Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War

by Herbert J. Redman

  Finck accordingly pressed off on November 13, crossing the countryside in two full marching columns aiming initially upon Nossen. He almost immediately ran into elements of Brentano’s men. The Prussians gradually encroached upon the Austrian posts, while Brentano fell back post-haste upon Obereula. While Finck’s men were engaged upon this new mission, he hitched into Augustusburg with at least some reservation. The weather, for one thing, was atrocious. A full snowstorm was covering the land, while Prince Henry wrote to his royal sibling that Colonel Kleist (the “Green” Kleist)5 was to be ordered off straightway towards Freiberg. With the Imperials under Colonel Raszler so obviously fleeing, the bluecoats, said Henry, should pursue them even up to the gates of the Saxon capital. With an additional body of reinforcements, Finck might thrust deeply into Bohemia.

  Kleist’s advanced guard got into Freiberg during the evening hours of November 11–12. Like the Proverbial prodigal son, Colonel Raszler had returned from his journey up to Hoyerswerda, aided this time around by Major von Leyszer. November 13, General Finck made it to Freiberg, and pressed on towards Dippoldiswalde. The bluecoats very nearly grabbed Hadik, who was on his own journey to the spa at Töplitz. The general was able to shake off his pursuers, but lost his accompanying baggage completely. The king, meanwhile, was encouraged by these new developments; as he proudly boasted to Prince Henry, and to anyone else who would listen, to the ranter.

  Daun’s headquarters and army lay a few miles beyond Meissen on November 12, while Prince Henry was about six miles to the northwest beyond Lommatsch at Herschtein. November 13, Frederick arrived to join up with his brother. Whether his arrival nearby had anything to do with Daun embarking on retreat is an open question, though at least to the rather egotistical Frederick himself, it did. The Prussians could now boast of some 57,000 men, but the enemy had over 80,000.6

  The Austrian main body pulled up stakes and tumbled backwards upon Sora and Blankenstein, new headquarters at Wilsdruf. This move left Sincère in a very exposed forward post hard-by Proda. The Prussians of Aschersleben pressed promptly into the rear of Sincère, who made the cardinal error of sending off his foot soldiers to make good their escape. This situation, unfortunately, left the Austrian artillery and the cavalry exposed to the attacks of the vigorous Prussian pursuers.7 Daun, never one to lose his head in such a situation, ordered one of his best units, the Clerici Regiment, to storm back to recover the lost booty. But the very energetic bluecoats utilized the intervening time to bring forward their own ordnance, under Major-General Diericke. This commenced laying down a barrage against the returning Austrians. Clerici put up a stout fight of their own, the regiment—after losing 200 men—held the lost ground long enough to recover 13 guns which had fallen into enemy hands.

  Daun lost no time pulling back through Meissen, to the unpleasant accompaniment of Prussian artillery, which shelled the proceedings unmercifully. The whitecoats did drag their feet a little, but even as late as 0800 hours on November 14, some of the Austrians were still trailing out of Meissen. Shortly after, advanced bluecoat patrols appeared before the town. While some of the last of the Austrian baggage trains were still heading for Lossen, some of the very forward Prussian Jägers forced their way into town and nabbed the rest of the enemy. Austrian losses were given out as 31 wounded, 15 killed, 56 prisoners (plus 87 missing), and 22 deserters.

  Frederick trailed in behind the advancing men, riding in a carriage, and frequently sticking his head and arms out the windows, hurrying matters along and shouting, “March! March!” Under this “gentle” prodding by their monarch, the bluecoats pressed up, advancing too quickly for their own good it would seem. While the body of men with the king made it through Meissen, Finck ordered off Wunsch with the Salenmon Free Corps, the Gersdorf Hussars, and some mixed grenadier units towards Rothschönberg, seeking out the rear elements of Brentano’s command. Frederick was losing more and more of that temporary caution of the past months, and beginning to regain his aggressive tendencies. At the wrong time! With this view in mind, Finck was rerouted from his initial objective of Neukirchen-Alttanneberg to a marching line much closer to Bohemia than before. This latter goal would fulfill a plan the Prussian command had conjured up about a week before. The king, in person, ordered Wunsch to go to Finck, at the front, and have him move on Dippoldiswalde. When General Finck received this disturbing instruction, he rode back to see the Prussian monarch personally to confirm what he was to do. This would have huge potential for trouble.

  Desire for vengeance began to permeate the Prussian king’s actions and thoughts. His first move (and first mistake) was in ordering off forces to hound and intercept the retreating enemy. Obviously in doing this he showed that he wanted to deliver a blow before his opponent could retire behind the border into Bohemia. He undoubtedly carried this desire to a ridiculous extreme. In trying to make good his previous mistakes he committed a blunder which was to lose for him the rest of the campaign and a good portion of the already reduced force left at his disposal.

  As added proof of his anxiety about delivering a stroke against Daun before the main Austrian army could retire, the king, as we have observed, kept personal supervision of the vanguard, which was shoved out in pursuit. The result was a localized engagement at the village of Korbitz (remembered for the encounter there between Hadik and Finck earlier). The Austrians tried to rally at Korbitz, but unsuccessfully and at length they were forced to give way. Had Frederick simply allowed Daun to take away his army unmolested, it would have been better for him and his cause. Knowing the marshal’s character, one is inclined to believe he had no other intention at this stage than retreat to winter quarters away from Saxony.

  One more thing seems certain. Dresden, without the shield of Daun’s huge army, could not long withstand the Prussian designs upon it. This is one case where doing too much hurt the bluecoats worse than doing nothing at all. Frederick moved forward to Krögisae—from where he gave Finck orders to march around the rear of the enemy and take post in the Maxen hills behind Daun’s lines in his rear. A little skirmish thereabouts just ending, Frederick gave Finck his marching orders. Frederick’s adjutants, following the retirement of the foe after the skirmish, ordered out Wunsch in pursuit. The Austrian retreat was so swift and their retirement so sudden that Wunsch had to return by mid-afternoon, having failed to inflict any appreciable damage on the foe. When he returned, he found the king’s headquarters already at Krögisae (Finck had been reluctant to move without knowing what Daun was doing) so when he heard that Wunsch had been unable to come to grips with the enemy he became angry and ordered him to go and give Finck instructions to move at once.

  Finck’s post was at Nossen (ten good miles from Krögisae and twice the distance to the west of Dresden). He was on the edge of what formerly had been Daun’s left wing, as soon as he turned to face the Prussians, this would again be the case.

  Frederick’s plan of action called for Finck to move around, by the route of Freiberg, Dippoldiswalde and the eastward places thereabouts, to the heights of Maxen, directly in Daun’s rear. The king hoped that this effort would force Daun’s hand, and either severe his line-of-communications with Bohemia and thus drive into a possible trap, or else compel him into an outright fight. At first glance, the plan sounded feasible, and sound. Had the Prussian army been up to its usual standard of quality the goal might just have been attainable. But this ignores one important point: it was far too ambitious an undertaking for the still shaken Prussian army to try now. The higher Prussian officers were almost unanimous in condemning the move.8

  Prince Henry was particularly outspoken. Following an argument with his royal sibling over the dangers of leaving Finck in a dangerously exposed position, the prince said: “I spoke as a true patriot and a good brother, but he [Frederick] would not listen to me.”9

  Near 1500 hours, Finck arrived at headquarters while the king was out spying on the rises behind Krögisae with his glass. The object of his visit, evidently, was to try to talk Frederic
k into some alternative plan or at the very least obtain further instructions for the present one.10 The king was in no mood for much talk, he had determined to get Daun out and there was no use trying to discuss alternate plans. Frederick’s sharp rebuke, “He knows I can not stand difficulties; be off!”11 Finck returned to his men, and prepared for the march on the morning to Maxen. It must be borne in mind that the king had the reputation of being less than gracious to anyone telling him he was wrong about a given situation.

  It was early on the following morning, November 15, that the general pushed off. He soon encountered Imperialists at Freiberg, but quickly attacked and drove them off. He thereby opened the road to Dippoldiswalde. Finck promptly pressed on, reaching the latter. Preussen was left to guard the place and hold the road with the Free Corps, here Finck decided to locate his magazines. Meanwhile, the advanced guard—under Wunsch—was simultaneously pressed forward towards Maxen itself. Wunsch reached and seized Maxen on November 16. Next day, Finck, pushing through some poor weather, the mixed storm of sleet and snow that had begun to brew, reached the scene. Only token enemy resistance had so far been encountered. Nevertheless, the reaction of the allies was quick and effective, for once.12

  As soon as word reached them that Finck was astride their line-of-communication and supply (thus no further provisions would be forthcoming until he were dealt with), they reacted.13 It was true that Zweibrücken had retired personally on to Dresden (November 3), leaving General Althann in charge of the Imperialists. November 5, responding to the changing nature of the campaign, Althann fell back across the Katzbach on to Proda.

  Marshal Daun discovered much to his chagrin the Imperialists at Proda. Their presence there was actually interfering with the planned withdrawal of Daun’s own men. Other business needed conducted as well. Once back at Dresden, the Imperial command was given over to Serbelloni to try to rebuild the Imperialist grip on Dresden. Serbelloni was given orders by the marshal to deploy men from beyond the walls of the city to build up obstructions to help hinder the approach of the bluecoats upon the Saxon capital. General Rosenfeld was detailed to personally oversee the task at hand.

  Meanwhile, back in Vienna, Graf von Haugwitz took over practically every aspect of detail when it came to the particulars of the Austrian main army. This man who was once regarded as “the most important single minister at court.”14 All of the efforts of the Austrians to deal with their finances had been very successful. The army was being regularly paid, and, for the time being, money was not an issue. The logistics of supplying the army while in the field also continued to function, quite well actually.15 This would henceforth be enough to keep Haugwitz and his mind busy. While he was so occupied, Count Kaunitz took a bad spell of depression—mostly due to the way the campaign seemed to be concluding and, not on an up-note, by any means. Under the troubling state of the allies in November 1759, there seemed little chance of improvement.16 But Count Flemming, the wise old one, knew better: He just knew that the king would do something to try to restore Prussian fortunes in Saxony before the campaign ended. Turned out, he was right on.

  Back at the front, meanwhile, Brentano hitched into Herzogswalde on November 14. Simultaneously, the bluecoats were pressing up, while Colonel Bosfort was up to Niederschöna from Grossvoigtsberg; General von Holnstein led a mixed force on to Freiberg, passing through Herzogswalde and picking up some timely reinforcements, namely the Zollern Cuirassiers. Bosfort tried to take out the Prussians at Freiberg (night of November 15) with this greatly enlarged strike force, but new Prussian reinforcements of four full battalions under Major-General von Sydow meant for a rude reply to those Austrian efforts; they failed most miserably.

  The “Green” Kleist, meanwhile, was to be shadowed on his way to Bohemia by Bosfort, while Marshal Daun pressed off patrols to Töplitz and Lobositz. From Maxen late on November 15, Bosfort sent off scouting forces which detected Kleist galloping for Töplitz. Kleist’s scouts became aware there were no blocking posts over near the Metal Mountains, but, in any case, the Imperial army was simply not up to the task of facing their more vital Prussian opponents. Kleist pressed off on to Marienberg and Sebastienburg,17 then on Frauenstein heading for the border of Bohemia, so that he could smash the magazine at Aussig. His marauders moved forward in two columns, the first swinging through Graupen and Mariaschein on to Töplitz, while the second drove hard through Klostergrab and Ossegg on to Dux and Brüx. The Prussians were held off from Aussig’s magazines by Bosfort’s efforts, although bluecoat skirmishers did make a brief appearance in the town. The Prussians, more than a little perturbed by this repulse, proceeded to wreak havoc on other towns and villages which fell within their reach.

  At the monastery of Ossegg, for instance, Kleist rode in with the Szekely Hussars and some jägers early on November 17. For those with religious sensibilities, the intruders committed a number of heinous acts, all in the name of war and of naked aggression. Some of the nefarious acts were committed upon the dead, many of whose tombs were unmercifully disturbed in the search for “hidden treasure,” while Kleist summoned the monks who resided in the compound there to produce a ransom. When this failed to materialize, the intruders sacked the entire complex, turned over the tabernacles, and even severely mutilated a treasured statue of the “Mother of God” (a noted Catholic idol) breaking up the statue and removing the head. This brutality was not confined to just physical possessions, for the Abbott himself was accosted and severely beaten by the Prussians. In addition to this, some 20 other monks were led off as hostages and Kleist emphasized they would not be returned unless 25,000 florins were paid up as the price of their freedom.

  Nor was this particular brand of brutality confined to Ossegg. The famous hot springs at Töplitz were cleaned out of allied general officers, including 11 Allied generals; Hadik was fortunate not to be one of that number. But, alas, the good times could not long last. Kleist realized quickly he could not remain in Bohemia indefinitely, thanks to the spirited Colonel Bosfort. The latter was beating up the roadways looking for the “Green” Kleist and his brood. Without further ado, Kleist put his campaign under wraps and galloped back towards Dippoldiswalde (November 20).

  Meanwhile, Marshal Daun galloped out at first light on November 16, through Herzogswalde, with his sights set upon Freiberg. While he was so occupied, General Lacy blazed towards and through Nossen, then was summoned to meet with Daun in an impromptu council-of-war late in that day to decide upon the next course of action. There was not much arm twisting, and none was needed. After just a short discussion, the marshal issued orders for an immediate retreat. This is not surprising. The Prussian advance was in danger of compromising Daun’s entire left flank. Nonplused, the Imperialists hastened to get out of Daun’s way. While Serbelloni assembled what forces he could on the right bank of the Elbe, Holhstein hitched into Dippoldiswalde to put a defense, although he had but some 1,800 men with him to oppose to a very insistent opponent.

  About 0830 hours on November 16, a Prussian force struck at Holhstein’s outposts, but the two sides did not close largely because of the extreme condition of the elements, the bitter cold and the snow. Holhstein, under the circumstances, did not waste any time. He issued orders to retire upon Dresden.

  The Imperials were assembled at Leuben on November 17. Once the army was assembled, the whole body moved to a camp at Berggiesshübel. Ironically, while a Prussian command under Wunsch was near-by at Dohna, a weak screen force was thrown up, behind which the Imperialist army baggage and War Chest were to be successfully rescued. Sincère and Brentano joined forces early on that day. This accomplished, Marshal Daun punctually divided his main army into four columns, passing through Wilsdruf, Kesselsdorf, and on to the rises from Plauenishem Schlage leaning over on Windberg. The marshal’s men occupied this post, with Brentano anchoring the right wing of the main Austrian army, while Sincère secured the Austrian left. A Prussian attack, composed of eight squadrons of horse, was almost immediately unbuckled upon the enemy posts c
rowning Kesselsdorf. Brentano beat back this attack emanating through Wilsdruf, but not without difficulty. The Austrian artillery played a key rôle in this repulse.

  Sincère pulled off to Nöthnitz with patrols reaching over towards Passendorf, while Brentano kept retiring ever so slowly further upon Dresden. Prussian patrols nipped at Daun’s coattails, but the Plauen Chasm was pretty much inaccessible to attack, especially once Marshal Daun was given time to practice his polished art of erecting defensive barriers.

  The main Prussian army lost no time in reclaiming ground as Daun yielded it up. A new campsite between Limbach leaning over towards Birkenhain was occupied and held by the main force. Ziethen’s patrols were pressed up on Altfranken-Pennrich inclining towards Kesselsdorf. The bluecoat line started near the Tharandter Wald, meandering past Herzogswalde, Kesselsdorf bordering on the Elbe hard-by Zschoner Grund. This post was a springboard for the advance the following day upon Kaufbach. On the surface, affairs seemed to have reached a stalemate, especially in view of the worsening weather conditions. But the king remained supremely confident through it all. He persisted in his belief that Marshal Daun was looking for little more than an opportunity of marching upon Bohemia. For a time, of course, so was the marshal.18

  That might well have been the case, except for the marshal’s little ace in the hole: bagging Finck at Maxen. After initially informing the Saxon progeny around November 14–15 they would need to prepare to depart when the main Austrian army withdrew for home,19 within half a week’s time, the marshal made a complete about-face. He was now prepared to defend Dresden to the last man. Why the change? Obviously in there, probably late on November 18, Daun reverted to his very brief fling with offensive war.20 He was out for nothing less than capturing the whole command of Finck.21