Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War

by Herbert J. Redman

  The Austrian move continued. While Gemmingen barged into Merkwitz, the main body tended through Österitz upon Scholis. Wunsch swept from Schmeideberg, with the obvious intention of severing the Austrian line-of-communication and retreat, while Rebentisch advanced some of the new horsed artillery past Merkwitz on to the Schlöss-Berg. From this rise, the latter commenced blasting away towards the enemy emerging near Österitz. Prussian horse, led by the 11th Dragoons, joined almost immediately by the 12th (Württemberg) Dragoons, strove to cover the bluecoat lines, helping the aforementioned horsed-artillery to do its job. Free battalion Salemnon scurried to grab Österitz, while Rebentisch deployed in two good lines just to the south of the place.

  Meanwhile, Finck rolled forward upon Dommitzsch, where Brentano tried to make a desperate resistance, along the line to Pretzch. This meant Arenberg was caught between two forces, both of which were fully capable of continuing to advance. This threw panic into the normally level-headed general, and he wanted to make off, which would leave Gemmingen to face the enemy alone. The main Austrian force fled precipitously across the Heath, halting to the south-southwest at Düben, where it came to a halt. The forces left on the field strove to cover the retreat.19

  Colonel Karl Friedrich von Haller (of Regiment Colloredo) took up a blocking post with some 2,000 grenadiers close-by Sackwitz. To help extricate this force, Gemmingen ordered one of his Cuirassier regiments (20th) into a galloping attack against Gommlo to try to check the Prussian horse. This move, although commendable, only served to increase the size of the prisoner haul, for the Austrian horse could not stop the onrushing Prussian cavalry, which rode around and then rode them down. Haller’s men tried to resist the fury of this attack, carried out by Colonel Gersdorf’s command, and Möhring’s 7th Hussars. The Austrian infantry were shredded as their own panicked cavalry rode through their ranks trying to escape.

  Many did. Gemmingen was not so fortunate, neither was Colonel Haller. A total of 15 officers were captured by the victorious Prussians, along with 991 men. Brentano suffered as well. One hundred and seven men and officers. The Prussians claimed 1,276 men and 24 officers among the captured. Bluecoat losses were reported at 105 men and three officers.20

  The Austrians again wondered aloud why General O’Donnell was not rushed forward to join the action. This should have brought some 25,000 Austrians against an enemy force which totaled barely 15,000. Finck, on October 31, occupied Düben, while Arenberg’s men retired, spared any long-range pursuit.

  There was enough blame to go around. Marshal Daun blamed Arenberg for his premature retreat upon Düben, along with General O’Donnell for not pressing forward to join his comrades. He did not hesitate to inform the worried Maria Theresa of this feeling. Others imputed to Daun and his almost slothful lack of movement, at least in part, the direct cause of the reverse.

  Nor was Prince Henry immune to the pressures of the moment. But he was simply less willing to keep the status quo if it could be helped. In the first week of November, Prince Henry would attack and roll back the extent of the enemy posts thereabouts, retaking all the terrain he had lost. It appeared as if the cautious, wholly defensive tactics of Henry were less risky than the bold offensive strokes of his older brother, and if they were not as spectacular, the status quo was at least maintained.

  Other Prussian forces were making their way to Saxony. Daun now learned of Hülsen’s approach; November 2, the latter reached Muskau, and on November 4 Daun found out. The marshal promptly abandoned Schilda, which he had occupied as soon as Prince Henry had vacated it, and retired towards Dresden. Why Daun would retreat from a force which he outnumbered by more than six to one demonstrates just how cautious he really was. However, the arena was not one-sided, by any means. Although Dresden was gone, along with sections of Saxony, so long as Prince Henry remained the complete subjection of Saxony by the allies was impossible. Silesia was secure now, but the king worried because if Saxony fell he would have no way to feed his army, and his amount of maneuvering room would be sharply reduced (not to mention bringing the enemy to the very gates of Prussia).

  Torgau was regained on September 3, the day after Wittenberg was recaptured, the enemy retiring on Leipzig. Wunsch’s guns now forward, he moved on the same day towards the suburbs of Dresden at Grossenhayn. General Vehla had been moving about in that region, he retired on Leipzig and ordered Kleefeld up to his assistance. Thus the Imperialists went marching back to retake Torgau a second time.21

  Prince Henry had risen from Rothenburg with his army after a short rest break of a bare three hours’ duration the day he arrived there, September 23, and swept westward. After an 18-mile march, his tired troops reached Klitten early on September 24, where they were given another pause. Now Henry moved on the same morning heading to Hoyerswerda (20 miles to the west) where an enemy command of 3,000 men under Vehla was located. Marshal Daun attempted to check this move, but he was not as proficient in maneuvering as his more capable opponent.

  As a result, Vehla was as good as on his own. Lt.-Gen. Pálffy was nearby at Muskau to help anchor Vehla. Incredibly, Vehla was not too worried at all. He wrote to the marshal September 24, that there was no sign of any substantial enemy near-by. The Austrian patrols, as a result, were relaxed; this allowed the bluecoats to close in. About 0300 hours on September 25, Austrian patrols spotted Prussian troops just east of town sneaking through the nearby woods, giving little time for Vehla to get himself and his men ready for an imminent attack.22

  General Lentulus assumed a position to the east of the ford at Hoyerswerda, and awaited Prince Henry’s arrival. Henry forthwith ordered Lentulus and General Krockow’s cavalry to cross the ford and strive to take the enemy in the rear. Another force, Itzenplitz’s old regiment (Infantry 13th, now led by Major-General Friedrich Wilhelm von Syburg), the Grenadier Battalion Graf Anhalt, and the Free Battalion Salemnon, supported by a battery of seven guns, would break out into the enemy’s front. The remainder of the Prussians would concentrate on seizing Hoyerswerda itself.23

  Vehla could hardly believe the reports of the enemy being at hand. At first ascribing the intruders to a mere raiding party, Vehla resolved to take no chances. The baggage was ordered gathered, and the Austrian hussars galloped towards the Elster to head off the Prussians from breaking over. Another force, barely 100 men at the abatis behind Hoyerswerda under Captain Horwarth, resisted bravely. But the numbers of the foe quickly proved too great, and when the Austrians tried to break for the open road, few found the way.24

  Prince Henry had done it! In a few minutes, and with no tangible support, he had crushed the foe completely. This assault was a surprise, as Vehla had not expected the blow that quickly, and the ill-disciplined Imperialists could not be expected to keep formation long when Prussian artillery was hammering them from the front and at each flank. They broke and fled, losing heavily in the short fight. Out of his command, Vehla lost 600 killed/wounded; and 1,785 captured, including Vehla himself.25 This was along with six cannon. The survivors simply fled. If there were another “hour of daylight, not one of that corps would have escaped.”26 Prince Henry lost 44 men killed/wounded/captured in the skirmish, and took a brief pause. General Bredow was sent to watch out for Pálffy, and, on September 28, General Bülow pressed off with the vanguard on Elsterwerda, followed by Prince Henry with the rest of his men. He promptly pushed on for Dresden, where he knew that Finck would be in danger by then.

  Bülow arrived at Grossenhayn on September 30, and (October 1), Prussian patrols were up to Merschwitz. A pontoon bridge allowed the prince’s men to continue the trek, while the bridge at Meissen was also repaired. Daun, comforted by the thought he might be able to trap Prince Henry over by Görlitz, marched for Hochkirch (September 20). Austrian scouts could not discover Prince Henry’s men, and not until the marshal hitched into Görlitz on September 25 did he even realize the wily Prussian had scored a success at Hoyerswerda. Immediately, Daun rose and moved back towards Weissenberg, reaching Bautzen (September 26), by
which time it should have been crystal clear Prince Henry was across the Elbe already. The march had not been without cost; fully 6,000 men were gone from the Austrian ranks. Some would make their way by and by back to the army, but most were simply “lost” and/or deserted. Daun moved out for Hartha, over by Bischofswerda, crossing the Elbe (September 28), and barging into the vicinity of Prince Henry, who was threatening to derail this whole allied reoccupation of Saxony thing.27

  Indeed, after the success at Hoyerswerda, the victors again made themselves the master of northern Saxony, though Dresden had fallen by then and could not be retaken. As a consolation most of the province was shortly in Prussian hands again despite the enemy’s great numerical superiority. Prince Henry was still cut off from Frederick (a mixed blessing it would appear), but his opponents were holding a line from the Bober eastwards to Hoyerswerda, some 80 miles, behind which Daun was drawing his supplies. A short step back in time will demonstrate the reach of Prussian success. Soon as Prince Henry learned of Ziethen’s close call, he marched from Sagan heading southward. Zittau would hold out, but little else in Henry’s vicinity. Ziethen then strove to put a thorn in Daun’s side, while General DeVille, who had 10,000 men with him to protect the rear of the main army, did not attempt to disturb him in the least.28

  Daun had arisen from Triebel when it became clear that the situation was unstable, and moved rapidly to Görlitz escorting the supply wagons there to Bautzen, while General O’Donnell—who had taken DeVille’s place—covered the marshal. Henry, with O’Donnell hanging hard on his flanks, marched into Görlitz and encamped his army on the Landskron Height and the neighboring hills about September 11. Once there the Prussians waited on Daun’s next move, at the same time preparing to march to Finck’s aid at Dresden. While this was taking place, at other theaters operations were developing. We must briefly back track.

  At the beginning of August, allied detached forces (led by Vehla and Brentano) made their first appearance in northeast Saxony where they paused to await the capture of Torgau and Wittenberg as well as Leipzig. They planned to march from the northeast to meet the Imperialists sallying from the northwest. Then they planned to recapture as much of Saxony as possible, including most especially the Saxon capital of Dresden. As soon as word arrived of the Prussian disaster at Kunersdorf, the allies in Saxony redoubled their efforts. Daun sent off MacGuire and 12,000 men to go to Saxony, take charge of Vehla’s and Brentano’s forces and the Imperialists and then march on and besiege the Saxon capital. Zweibrücken, who had left about half of his army in garrisons in northwest Saxony, had only 15,000 men left. But he did move towards Dresden on August 23.

  Chapter Thirty-Six

  Fall of Dresden; Soltikov Departs

  Thus began the chain of events that led to the Siege of Dresden.1 This siege was all-important to the allies at the moment, and upon its outcome rested the course of the remainder of the campaign. As soon as Schmettau, who was still the commander of the forces in Dresden, heard of the disastrous defeat at Kunersdorf, he increased his preparations to defend his position from the enemy. He now realized that the enemy would very shortly appear outside the walls of the capital and he would have a grim siege ahead. Schmettau had no real advantage numerically, his garrison numbered only approximately 3,650 men, or in quality, which was likewise low.

  In any event, he doubted the loyalty of a large portion of his troops. His difficulties were compounded by the presence of a large population in the city, and was not aided by the king. The latter had made the now unfortunate choice to put considerable ready cash in Dresden for safekeeping. In addition, there were 7,962 men and 22 officers held as prisoners-of-war in the city. Schmettau had decided to do his best to hold Dresden, despite the odds he would undoubtedly face in the endeavor.

  The Saxon capital’s walls were not in the best shape, and often stretched the meaning of the word “wall” itself. New Town, for example, had only ditches and a “wall” that was never finished during the time since its construction. The Prussians had made a number of capital improvements, like building up palisades and block posts beyond the confines of Dresden itself. In short, Schmettau was careful to avail himself of every means at his disposal to strengthen the bluecoat grip upon Dresden.

  Quickly the Prussians began drawing in the outposts closer in upon the city. On August 20, eight days after Kunersdorf, Schmettau ordered his men to abandon the northern section of Dresden beyond the Neustadt. He could not defend it without a force of adequate size, which he did not have, having decided instead to fortify the lower bank of the Neustadt and to blow up the stone bridge leading across to the upper bank if the already critical situation deteriorated still further. Meanwhile, the allies were making by their own unique ways to the scene. Zweibrücken was present at the Castle of Nischwitz. This particular property belonged to Count Brühl, the despised Saxon Foreign Minister, and the Prussians left no doubt of their opinion of the man. They plundered his estate heavily, without mercy. MacGuire came up to Dresden (August 27), and the Imperials appeared at Meissen. Following a short break, the Imperialist throng then sauntered forward on to Alstadt (August 29).

  The Austrians, through a flag of truce, offered ‘Free Withdrawal,’ so long as Schmettau accepted the terms within 24 hours. New Town was in the shaky hands of the “Austrian Croats” by the afternoon of August 26. There were a number of impressive stores captured. These included 6,000 bushels of corn, 6,000 bushels of oats, 10,000 hundredweight of flour, and 800 bushels of barley. As far as war implements were concerned, here there was a rich haul as well. One hundred and thirty-six cannon, 3,000 sabers, and 4,000 flints for the muskets were discovered. A rich yield indeed.

  August 28, Colonel Török got to Pesterwitz and, next day, word filtered in to both sides that Wittenberg had been retaken by Wunsch; he must be heading towards the Saxon capital. The allies took to posts, as a response. Zweibrücken paused at Görbitz, falling out on the rises near Ziz—between Dölzschen and the Elbe. Some of the allied generals, including Prince Stolberg, Hohlstein, and Baden-Durlach put up temporary headquarters at Plauen Chasm. Vehla was at Blasewitz, while McGuire was ensconced at Loschwitz.

  By this point, Marshal Daun had set his eyes on definitely retaking Dresden, first and foremost. He placed more trust in gaining long-term results here rather than in engaging in coordinated military operations with Soltikov. We are not understating the importance of the Saxon capital by any means, both symbolically and strategically, but a successful rendezvous with the Russians might have helped the allied cause and even helped win the war.

  By the afternoon of August 29, a total of approximately 20,668 men were in position opposing the bluecoats still in Dresden. Nearly 8,000 of this number were from the Imperials. Five days before, Schmettau had a bomb placed beneath the main spine arch of one of Dresden’s bridges so that span could be detonated if the enemy attempted to cross it. This possibility was not at the moment considered likely. Same day (August 25) he received the letter from the king which had been composed just after Kunersdorf from Reitwein authorizing the surrender of the Saxon capital on good terms if attacked.2 Then Schmettau allowed the Royal Court in Dresden to negotiate with the enemy, but only as a means to gain time.

  Unbeknown to him, Wunsch had already started with his force to rescue the beleaguered garrison, as a second letter instructing Schmettau that reinforcements were coming and not to surrender Dresden had not yet been received by him. The latter must have been inclined, as indeed were many in the realm, to believe that Prussia’s fate was sealed and all that remained was mopping up. The blow was indeed bad, but not fatal. Later, however, rumors to the effect that the main Prussian army, and thus by extension Prussia, had some life left, that the allies were making no move to follow-up their hard won success, so in Saxony the Prussians began to take heart again. Whether Schmettau knew of this swirl of rumors remains an open question.

  What is certain is that a period of doubt and confusion permeated Schmettau’s thinking from the
moment the Imperialists made their appearance nearby. August 26, the enemy sent an announcer to the gates of Dresden with a message from Zweibrücken; the man was duly admitted to the city after being blind-folded.

  He brought a request for Schmettau’s surrender, and if refused threatened to allow the Croats a free hand when Dresden did fall among the Prussian officers and enlisted men within. Schmettau was adamant, and told the messenger to be off in no uncertain terms with the request. He was determined to stand his ground, with the forces he possessed, ordering some supplies, which had been stored on the upper side of the Saxon capital, moved to the lower bank. Simultaneously, he gave orders for construction of a battery on that side of the river. This was made out of twisted, refused steel beams, side-by-side with mounds of excavated earth. These were reinforced by stone structures at both far ends to provide support, and he had the gates locked, with guard posts set up at each entrance.

  On August 30, Schmettau, who was outnumbered by nearly 5-to-1, retreated to desperate measures. The same day, a small force of Croats was able to break into the Ostra suburb (of the Friedrichstadt), of which move MacGuire was apparently not apprized. This alarming development caused a knee-jerk reaction on the part of Schmettau. He ordered word sent to the enemy that, if the Croats were not forthwith halted in place, then the Friedrichstadt would be put to the torch. Kollas was sent to perform this task, and the allies, far from wanting to kill the messenger, gloated that, should Schmettau carry out his threat, then Prussian cities in the occupation of the allies would also be similarly treated.