, at all levels of command, there was a mutual lack of trust regarding their “ally’s” intentions.11 Even against a common enemy, Frederick’s Prussia, they were unable to give more than a rudimentary cooperation. This condition manifested itself from time to time in this long war. And, time and again, Frederick owed the survival of his army and his nation to that very lack of cooperation. Especially so now.
Chapter Thirty-Five
Maneuvering in the East; Frederick Prepares to Move to Saxony
Prince Henry had come up with a plan. He was at Sagan from the end of August, leaving Schmöttseifen well garrisoned. He had heard that Daun was in the process of readying supplies and reinforcements for the Russians.1 Henry decided to wreck, if he could, these preparations. He shoved his van to Sorau in enemy country. Ziethen commanded the body. His appearance there threw the enemy into a temporary panic. Ziethen was also, if he could, to reopen contact with the king, then at Fürstenwalde. Soon the sheer numbers of the foe forced Henry back to near Görlitz. His stroke had caused Daun to deviate from his plan, sidetracking troops that might have been used with good effect against Frederick’s army. Daun tried to pulverize Ziethen by way of reprisal.
Ziethen had 15 battalions and 30 squadrons (roughly 10,000 men) with him. August 16, he reached Bunzlau and, the next day, Ober-Leschen. The fearless hussar put up his camp at the latter, with the Bober River in front and his flanks concealed behind thick forests. Daun had hitched to Pribus, as seen, while Ziethen stayed unmolested for a week and a half without moving. Prince Henry detached Fouquet with orders to hold Schmöttseifen to keep close tabs on the Austrians at Laubau. Buccow abandoned Sagan, temporarily giving up that place. August 27, Ziethen’s hussars, probing Sprottau, fought Beck’s outposts, alerting him to the danger confronting him. Next day, Prince Henry reached Sagan. His goal was to attempt to establish firm communications with the Eastern Front and try to clarify the still fuzzy situation with regard to the king.2
Ziethen pressed forward to Sorau, where he boldly captured a valuable magazine, as well as taking 84 hussars and three officers.3 The old hussar espied there the danger threatening from the number of enemy forces in his proximity, and stayed ever alert. Henry ordered the Free Battalion Salemnon (of General Konstantin Nathanael von Salemnon) to move, on the night of September 1–2, to occupy the defile of Buschmühle. Then Henry’s advent convinced Daun to beat a retreat.
Ziethen was well served by General de Czettritz, who chased after the retiring Austrian main army and took 73 Austrians as prisoners on the road to Treibel. Daun was of a mind to take advantage of Ziethen’s exposed forward position and capture his men if he could. Beck was told off to take his force through the thick Sorau Woods; he was to lay hold of the defile on the road to Sagan. Simultaneously, Buccow would work his way around the Prussian right and on into Ziethen’s rear. The main army was to smash in the front of the Prussian position.
There was activity on the Prussian side as well. A patrol pushed out into the night (September 1–2) forward on Muskau, failed to pick up on the Austrian preparations, although they did bring in a needed provision train. Prince Henry’s own hussars, from Sagan, were more alert. These troopers barged into the point guard of Beck’s marching army, and, after a short tussle, they captured 30 Austrians and sped off.
Salemnon had arrived at the defile by then, and speedily encountered Beck’s advancing troops. Mutual surprise, although Beck was thoroughly deceived. Believing he had encountered a relief force intended for Ziethen (who was still blissfully unaware of the situation), he retreated back into the Sorau woods. Early the next morning, the alert de Czettritz, with 200 cavalry, discovered Daun’s movements. Immediately the camp was dismantled, and Ziethen ordered a withdrawal through the Buschmühle that Beck had so obligingly left open. Czettritz checked the very eager Austrian horse, and stuffed any hope of pursuit, while Salemnon did the same to Beck when he endeavored to interfere. Prussian losses were fewer than two dozen altogether, and Daun was thoroughly frustrated by the proceedings.
September 2, Daun swept towards Sorau while his two detachments stole round Ziethen and might have captured Ziethen’s force if not discovered. Hearing word from the locals that Dresden’s garrison was on the verge of surrender, the marshal pulled up stakes and headed for Spremberg. Prince Henry promptly moved with a force to block him, leaving Sagan for Lauban, where he arrived on September 9–10.
Major-General Joachim Friedrich von Stutterheim was unbuckled upon Friedland and Zittau to bar Daun from Bohemia.4 At Friedland, there was a virtual bounty to be had by Sutterheim’s men. Stores destroyed were 10,000 bread rations, 4,000 bushels of oats, and 1,600 hundredweight of flour, which could not be removed “for want of carriages to bring it off.”5 No less impressive was the prisoner haul. Six hundred and sixty-nine men, six officers, and two guns from Friedland were nabbed. The detachment pressed on to Zittau. Although Stutterheim was unable to capture either the town or the fortress, he did grab another big haul of stores: 5,000 casks of flour, and 10,000 hundredweight of oats. The cost? There were 15 men killed/wounded during the expedition. The Austrians experienced another failure here. General deVille’s efforts to contain Prince Henry from breaking the barrier of the Queiss were ineffectual, and Prussian patrols pressed on for Görlitz.6 Other forces were utilized to keep the Austrians from Bohemia; Prussian troops took up blocking posts. In the end, Henry so harassed and bothered Daun that the latter detached only some 10,000 men to join up with Laudon and the Russians. Then, with the majority of his forces, he promptly began retreating towards Bautzen. Prince Henry followed, picking and prodding at Daun’s stragglers, capturing hundreds of prisoners in the process as we have seen.7
Soon after the Russians were complaining that Daun had made no attempt to link up with them. Soltikov, whom, on September 10, was promoted to the rank of Field Marshal, positively refused to undertake any additional operations in concert with the Austrians. Frederick was more secure with his whole predicament than he had at first assumed. But Henry was called on by him to move further up from his post to help Finck in Saxony or just where needed, like Berlin. Daun went streaming back as fast as he could (losing 3,000 men collapsed/deserted on this grueling march) to Bautzen, making a halt of several hours at Gross Kölzig out of dire necessity,8 but soon guessed where the wily foe was heading for—Dresden—and shortly shoved his army across his way on the road to the city. Both the Austrians and the bluecoats of Henry arrived at the Elbe almost simultaneously. This was despite the fact Daun had the advantage of better roads, a shorter distance to cover and a friendly population to boot.
Daun soon moved to join with Zweibrücken against Finck. The latter had been detached to go to that theater from the banks of the Oder. Finck was forced to retire on Strehla, while Prince Henry, now across the Elbe at Torgau, came up behind him to help stiffen his resolve. Daun now boasted of 83,000 men (60,000 from his own army, plus 23,000 with Zweibrücken and the Imperialists—General Thomas Blonquet led an Austrian force attached to Zweibrücken’s command). He was opposed by Henry, who had 24,000 men with him. But while this was occurring, Frederick was busy with Soltikov.
Seeing the main Austrian army drawing away, Soltikov, in spite of the reinforcements from Daun, decided to make for East Prussia (or so it seemed), where his hungry men could finally be supplied. His Austrian comrades were either unwilling or unable to fulfill his expectations in this regard. September 15, the Russian army moved from the encampment to Waldau (arriving there the next day), after which, on September 18, the army lurched off for East Prussia. At least Frederick believed that Soltikov was heading there. The king moved to Sagan, which he occupied despite token resistance from a body of Croats present there. His reason for this move was a desire to be in closer touch with Prince Henry.
The allied cordon having been broken, Frederick at once attempted to draw on Henry for reinforcements (September 18–19). Frederick’s confidence was r
eturning by the day now.9 Daun for one had not been impressed with Hadik, in Saxony, who had, meanwhile, led 37,000 men in concert with MacGuire in a series of allegedly “incompetent” moves upon a much smaller Prussian force of not more than 12,000 men under Finck.
Hadik had barely been given time to move out on September 15, before disturbing news came: Leipzig had fallen to Wunsch and Finck. This could not have been pleasant intelligence, especially considering the move came from an enemy who apparently had been dealt a “crippling” blow barely a month before at Kunersdorf. Zweibrücken’s men, holding tight at Nöthnitz, looked to secure themselves from the enemy. Hadik marched to Alttaneberg, although Wunsch’s next move was to drive to Döbeln to support Finck’s command. The bluecoats engaged the enemy in a fight that obliged the unsteady Imperialist command to abscond, this to posts on the further bank of the Triebisch River. Hadik scattered his command back upon Burkenhain, while Prussian patrols were pressed up to the Triebisch hard-by Wünschutz.
But the Prussians were hardly overconfident. For one thing, they were inferior in numbers to the enemy. For another, Finck and Wunsch still had units that desperately needed time to rest and refit after a debilitating campaign against the Russians. But Finck decided to do his best. He pressed the right side of his troops on to Nossen, against the Frieberger Mülde, while the left leaned upon Miltitz. Finck was resolved to hold his ground, and sent light units that scouted into Siebeneichen, drawing Hadik’s attention upon him.
This, in turn, led Zweibrücken to move forward, seeking an action, upon Schmiedewalde. Finck, confronted by an enemy who suddenly appeared to come to life, desisted from the offensive and prepared instead to withdraw from what he felt was a vulnerable post (September 19). The Prussian general withdrew on Korbitz, where he set up his headquarters. He deployed his force into a new position leaning over on Meissen. Whatever defensible potential the terrain thereabouts contained was enhanced by the construction of some fortified lines. Wunsch, meanwhile, assumed control of a post at Lercha-Siebenstein, to the East of Finck.
Zweibrücken, for a change, seized the rôle of a pursuer. The Prussian baggage was accosted by Ried at Krögisae. The Imperialists seized a number of vulnerable wagons, although an aggressive Prussian counterattack not only recovered them, but forthwith stopped the pursuit there and then. To ensure the enemy kept their distance henceforth, Schenckendorf was duly vigilant. The Imperials deflected their advance. The left flank of the army paused at Taubenheim, although there was a pronounced superiority in numbers. The right, far from secure but more stable because of the natural barrier of the Elbe, was less subject to the probings of the bluecoats.
Finck was not left isolated, by any means. The Prussian king informed Prince Henry that the force at Meissen needed to be given as much aid as possible. The salvation of the whole of Saxony, that part not already under Austrian control, was at stake. Despite the exhortation, though, taking a position so close to the enemy was not without risk. Marshal Daun, one among many, thought the Imperialists would grasp the proffered opportunity to crush Finck’s command as soon as possible.
Zweibrücken hesitated to act, displaying undue caution, while the foe, acted. In this, they were encouraged by the ever volatile Wolfersdorfe (who harbored nothing but resentment towards the Saxons), in stroking the fires of destruction. Zweibrücken saw good to even send intelligence riders to the newly recaptured Saxon capital with news that high ranking officials present there should flee across the Austrian frontier to Prague as soon as possible. To add to these woes, the weather was turning much colder, and much wetter.
Emboldened by a thorough reconnaissance of Finck’s lines, and convinced of a very pronounced superiority in numbers, Zweibrücken chose the latter part of September to act. The plan was to pound Finck’s carefully constructed works with some adroit artillery fire, as much to weaken the enemy’s resolve as much as their works. Up next was the attack. The left side of the Prussian lines was enhanced by the nature of the ground; here Finck was probably unassailable. The same could not be said for the Prussian right.
The Prussian right wing was more open, vulnerable to an aggressive enemy, and could conceivably force Finck to fall back into country bisected by three nearby rivers and thus fragment his force. In order to lessen any possibility that he would be forced from his post, Finck resolved to strengthen the right side of his lines. This would be done at the expense of the left side. The latter could be well held by a small number of men, freeing more aid to the bluecoat right. And yet, through the right wing lay the Prussian line-of-retreat upon Torgau in case of need.
Finck feared the result should Zweibrücken make his main effort against his much weaker right wing. Fortunately, the Imperialist commander did not see the need to do so. In the end, the force that actually assailed the bluecoats was Hadik with only a small body of Imperial troops attached to his command. The allies would strike along the whole front of the Prussian position. About 1500 hours on September 20, the different units set off, plodding through the thick mud that wanted to swallow up man and beast (not to mention ordnance) alike. Hadik moved out, plowing through Munzig, and on to Miltitz. The march progressed so slowly due to the adverse weather conditions that the men failed to reach the jumping off posts until early the next morning.
Even then, the ordeal of the march and the continuing unfavorable weather pattern delayed the allies until nearly 1100 hours. Finck, with some 10,000 men, had been apprised of the approach of the foe. Hadik laid down a barrage, but held off for a while on committing for a ground attack. He had approximately 10,137 infantry and 6,156 cavalry with him, which did not reckon an impressive train of ordnance. There were a total of 74 guns, including ten 12-pounders and eight 7-pounder howitzers. Hadik fed his men north from Miltitz near Krögisae, against Finck, ensconced behind Löthain. As the latter had the advantage of higher ground, he could shift his forces back and forth at will to strengthen whichever flank or flank or side would need help. All was possible without the enemy ever becoming wise to the fact.
This was important because Hadik’s move was certainly not the only one Finck had to worry about. Wunsch, near Siebeneichen, with some 5,000 men on his own, was confronted by Zweibrücken’s men, aided by an Austrian force under MacGuire. MacGuire’s formation was deployed from a line of Polenz-Riemsdorf-Batzdorf. The allies had decided to strike at both flanks more or less simultaneously. Zweibrücken & Company moved to the charge before Hadik. With the mist dissipating, the allies were unleashed on to Batzdorf about 0930 hours on September 21. Major-General Philipp Freiherr von Müffling’s men went forward following a heavy barrage, against Batzdorf. Prince Stolberg took up the mantle by striking at Riemsdorf and Polenz. Colonel Ferdinand Freiherr von Baumbach seized Batzdorf, while Ried was unbuckled from Ullendorf with a force of Croats. The attack progressed as Stolberg seized Polenz and finally forced the foe from Riemsdorf. Austrian howitzer fire smashed down the village of Bockwen. While this place burned, Wunsch withdrew on Meissen to consolidate his forces. The allied strike in that direction stalled out, although a legitimate Prussian counterattack was brought up short beyond Spittelwitz. The allies, encountering a number of ravines and Prussian obstacles, halted the advance. Artillery fire was unleashed again, from a number of batteries that had been brought along the way. Moreover, the nature of the ground the allies occupied precluded ready means of communication with Hadik. Wunsch had dispatched a rider to go score some reinforcements from Finck.
The latter had his own problems.10 Hadik’s march against Finck was directed towards Robschütz, with a post at the Great Angstberg, while the exposed left leaned over near Kanitz. Brentano, with seven weak squadrons of cavalry and four battalions of Croats, was told off to move behind Kanitz and migrate on Stroischen. This would put him in an excellent position to cut off and bag Finck’s retreating men. If they recoiled, that is. Brentano’s men were still in touch with Hadik’s main body through the auspices of Colonel Vecsey at Kanitz.
Meanwhile, through
it all, Gemmingen was busy carting the reserve artillery up to the rises near Luga. Once the pieces were set up, they commenced laying down a fusillade against Finck. The latter’s ordnance, sited beyond Löthain (which the bluecoats put to the torch before they retired) as well as behind Stroischen, opened in reply. Finck, though, was fixated on Hadik’s main body; which seemed to him to be aiming for Lommatzsch. This would not be a healthy development for Prussian affairs. Immediately, Finck unleashed an impressive force (some 7,000 men) under Major-General Johann Karl Freiherr von Rebentisch from the Prussian right in response. Rebentisch moved towards Stroischen, a development which threw alarm into Colonel Vecsey. The bluecoats veered off towards Löthain, and they at once attacked the allies, with the good prospect of denying Brentano any further gains (1400 hours).
The latter quickly crammed Major La Fontaine (with a good battalion of Warasdiner Croats) into Löthain to shield their posts from Rebentisch. Colonel Vecsey stayed ever alert. The Prussians did not hesitate. Just about the vicinity of their lines, the military band blazed away with music, while some Croats (led by Losy von Losenau) actually took to their heels towards Pauschütz when the bluecoats appeared. Brentano promptly sent word to Hadik that he needed some help, and this quickly materialized in the form of some mounted assistance.
None of this phased the defense forces left in Löthain. La Fontaine and his force were able to hold on to the place during the overnight hours until the next morning. Moreover, there were more forces being directed. Major-General Graf Lamberg was jostled ahead, with the Marschall Infantry Regiment (Colonel Christian Friedrich Baron Leubelfing), along with Rehbach and Gourcy. They brought in their wake the Benedict Daun and the Schmerzing Cuirassiers. While these new men were coming forward, Vecsey and Colonel Török did all they could to check the enemy. Leubelfing’s men, engaging a stubborn enemy force during this time, had shot off all their ammo and the Prussians were commencing to appear in force behind Leubelfing.
Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War Page 64
