So, during the night of September 29–30, General Laudon alerted his army to prepare to carry out an assault upon Schweidnitz; the next morning, the Austrians set out on their mission.5 The unfortunate garrison of Schweidnitz was trapped. By 1000 hours on September 30, the whitecoats had thrown a ring around the whole of the Schweidnitz bastion in preparation to storm it, led on the spot by General Jahnus, although Amadei was to head the whole attack force in person. The enormous logistical considerations/details for the coordinated assault were worked out by Laudon’s Chief of Staff, the Marquis Ernst Friedrich Giannini. A throng of Croats was flung out in the vicinity to impede any Prussian rescue attempts, while other troops assembled scaling ladders. Laudon, by eschewing a siege (and all that a siege entailed), intended to take Schweidnitz by utter storm. By going over the walls. A large number of Austrian battalions (a total of 20)6 were detailed for the actual assault, while Cherneyshev contributed 800 of his finest grenadiers to help. About 2100 hours, the troops entrusted to the attack took up their stations.
The Prussian forces involved in defending Schweidnitz were a hodgepodge crew. The details are enlightening. The abutment of the Wasser [Water] Fort was held by the most men, some 80 of the garrison. It was fronted by the Schweidnitz Water, and fully exposed to Austrian maneuvers from the eastern side. This particular post was anchored by 12 pieces of artillery, including four mortars.7 It also happened to be the location of a P.O.W. facility which housed some 787 prisoners.8 For each of the four forts which made up the Schweidnitz Compound, the bluecoats could deploy a total of approximately 130 men with a similar number held back in reserve in case of need. There was also a mobile reserve of more than 1,400 men, over and above the other forces within the compound. At the main complex, Zastrow was leading about 400 men separate from the other forces.
The Bögen Fort, the southernmost of the embrasures, also housed the greatest quantity of ordnance: 27 guns. All of the enclosures, however, suffered from a shortage of experienced artillerymen, a deficiency which proved crucial in the imminent action. As for the main gate of the complex, a separate force of 36 men were detailed to keep it secure from the Allied encroachments.
An assault by the allied force was an involved procedure, but certainly one conducive to a bit of deft organization. Laudon and his staff did indeed prep well, and so the attack ended more favorably than could have been anticipated at first. As a part of the scheme, there would be no artillery preparation.
The assault groups were summarily divided into four, one for each of the four main enclosures, all under the joint command of Major-General Amadei. The assaults were to be made with as much synchronization as was possible under the prevailing conditions. This while Jahnus led his own body of men to lay hold of Kletschkau. The engineers were ready.
Around 0200 hours, October 1, the much anticipated strike commenced, at the point of the bayonet. No musketry was initially permitted, again so as not to alert the Prussians inside Schweidnitz as to what was unfolding. The onslaught was commenced “without opposition, they [i.e., the attacking men] fixed their scaling ladders, and had begun to mount before they were perceived by the garrison.”9 Laudon himself waited at Schönbrunn to hear the results of the effort, with reinforcements standing at the ready in case of need. No sacking of the valuable Schweidnitz fortress or its content was to be permitted, and so Laudon offered monetary rewards instead to “inspire” his men to obey this very necessary provision.
Meanwhile, over in the Prussian camp, Zastrow, Frederick’s johnny-on-the-spot, was smarter than Laudon gave him credit for being. Zastrow certainly knew on the morning of September 30 what was happening. In truth, there was precious little he could do about it. But, as night fell, the Prussian commander sent patrols beyond the fortress walls to discern what the enemy were doing. One of these patrols stumbled upon the Austrians and Russians moving up in the darkness, and immediately reported this fact to Zastrow. A few rockets were shot off to illuminate the scene, the enemy were discovered very close-by. Zastrow had also been careful to deploy his limited available forces where they could be of the most use.
On the other hand, Archenholtz states a “captured Austrian officer called Roca was [given] unlimited access to the whole of Schweidnitz Compound; he forwarded the information to Laudon.” Also that Zastrow, in violating more of war’s most sacred rules about being in ignorance of the foe’s movements “failed to despatch scouts to patrol the vicinity.”10
Nevertheless, when the initial blow fell, the column of Lt.-Col. de Vins (employing Major Hoym as his chief engineer) railed against the southern side of Schweidnitz, at the Bögen Fort. The Prussians within, led by Major Ripp, reacted as best they could (0215 hours). The fight that soon erupted may have been short, but it was far from sweet. Within about 40 minutes, Lt.-Col. Caldwell’s column (with the chief engineer of Fabris Count von Cassano), issuing from Schönbrunn, hit the bluecoat posts (commanded by Major Siegeroth) at the Garten Fort, which were being entered just about then by the wavering Prussian horse. Resistance to the intruders was forlorn at best. There was precious little that could be done, so the outnumbered Prussians, after repelling two very determined assaults, fell back towards the main complex.
Meanwhile, Colonel Wallis, fired up with the effort against the Galgen Fort, made a supreme exertion in trying to take the structure, and in this he was ably aided by the grenadiers of the Russian Cherneyshev. The engineer in charge thereabouts was Major Philipp Elmt. The Allied enterprise was repulsed initially with heavy loss, as were three other attacks, but, receiving new men from General Dombâle’s command, the strengthened forces finally overcame the fierce, but determined, resistance of the Tresckow infantry. Finally, the Jauernicker Fort, manned by the Prussians of Major Berrenhauer, was attacked by the Allies of Major Lincke (the chief engineer of this column was Major Köppenzoller). Major Elmt took it upon himself to put a halt to the proceedings at the Galgen Fort when his men reached the enemy magazine down the causeway at the rear of the main fort.11 The bluecoats finally gave way begrudgingly, falling back to make a last stand at the Wasser Fort, as the rest of Schweidnitz was by then in Allied hands.
The attackers, nevertheless, speedily overran the outlying works, but the main bastion’s defenders at first valiantly repelled the enemy effort. These bluecoats were now thoroughly awake. An explosion in a powder magazine had killed about 400 densely-packed men and momentarily delayed the assault, while at another spot the Russian grenadiers were temporarily stopped near a rampart by very accurate Prussian fire. Quickly, however, Cherneyshev’s elite troops overcame their opponents, and stormed the town wall. Just about the same time, the Austrian prisoners housed within the Wasser Fort, knowing full well what was occurring outside of the complex, freed themselves in the confusion of the moment and attacked the bluecoats from behind while lowering the drawbridge to let in their comrades. As a result, the Wasser Fort was in Allied hands in short order. The Russians had accomplished their part. Once the Prussian resistance was done, the greencoats simply paused to await further instructions. In truth, Cherneyshev’s fine soldiers set a splendid example, one on this occasion not followed. They witnessed a maddening plunder when the Austrians finally broke in around 0530 hours, despite Laudon’s stern admonition against ransacking. The bluecoat survivors then forthwith laid down their arms.
The very successful attack (by far the single most important military event of the entire Campaign 1761) cost Laudon 1,500 casualties. But the losers not only lost the entire garrison of 3,800 men,12 but also impressive stores fell into the eager hands of the whitecoats. Stores of provisions, 211 heavy cannon, 135 mortars, some 1,300,600 musket cartridges, and 123,077 cannon shot.13 As soon as the smoke began to dissipate, Laudon sent Lt.-Col. Caldwell on his merry way to carry the news to his “superior” Daun, over in Saxony. Knowing how the high-born Austrian officer corps as a whole generally turned their collective noses up at the modest-reared Laudon, the latter had to derive some considerable degree of satisfaction from C
aldwell’s mission. For the bluecoats, the news was not so joyous. A bad reverse! But, worst of all, Laudon’s little coup cost the Prussian king Schweidnitz and would have been a far heavier blow than it turned out to be if not for a sudden, imminent reversal of fortune on the part of the warring powers. Nevertheless, control of southern Silesia was forfeited for a time to the fired up Austrians.
We might now turn our attention to briefly narrate Prince Henry’s operations in Saxony against Marshal Daun.14 The prince had been ordered by Frederick to fight only a delaying action with Daun, with a commensurate minimal involvement and modest objectives. Should the Austrians march from Saxony on into Silesia, Prince Henry was to leave a holding force in the former and race over to join his brother within the confines of the latter. With the withdrawal of large numbers of Prussian troops from Saxony to stiffen the main body over in Silesia and other fronts,15 Henry was forced to contract his lines in to Schlettau at Katzenhäuser in early May. From that point of vantage, he was in a position to keep an eye not only on Dresden but also Daun’s large army thereabouts. There is some evidence that Prince Henry’s army was being dangerously reduced. June 20, Mitchell “reported that the prince’s army had a “paper” strength of 43,000[,] but [in reality] numbered only 28,000 effectives.”16
Over in the Allied camp, the Imperialists were sure in a predicament. A similar one, in fact; too familiar for the Imperialists. Their army at the beginning of the campaign had been ensconced hard about Crönach, where the commander, General Hadik, was headquartered over the winter of 1760–1761. This force was in desperate straits, with grim prospects for any improvement. Imperialist posts stretched into Thuringia, confronting General Hülsen and his recently successful encroachments against them in southwest Saxony.
General Syburg brought a force of 20 squadrons of Prussian horse swinging out of Erfurt through Weimar (February 27), which further boosted Prussian prospects against the Reich Army. A body of the latter, under Marshal Rosenfeld (five battalions, one cuirassier regiment and one regiment of hussars), was deployed about Saalfeld and Schwarza. Major-General Baron Vecsey (with three battalions and four companies of grenadiers) encountered a force of the bluecoats at Schwarza (March 3), another limited action which further trouble added to the army’s woes. The Prussians here were from Free Battalion Collignon, along with three regiments of cuirassiers, under Major Anhalt and Colonel Lölhoffel.17
Moreover, the formerly “close” working relationship that had existed between the Reich Army and the Austrians had eroded badly by 1761, and there was now a significant gap yawning between the two forces which the bluecoats could take advantage of, provided they were in a condition to do so. In addition, the raw strength of the Imperialist army was not what it should have been, as many of the German Reich states had not yet sent their full complement of contingents. So what else was new? If that itself were not bad enough, shortages of equipment of all kinds were becoming very pronounced. A situation that, without help, could only worsen over time. As a final insult, much of what was available was scattered among the various factions.
The Imperials were also out of effective support from the French; between their two forces yawned an even wider gap. In spite of everything, the Reich army continued to function, even if in a perfunctory degree. Hadik kept Rosenfeld’s men hard about Saalfeld, where the latter promptly got into an altercation with one of the Prussian patrols (night of March 9–10). This time, it was a body of bluecoat hussars under Major Prittwitz and the Free Battalion Lüderitz, against some 2,000 men under Vecsey. More woes.
Over in the Prussian camp, meanwhile, General Schenckendorff had been unbuckled to press against the Imperialists, working—and in conjunction—with Syburg’s horse. This was over by Schleiz (March 16–17). The Prussian advance rolled through Rast (March 16), and, at Schleiz, they encountered the Imperialist cavalry units of Saxe-Gotha and the Pfalz Dragoons.18 Now General Kleefeld was posted about Obschütz. He and Schenckendorff’s Prussians promptly engaged in a desultory cannonade before the bluecoats attacked at about noon, in a half-hearted manner, on March 17. Not much came of this affair, though. None of these developments fazed General Guasco, who was encamped behind Röda, with his headquarters at Jena.
All of this sure kept the pressure upon the Allies, but in particular the Reich Army. The duo of Syburg and Schenckendorff were also far from done. Their command staff must have expended much effort preparing for their new endeavor. An organizational chart of the expeditionary force, set out in detail, shows the extent of the preparations.19 April 1, Syburg pressed off from Orlamünde, with Schenckendorff rolling towards Neustadt. The latter’s command boasted five full squadrons of the Ziethen Hussars under Major von Hundt. As for Rosenfeld’s command, it contained six full infantry battalions and the cavalry of Vecsey. An encounter at Saalfeld on April 2, was the next one in this series of lightweight fights—although the Saalfeld tussle was a larger one than normal.
Major Prittwitz was leading the 2nd Hussars as the advance guard, which drove straight into the streets of Schwarza, where the enemy had two battalions (from Crosten and Wöhlsdorf) and two squadrons of horse. Prittwitz’ charge was straight into the flank of the enemy, while Schenckendorff simultaneously kept Rosenfeld busy at the front. The Prussian cavalry quickly overcame the enemy, “taking the commander and 400 men prisoners, along with four cannon and two flags.”20 The fired up troopers then rode straight down the road to Saalfeld without hesitation, driving off in confusion or capturing the Imperialists thereabouts, capturing another 900 prisoners and six guns. The price they paid was grievous. Major Hundt and a number of other lads fell in the fighting on that day.21 (Map #10 from Kessel’s work provides a large scale map of the action at Saalfeld.) Soon after, Hadik turned over the chief command of the Imperials to Serbelloni, on April 9, in an arrangement that few liked. The Imperialist army was soon after, May 23, ordered over to Ronneburg, from where it could threaten the flank of Prince Henry.
The Imperialist move in support of the whitecoats makes for depressing reading. There was no organized commissary of any kind for the Reich army at this stage, and little to no attempt to provide any kind of sustenance for the hungry soldiers. Nevertheless, by July 20, Serbelloni’s men were at Ronneburg, right on the threshold of Prince Henry’s door.
There was little meaningful action in Saxony while the main contenders maneuvered back and forth in Silesia over the summer.22 Prince Henry was more or less content to assume a dormant stance, only sending “Green” Kleist and Seydlitz to shove back the façade Imperialist Army from southwest Saxony.23 Ah, yes, Seydlitz!
Prince Henry did benefit from the addition of Seydlitz to his list of subordinates. The latter had finally healed sufficiently to return for full field duty in 1761, but the king, rightly (if not magnanimously) viewing Prince Henry as in the most need of experienced attendants, sent Seydlitz to Saxony straightaway. Henry was to deal with the Saxon theater this season. But, to reiterate, most of the Campaign 1761 in Saxony was to be waged in the form of small, isolated clashes with modest pockets of men wrangling over very limited objectives. One such encounter was courtesy of our old friend Colonel Török. August 18, Török’s forces suddenly struck at Prussian outposts near Neunkirchen, Hirschfeld, and Siebenlehn.24 The damage subsequently inflicted was not substantial, but even before this “Green” Kleist had also been unbuckled from Döebeln with an intrusion of his own in mind.
Kleist was juxtaposed against Serbelloni at Penig—where General Nauendorf had three battalions of infantry and one regiment of dragoons, a total of some 3,500 men—while the Prussian had a single regiment of infantry and 500 cuirassiers. Kleist pulled back, on August 1, through Waldheim and Schmiezerhayn, through Seifersdorf and Luzenau, endeavoring all the while to try to outflank Nauendorf’s larger contingent. He encountered Imperialist supply wagons and a force hard about Löhma (at Ronneburg), which ended up causing still more difficulties for the Reich forces.25 This host was most certainly short of manpower. The whole
of the Imperialist army in the field was reckoned as approximately 18,952 men as of the end of June.26 Still, they stayed put about Ronneburg and Reichenbach.
The latter did not show any steadiness, and the one lingering problem that bothered the Prussians was the lack of men to garrison the areas so regained. Nonetheless, the presence of Marshal Daun and of his Austrian army were of very serious concern, and it did not help matters that Henry was ordered to keep watch on other theaters of war besides Saxony.
Finally, Seydlitz & Company lashed out, so to speak. Seydlitz’ men, based in Mannichswald, probed forward, on September 4, towards Serbelloni’s position. While the bluecoats prepared to attack, Serbelloni tried to parry the thrust by pushing additional men and material to hold posts at the Reustenberg, while trying to keep on the alert for the Prussian movements. Next day, Seydlitz’ men debouched towards the Imperialist position, fully intending to make an attack, but found that the Reustenberg was now held, not by a small body of men, but by a large force with artillery who also had the vantage point over any attack; this was a similar situation to the one encountered by the king with Laudon on the heights of Hohenfriedberg on August 14. Under these changed circumstances, Seydlitz did not deign press forward with his attack, and Serbelloni hitched back upon Würben. In the spirit of Allied cooperation, or rather lack of the same, Marshal Daun had not troubled himself to even try to help Serbelloni and his army out.
For instance, at Ferdinand’s urging (August 1761) Prince Henry detailed a force to lay hold of Wolfenbüttel and thereby threaten the French positions they occupied in Hanover, while at the same moment screening Magdeburg against possible French encroachment. Nearly simultaneously, other task forces had also been sent. General Stutterheim’s body of men was instructed to face down the Swedish threat. The latter host was acting with uncharacteristic energy in this 1761 Campaign.
Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War Page 95
