At 0500 hours, August 10, the bluecoats were on the march again. There had been no sign of an enemy assault, so Frederick directed his troops past Schimmelwitz on to Liegnitz. No enemy stood in his path to offer resistance, so the moment to catch the king at a disadvantage again passed. This was in spite of the fact that Daun did march as soon as he knew the foe was stirring.6
The main Austrian army was on a mission, so to speak. About 0200 hours on that morning, the united throng, divided into four columns, moved out, with the vanguard under the Prince of Löwenstein pushing out to block roving Prussian patrols. The first column migrated through Löbau on to Hochkirch, with the second crossing over by Nieder-Krayn, the third (of Colonel Joseph Graf Ferrari’s Grenadiers and Lt.-Col. Normann’s Grenadiers), while the last, led up by the mounted horse of General Beck, aimed also at Hochkirch. A flanking force of General Ujházy’s Hussars was pushed out to cover the army as it progressed, providing a shield against the aggressive Frederick.
Daun shoved his troops on the opposite side of the Katzbach, followed by Laudon—who was operating on Frederick’s southern flank—Lacy harassing the Prussian rearguard with his Pandours. Beck, too, had been given an independent command; he was operating near Lacy’s position. After a hard days’ march of some 15 miles, the bluecoats drew rein at Liegnitz in the evening. Lacy swept across the Katzbach from Goldberg to follow the Prussians from that side. Daun rolled through Reichenbach (August 4), Lauban (the next day), and Schmöttseifen on August 6. Laudon, spurred on himself, made it to Neu-Sörgau (August 6), pressing on for Striegau the next day, preparing all the while to face the king.
Frederick immediately occupied the heights near Pfaffendorf and Schimmelwitz upon reaching Liegnitz (about 1100 hours on August 10), but an alarming reconnaissance revealed the ground on the lower end of Liegnitz to be infested with the combined armies of Daun/Laudon, distant only some three miles in his rear. Worse, some seven miles ahead other foes had already taken post out near Jeschkendorf and again nearer to Parchwitz and Jauer than he. About 2300 hours, the king’s army rose from its dangerously exposed position and returned to the one he had previously occupied beyond the Katzbach.7 This retrograde action was considered necessary as the king sought to gain Jauer from that point.
The Prussian march was swift for Frederick planned to head for Jauer at once, although his exhausted men had already traveled 30 miles going and coming recently. The goal of getting on to Jauer might have been possible had Guichard been as energetic as the rest of the army. It should be pointed out, however, that he was saddled with bringing on a 2,000-wagon provision train, a no doubt arduous task.
Unfortunately, when Frederick reached his former post although he had outdistanced Daun and Laudon in the rear, Lacy had a body of men present nearby. Lacy’s appearance in his rear must have been a rather rude surprise for the worried Prussian monarch. Frederick tried to entice the latter into a battle, as a quick victory would help raise the morale of the now thoroughly discouraged bluecoats. Not to mention possibly throwing the enemy off balance long enough for the Prussians to reach Breslau. With this singular thought in mind, he crossed the Katzbach against Lacy. True to form, the latter promptly fled the immediate vicinity. Lacy’s baggage was unable to get away. Frederick made a catch of some meticulous maps from Lacy’s extensive collection (a valuable cache, since the king was always in need of topographical aids).8 What a development. He was now back where he had already been, arriving at about dawn. The baggage, bringing up the rear, did not finally arrive until after 1000 hours. As for Marshal Daun, his army pressed up. headquarters were made at Peterwitz—on which the Austrian left wing was anchored, while the right side tailed off on the village of Schlaup.
By this time, Daun and Laudon, trailed by a more cautious Lacy, were again at hand, so it was useless to try for Jauer again. Frederick instead took his tired command to miserable quarters in the little village of Seichau, surrounded at all sides by heights which were largely occupied by the Austrians during the course of the evening. That night (August 11–12), the king formulated a new plan. He intended to make for Schweidnitz by the roads across the hills near Pombsen, past Hohenfriedburg and Schmöttseifen to outflank the enemy. With his new resolve steeled, Frederick sent out scouting parties towards the routes in question to recon. Daun/Laudon, however, had risen earlier to the occasion than usual, and by 0830 hours, August 12, their men were massed between the little Prussian army and Goldberg, intending to cut off and perhaps even surround the enemy there.
Again stymied, Frederick rescinded his marching orders, hearing of the reception that the enemy was preparing, and instead decided to stay put. Soon word arrived from the scouts that the roads veering on Hohenfriedburg were too narrow for the wide tracked Prussian wagons. Anyhow, the Austrians were occupying posts that barred Frederick directly from Pombsen. The latter commander had no viable alternative save for bivouacking again at Seichau until he could decide what to do next. That same evening, the British ambassador, Mitchell, destroyed his cipher keys and important papers, fearing their capture. As dusk fell, Frederick sent General Bülow to lay hold of the terrain towards Goldberg over the Katzbach. This in preparation for a second march upon Liegnitz, as the king deemed it more useful than the current post.
About an hour after Bülow marched, the Prussians rose, about 2000 hours, and made for Goldberg. Four hours brought them to their destination. About 0100 hours, August 13, the bluecoats were crossing the Katzbach. Once more enemy patrols and activities were at a minimum. Frederick thereby narrowly escaped the trap which was inexorably but slowly closing in around him. He now moved directly to Liegnitz. After another hard march, the exhausted Prussians reached the latter at around 1200 hours. Frederick’s new headquarters were at Schimmelwitz, and the army was deployed at and below Liegnitz. On the road from that place leading up to Gassendorf the road from Schimmelwitz made juncture. These roads curled around two rows of rises which began south of Liegnitz leading towards Schimmelwitz.
Here the discouraged Prussian array encamped, in two lines about two miles long, on August 13. The whitecoats had started forth in pursuit of Frederick as soon as Seichau was found to have been abandoned by the Prussians. They were near Liegnitz from about 1400 hours, taking posts on nearly every side of the Prussian position: Daun, near Jauer and Nichölstadt, some eight miles distant; Laudon near to Koischwitz, between there spread to Jeschkendorf on the route to Parchwitz; Lacy, still behind the others, was at Goldberg as of yet, eight miles to the southwest of the foe’s position. Thus the Austrians, to the tune of nearly 90,000 men in the three formations, were closing off virtually every avenue of escape for the Prussian king and his desperate band of 25,000 men.
Only one route, that of Liegnitz on Parchwitz/Glogau, remained open to the latter. Cut that last path, and the bluecoats would either have to surrender wholesale or else disperse, for their supplies without due replenishment could last no more than a few more days. It could have been even worse for the Prussians. For the Russians, meanwhile, had reached the lines outside of Breslau on August 6. Soltikov, who had become convinced that Frederick’s maneuvers recently indicated he was going to cross the Oder and operate against the Russian army in concert with Prince Henry, was duly preparing to retire upon Trebnitz with his main body.9 This was in spite of Laudon making an impromptu journey to Russian headquarters to make a personal appeal to the senior Russian general about expanding the scope of Russian operations in this campaign.10 The only concession Laudon was able to wring was in persuading Soltikov to detach a separate corps to go join the Austrians. There was a separate force with General Zachary Cherneyshev with 24,000 men who had been detached from the main army.
The latter crossed the Oder at Auras on August 13–14. He was now moving to link up with the Austrians. In his turn, Marshal Daun unbuckled a force under General Beck to go directly to link-up with the Russian detachment. When joined, the allies would have upwards of 114,000 men against Frederick’s ragged bunch. Thus the latter woul
d have to face long odds of something like 4-to-1, and he had reached what can be considered the most desperate stage he had yet encountered in the course of the war. The king himself was in the depths of black dejection, but while he did not believe victory to be hardly possible under the circumstances, he adamantly refused to yield. He was well aware that Lacy, Laudon, and Daun were all within easy striking distance by then. Word now reached the Prussian camp that Cherneyshev was at hand—a bare 20 miles distant on August 14.
The nearness of the Russians was directly communicated to Frederick during the daylight on August 13, by Lt. von Wolfrath, who had just returned from a reconnaissance mission with that information. The king did not seem to believe the greencoats were that close at hand.11 But the news could not have been comforting. There was thus further cause for dejection. Yes, the Austrians did have the idea of “bagging the whole [Prussian] army…” but it depended upon Frederick staying put while his enemies slowly closed the trap they were laying for him. To help seal the deal, Maria Theresa went so far as to order Marshal Daun to go seek battle, then, incredibly, absolved him in advance should the encounter turn out badly.12 One is left to wonder how the Prussian king, who was used to nothing but implicit obedience to his orders, would have handled this whole situation.
The country the little army occupied was astride the Katzbach. From Liegnitz, the latter flowed out towards Schimmelwitz, then joined the Schwartzwasser. The latter flowed curling around Liegnitz to link up with the Katzbach near Pfaffendorf Heights. The latter were joined with the far bank by an old stone bridge (at Töpferberg). From here the meandering Katzbach continued on past Parchwitz. As for Liegnitz itself, it lay on the southern side of the confluence, and on the western side of the Katzbach before it joined the Schwartzwasser; a town of about 7,000 people. The town’s one main street was crossed by several smaller avenues and the like.
Frederick surveyed the ground round about and discovered that the terrain, so long as it was near to the stream, was reasonably level, but moving back in either direction it assumed a rocky, steep nature at places. On the northern side arose the Pfaffendorf rises, continuing on and about the country near Rüstern. Still further to the north, a fresh set of rises came into view—the Kuchelberg Heath—near the road from Liegnitz to Langenwaldau. This is actually the area which concerns us, since it was here that the ensuing battle would be fought at.
For the remaining hours of August 13, the Prussian troops were given a well-deserved respite. The enemy were closing in for the presumed kill. Daun wiggled around forward from Jauer to Wählstadt (within about four miles of the bluecoats at Schimmelwitz); Laudon drew out between Kunitzer See, Jaschkendorf and going past Seifersdorf to Koischwitz. From his lines, Laudon was within five miles of the enemy and nearer on the road to Glogau, with the Katzbach between the Prussians and himself. Most of the king’s men were still near to Liegnitz. Lacy, not venturing to take a chance of a premature engagement, stayed comfortably back. Frederick’s reaction to Daun and Laudon was to prepare for battle. He would receive them in a defensive action if the need arose.
A body of the enemy did appear on the rises nearby, but the extent of their intentions amounted to just reconnoitering. The marshal himself was with this party. The Prussian baggage train of some 2,000 wagons were dispatched under guard for Glogau, some 45 miles to the northwest. That evening the Prussian king intended to steal a march to Parchwitz, and from there make for Glogau with the main army. Under the big guns of the fortress, the bluecoats might find a temporary rest.
As a preliminary, it would be necessary to disentangle the men from their lines before Liegnitz. The bridge at Töpferberg would be used to transfer them to Pfaffendorf and to head from there to Parchwitz. The king took his generals and rode out, crossed the Schwartzwasser and the Katzbach, explaining on the way his new general plan. He fully intended to await Laudon’s advent in his current position, according to one eyewitness.13 When he had finished, Frederick returned to his headquarters at about 1600 hours to take a short rest break. His sleep14 was soon interrupted suddenly, it is said, when a drunken deserter from Daun’s army came into camp15 and told Frederick and his men that the Austrians were at hand. The latter was preparing to sweep against the Prussian rear across the Glogau road. Interestingly enough, this intelligence actually referred to the main army of Marshal Daun and not specifically to what rôle Laudon himself might play in the proceedings. That being the case, the Prussians actually profited little from Captain Wise’s “intelligence.”16
Nevertheless, about nightfall, the king apparently rode out with the man to scout and see for himself, after plying the visitor with “gallons of tea and several enemas.”17 As soon as Frederick returned, the men made ready to move out. We can well imagine the mood of the camp that terse evening. The troops had the total failure of the Siege of Dresden to lament, and were worn out from seemingly endless marching, none of which effort appeared to have accomplished the least good. What was worse, they knew they were facing greatly superior enemy forces. It was a low point in Prussian fortunes, but the loyalty of the majority of the army kept them in the ranks, when a more selfish approach could just as easily have been adopted.
In many ways, the iron discipline of the Prussian army, strict and reliant upon an almost unquestioning obeying of orders, no matter what they might be, had really served to keep the Prussian cause alive.18 Without this training/discipline, Frederick would never have been allowed to become the “Great.” And, we might add, it was not just the rank-and-file that possessed loyalty. Although there would always be a number of officers who felt much the same lukewarmness as Prince Henry did, the king could never have stayed in charge without the loyalty of the majority of the Prussian officers. Ziethen personified that sentiment when on one occasion he announced excitedly (no doubt sincerely), “Long live our Great King!”19
In short, the king, for all his shortcomings (and they were many), was able to instill confidence in the minds of his soldiers, like few military commanders in history had ever managed. But it was a confidence inculcated largely through hardened respect, and certainly not by love. This was unlike the Austrians, who often managed real, tender affection for the person of their queen, Maria Theresa.
Chapter Forty-Two
Battle at Liegnitz and Aftermath1
Laudon had marched from his encampment about 2000 hours, August 14, aiming to lay hold of the rises at Pfaffendorf.2 Those selfsame heights that Frederick wanted to shelter his army under during the rest of the night. Laudon wanted to be there by dawn. He had left the campfires burning to deceive the Prussians, with a skeletal force in attendance. His army was marching forward in the darkness of a moonless night blindly, without an advance guard, to ensure that his movement would not be detected by the wily foe. His scouts brought word that the Prussian baggage had passed through Töpferberg before dusk, so now he intended to take that train as well. Laudon left the main body to capture that train with a small force.3
Frederick had left Schimmelwitz at about 2000. As soon as he seized the Pfaffendorf Heights, he would start for Glogau with the dawn. His men trudged around and through Liegnitz, from there across the Schwartzwasser towards Pfaffendorf, a place where everyone seemed to be heading for on this dark night. Frederick had ordered the utmost quiet to be observed during the course of the night to keep the enemy outposts beyond the water ignorant of the march. Beyond those outposts, the campfires of Laudon’s camp were burning unusually bright tonight (with good reason). A column of bluecoats marched through the alleys and main street of Liegnitz, the rest bypassed it. The Schwartzwasser reached maximum width thereabouts at Waldau—not more than one mile from Töpferberg—so Lacy instead made for Töpferberg when he, too, marched that evening.
Lacy’s task was to turn the left of Frederick’s old position, which was by now all but abandoned. There should have been no surprise to learn the king might have withdrawn to the far bank, which was greatly elevated above the near side, although neither section was
flat. In the hilly country beyond the Schwartzwasser the Prussians realized they had a better chance in the defensive battle they must soon fight.4
As for Laudon, the possibility of a Prussian retirement must never have occurred to him for he failed to send out even small parties of men to scout. Had he done so, the ensuing battle would probably never have been fought in the manner it was. Why did Laudon force the issue? Time was definitely on the side of the allies; not only were Laudon, Lacy, and Daun present with nearly 100,000 men, but the arrival of Cherneyshev would make the odds even worse for the bluecoats.5 Just beyond the Töpferberg Bridge, the Schwartzwasser and the Katzbach joined briefly. On the rise of heights beyond, Frederick spread his army out in order-of-battle in two lines. The front, under the king himself, was opposite to Laudon, while Ziethen, with the left, was deployed to oppose Daun.
By about 0100 hours, the crossing was largely complete, the artillery passing by the old stone bridge itself. Off in the distance, the campfires of both Daun’s and the Prussians’ could be seen burning; but the latter were attended by a few locals, along with some hussars to maintain the illusion. Once the assembly was complete, the bluecoats settled down for the night to rest under a clear, star-lit sky. Mitchell was a way’s back, at a comfortable distance (he was near Kuchelberg). This hardy individual had seen many hurdles with the Prussians, but this time things looked dark indeed. As for Daun, he had left his camp about dark. He intended to be astride the Katzbach with the dawn; here Lacy, Laudon, and the marshal were supposed to rendezvous prior to closing the jaws on the struggling enemy. He, too, had left minimal forces to man the fires, and was feeling his way forward in the dark night.
Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War Page 79
