Meanwhile, Daun, protesting as usual that he was being exposed to Prussian prowess, in his turn took the field (May 8), taking up a secure location directly in front of the prize location of Dresden, the one major city which remained beyond the king’s grasp in Saxony.8 The marshal did see good to push off a detachment under General Sincère to go occupy the key post of Zittau, which Daun was ordered to maintain at all hazards. On July 3, the worried Empress communicated as such in a letter to Marshal Daun, and that the force at Zittau “had to be kept at 20,000 combatants,” and worse (from Marshal Daun’s viewpoint), kept for the disposal/availability of Laudon over in Silesia.9 This substantially reduced the real number of warriors that Daun himself had available for field campaigning in Saxony.
Furthermore, Prince Henry was to command this season in Saxony, where he would have between 30,000–36,000 men with him,10 while Daun had built up, in a short amount of time we might add, to approximately 79,695 men in his camp.11 Daun’s ranks on June 30 had been approximately 52,134 men.12 Another singular fact remained. Between Prince Henry and the “Green” Kleist, the previous campaign had been a very successful one, as even the enemy readily acknowledged.13
Once an allied offensive was underway, though, the objectives of this campaign would be fairly straightforward. Contingent upon a successful offensive operation was largely how the two main Allied forces managed to form a juncture. This last operation was supposed to take place in the vicinity of Neisse. Then, with the momentum clearly on the side of the Allies, they were to seize Neisse and target the other fortresses of central Silesia.14
After Frederick reached Silesia, he unbuckled Goltz to go to Glogau with some 10,000 men (15 battalions, 26 squadrons) to watch for the advance of the Russians. The king was expecting a Russian strategic plan to be forthcoming momentarily, for his excellent spy network was in touch with none other than Totleben himself. The Prussians indeed had one of the best espionage networks in Europe at the time.15 In sharp contrast to this, stood a nation like France. The agents that nation employed “seem to have been individuals of very little ability … [who] provided information of only the most rudimentary sort.”16
The Russians, meanwhile, had started to march by that point.17 Around May 20, the Russian bear emerged from his winter hibernation, moving with some dexterity of purpose on Dirschau. May 25, the greencoats were at Münsterwalde, where they paused for a time to regroup. May 30, the Russian horde rolled towards Neuenburg, and about June 4, reached Nakel. From here, Posen was not much of a stretch, and Russian scouts probed towards the latter. About June 26, the Russian mass, still trudging forward slowly, reached Maszinna. By that point, with the Russians making it into the main theater of operations, their movements were more carefully scrutinized by both the Austrians and the Prussians.
Frederick was interested in these developments, to say the least. From General Goltz, came the idea for a reinforced corps of 20,000 men, to be led by Goltz himself, of course, to strike at the Russians while they were still en route for the anticipated juncture with Laudon. The plan actually involved taking on the three separated columns by which Buturlin was making his passage one at a time.18 There was a need for reinforcements, though, if the idea were to be brought to fruition. The king dispatched 11 battalions and 20 full squadrons, right around 10,000 more men, to go with Goltz. Before the assistance could arrive, Goltz, who had utterly ruined his health by nearly constant agitation and worry, fell ill with a raging fever. Frederick sent forth his trusted old hussar, Ziethen, to help lighten the load on Goltz as much as he could and expedite Goltz’ recovery, if possible. But the latter, in the meanwhile, worsened and died on June 30.19 Yet another of Frederick’s better field generals was gone.
Ziethen immediately took full charge of the operation, following Goltz’ demise, and actually made an abortive, half-hearted attempt to intercept the enemy’s march. Ziethen divided his force (which consisted of 24 battalions and 47 squadrons of cavalry) into two individual formations. One of the assemblies moved, via Stare Drzewcze and Grosse-Lissen, towards Koscielnye, while the second body rolled through the streets of Glogau itself, past Ösowa Zien aiming at Fraustadt. Almost immediately, the forward elements of the Prussian advanced guard, led by the ever vigilant Colonel von Lossow, encountered and charged a Russian force at Semiegle (June 30). A short altercation sent the greencoats in that post and their commander, General Lopen, scurrying towards the rear, carrying away most of the force but leaving 42 men behind as casualties. Prussian losses were 14 dead and wounded, and 18 captured in the brief scuffle.20 General Ziethen wasted no time here in pressing forward, but failed to venture past Kosten, unsure about the strength of the enemy.
Once there, the hussar leader paused, evaluating as best he could the whole developing situation. Bluecoat patrols probed to Storcknesch, while Buturlin’s scouts veered off on Dolzig, without further interference from the Prussians. Buturlin indeed made Dolzig a rallying point for the slowly advancing Russian forces, which move finally induced Ziethen himself to react to this inexorably worsening situation. Dalwigg was forthwith ordered to make a determined effort to blunt the Russian advance. He promptly attacked the enemy opposite to him, on July 8, sending the vaunted Ruesch Hussars to the task. They performed their chore with much vigor and enthusiasm, broke through the much harried enemy line, and promptly sent the Russians (minus 200 men lost in the scuffle) reeling backwards. Dalwigg lost 20 men for his part, but retreated in short order as disturbing reports were reaching his ears now that Buturlin was continuing to build up his forces in the immediate vicinity.
The Russian host now veered off to Nowieczek, while the main army of Frederick had reached no farther than Posen. In their own territory, the bluecoats could usually rely upon locals for reliable information about enemy movements, but Ziethen’s scouts sure let him down in Poland. Upon being told by his scouts that the greencoats were already as far as Börcken (which turned out to be incorrect), Ziethen pressed with his own force on Bojanovo (July 9), and Trachenberg (July 10). By the time the indomitable hussar ascertained that the Russians were not at Börcken, his own men had reached the relative security of Prausnitz (about July 12). Ironically, the same day, the greencoat advanced units finally did get into Börcken. Buturlin’s patrols were far reaching, storming into Kobylin on July 12, and, after a brief pause at Zduny, again to collect stragglers, the Russian mass finally reached Silesia itself at Prestowitz; but a short distance by land from Bethlen’s outposts astride the Oder at Oppeln. Another short pause was given to the Russian array to close up the stragglers (of whom there must have been a great number, especially taking into account the more than usual “energetic” pace of the march). Then July 20, Buturlin finally lunged at Wartenberg.
Meanwhile, Laudon was back at it again. He rose on July 20, pushing, in three columns this time, proceeding by Wustegiesdorf, aiming all the while for Neisse. At the latter locale, he was supposed to join up with the Russians. Whilst this was occurring, General Brentano, who had his own force, was unbuckled upon Münsterberg, and Luzinsky, joined to Ellrichshausen, lunged from Landshut on to Habendorf (July 20). Laudon, in his sphere, was acting the part of the Deceiver in sending out these two auxiliary forces to sidetrack the Prussian monarch if he could as to his real purpose. Although he tried “to conceal his real object from the king, Frederic [sic] at once penetrated his design,” which was to lunge across the Oder, “without a battle.”21 Frederick was resolved to prevent this. Ziethen, meanwhile, was preparing to abandon his expedition into Poland. The old Prussian hussar had no other choice. The roads were thick with the enemy, and there was little in the way of Prussian forces behind him in Silesia.
There had been some success, but meanwhile Buturlin’s disunited units were reassembled, hard about Tschechen. By about July 20, Buturlin was at Namslau, threatening Breslau and looking for an immediate rendezvous with the Austrians. And the Russians were back hard at another one of their favorite indulgences: plunder. In fact, the band of “Buturlin, w
hose army had enjoyed an orgy of rape and pillage east of the Oder” must have been anticipating even more “riches” once they crossed the Oder.22
Ziethen thus had little choice but to return to try to impede Buturlin’s inexorable advance. His shortage of troops, most especially of cavalry, had doomed a fine effort. Frederick, in short, soon ordered Ziethen recalled in any case; only a screening force under Knobloch was to be left at Hunsfeld.23 The foregoing had helped demonstrate a disturbing pattern. One that would become all too familiar to the Prussians in 1761. For a wholly offensive-minded commander, the Prussian leader had little real choice in Campaign 1761 but to largely sway to the punches of Buturlin and of Laudon.
Furthermore, for the first time, the king was forced to wage a defensive campaign in the hope of forestalling what in this early period of 1761 still appeared to be inevitable sooner rather than later—the eventual defeat of Prussia in this war. Frederick could not challenge his individual opponents in the field one at a time, for they would have none of it. And it was tantamount to military suicide to face them together in the open field; such a juncture, provided the enemy took “full advantage” of the opportunity, was likely to be fatal, with or without a battle.
In the event, in order to circumvent the expected Austro-Russian link, looked for near to Neisse, Frederick then undertook a series of maneuvers designed to throw his frail army between the energetic Laudon and the dilatory Buturlin. Laudon, who had the task of gathering up reinforcements, was up to some 75,000 men strong by that point.24 In mid–July, he began to stir, hearing news that the Russians were finally nearing Breslau.25
About July 18, upon word the Austrian commander was likely making for Neisse, Frederick, with the Russians coming up slowly behind him, flung his 50,000-man army into Laudon’s path near Münsterberg and thereby foiled the effort of joining Buturlin (who was himself wasting valuable campaigning time at that point by hesitating). Two nights after, the hard pressed monarch pushed to Siegenroth, over near Nimptsch. Knobloch was still ensconced at Hunsfeld, and Ziethen was camped out at Brieg for the moment, waiting out developments.
July 21, meanwhile, Laudon sauntered into Münsterberg, while his right flank stretched over to Leipe, facing Luzinsky, who had by now crawled forward to Kleitschberg. The various opposing units were still playing a game almost of cat and mouse, with no clear advantage to either side. Laudon, for his part, was not content by any means to set back and await further developments, even though he was as yet still acting under the restraint of Vienna.26 The very next morning, he rose and made for Grosse-Nossen, while Brentano probed towards Münsterberg to take over Laudon’s old camp. This maneuver put the Austrians squarely in the Prussian path over towards Neisse.
The king, with his route blocked, had no choice but to react. The bluecoats, once more divided into three columns in order to expedite their movement, pressed off to Karlowitz (about 0300 hours on July 21), hoping to lure Laudon out for a fight.27 The latter force was in very close proximity, which likely increased Frederick’s hopeful belief that Laudon might be emerging at long last for a brawl hard by Heinrichau.
The bluecoat army, for this particular mission, was once more distributed into three separate formations. One of the columns rolled through Tarchnitz and Heinrichau, consisting of the Salemnon Free Battalion and five squadrons of hussars under Major Karl Erdmann von Reitzenstein; the whole ensemble was being led forward by the king himself. This one was opposed to the forces of General Brentano. Another procession traversed the thick woods over by Ober-Kunzendorf aiming at Schulzendorf, while the third column rolled by Wiesenthal and Glasendorf. The bluecoats were certainly readying for what looked like a sure-fire battle/encounter of some sort.
The Prussian march naturally carried it directly past the Austrian right wing, where Luzinsky was in charge. Now occurred one of the unfortunate little episodes of war. Luzinsky sent off dispatch after dispatch to Laudon’s headquarters to the effect that the bluecoats were easing past his position, advancing directly upon Gross-Nossen. At the beginning, Laudon wholly ignored the missives, but his next new encampment was to have been astride that selfsame Gross-Nossen on the morrow. Laudon unaccountably hesitated, especially with his great foe astride the very post he needed for his own army.
However, once the matter was brazenly apparent, the Austrian reaction to the bluecoat encroachments was predictable. Laudon ordered his men to go on the alert, while Brentano himself was careful to bar the enemy from Münsterberg as far as possible, even though he too must have vacillated at first. Both commanders seemed almost in a fog. Then they suddenly appeared to waken. Brentano, following Laudon’s lead, finally took active measures to oppose the foe. His artillery train was posted on the rise of Öhlgotte, and commenced blasting away in the direction of the Galgenburg. A bluecoat advance guard, driven forward on the run, now pressed the enemy back in confusion well past Grosse-Nossen. The Prussian advance was not terribly involved. The fact remained, in the end, though, that the designs of General Laudon had been trumped.
Moreover, Luzinsky, convinced that he had been left out to dry by his superior, grumbled aloud with some degree on intensity that his warnings about the Prussian march had been disregarded by Laudon. The whole incident, actually rather limited in nature as it turned out and with no permanent impairment to Austrian arms, nevertheless produced a damaging rift between Luzinsky and Laudon. One which resulted in bitter enmity, and which had to be well visible to the rest of the junior officer corps present with Laudon’s command. The resulting backlash was also inevitable. Luzinsky was subsequently shipped off to join the Imperialists, and was never again around Laudon as a subordinate in any capacity.28
Meanwhile, the ever resourceful king, in the first real action of his new campaign, led a force composed of the 33/42 Nimschöfsky Grenadiers and Salemnon, against the enemy over in Münsterberg, while Prussian guns opened up to try to zero in on the enemy artillery on the ridge opposite to them (July 22). The following bluecoat attack was pressed forward immediately with some limited advantage. It soon became clear to the whitecoats thereabouts that the king’s men had gotten the better of the action. This becoming obvious, the Austrians, with their right wing being taken in enfilade, gave up the ghost, wending back in the direction of Beerwalde. The king forthwith took his army to Gross-Karlowitz, with his left now leaning upon Grachwitz.
In this latest post, the Prussian main army was in the enviable position of holding close to Neisse, which immediately rendered Allied attempts to link up thereabouts out of the question. The king, nonplused by all of this, affected a new line from Űllersdorf leaning over towards Woitz. Bluecoat patrols squeezed Bethlen out from Oppeln, moreover Ziethen, with the Poland adventure now in the books, rolled into Falkenburg, while Knobloch, stirring at long last, set up camp over by Lëwin, facing a line by Schurgast.
Bethlen, who had in the meanwhile, withdrawn to Schnellenwalde, seized the initiative as best he could, and, being joined up with General Draskovitch’s men, erupted against Oppeln (July 26); this latter move being primarily designed to link up with Buturlin’s men.
While General Jahnus took up his position over at the well-traveled point of Waldenburg, Laudon, perhaps acting under the supposition that he was becoming too convenient a target for the main Prussian army, fell away on to Frankenstein, taking up his old digs (July 28–29), all while sending out patrols to keep him informed about the relevant Prussian marches in the area. The Austrians were still acting with some degree of nervousness, with good reason.
Frederick, meanwhile, had decided to act the part of the aggressor. It was a rôle he knew well, probably too well for his own good sometimes. He seized on the idea of attacking Bethlen’s command, now ensconced back in Oppeln (from where they had just ejected the bluecoat guard force), as a means to subvert if at all possible the planned juncture of the Austrians and the Russians. The situation for the bluecoats seemed daily to be growing more grave, so, on July 29, the king decided he could wait no longer. He sh
ook his formations into motion, wending past Lindenwiese, pausing at Öppersdorf. Knobloch passed on to Milkow, acting as a sort of reinforcement for the Prussian forces in that region.
The Austrians were by no means inactive. Jahnus brought his body of men to join Laudon’s flank over at Nickelsdorf, Luzinsky holding fast to Kamenz, while General Brentano, huffing and puffing the whole time, set up for business on the rises about Stölz. Finally, Draskovitch with his body of men pressed over to meet Bethlen about Neustadt.
The wanderings of the different bluecoat formations likewise continued, without interruption. The king rolled forward against the Draskovitch-Bethlen combination over at Neustadt (July 30), while Ziethen made at his best pace for Zultz in order to come up with the king’s main force. Knobloch, not to be outdone by the others, moved dexterously on Steinau. Frederick was anticipating some kind of firefight with the whitecoats at Neustadt, but Draskovitch & Company on this occasion did not prove to be so obliging. The latter fell back without hesitation to set up stakes at Jägerndorf, while the Prussian monarch, acknowledging the enemy were not ready to “play” as of yet, pulled back to Kunzendorf.
Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War Page 92
