Laudon’s siege of Breslau was already an abject failure, for not only was Tauentzein holding firm, but Henry was racing ahead of the dilatory Russian army that way. His men rose from Gleissen (July 27), on to Strapel. Henry was absolutely bent on containing the Russian threat. He strode forward, reaching Rietschütz (July 28), and Pudligar (next day). At the latter, the bluecoats, thoroughly worn out by all of the hard marching, had to pause until July 31. That morning, Prussian scouts reached as far as Linden, narrowly missing General Totleben’s men over by Polnisch-Lissa.
Soltikov, meanwhile, simultaneously pressed past Kosten and Guslin, which move served, in essence, to prevent Prince Henry from reaching Glogau.79 Laudon was expecting the army of Prince Henry to appear about any time now, so he took the precaution of sending out a detachment of about 2,000 men under General Count Karl Caramelli to Parchwitz, right into the projected path of the Prussians. In the meantime, Soltikov had been slowly and deliberately making his way forward with his main Russian array.80
Prince Henry reached the vicinity of Breslau on August 3, marching across the Katzbach to strike Laudon’s detachment and bakery at Parchwitz. Caramelli responded to the sudden Prussian advent by pulling back to Leubus and demolishing the bridge thereabouts, thus intervening between his force and the Prussians. The Austrians subsequently bundled into Prince Henry’s men hard-by Canth, the latter under General Werner. Werner lit into the stunned whitecoats of Caramelli, inflicting heavy losses, capturing 370 men and seven officers, a total which included General Caramelli.81 Intelligence soon reached Laudon that the Prince was at the scene, while Soltikov was still struggling along in northern Silesia.82 Knowing at once, under the circumstances, that his siege was doomed, Laudon drew up orders to fall back on Streigau. Caramelli was ordered back, and after dark on August 3, Laudon rose and fell back, effectively abandoning the siege.
Prince Henry rested his weary men a grand total of one day, August 4, and, on the next morning, he moved on Lissa, where he encamped to make ready to oppose Soltikov and Laudon if indeed they should try to join.83 Henry sent men to chase after Laudon’s retreating army, but took only a few prisoners. Prince Henry halted nearby, dropping a guard force and moving back across the Oder (August 8), flung himself and his tired army between Soltikov and Breslau. It can thus be said that Henry not only saved Breslau from each opponent in his turn, but also prevented the planned juncture of the allied armies.
The Russians continued to progress. Their van reached Kotzerke (August 5), and, on the following day, Gross-Weidenhof. At the latter destination, the main Russian army took yet another breather; mainly to see what was developing. Russian patrols reached Hunsfeld (a small point on the road from Prausnitz and Trebnitz about seven miles from Breslau) on August 8, to find no sign of Laudon or siege guns or (still more importantly to Soltikov) any signs of provisions. Instead, there was the wily Prince Henry drawn out across his path, undoubtedly intending to dispute him every inch of the way should he try for Breslau. The Prussian had ordered Colonel Reinhold von Thadden to storm the rise of Freiwald, and when the Russians did appear, the bluecoats assumed they were only General Gottlob Kurt Heinrich von Totleben’s men.84 Thadden accordingly arrived near to Freiwald, and discovered to his chagrin, that the enemy body was Soltikov’s main force.85 The Russian commander immediately lost what little enthusiasm he had had for this venture, and drew up short.
This behavior came about, in part, because Soltikov just did not trust his Austrian allies, Laudon or no Laudon.86 Any offensive plan thwarted, Soltikov would sooner or later either try again at another point to join the Austrians or else retire into Poland empty-handed. Prince Henry’s actions had utterly destroyed the allied plans of rendezvousing deep in Silesia. Again we can be tempted to believe that his wholly defensive minded maneuvers were just as equally effective, and sometimes a great deal more so, than his royal brother’s daring strokes.
At the Northern Front, the Swedes and Prussians continued their seemingly endless struggle for supremacy. General Forcade,87 with his men deployed at Rega, was attacked on June 15 by elements of General Totleben’s men. Forcade, with 10,000 men and 30 guns, was able to fend off the blow. That was enough. Totleben was soon off on new business. Meanwhile, General Langtinghausen was preparing to carry the war across the way against the Prussians. August 16, the Swedes suddenly erupted around the enemy’s left wing across the Peene. General Fersen with the Swedish Advanced Guard breached the Trebel hard-by Volksdorf. The Swedes pressed on Demmin, and, nearby, encountered the bluecoat forces of General Otto Ludwig Jung Stutterheim.88 General Augustin Ehrensvard made a concerted effort to pry the Prussians back from Anklam. The effect of the Swedish maneuvers, coupled with their superior numbers, finally compelled Jung-Stutterheim to abandon his forward posts and fall back upon Spanekow (August 21). General Fersen and Ehrensvard followed up in their turn, but their advanced units reached Ivenacke before the bluecoats finally reeled back upon Schönwald (August 22). Before the month was out, advanced detachments of Swedes stood before Rollwitz, while another force was able to encamp near Strasburg driving back Prussian patrols hard-by Pasewalk. This blow gradually forced the Prussians to pull back.89 This assemblage cleared out, Langtinghausen moved on towards Pasewalk (September 3). The Swedish commander paused there, with a strength of 17 battalions and 42 squadrons of horse. But that old familiar problem of logistics again reared its ugly head. The frail Swedish commissary system of supply about then almost completely broke down, which, in combination with disease and mounting battle casualties, really served to take the wind out of Lantinghausen’s sails. Such as it was.
Back in Saxony, General Hülsen was at Meissen, while Major-General Christian Bogislav von Linden was over at Jagen, with “Green” Kleist near Döebeln. Hülsen had his hands full with the weak Imperialist armies during all this while.90 Prince Stolberg was unbuckled upon Kesselsdorf, while General Kleefeld was encamped during this period over at Freiberg. Prussian outposts were viewed as vulnerable by the somewhat livelier allies. Stolberg surprised a bluecoat post at Siebeneichen and scattered the Prussians sheltered thereabouts.
Frederick’s departure had awakened the latter to life, and in mid–August some 30,000 men were driven by Zweibrücken, divided into 45 squadrons and 38 battalions (positioned between Plauen and Kätzenhäuser) against the Prussian positions, which were deployed between Strehla and Lockwitz. A total of between 11,000–12,000 Prussians under General Hülsen.91 Hülsen had managed to position the majority of his units on the high road to the west of Strehla. Imperialist troops seized control of the Öttendorf rise, this to shield Stolberg’s swing upon Canitz. The allied army was divided into three main pincers, originating from near Lockwitz, which was broadly designed to divert Hülsen’s attention away from his posts surmounting the Dürrenberg; these the Grenadier Battalion 11/14 and G-I/G-XI with an infantry accompaniment. Prince Stolberg led a force of ten squadrons and eight battalions, with two guns, over by Gaunitz and Torpitz, past Leobschütz aiming for the Dürrenberg (August 15). Guasco (August 14) attacked a Prussian force at Krögis, but was unable to carry the post, and was forced reluctantly to call off the attack. Two days after, General Linden rose from Jagen and moved on Döebeln to join forces with the “Green’ Kleist. Meanwhile, Guasco next motivated his Grenadier Corps over the rim of the Öttenberg, due north, facing Clanzschwitz. While these forces closed up, the ever resourceful General Kleefeld hitched round the Prussian flank to approach Hülsen’s post facing Laas (August 14).
Overnight on August 19–20, the Allies, divided into three columns, lurched into the Schlettau-Meissen country, originating from near Lockwitz, this, again, to divert General Hülsen away from the Dürrenberg. The bluecoats were composed of 17 battalions and 24 squadrons.
This was yet another of those pincer movements that the Allies, most especially the Austrians, seemed to favor more and more in later military actions of the Seven Years’ War. The forces were to set off before midnight on the night of August 19–20. Th
e weakness of the scheme lay not in its daring, which did not lack imagination, but in the hard realities associated with this type of attack. Widely divergent columns of men approaching from different directions upon an enemy posted on ground that clearly favored interior lines, all while the attackers must of necessity traverse thick woods and be without regular contact with the other columns. (The Prussians would learn the same lessons, to their chagrin, in the hard snows of Torgau, before the campaign ended.)
Wily General Hülsen, a seasoned veteran gifted with a good degree of sense, clearly did not panic and decided, with little fanfare, to take full advantage of his position of interior lines. He thus fell back completely on the defensive. With the enemy threatening to engulf the Prussian lines on the Dürrenberg,92 Hülsen took steps to pack his right flank with a better punch. Major-General Braun wasted no time in bringing in as many men together as he could. The net result was that the bluecoats, on the summit of the Dürrenberg, were able to confront the enemy’s presence.
The Allies finally uncorked their advance when Stolberg, unlimbering his artillery, commenced a ferocious shelling of the enemy position, which did not really affect the Prussian posts on the rises over by Laas, where Kleefeld was about to emerge, or from the south. The grenadiers of Burgsdorf took up at the Sittelberg, with a couple of 12-pounder guns to help stuff any allied effort from the south. It might have even been viewed with some disbelief that the Imperialists would take the offensive.
About 0500 hours on August 20, the allied artillery of Guasco commenced a lively shelling of the 7/30 Regiment, to which the Prussians hastily replied, but, with distances of more than two miles, the damage inflicted on both sides was bound to be limited. Still, under the cover of this shelling, Guasco and Prince Stolberg’s men moved up to jumping off points near Wellerswalde. Before 0600 hours, the allies rolled forward in full glory, compelling Major Lubath to recoil upon his immediate rear, while Guasco led up his grenadiers towards the Dürrenberg. General Braun unleashed the Grenadier Battalion 38/42 (Burgsdorf) on the Stilleberg and its guns straight into the face of the advancing forces of Guasco. The latter replied by turning his own artillery and started shelling, trying to knock out the Prussian posts on the Stilleberg. The allied stroke was against the Prussian right flank.
Guasco brought his grenadiers forward, where the Prussians started using their ordnance to inflict substantial losses on Guasco’s men. This forced the Allied commander to temporarily stop his progress, but the 33rd Infantry of Esterházy rolled forward its guns and the men, moved up to help Kleefeld. Hülsen unleashed some formidable cavalry, five full squadrons of Schorlemer’s Dragoons, under Major Marschall von Biberstein. The latter galloped out to strike and ride over Esterházy’s right flank, when, in the event, General Braun hurled his infantry, bayonets at the ready, into the suddenly panicked ranks of allied infantry before him. But a timely Austrian counter stroke, led up by Major Johann Tobias Seeger, stopped the progress of the Prussian horse in its tracks, compelling the bluecoats to deviate towards the ground beyond Laas.
The Prussian horse then attacked and rode down the 30th Hussars (Baranyáy). The Austrian cavalry force, placed here rather ironically to charge into a retreating enemy force, was badly used from another attack, launched this time from the cavalry of the “Green” Kleist. This was 14 full squadrons, including the remaining two squadrons of the Schorlemer Dragoons. The whitecoats were wavering when a large reinforced body of Austrian cavalry, 14 full squadrons, appeared on the scene. The force of “Green” Kleist crashed unceremoniously into the enemy cavalry ensconced between Sornewitz and Klotitz. Marschall’s riders completed the overthrow of the faltering Austrian horse. The latter flew wildly to the rear. General Hülsen’s cavalry pulled up short, and reformed on the Dürrenberg, preparing for a possible renewal of the contest. But there was no renewal. Hülsen, with his men worn out from the tussle, kept to his lines until about 1300 hours while he prepared to retire upon Torgau. While the general took his command to Torgau, the fired up riders of Kleist’s rearguard were present to ward off any allied attempt to interfere. Once Hülsen’s men arrived at the formidable fortress, the bluecoats took measures to prepare for an enemy approach. That finished the endeavor. Allied losses were 1,178 men and 39 officers, not counting the missing, etc.93 So Allied losses were some 2,000 men.94 Prussian losses were approximately 559 killed and 503 wounded.
As soon as this episode ended, the Allies, not venturing to give direct chase to Hülsen, neatly side-stepped the bluecoats to continue their task. So this temporary repulse was not enough by itself to deter Zweibrücken, who was in an uncharacteristically aggressive temperament just then. He saw the long-awaited chance of recovering Saxony, at a single stroke. Nevertheless, Hülsen kept to his works, and withdrew on the morning of August 20 slowly towards Torgau.95 The magazine thereabouts provided sustenance for his army, and Hülsen thus resolved to keep his post despite the fact that the enemy was being constantly reinforced.
At this stage, the pressure from the enemy upon Hülsen’s lines steadily increased. Part of the goading was applied by Duke Karl Eugen of Württemberg’s command of some 8,000 men, which took up positions close-by (September 12), although Duke Karl was not prepared to place his force under Imperialist control, and so his force operated independently.
Daun brought his army up to Altbelgern (August 25), confronting the Prussian king, over by Breslau. The next day, Prince Stolberg and General Kleefeld rolled across the Elbe, encountering little Prussian resistance, while the marshal progressed on to Tristewitz. From here, Austrian patrols were gradually pressed across the Elbe, while General Hülsen, not panicked by any means, resolved to stubbornly hold on to Torgau.96 The whitecoats, nonplused, fell back across the Elbe and made for Schildau (August 27). On September 2, Hülsen pushed out patrols to aggressively probe for the main Austrian army, which was unbuckled upon Doberschütz without ceremony. Prince Stolberg, not to be left isolated, was pushed to Schildau, while General Kleefeld seized posts north of Torgau, hard about Wildenhain. Other Austrian forces, under Colonel Zedwitz, stayed immobile about Belgern.
Meanwhile, the opposing forces took a breather for nearly three weeks. Duke Karl Eugen of Württemberg took his men and moved to join up with General Luzinsky at Pretzsch (September 21). Meanwhile, General Hülsen, flinging off some of the conservatism he was noted for, suddenly took the initiative (September 26) just when he would have been better off to have instead stayed put.97 The Prussian force was pressed directly through the streets of Torgau to swing in upon a significant body of the enemy that, at first glance, appeared to be isolated from the rest of the Allied forces.
Hülsen was beginning to doubt whether he would be able to retain more than a small section of Saxony without needed reinforcements.98 By September 25, Hülsen had been forced to retire from both Torgau and Leipzig under the intensifying Imperialist pressure. Duke Karl Eugen’s men broke the barrier of the Elbe, while the main Austrian army lurched off towards Torgau. The enemy were threatening to outflank him, and Torgau finally fell. This took place on September 27, when the garrison, a little over 1,800 men (consisting of one battalion of the Grohlman Garrison Regiment, one battalion of the Life Guarde, and the Lettow Garrison Regiment)99 under Lt.-Col. Ernst Freiherr von Normann, marched out.100 The 1st Battalion of Grohlman was taken prisoner at Torgau on September 27, and the second at Wittenberg.101 The Austrians promptly rolled across the Elbe and took up post at Litchenberg. Through it all, Wittenberg alone held. It was clear that Wittenberg would prove to be a physical location where the opponents might have major issues. From both perspectives.
Hülsen, still looking to make a stand against the Imperialists, was moving on Wittenberg. With the tussle at Strehla behind him, the Prussian commander determined to stand his ground, and Zweibrücken, for his part, did not go out of his way to seek another engagement. Yet.
Then, with the foe pulling off on Wittenberg, the Allies suddenly came to life. October 2, Zweibrücken sent the Grenadi
er Corps forward against the bluecoats, now firmly ensconced in Wittenberg. The Prussian artillery, during this time, was impressive. Four batteries of guns in the area thereabouts. In the event, this first attack carried the village of Teuchol outright, but could progress no further. General Hadik then launched an attack (led by General Luzinsky) against the Prussian rear hard-by Dobien. Major-General Vecsey did not get on track right away, however, and Prussian forces, taking advantage of this situation, drove off General Luzinsky and would likely have gained the day except that Zweibrücken rather aggressively rolled into Schmilkendorf and cut Hülsen off from the rear.
That effectively sealed the deal, and the beaten Prussians withdrew towards Rosslau. Some “300 to 400 men had been lost on each side.”102 The repercussions were obvious. With Hülsen & Company moving off in the direction of home, Wittenberg was left to its own devices. Zweibrücken laid siege to the walled university town, and grimly resolved to take the place. The allied siege lines were commenced around October 10, and the besiegers were keenly resolved to keep the Prussians from sending any relief to Wittenberg. With allied batteries being set up, most especially fronting the north and the northwest ends of the place, the Prussians were determined to dig in and hold their ground. Wittenberg itself had old, but solid walls, backed up by enormous 24-pounder cannon embedded in those walls.
The garrison,103 consisting of two garrison regiments (Infantry Regiment Plotho and the 2nd Battalion of Grohlman), under the command of General Salemnon, tried to mount a defense.104 The allies commenced shelling the town walls on October 13, with three batteries of three cannon, a battery of three mortars, and three howitzers, a total of some 15 pieces, all under the charge of Major Anton Grumbach. The firing was sustained for a while, but, even though a couple of the Prussian pieces were unseated and damaged, Zweibrücken realized he did not have sufficient firepower in his 12-pounder guns to accomplish much in the way of inflicting damage on the fortress. With this less than stunning revelation, the attackers accordingly shifted their bombardment to the town itself. This decision was reached reluctantly, since Wittenberg was such an old, historic city that had a number of imposing façades. Zweibrücken was in receipt of some dark intelligence. The rumor mill was churning, and the Prussian king was said, on good faith, to be en route to Saxony to try to gain back that part of Saxony that had been sacrificed lately. There was thus, under these circumstances, no time to lose, hence the accelerated rate of the bombardment.
Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War Page 82
