About 1330 hours, the main assault actually commenced. One of the Prussian musketeers, one Dominicus from the Schenkendorf Regiment, mentioned in his diary that the men were just getting ready to eat [at a time of battle?] when General Rebentisch appeared in response to the attack, shouting to the rank-and-file: “Up! Up! All Forward!”35 Despite the extended preparation time, this attack appears to have taken General Finck by surprise; even, apparently, that he was not expected to be attacked that day.36
Meanwhile, the Austrian guns commenced belching fire, some of it passing over the heads of the forward Prussian troops and landing amongst the Prussian baggage train, blowing wagons apart and creating much confusion. The civilian teamsters had little stomach for battle, and they commenced scrambling around seeking shelter for themselves and their teams. Finck was in the midst of all of this, trying to sort out his formations and keep room open for them to redeploy. Meanwhile, the allied assault was threatening to compress his lines that much more.
The bluecoats were equipped with a few big guns of their own, but not as many. There were a couple of howitzers positioned in a redoubt by Maxen, along with five 12-pounders sprinkled along the line and a battery of four 6-pounders. The enemy certainly did not neglect their ordnance. Austrian guns were advanced to the Heidi-Berg and a couple of nearby rises to the northwest of Hausdorf, from where they again opened up. This artillery barrage was particularly ferocious, and we have already observed the confusion within the ranks of the bluecoats, especially as some of the cannon were firing a flanking fire into the faltering Prussians. All of this took place before the opposing sides could even close. The village of Maxen was soon on fire, and the 12th Dragoons of Württemberg and Gersdorf’s men were on the point of breaking until they were withdrawn behind Maxen.
Major Tomiotti di Fabris, Conte di Cassano, who helped launch this whole effort, now did his best to help win the day for the whitecoats.37 By then it was about 1530 hours. Fabris was on the precipice of the ridge over the hollow near Maxen. He did the only thing he could do to help his men down the hill expeditiously. He fell down upon his bottom. Literally. And proceeded to slide down the ice-covered slope to the hollow, followed by the rest of the strike force. Once in the hollow, the men immediately began to scale the opposite slope, where the bluecoats were deployed, often by resorting to sticking bayonets in the ground, or pulling themselves up by tree branches or whatever was handy for the purpose.
Meanwhile, Finck ordered Gersdorf to gallop to the attack. The 12th Dragoons charged at the surging enemy, but there seemed no staying now. Elsewhere, other Prussians, attacked by O’Donnell’s cavalry, broke and fell back towards the Scheerberg. Johann O’Donnell, younger sibling to Carl O’Donnell, led his Jung-Modena (13th) Dragoons forward, beating and driving back the 8th Gersdorf Hussars. The latter body was captured and “no prisoners were exchanged until peace was made.”38
The Prussian army of Finck was coming apart at the seams, even as its last desperate efforts unfurled. Zastrow’s battalion, plus the miserable company of the battalion of Grabow (among whom a large percentage of the men happened to be Saxon) was still resisting. The bluecoats were being pressed from the left directly into the vicinity of Grabow-Zastrow. The 12th Dragoons were dealt a terrible blow when Münchow was fatally wounded by the fire of the revitalized enemy.39 The fleeing remnants of Grabow and Zastrow finally brought the 12th Dragoons to a halt.
In the midst of this whole mess, the Grenadier Battalion of Willemy, led off by General Rebentisch, together with the Finck and Kleist battalions, could make no headway and were rudely met by Colonel De Ligne, who attacked in company with the nearby units against Rebentisch and his neighbor, the Schenckendorf battalion, which was driven back. Further, the 11th Dragoons of Jung-Platen, unable to get on track thanks to the effectiveness of the Austrian bombardment, turned and rode for the rear with scarcely a whimper.
Now Brentano sought to insert his men into the action. In this direction were the last substantial bodies of forces available to General Finck. The latter, nonplused through it all, immediately ordered up Gersdorf (with three relatively fresh squadrons of cuirassiers), plus 12 more squadrons of cuirassiers and four good squadrons of hussars, all led up by General Bredow, Major-General Heinrich Rudolf Friedrich Wilhelm von Vasold, and Major-General Christian Sigismund von Horn. The latter units advanced towards Brentano’s men, who were also being struck by the Prussian artillery. Behind this handy screen, Hülsen’s 21st Infantry, the 14th of Lehwaldt, and Knobloch’s 29th Infantry began to advance against Daun’s men. This Prussian cavalry charge by the 15 squadrons (between the Scheerberg and the Lerchenhübel), added to the infantry accompaniment, strode forward towards the approximately 6,305 men under Brentano’s command.
At first glance, this last genuine Prussian effort of the day appeared to gain appreciable ground, but Austrian artillery sited on the Sandberg then promptly opened up on the advancing Prussians when within range. The terrain also became less friendly just about that same time. The bluecoats veered towards the right, initially flinging back the 31st Dragoons of St. Ignon, and aimed directly at Brentano’s infantry. The latter were now installed between Wittgenau and Trohlitz. The opposing horsemen battled it out, the allies counting among their number our old friend Colonel Török, who once again distinguished himself. The Prussian efforts disintegrated as they passed into the narrows of the Spargrund as well as the Sürssengrund. This was “helped” along by the efforts of some nearby Croats, who did all they could to contribute to the enemy’s discomfiture. A decisive charge by the 25th Cuirassiers ended this last Prussian effort; some 800 of the bluecoats were taken prisoner as a result of these proceedings.
Meanwhile, General Wunsch, hearing that matters were not looking favorable, started on Schmorsdorf, putting his men in motion about 1200 hours. Heading that way, the distressed commander was greeted by the rare sight of fleeing Prussian cavalry. All the while, the artillery fire was resonating from the ravine of Müglitz towards the East. Nevertheless, Wunsch’s men took the Imperials of Prince Stolberg on, while the aforementioned Croats (from the command of General Kleefeld) were fully engaged against a Prussian post on the Goldberg. The base was carried with not a little trouble, but Kleefeld lost no time in negotiating the Müglitz Stream past Dohna, and in surmounting the thick woods on the western side of Finck’s lines near Sürssen. When the Croats sacked Dohna, a couple of the local clergy—Magister Gottlob Pezold and Diaconus Benjamin Gottfried Wienart—were beaten and even in peril of their lives.
As for Stolberg’s guns, he did all that he could to bring his ordnance to bear upon the enemy. Really, few of the Imperialists made any appreciable movement other than the above. Wunsch unloaded a heavy blast of artillery fire upon those same Croat formations, which flung them back precipitously towards Sürssen. Following that, General Wunsch unleashed three full battalions into a counterattack to try to reverse the flagging fortunes of the bluecoats. This latest counterattack did manage a little forward progress, but, bottom line, Kleefeld’s men had still accomplished what was probably the single most important factor of the end of the battle: the Prussian line-of-retreat was cut off.
While Stolberg was busy in his sphere, General Ried finally appeared ready to deliver the knock-out blow. Marching three full battalions near the Müglitz (centered at Liebstadt) of Croats leading towards Falkenhayn, the men actually ended up at Biensdorf. Pálffy and his hussars, emerging on the scene near Gahmig, descended on the faltering Prussian line. Between all of these Imperialist efforts, a total of 426 Prussians were nabbed as prisoners.
The two armies paused as the light failed at the beginning of what would be a bitterly cold night. Serbelloni sent some more reinforcements to reinforce the Imperials just in case Finck & Company got any ideas about trying to break through the strengthening Allied lines. It had been about a five hour struggle, and even though the bluecoats were still in an organized mode after a fashion at the close of the day, Finck’s command hard about Maxen was ju
st as good as finished. The Prussians had entirely lost control of the rises near to Maxen, yet General Lindstedt still kept his command close-by Schmorsdorf, while the rest of the bluecoat command—that part not dead, wounded, prisoners, or deserted that is—huddled between Falkenhayn and Spargrund.
Finck met with his generals that night at a farmhouse over by Falkenhayn, trying to sort out what the next step would be. The total available men at General Finck’s disposal by that stage was only about 5,071 men and three cannon.
Finck was still thinking of fighting his way out of the whole mess, but few of his subordinates concurred. Even General Rebentisch, who was a very valiant gentleman, felt little could be gained from further brawling. Wunsch, on the other hand, refused to give up. About 0300 hours on November 22, he led off a full complement of 20 battalions of dragoons and hussars heading eastward, hopefully towards escape. Unfortunately, the men had to almost immediately dismount from their horses on a bitterly cold night and try to slowly make their way over pathways and terrain that had little to offer but treacherous footing.
At the end of his rope, Finck dispatched Rebentisch with a trumpeter to announce him towards the enemy’s lines to open negotiations for surrender of the Prussian corps. But it was a measure of the stinging cold night that the trumpeter’s instrument had frozen by the time the little band reached the Austrian lines to parley. Nevertheless, Daun, soon apprised of this development, wasted no time. He sent Lacy to conduct the negotiations, which were carried out at Ploischwitz. The proceedings were hastily concluded, and, by no later than 1030 hours, Lacy could inform the marshal that the surrender was a done deal.
These blows lasted some four hours and constituted the Battle of Maxen. Finck’s chances from the very first were slim, and by the time the battle actually began he was doomed to failure. Nevertheless, the bluecoats gave a good account of themselves here. But their stubborn resistance could not turn the tide. The behavior of the allies, as the victors, was not notable, but the defiant Prussians faced the long, nearly hopeless odds with valiant try. What they did is proof positive of their training and pride as soldiers of Prussia. However, History has often unfairly taken a dim view of Finck and his troops, and of the salient fact he surrendered when defeat was inevitable rather than let his men be slaughtered.40 The battle had started near 1100 hours, and, by 1500 hours, after fierce fighting, Daun had broken through the Maxen perimeter, driving out the bluecoats as he entered it with loud shouting.
There had been one last glimmer of hope. Earlier, as Wunsch still held Dohna, he decided to move the whole of his remaining forces to join Finck, and then push across the Rothwasser where, on the opposite bank, there were roads to maneuver upon. Finck still, at that point, was gamely resolved to either break through the enemy ring or else die in the attempt. Thus decided, he assembled his generals on Falkenhayn-Bloschwitz hill range and gave them their marching orders. Soon word arrived that the Imperialists, under pressure, were stiffening and recovering from their earlier repulse, and were beginning to gather in force at the critical points across the Rothwasser. As this news reached him, Finck was quick to realize that his whole situation was growing worse by the hour. Then, and only then, did he ultimately decide that at the very least Wunsch should be able to cut his way through the enemy net. This turn of events sent Wunsch on his journey, although he likely realized the futility all along of trying to get out the discouraged soldiers over the passes, now barricaded by the enemy in strong force.
A careful examination revealed there were now (including the troops actually ready) within the remaining Prussian lines approximately 2,836 men; fewer supplies, and ammunition for both the artillery and the muskets were critically low. The rest of the army had been killed, wounded, captured, and/or deserted. As the morning of November 21 arrived, Daun’s artillery opened a cannonade of Finck’s weakened formations. Finck, meanwhile, awaited Rebentisch’s mission. The terms?41 Unconditional was the reply! This meant the disposition of the defeated troops would be at the victor’s mercy. The Prussian troops were to become P.O.W.’s, and only Finck, by virtue of his rank, would be permitted to keep his personal baggage and belongings. Daun also insisted that Wunsch surrender.42 The latter returned, and laid down his arms along with the others.43
But the whitecoats could not celebrate. On that same evening, Austrian outposts in front of Dippoldiswalde were under attack by some of the “Green” Kleist’s hussars. The Austrian units on the spot, the Botta-Botta and Colloredo regiments, put up a resistance but the intruders were actually part of the relief effort under General Hülsen dispatched by the king. With the enemy being encountered in strength, Hülsen, who had actually joined forces with Kleist in the confines of the Tharanter-Wald, proceeded to encamp between Sadisdorf and Reichstadt, with some 8,800 men. Not because he lacked the will, but the combination of the harsh weather conditions and the prevailing darkness made the further progress of the rescue force difficult. Hülsen was also in receipt of a note from Finck, composed much earlier in the day, that stated succinctly that Maxen was in the hands of the Allies but that, at least, Finck’s men were yet holding to a post at Dohna. That was encouraging. General Hülsen, however, quickly received clarification from some locals that Finck and his men were by now P.O.W.’s. Hülsen at once forwarded this disturbing intelligence to the king, with the qualifier that he did not entirely believe that Finck had surrendered. For the moment, he kept up minimal patrols and awaited word from the king.
Meanwhile, the enemy, over by Maxen, could not get under shelter as the tents could simply not be set up in the frozen earth and the men were consequently exposed to the unforgiving elements. Sincère was forced to pull back the majority of the Austrian troops over on to Reinhardtsgrimma, and kept only two battalions at a time—which would be rotated daily—to watch over the camp at Maxen. There was nothing to fear; Hülsen had already issued marching orders to pull back from his exposed (in more ways than one) forward position, once it was clear that Finck had indeed surrendered. He was helped to this step by a disturbing development. Overnight on November 21–22, three of the Prussians with Hülsen had literally frozen to death and the prevailing conditions were plainly inhospitable and worsening. Hülsen ordered the infantry to seek shelter in the buildings of Colmnitz while the cavalry quartered at Bobritzsch.
Meantime, the king paced at his headquarters and often pored over his map, trying to make heads or tails of the whole situation. When the Prussian royal headquarters heard of the disaster, Frederick’s mood can be guessed at. The first inklings had come earlier from riders sent by General Braun, over by Mohorn at the limit of the Tharanter-Wald. Here his men were deployed to keep open the line-of-communication with General Hülsen. The enemy were not exactly inactive either.
November 23, General Buccow probed towards Kesselsdorf, trying to ascertain the extent of the Prussian posts thereabouts. Brentano was doing basically the same task over by Dippoldiswalde. This was in an area where General Hülsen took some alarm, but, in spite of presumed threats from the Austrians, nothing really came out of this. The end of November found the bluecoats still forced to stay in field dress in tents and huts. Yet it was a measure of the man that the king still half-expected Daun to retire into Bohemia in spite of everything.
Meanwhile, the combatants began to thin out. After keeping in the field for longer than they probably should have, the very shaky Imperial army finally departed for winter quarters on December 2. Zweibrücken accompanied the force back towards Bohemia and winter hibernation.
Daun also had to acknowledge the onset of winter, in this case an exceptionally bitter one.
This, then, was the story of the entire Maxen army under Finck on November 21, 1759, one of the most disastrous reverses that Frederick would ever suffer.44 The Prussian loss will probably never be known; the best available estimates are, of troops, about 12,000; of officers, 537; eight generals (including Finck and Wolfersdorfe, Wunsch, and Mosel); plus a sizeable body of deserters. So the loss was upwards of 1
3,000 men in this one stroke. One source states that 12,496 noncommissioned officers and men were led into captivity, along with 745 wounded.45 Most of the unfortunates (native Prussians, that is) never laid eyes on their homeland again, as the Austrians almost immediately afterwards refused to exchange any more prisoners with the Prussians.46 The village of Maxen lost many buildings from the fires, including a nursery, 13 cottages, and the local school. Also lost in this action were some 70 guns, Finck’s entire complement. This as well was a sore loss, although at this point “any” reduction in power was a blow to the still wobbly Prussian army.
In retrospect, Maxen should have been a clear lesson for Frederick the futility in trying to deploy an isolated detachment from an already beaten army under a subordinate to engage a superior enemy force. He should have realized the sheer folly of such an attempt. Meanwhile, the ripple effects from the battle were felt both far and wide. Following the long war and a final exchange back to Prussia, the king called for a court of inquiry, to convene on April 7, 1763, regarding the disposition of Generals Finck, Gersdorf, and Rebentisch and, specifically, their behavior at Maxen. All three were “guilty,” which would seem to have been a foregone conclusion. Finck received one year, Gersdorf two and Rebentisch one year of fortress arrest.47 Moreover, even the rank-and-file soldiers from the disaster could never restore their reputation in Frederick’s eyes.48 Finck died in 1766 while in the Danish service.49
Frederick must have believed that Daun feared him so much he would retire, it might be added, into the waiting arms of Finck’s men. Even were this true enough, the king must have known that it was he himself and not an unfortunate like Finck that the Austrian marshal feared. The latter behaved predictably. What made Frederick squander over half of his remaining troops on what was a doomed mission from the inception? Whatever the reason the rest of the world heard the news of what had transpired and thought the Prussian leader and his magnificent legions were crumbling away. Even the king himself, after the double blows of Kunersdorf and Maxen, might have been inclined to agree.
Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War Page 71
