At Prague, the local citizens closed the gates (July 12) and mounted ordnance on the walls against the roaming Cossack bands, in the spirit (but not the substance of) the Great Siege of 1757. The nearby towns of Staudenz and Raatsch were sacked, prominent citizens killed or carried off, and many of the local women raped. The extent of strategic damage inflicted upon the Austrian war effort that Reitzenstein & Company could actually inflict in Bohemia was basically limited to the Austrian magazine at Braunau. And Daun had already taken steps to protect the Austrian hold upon his supply depot thereabouts. So, July 18, Reitzenstein and the Cossacks returned to Silesia and their starting points from earlier in the month. The upshot was, Daun did not budge, and, in fact, had not moved significantly. With nothing to be gained and the front static for the moment, the stubborn Prussian leader turned over full control of the operation to General Wied, and just withdrew to his headquarters. All of this had taken much time, and had produced no lasting effect.
Initially, there had been Austrian fears that the Russians would send large bodies of troops to actively help out their Prussian allies. The preceding “contribution” by Cherneyshev was the extent of the actual Russian involvement in the fighting of the war as an ally of Prussia, and Austrian fears of massed numbers of Cossacks roaming deep into Bohemia, Moravia and the Austrian heartland, plundering, pillaging, and raping all the while, never materialized. Protests were vociferously directed towards Marshal Daun that he may even be abandoning the locals to their fate. However, it was not in the commander’s nature to panic. He may have been a slow calculator of events, but he was also sure. Daun would never act rashly. In short, the marshal, never in his long career against Frederick the Great at least, had tried to second guess himself.
In the end, Daun chose not to heed the fears of the Austrian court and paid little attention to these raids, regarding them again as little more than diversions. He realized that Frederick had no real intention of pressing on in an invasion of Bohemia while the main Austrian army remained bound up in Silesia and that mere raiding parties could do little more than superficial damage to the overall Austrian security. So Frederick, in the end, was left with little choice.
He had now to plan for the battle he never wanted to fight at all, as the last method of shoving Marshal Daun out of the way so he could proceed with his business. General Wied had returned to Kunzendorf, while the king busied himself with drawing up/ preparing for the latest plan of action. Wied detached a force of some 5,000 men under Major-General Gabelewitz; the latter took post about Trautliebersdorf leaning over at Friedland. Frederick’s focus was to turn and break in the Austrian right, as the left had proven to be a far tougher proposition than imagined. The Austrians were unsure about the strength of the force of Gabelewitz, although O’Kelly was fearful of being attacked by that same force. He was really unsure about the intentions of the enemy at Trautliebersdorf. This situation left General Hadik in a static position over by that place, confronting a Prussian force which he did not know the size of. This gave him no flexibility to move against the Prussian king’s main body. Thus, this meant that Hadik, with 21,000 men at his disposal, stayed put to confront the Prussians at Trautleibersdorf, a force of hardly 5,000 men. Once more, the reason for this whole unfortunate scenario was the Austrian lack of light cavalry, a deficiency which would plague Daun continuously throughout this final campaign of the war.
The pursuit, led by Major-General Thadden, commenced about 0200 hours on the morning of July 8. This was unbuckled against Brentano’s force, which consisted of the Erzerherzog Leopold [1st]and St. Ignon’s [31st] Dragoons, the Kaiser [2nd] and Kalnocky [17th] Hussars, and the Croats. Brentano had just received permission to withdraw from Adelsbach. An attack through the defile at Dittersbach was repulsed, with some 280 attendant Prussian casualties, of whom some 200 had been captured. Brentano’s losses were somewhat higher: 194 men in this effort. The king was still trying to outflank the Austrians, without trying to conceal himself. When the latter discovered Frederick’s vigorous intent, he rose and marched southward into the mountains, abandoning Kunzendorf and the area thereabouts forthwith. Pausing to take up headquarters at Tannhausen (interposed between the enemy and his base), Daun now deployed his army to cover the whole wide range of country thereabouts. His left now lay across the Schweidnitz Wasser, with the center/right stretched from beyond Burkersdorf Heights (the village of Burkersdorf on the western end of the stream {near the dominant rise}, although the rises occupied both banks). This covered the approaches to Schweidnitz on that point. Daun’s strength was his right resting upon the Burkersdorf; beyond it to the right (towards the east) were the rises of Ludwigsdorf and Leutmannsdorf—where the Austrian encampment ended. The whitecoat army was positioned in a semi-circle, so that it could not have its post turned unless it would be attacked.
O’Kelly busied himself with bolstering the Austrian defensive positions upon the rises where his men were located. He employed a group of engineers, led by Captain Kuhl and Lt.-Col. Bechardht, to work performing these improvements as expeditiously as possible. This was principally carried out between the Leibelberg and the Weistritz Valley. In this area, Laudon & Company held sway, which was in an area where the number of troops present was low. Meanwhile, over by Ober-Leutmannsdorf, Daun had deployed an under strength force of his own under Major-General Pfühl.
Daun stuffed posts on all three rises—Burkersdorf, Ludwigsdorf, and Leutmannsdorf, all of the chain—with troops, augmented by generous portions of emplaced batteries, linked by trenches and abatis. The center and left were equally well-prepared. Daun had reason to be proud. In a series of cautious, yet intelligent, maneuvers he had consistently outwitted the great Prussian king and his vaunted legions, thwarting his designs upon Schweidnitz for several precious weeks and all without a battle. Moreover, the marshal, for now, could still feed men and supplies into Schweidnitz at will, where he had a garrison of about 12,000 men under Franz Guasco to stand fast.
However, Frederick had forced Daun to uncover the approaches to Schweidnitz and thus gradually allow the Prussians to begin preparations to put it under siege. The king had taken over the position on the Kunzendorf for his headquarters, and he now began scheming how to lure Daun out from his current posts without recourse to battle. A number of intricate, but altogether futile, movements and a series of “phony attacks” by the bluecoats failed to dislodge the cautious old marshal from his lines. Particulars follow. Very early on the morning of July 13, General Ziethen led a composite infantry cavalry force against the enemy posts at and about Hoch-Giersdorf. Frederick himself, leading a task force of 15 full squadrons of cavalry, slipped over by the Weistritz Valley, east of Daun’s post. Daun still did not budge. His lines were strong. Besides which, he had a pretty good idea of what Frederick was planning. Daun viewed time as on his side in this endeavor—which, in view of the volatile climate of politics at St. Petersburg, it was. The extent of Marshal Daun’s response to the Prussian march was to lob shells at the bluecoats at extreme range, but there was no large scale troop movements undertaken by the marshal at that point.
Meanwhile in his post, Frederick took in the view. From the beginning of the Burkersdorf to the tallest rises to the rear of it, like the Eulenberg, ensconced between Tannhausen and Reichenbach, or a distance of some 12 miles as the crow flies, the Austrians held sway, and so before any serious siege of Schweidnitz could be undertaken, Daun would have to be pressed back further.
Complicating the situation still further, Daun made sure that the flanks were strengthened to prevent the enemy from really encroaching upon him. Orders had been issued to General O’Kelly to make certain to strengthen the Austrian lines thereabouts as much as possible. Prussian reconnaissance had little trouble discerning what the strength and position of their enemy was. This because they had a plethora of light forces with them, besides knowing how to employ them. On the western end of the Burkersdorf, the rise (which here faced Kunzendorf) sloped down, while on the east the Weis
tritz River ran past the height to create a small, narrow valley, which constituted the single pass through this entire chain here. Daun had been alert enough to put a task force there, behind a line of trenches together with a sunken battery of big guns in case the Prussians got any ideas. East of the Burkersdorf were the Ludwigsdorf and the Leutmannsdorf. These rises were sufficiently distant to force Frederick to divide his plan of battle into two different sections—the Leutmannsdorf, for instance, was about five miles to the southeast from Burkersdorf—and its partner more than three miles to the east—in order to accomplish his objectives.
The two rises were also steep, not like the Burkersdorf on its western end, but it must be kept in mind that that master of defensive warfare, Marshal Daun, had given his all to the preparation of earthworks upon the rises. The intervening country was thoroughly infested with the Austrians as well. There was another factor. The Austrian works were placed in such formidable posture, especially upon the Burkersdorf, that the bluecoats would have to be in very potent strength to overcome them. The details are revealing. The batteries were mounted behind walled positions, complimented by abatis and troops crammed into every possible point. The lines of entrenchments were layered between hardwoods so thick there was room enough only for the barrels of muskets between the cracks.
The king’s army was positioned about Kunzendorf only a short distance away. Ziethen with his force was over at the Würben Heights, and Cherneyshev occupied the old lines of Bunzelwitz with his Russian detachment. Frederick’s plan was all set by the time Wied returned from his abortive Bohemian mission. As it worked out, the outline was masterly in its conception. General Möllendorf, with a strong force, was to move out so that the enemy could detect him, feinting over towards Würben, and thus give the enemy a wrong impression. With Daun thus deceived, he was to then swing past Kunzendorf and Bögendorf, heading to pounce upon the Austrian works upon the Burkersdorf in a few days’ time. The bluecoats were to demonstrate directly forward of the main Austrian body of men. General Möllendorf had the task delegated to him of deploying and using his artillery, making some noise, this to hold the attention of the enemy.
Incidently, the force of Marshal Daun was by this time reduced to no more than 30,000 men, markedly inferior to the forces of Frederick.54 But the king was not above some shenanigans. For the day of Burkersdorf, the Prussian tents were to be left standing for that very same reason, to divert Daun away from the main business. The Prussian forces to be employed at the coming action were in three separate columns. Möllendorf left camp on July 17, while Wied, as soon as he was home, started out with his men, aiming for Leutmannsdorf-Ludwigsdorf. Simultaneously with Möllendorf, or as nearly so as possible, he was to hurl his men upon the latter and break up the Austrian concentrations. In sum, the final attack formation, directed by the king himself, consisted of the command of General Knobloch. The latter was to lead off to the right of Möllendorf’s large force, with the avowed intention of surmounting the Leibelberg. This position faced the command of O’Kelly directly. O’Kelly had some 4,000 men with him, comfortably based in the Weisteritz. For this coming battle, the Austrians would have the advantage of interior lines, some seven miles of defenses to man. This stroke was set for July 20–21. But, before Wied could so much as march, disturbing news reached the front which might put an end to the movement before it could ever commence. Complicating matters still further, the skies had opened in the midst of all of this, with heavy sheets of rain virtually paralyzing the movement of both sides. But if the weather was proving difficult to get cooperation from, there was still another far more serious political difficulty.
Afternoon of July 17, while Frederick was in his headquarters fully occupied with his new endeavor, Cherneyshev burst in with bad news: Word of a revolution in St. Petersburg, Peter deposed (and likely dead by this time), and Catherine on the throne of Russia. The latter, Cherneyshev said, had promptly recalled his Russian force home (except for a force to go reoccupy East Prussia as soon as possible), without loss of time and without even so much as a skirmish with the Austrians. So he had no choice but to go. What tidings upon the eve of battle with Marshal Daun. This was in bad timing. What with the bluecoat forces already embarked now.
Chapter Fifty-One
Battles of Burkersdorf and Reichenbach; Fall of Schweidnitz1
The final drama of the war in Silesia was in motion. Meanwhile, the Prussians assigned to their two-pronged attack were diligently carrying out their preparations. As darkness on July 20 descended, Daun’s forces holding the village of Burkersdorf were quietly ejected by the bluecoats (who had no desire to alert their comrades upon the rises above as to what was going on overnight). An attack carried out upon the orders of Frederick directed at the Ohmsdorf Castle of the place, where a stubborn enemy force was present, succeeded only after a most obstinate defense—the noise of which could not have failed to reach the whitecoats on the rises. The particulars follow.
The task force consisted of some 150 Prussians (100 of whom had been pulled from Saldern’s 6th Infantry, led by Captain Mengele). Their initial attack against the Ohmsdorf Castle scattered the Croat command all right, but met a stiffer defense from a group of grenadiers, who had determined to defend the structure, and were not prone to leave.2 The castle was in the middle of the plain, virtually cut off by the bluecoats from the remainder of the Austrian force. One of Daun’s most exposed positions. The Austrians there had not been caught completely unawares.
In the event, the drawbridge had been pulled up when the bluecoats first appeared. However, one of the attackers familiar with the castle saw the opportunity to strike a blow against the hostile garrison, and cut the cable at an opportune moment, which immediately brought the bridge down. This obstacle out of the way, the Prussians, after a brief cannonade (which itself knocked down a hastily-assembled barricade erected by the garrison), stormed forward, overwhelming the little force of the castle. The latter, 39 men and their commander, Lieutenant Salisch, were compelled to surrender.3
The upshot was, the castle was taken under cover of the darkness, night of July 20–21, and hardly had the Prussians made themselves to home in the structure than they commenced to set up batteries, a total of 45 howitzers and ten 12-pounder guns, pointing to the south against the Austrian positions directly forward of them.4 Darkness would, after all, be the perfect way to conceal offensive actions against an enemy short on light cavalry.
Since this activity did not require the cooperation of Wied’s attacks, Möllendorf’s command moved the equipment. However, as his men ascended the track the progressively narrower it became, until, as he had suspected, it was too much for the horses and the guns. Möllendorf became desperate and forthwith ordered the troops to lug the guns up the way themselves. No doubt the effort required to overcome the steep, rocky terrain and actually advance must have been very great, particularly the part about lugging the big guns, but, at length, Möllendorf’s exhausted men reached the peak.
Soon the king arrived to look over matters. Before 0400 hours, Frederick was surveying the scene as best he could, and anxiously awaiting the coming of dawn and the imminent battle. The monarch had to believe that a victory here would give him the long awaited opportunity to regain Schweidnitz. It was clear that Möllendorf had to await Wied’s actions before he carried out his part of the coming action. The somewhat agitated monarch then rode on, to see to the situation elsewhere before the army. At Burkersdorf, king and army would not be a compact bunch by any means.
The king’s saunter over towards Wied’s post was a short one indeed, more in the nature of a hasty reconnaissance. However, he did not account for the arrival of Brentano’s force; but, since cooperation between the two forces (of Möllendorf and Wied) was essential, Wied’s attack had to begin before the covering fire; thus cooperation was essential. The sum of this effort to complete Frederick’s battery, of course, was a done deal by this point. The perimeters of the Austrian position, although not yet turned, were on
the verge of being compromised.
Throughout July 20, there had been different columns of Prussians appearing in the area forward of Daun’s lines, with unknown intentions as yet. The bluecoats that were visible seemed to be independent columns, almost dissociated with each other. In his corner, O’Kelly had espied the build up of the enemy beyond the Austrian right near Gräditz. Marshal Daun did his best to strengthen his posts thereabouts, chiefly by dispatching General Brentano with a force of nine full battalions to go occupy Leutmannsdorf to directly counteract the enemy threatening the Austrian right. Brentano was unable to get into his post until nearly midnight as his men were fatigued from marching under very humid conditions. Wied’s effort was to be directed against this same Leutmannsdorf.
There was more encouragement as well; for Frederick, having shown Cherneyshev what was afoot in his action against Daun’s lines, had persuaded the Russian to hold off on giving his marching orders for a few days until the outcome of the battle (Cherneyshev here shows that he was not above blatant bribery, as we will see). The king well knew what the presence of the Russians would exercise upon the mind of Marshal Daun.5 Frederick was gambling that the news which Cherneyshev had brought from St. Petersburg was still unknown in Austrian circles, as there was no indication as yet that Daun & Company knew what was afoot. The consideration now was to act before the enemy discovered what was going on. This last consideration was very significant. If Daun acted quickly and decisively, he could even now try to sabotage the Prussian plans to finally lay firm hold on Silesia.
Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War Page 103
