Prince Henry’s major concern must be the Russians, a people whom the king himself no longer had the intestinal fortitude to confront. He instead consigned himself and his army the task of defending Saxony from the much tamer Daun. Although he never owned up to it, this was without question the reason that Frederick had sent Henry.36 Prince Henry, as the old adage goes, “sure had his work cut out for him.” The forces opposing him were formidable: Laudon had some 50,000 men scattered near the border with Silesia, while Soltikov, once more in overall command of the greencoats, had a full 60,000 men with him. Henry was content to leave Generals Forcade and Johann Jung-Stutterheim with 15,000 troops to hold the Swedes at the north as well as guard against frontier incursions into Prussian Pomerania. The prince moved to occupy Landsberg, instead of Cüstrin, although the king thought the latter was the better choice of bases.37 But General Count Gottlob Friedrich Tottleben with a large force of Russians had been sent into Pomerania/Mecklenburg to plunder them. Forcade, in the month of June, marched to drive out the invader. He was successful; July 5, he sent Henry the news.
Before the intruders had been driven off, the roving Cossacks had caused much trouble. A group from “Major Settelben’s corps” (fifty riders led by the Russian Captain Howartreck) descended on Schwedt (February 21), and captured Eugene of Württemberg (who had been wounded at Kunersdorf and was recuperating at home) then made off. Eugene, however, was extricated from his situation, and the enemy were themselves in trouble in short order. Duke of Brunswick-Bevern, learning of this development, sent off a force to go retrieve the Duke and the Princess of Württemberg. When the bluecoats overhauled the Cossacks near Damm, they attacked and drove them away, after freeing the captives of the Russians. Not to say that the intruders cooperated. Captain Howatreck had three horses shot dead under him in this action. This gives us an idea of how hard the Russians fought before giving way.38 At about the same time, there had been an unfortunate development in Saxony.
Frederick’s army was still in winter-quarters on the upper side of the Elbe, with only a single post at Kossdorf (near Torgau) below under Lt.-Gen. Ernst Heinrich Freiherr von Czettritz. This was a precariously placed post, and isolated, so Daun decided to take advantage of the situation.39 He sent off General Beck with a force of some 3,200 men in mid–February on a task. Beck was to take on the forces of General Czettritz, who maintained a cordon of some 1,600 men from Kossdorf to Blumberg.40 Beck, harking back to the campaign of 1759 with little fanfare, attacked and rode down two full squadrons of the vaunted Bayreuth Dragoons on the misty morning of February 21, 1760. The farthest Prussian guard force was thus attacked suddenly and overrun by the Austrians, who nabbed seven officers and 200 men, along with two guns. Resistance stiffened as the main outpost opened up a brisk fire and Czettritz ordered his men to retire. Soon he had been knocked of his horse and “was made prisoner.”41 The bluecoats replied with reinforcements and drove Beck away. This incident would hardly be worth mentioning except that a copy of the secret Instructions—which Czettritz had brought into the field with him in clear violation of orders—fell into the hands of the enemy, in a haversack. The captured document was at once forwarded to Daun. The Prussian secrets were thereby finally revealed to the foe. Frederick was understandably concerned. He feared that the enemy’s plan would be unduly influenced by the capture of these directions. In retrospect, this did occur, although only to a limited degree. Meanwhile, there was little of the usual preliminary maneuvers to recount.42
In Silesia, around the same time, Goltz had a second post at Leobschütz, under the command of Major-General Grant.43 About March 13, Laudon ordered a concentration of his forces to invade Silesia. Having been informed by Laudon that the winter truce was about to expire, Goltz at once ordered Grant to march with his men towards Steinau, in the direction of Neisse, to oppose enemy posts near Leobschütz and Neustadt. Simultaneously, he himself prepared to march to support Grant’s enterprise. A difficulty with gathering the baggage train delayed his departure until 1700 hours on March 15. At the lead was Manteuffel’s 17th Infantry. The unit marched out the northward end of Neustadt, in company with a force of dragoons, some 2,000 men all told. The Prussians were surely ready for the business at hand.
Laudon had a force of about 5,000 cavalry. He was supposed to be joined by five battalions of infantry under General Draskovitch (some 1,900 grenadiers and 2,000 Croatians), marching into the outskirts of the place, but the infantry accompaniment was held up by the necessity of repairing some bridges in the rear. This reduced the value of the attack. The outnumbered Prussians thus refused a proffered surrender, and, later, on approaching the village of Buchelsdorf, the bluecoats perceived an additional enemy body in their path, under the command of General Jacquemin (part of Prince Löwenstein’s force) directly across the road leading to Neisse. Again parley was refused, and the Prussians formed square while Laudon charged from the front with his full strength. The Prussian vanguard, consisting of about 100 men under Captain Blumenthal, was from the command of Manteuffel. The main body, under Captain Chamibaud, was fully alert and ready for the enemy.
The first attack was met by a withering fire, which stopped the enemy cold before they reached the square. General Jacquemin charged the bluecoats at the vanguard without so much as blinking. A second, and then a third, charge were likewise repelled,44 and Laudon withdrew from the action. Goltz resumed his trek, the Austrians falling back before him from one position after another. Finally, just short of Steinau, in the confines of a ravine there between that place and Siebenhufen, Laudon made another stand.45 The larger portion of the bluecoats nevertheless did traverse the obstacle, although near the end of the line one of the wagons broke down and the rest following it —five baggage wagons and 13 provision wagons—had to be left behind.46 Laudon had suffered considerably more losses than he had inflicted in this endeavor. Roughly 800 casualties (of whom about 500 were wounded, the rest were killed), while Goltz suffered about 35 dead, 79 wounded, and 43 captured.47 So the whole adventure can be judged to be wholly unsuccessful for the Austrians, especially in view of the number of casualties.
Goltz was able to reach his destination with no further interference, but Laudon was by no means shaken by his reverse. It is significant that the king mentioned this engagement, but reported that the Prussians on this occasion “sustained no loss … and entered the fortress of Neisse triumphant.”48 To use the word “triumphant” might be overstating matters, just a tad. Frederick, this aside, was singularly impressed with the 17th Infantry. Six of the Pour-le-merite medals were distributed in the unit for the event, and the monarch held up the conduct of the contingent as befitting the fine Prussian tradition, and not “according to infamous modern examples.”49
Laudon, stunned by a new appreciation for the enemy, suddenly began to question whether he had sufficient strength to oppose to the bluecoats over in Silesia. He took measures to try to secure additional reinforcements. Laudon inquired of Marshal Daun about some reinforcements, but Daun was less than willing to part with any of his forces.50 He made a reply to that effect, and seemed almost pleased to be able to do so. Of course, there was much to this situation beyond the moment. One more thing was certain: There would always be an undercurrent of uneasiness between Daun and Laudon, exacerbated by political maneuverings from Vienna.
Against this backdrop, the campaign finally opened. April 25, Frederick marched his army from Freiberg into the field, leaving Wilsdruf and vicinity. He had only some 40,000 men with him, opposed by Daun, who had 100,000 men accompanying him over and above the forces with Laudon, although the latter operated as an independent command. Yet even Laudon still answered to Daun, technically his superior. Frederick moved his army to Schlettau, where he put up an encampment. His right leaned upon the town. Fortress of Katzenhäuser, with the left astride the Elbe near Meissen.
At Schlettau was a fortress like Katzenhäuser, although not nearly as strong. The king was quick to deploy his right where the most pressure from
Daun was expected. The line that the army now held was some 12 miles in extent and could be secured by the force with Frederick with little difficulty. Prince Henry was to guard both Silesia and the southern portion of Brandenburg from the Russians and Laudon—the latter was also confronted by Fouquet. A relatively secure front. But this left the 50-mile stretch east of Meissen towards Brandenburg entirely denuded of troops, as the king could spare none to guard it. Daun, meanwhile, had emerged from winter headquarters (about June 1) and formed his army into two distinct bodies: one in Dresden itself, the other just across the Elbe near Boxdorf. At the latter, Lacy with 30,000 men were deployed. Austrian cavalry (of the Rudnicki Uhlans) forced back the Prussians ensconced near Kossdorf. However, the commotion produced thereby alerted a bluecoat cavalry post at Nichtewitz, a force of some 150 riders which galloped up to counterattack the enemy. This initial effort was beaten back, but Ziethen’s Hussars rode up to the attack. A bitter fight finally forced the Prussians to recoil towards Torgau, leaving some 130 prisoners in the hands of the Austrians (June 2). There was a brief pause at that point, so we can examine the other forces.
The Russians had been slow to get underway. The caution of Soltikov, which in late 1759 had probably helped save the Prussian monarchy, now assisted the irascible king once again. The Russian commander did not wish to confront Frederick anew if he could possibly help it. There was no plan to make an advance into the main theater of war at all, according to the scheme Soltikov wanted to employ.51 The commander had no offensive plan at all, except to try to lay hold of Colberg. Capturing that fortress would be a key to keeping the Russians in decent winter quarters and thus allow them to start the campaign of 1761, assuming there was one, for the first time in the vicinity of the major campaigning.52 Any joint operations conducted with the Austrians would be very much of secondary consideration, under Soltikov’s outline for the coming campaign.
But the Russian High Command, and, to her credit, especially Czarina Elizabeth, along with an allied Congress called to conduct joint allied operations, rejected Soltikov’s formulate; the latter on March 30, 1760.53 This assured their allies the Russians would indeed be a factor in this campaign. At least in theory. The disposition of Russian intentions seemed to bear this out. The arrangement that took place in lieu of Soltikov’s plan was an advance by several columns aiming for the area between Crossen and Glogau, with the view of trying, in the spirit of cooperating with the Austrians, of working out yet more accomplishments in this long war.
Meanwhile, to try to persuade the Russians to take yet more active participation in the campaign ahead, Daun sent one of his slick-talking commanders, outspoken Irishman Lt.-Gen. Thomas Plunkett, with specific instructions to go see the Russian commanders and try to persuade them to make a more concerted effort on behalf of the common cause. Daun’s “vision,” on this point, was rather more in the nature of the tunnel type. The Austrian apparently presumed that his pick of liaisons, Lt. General Plunkett, would have no trouble in trying to secure confidants among the Irish officers within the Russian ranks simply because they were Irish.54 This although Laudon himself wanted nothing to do with him and his mission.55 Likely this was, at least in part, because Laudon did not hold out much hope for its success. Plunkett selected as his comrade in arms especially the Russian general Georg Browne, who also was Irish and happened to be from the same family as Field Marshal Maximilian von Browne from earlier in the war. But, in spite of everything to his favor, Plunkett never seems to have ingratiated himself with many in the Russian camp.
Military operations had by then commenced. About the last of May, Laudon suddenly appeared in force in Silesia, which had been his plan following the earlier rebuke from Goltz.56 From a post near Rothkosteletz, the Austrians materialized at the passes near Jägerndorf and Neisse (May 29), not near Fouquet at Landshut, leaving Fouquet time and real estate in which to react. Laudon, throwing caution to the wind, moved on Frankenstein, pressing Oraskovitch to intrude upon Weidenau, while the irascible Wolfersdorff was ensconced at Prausnitz. Meanwhile, Fouquet reacted at once (June 2–3), marching over the Schweidnitz-Reichenbach road aiming east, reckoning that the enemy was heading for either Schweidnitz or Breslau. His scouts could detect no such maneuver, however, so he weighed what to do next. Austrian horsemen conducted some raiding expeditions as far as Breslau. Fouquet pulled back on Würben, where he assumed he might be more secure. Next day, June 4, Laudon, who had swerved his marching troops towards the left after entering Silesia (and thus Landshut and Glatz) instead of right and Breslau/Schweidnitz, suddenly swept into Fouquet’s rear, shocking the Prussian. Laudon took up at Nimptsch and rolled forward upon Reichenbach.
That commander immediately sent a detachment—some 600 men under the command of Lt.-Gen. Gaisrück—which seized Landshut against negligible opposition (as Fouquet was otherwise engaged, having left only a skeleton guard force) then he promptly pushed on to put up blocks about Glatz fortress itself about June 7. Fouquet heard of the surprise enemy moves a couple of days after, which news caused him to recoil upon Romenau, so he could be closer to Breslau. Fouquet shortly received instructions from Frederick (sent on June 11) to return and while keeping Glatz secure to retake Landshut instantly, which appeared even more important. The king inquired with a scolding tone and a clear command “the Devil thank you for leaving my hills [about Landshut]; regain me my hills.”57 Fouquet had his new instructions by June 16, and decided to obey them to the letter and do nothing more. He unbuckled General Ziethen with seven full battalions to hold to a post hard-by Fürtstenstein. About this same time, Fouquet sent for his heavy artillery, which was camped out near Schweidnitz, to come join up with the corps. He must have known that the task to which the distant king was assigning him was just far too ambitious for his paltry resources.58 He so indicated in a speech he made to his subordinates that very evening: “It appears that we must retake Landshut then. Laudon, on the instant, will then come against us there with the mass of his troops. We must then, like good Prussians, make a stand for as long as possible, think of no surrender on the field, if indeed beaten then we must defend ourselves til the last man of us falls. In case we are forced to retreat, I will be among the last to leave the field, and if I survive the day, I will lay down my sword, and, on my word, never pick it up again.”59 Therein lies the surprising statement of a man which in most every respect foreshadowed the battle he was about to fight. The Prussians arrived in the area, around dawn on June 17, hard-by Förste. Fouquet was unsure of the enemy’s strength, although scouts reported an Austrian force of at least five regiments strong near-by at Friedland.
Chapter Thirty-Nine
Battle at Landshut and Events Up to the Siege of Dresden1
And so it went. Denied any additional clarification, Fouquet did as instructed, attacked and defeated the little Austrian force of General Gaisrück there and reoccupied Landshut (June 17). Gaisrück fell back upon Reich-Hennersdorf to recover. He then set to work immediately to prepare the works there to better face Laudon. He knew the latter would be there soon enough. The Austrian commander prepared, and moved to the offensive as soon as word was circulated that the bluecoats had returned. Laudon acted at once. Leaving a small force before Glatz, under Lt-General Ferdinand Freiherr von Unruhe, the Austrian commander pressed off from Pischkowitz (June 18), and within a mere day and a half had developed the presence of Prussians in strength in and about Landshut. Laudon’s men defeated and drove off the Prussian detachments, inflicting heavy losses. Austrian casualties amounted to ten men killed and 20 wounded.2
General Beck, moving up from Friedberg to Schmeidenberg, was in close support. He moved rather dexterously by Braunau, and Tannhausen forward upon Schwarzwaldau. General Malachovsky was encountered on the rises hard-by Schwarzwaldau with a force of bluecoats, including some 300 hussars (June 17–18). Nothing daunted, on the morning of June 18, Fouquet sent word to the king that, as long as a man of his command lived, his orders to hold Landshut would be obeyed. He was neve
r allowed to keep his promise here, however.
Frederick, in the meanwhile, had sent orders (June 22) for Fouquet to keep a firm hold on Glatz and to occupy Landshut if the enemy were not in close proximity in great strength. What had led to Frederick’s sudden change of heart in his instructions? In the back of the king’s mind had to be the debâcle at Maxen, largely orchestrated by the same kind of dogmatic royal instructions. The preceding example inspired Frederick to better state what the Prussian command felt with regard to Landshut, a far more moderate viewpoint under the circumstances. Before this modified set of instructions could reach Landshut, though, it was already too late.
The Prussian position in and about Landshut indeed was a fairly secure one, so long as sufficient numbers of troops were available to man the works.3 There were, to the East of Landshut, bluecoat posts that lined the Doktorberg and its nearby neighboring rises, with another group of heights almost directly south of Landshut, the Kirchberg, the Galgenberg, Blasdorferberg, and the neighboring swells, Prussian posts dotted all over them.4 The 33rd Infantry, 10th Infantry, Grenadier Battalion Wobersnow, backed up by the 8th Dragoons, and the Free Battalion Mellin (on the eastern rises), under Baron Karl Gustav Freiherr von Rosen, commandant of the 33rd Infantry,5 along with Free Battalion Below, the 46th Infantry, the 42nd Infantry, the 37th Infantry, Grenadier Battalions of Sobeck and Koschenbar on the southern rises. This grouping, along with the 8th Hussars, a roving command ready to go where needed, constituted Fouquet’s army corps in and about Landshut. The posts that were manned by these troops were very formidable, with separate mile-long lines of walls and palisades that anchored the posts hard about Landshut.6
Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War Page 74
