11. C. B. Brackenbury, Frederick the Great (New York: 1884), 127–128. Brackenbury stated that the bluecoats “deployed a hundred guns in one grand battery extending from the Homolka… over to that of Lobosch”; König, III, 58–59.
12. The Austrian artillery had greatly benefitted in the interlude between the Silesian Wars and the Seven Years’ War from the direction of Joseph Wenzel Prince von Liechtenstein. He spent much time and money out of his own pocket to improve the Austrian artillery to make it comparable to the Prussian. He succeeded, and Lobositz was the scene of the first demonstration (Christopher Duffy, Instrument of War: Volume I of the Austrian Army in the Seven Years’ War [Chicago: The Emperor’s Press, 2000], 270–274). The point was driven home in short order. Field-Marshal Schwerin, among many, was singularly unimpressed with the previous work of the enemy artillery in the Silesian Wars. He said the Austrian gunnery was able to inspire fear “only among cowards… and born yellow-bellies” (quoted in Dennis Showalter, The Wars of Frederick the Great [New York: Longman Press, 1996], 140). Although Schwerin himself was not present at Lobositz, this type of Prussian contempt must have been drastically altered during the battle.
13. Duffy, The Wild Goose, 214.
14. Pauli, V, 215–264; König, II, 212–215; 277–279.
15. Bräker, 148–149.
16. There are quite a number of useful short biographies of individuals who died in the campaign of 1756 in Seyfart, such as General Quadt (Seyfart, II, 289–297).
17. Die Kriege, Part 3, I, 268.
18. Jomini implies the whitecoats were probably wishing only to withdraw from the scene (Jomini, I, 79–80). It soon became clear this was not the case (Franz Quandt, Die Schlacht bei Lobositz: 1. Oktober 1756 [Charlottenburg: Pfeiffer, 1909], 65–110).
19. To be fair to all, Bräker, as a “volunteer” of sorts, has left some very controversial insights on the old Prussian army. While his contributions must be tempered with the knowledge he served the Prussian king against his will, at least he has the benefit of being an eyewitness to the things he was recounting.
20. Pauli, VI, 1–70; König, I, 39–47.
21. Curt Jany, Geschichte der Preussischen Armee vom 15. Jahrhundert bis 1914, four volumes (Osnabrück, Germany: Biblio Verlag, 1967), II, 365.
22. Pauli, V, 1–34; König, II, 359–364.
23. Horace St. Paul puts the number of squadrons in the opening charge at 47 (1756 Horace St. Paul, 12).
24. Günter Dorn and Joachim Engelmann, The Cavalry Regiments of Frederick the Great 1756–1763 (West Chester, PA: Schiffer Publishing, 1989), 54.
25. In retrospect, the Prussian tendency to place squadron commanders forward of their men no doubt caused a disproportionate large number of casualties among those officers. Of course, this was by no means unique in military history. And, along with it, a high mortality rate among officers would be a recurring theme of later battles of this war (Brent Nosworthy, The Anatomy of Victory: Battle Tactics 1689–1763 [New York: Hippocrene Books, 1990], 177).
26. Bräker, 116–117.
27. As Horace St. Paul put the matter, the big guns “battered the Prussian cavalry’s flanks to such effect that they precipitately took to flight” (1756, Horace St. Paul, 13).
28. Lloyd, in his History, signaled out Radicati as having “the reputation of a good officer” (Henry Lloyd, History of the Late War in Germany Between the King of Prussia, and the Empress of Germany and her Allies, three volumes [London, 1781], I, 12).
29. Dorn, Cavalry Regiments, 21–22.
30. Pauli, I, 225–236; König, II, 446–447.
31. Dorn, Cavalry Regiments, 34.
32. Again, more evidence of the Austrian gunfire improvement; König, III, 292–293.
33. Dorn, Cavalry Regiments, 46; König, IV, 2–9.
34. General Grafen von Kalkreuth, quoted in Christopher Duffy, Frederick the Great: A Military Life (New York: Routledge, 1985), 105.
35. Duffy, Instrument of War, 246–247.
36. Robert Neville Lawley, General Seydlitz: A Military Biography (London: 1852), 30–31. This source details Seydlitz at the battle, but fails to mention his need to be rescued.
37. Campbell, Frederick’s Court and Times, III, 18.
38. The failure to take secure hold of the Homolka and Radowesnitz mountains was a serious one for the outcome of the battle. Cogniazzo contends that Browne issued the necessary instructions, but that a subordinate unwisely ignored them (Jakob.Cogniazzo, Geständnisse eines östreichischen Veterans in politisch-militarischer Berhaltnisse zwischen Östreich und Preussen, four volumes [Breslau, 1788], II, 236–237).
39. Bräker, 116.
40. Furneaux, 22–24.
41. Pauli, I, 218–220; König, II, 277–279.
42. Günter Dorn and Joachim Engelmann, The Infantry Regiments of Frederick the Great, 1756–1763 (West Chester, PA: Schiffer Publishing, 1989), 70.
43. Ibid., 76; König, II, 246–247.
44. Dorn, Infantry Regiments, 22.
45. Archenholtz, I, 19–20.
46. The major apparently wrote an account of this battle, which has been preserved in the modern rendition of The Journal of Horace St. Paul. Oelsnitz modestly says the battle “was finally decided by the courage of our infantry” (1756 Horace St. Paul, 22); König, III, 112.
47. Lloyd, I, 10.
48. Archenholtz, I, 20–21.
49. Dorn, Infantry Regiments, 58; König, II, 193–195.
50. Jomini, Treatise, I, 82.
51. Dopsch, 185.
52. Aster, 313–320.
53. Horace St. Paul wrote that Browne estimated total Prussian losses just after the battle to be more than 13,000 “largely as a result of desertion.” It appears most of these “deserters,” assuming there were so many, would have fled Prussia’s colors after Lobositz. Prussian sources are silent on this matter (1756 Horace St. Paul, 14.) The actual number of deserters seems closer to 30. Certainly nowhere near the Austrian “estimate.” Horace St. Paul must be used with caution, but his contemporary, often on-the-spot observations are also invaluable.
54. The General Staff history puts the losses at 2,873 for the Prussians, and the Austrians 2,863 (Die Kriege, Part 3, I, 285). Another source puts the figure at 3,304 for the Prussians and 2,863 for the Austrians (Dopsch, 176). The breakdown was approximately 727 killed, 1,879 wounded, and 290 prisoners for the Prussians. As for the Austrians, there were approximately 1,719 wounded, 422 killed, and 722 prisoners. The losses suffered, of course, were very similar for both parties involved.
55. Archenholtz, I, 21.
56. Retzow, I, 61.
Chapter 3
1. General Franz Xavier von Kollowrat leading three infantry regiments, the 36th Infantry of Browne, the 27th of Count Christoph Baden-Durlach, and Kollowrat’s 17th. Twelve companies of grenadiers led by Colonel Materni, with some other light hussars (400) and 200 dragoons. There were also some 20 guns of various sizes (Die Kriege, Part 3, I, 294).
2. Helden Geschichte, III, 731–740.
3. Some sources say there were no prearranged signals.
4. This was one of the chief reasons why the Prussians allowed Augustus to retire into Pirna in the first place. He had a large entourage with him, all of whom would need to be fed. As it worked out, Frederick made sure the royal table was kept supplied.
5. Aster, 338–342.
6. Reihe von Vorlesungen, I, 109–126.
7. Die Kriege, Part 3, I, 295–297; König, IV, 156–167.
8. Aster, 391–396.
9. 1756 Horace St. Paul, 27.
10. Die Kriege, Part 3, I, 303–306.
11. Thanks to the Prussian horse.
12. A more than adequate force.
13. They were indeed desperate.
14. He may have found more fault with Augustus than with the weather.
15. Cogniazzo, II, 253. The marshal was spitting up blood by then as well.
16. Almon, 175–177.
17. 1756 Horace St. Paul, 28.
18. Lloyd, I, 15.
19. Wilhelm Edlen von Janko, Laudon’s Leben: Nach Oirginal-Arten des k. k. haus-, hof-, Staats-, und Kriegs-Archivs, Correspondenzen und Quellen (Vienna: 1869), 21–31; George Bruce Malleson, Loudon: A Sketch of the Military Life of Gideon Ernest, Freiherr von Loudon (London: 1884), 14–15.
20. Some 1,400 men were under his immediate command.
21. Hanké, 319–321.
22. 1756 Horace St. Paul, 37. In the wording of the Saxon capitulation, specific release from Prussian service is sought for all Saxon soldiers and generals. Frederick’s curt reply was, “No general would be forced to serve.” Notice what was not said.
23. Aster, 409.
24. Ibid., 408–409, 18–35. Aster gives an actual roll of those individuals involved. Seldom does history record such meticulous records.
25. There were, of course, a number of exceptions to this rule. Major General Katzler, for instance, immediately earmarked “100 men from the Saxon Horseguards to make up for the losses his regiment had suffered” (Christopher Duffy, The Army of Frederick the Great, second edition [Chicago: The Emperor’s Press, 1996], 252–253).
26. Huschberg, 102–103.
27. Fraser, 319.
28. Die Kriege, Part 3, I, 321–324.
29. Reihe von Vorlesungen, I, 120–126.
30. Bräker, 121–123.
Chapter 4
1. Nevertheless, Frederick never hesitated on putting his army into hibernation, as he makes clear, in a letter to Ambassador Sir Andrew Mitchell, British representative with Prussia, that a winter campaign was “out of the question” (Tuttle, IV, 47).
2. Lloyd, I, 18. Lloyd does a lot of second guessing on this point. (I, 18–27).
3. This country was realizing what Frederick’s disdain of royalty really involved. During the earthshaking events of 1756, the king had refused to allow the French representative in Saxony across into the lines of Pirna. This helped exacerbate an already serious breach between France and Prussia, to the point where it could not be mended short of a conflict. Frederick knew already the French court was very unhappy over the treatment meted out to the Saxon king and his brood.
4. Most of the German principalities, not wishing to share Saxony’s fate, had formally declared war on Prussia on January 17, 1757, simultaneously branding the Prussian king a blatant aggressor (Artur Brabant, Das Heilige Römische Reich teutscher Nation in Kampf mit Friedrich dem Grossen Vol. I: 1757 [Berlin: Verlag von Gebruder Paetel, 1904], 77–94; Asprey, 439; Huschberg, 112–118; Seyfart, II, 298–301).
5. His appointment on November 19, 1756, led immediately to the second treaty of alliance, signed with Prussia in January 1757. This was a direct promise of troops and subsidies to Frederick, primarily to smooth direct Prussian assistance to Hanover.
6. This fact was not lost on all of the French, and many at court were decidedly lukewarm to the idea of expending the main French effort on the European continent, leaving Great Britain a virtual free hand in other parts of the world.
7. Fortunately for the Prussian cause, and as it turned out for the British themselves, Pitt would soon be restored to his full powers.
8. Ludwig Mollwo, Hans Carl von Winterfeldt: Ein General Friedrichs des Grossen (Munich and Leipzig: Drud und Verlag von R. Oldenbourg, 1899), 176–207.
9. Die Kriege, Part 3, Vol. II, Prag, 42–45.
10. Duffy, Military Life, 112; König, II, 46–48.
11. Austria being considered the heart of the new enemy coalition; rightly so.
12. Tuttle, IV, 82–83. Winterfeldt lacked the necessary authority to order implementation of such a plan; not to mention the fact he was detested by a large part of the Prussian officer corps. Any plan of which he was the author was bound to be opposed by most of the Prussian commanders (Varnhagen von Ense, Winterfeldt, 128–141).
13. A German “Sparta,” so to speak (Retzow, I, 38).
14. Frederick II, Seven Years’ War, I, 114–115.
15. The situation was similar to that of the end of the previous campaign. No less an authority than Hans Delbrück made the comment more than a century ago on Frederick’s odd behavior. Lunging into Saxony and then almost docilely abandoning the advantage thus gained for winter quarters (Delbrück, Friedrich, Napoleon, Molkte: Aeltere und Neuere Strategie [Berlin: 1892], 9–41.)
16. There was an obvious concern for Hanover (Almon, 179–181).
17. At this point, Cumberland’s unsteady position was aggravated by the British government’s reluctance to using British troops on the Continent for Hanover. The general contemporary notion existed in Great Britain it was “better to expend English money than expend English lives” (Karl W. Schweizer, Frederick the Great, William Pitt, and Lord Bute: The Anglo-Prussian Alliance 1756–1763 [New York: Galahad Books, 1991], 58.)
18. A veteran from the time of Frederick’s father, Frederick Wilhelm.
19. Asprey, 422. The Prussian monarch did not appreciate frank opinions. Most especially when they differed from his own.
20. Reiners, 168.
21. Hubert C. Johnson, Frederick the Great and His Officials (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1975), 169.
22. Ibid., 176.
23. Knowing the Russians would have to traverse Poland, with very long lines of supply, the wily Prussian king tried his best to impede them. Agents were sent well ahead of time to buy up all of the corn “and forage … where the Russians were to enter” (John Entick, The General History of the Late War: Containing its Rise, Progress and Event in Europe, Asia, Africa, and America, five volumes [London: 1775–1784], II, 226).
24. Tuttle, IV, 82; Duffy, Wild Goose, 235.
25. There is an excellent over view of this subject in Duffy, Instrument of War, 98–106.
26. In spite of an abundance of rumors flying about to the contrary.
27. Retzow, I, 78–83.
28. There are several good accounts of French political activities from this period available; we need not dwell on this subject at any great length. As for the would-be assassin Damiens, he was subjected to torture and finally killed on March 28, 1757, by four horses that pulled on his body in different directions, literally pulling the poor man asunder (Will and Ariel Durant, The Story of Civilization: Rousseau and Revolution, eleven volumes [New York: Simon & Schuster, 1967], Volume X, 91; Waddington, I, 135).
29. Schaefer, I, 271–273.
30. Although not a history of Sweden by any means, we need to briefly examine where that power was coming from. In 1751, Adolphus Frederick of Holstein-Gottorp became the king. The Swedish diet (or Parliament) was the real power in Sweden. It could ignore the king’s wishes for selecting new members of the court, and could draft new laws without royal approval. Growing tired of their position, the royal couple tried to take government control for themselves. The coup failed, and chief members of the plot were executed. The royal family was spared, primarily because of their popularity in the nation. Besides these political considerations, money was in short supply, and the French offer was tantalizing.
31. Or, Peter. The two spellings will be used in these pages.
32. Aster, 82.
PART II
Chapter 5
1. Helden Geschichte, IV, 7 passim.
2. Huschberg, 138–140; Bernhardi, I, 50–66; Richard Schmitt, Prinz Heinrich von Preussen als Feldheer im Siebenjährigen Krieges, two volumes (Greifswald: 1885), I, 30; Heinze, 36–44; Peter Fedderson, Stühr Forschungen uber die Geschichte des siebenjährigen Krieges, two parts (Hamburg: 1842), first part, 243–247; Reihe von Vorlesungen, I, 141–160; Schaefer, I, 271–279; Waddington, I, 278–306; Jomini, Traité, I, 44–114.
3. Seyfart, II, 312–314.
4. Malleson, 50; König, I, 148.
5. Cogniazzo, II, 256–257.
6. Janko, 32–33; Ferdinand T. von Krsowitz, Loudon’s Leben und Thaten, Heraus gegeben von einer Patriotischen Gesellschaft, two volumes (Vienna: 1791), I, 52–53.
7. Including one battalion from Prince Henry’s Regimen
t, of 21 officers and 623 men, under Major Samuel von Gosse.
8. Duffy, Wild Goose, 232.
9. Malleson, 51.
10. Duffy, Instrument of War, 301.
11. Schaefer, I, 303–332.
12. Entick, II, 228.
13. Cogniazzo, II, 258–259.
14. Pauli, V, 85–126; König, III, 241–245.
15. Seyfart, II, 315.
16. Entick, II, 228–229. Another source details Prussian losses as three dead and ten wounded (Die Kriege, Part 3, II, 30–31).
17. Schaefer, I, 303–314.
18. Die Kriege, Part 3, II, 26–28; Retzow, I, 83–111.
19. August von Janson, Hans Karl von Winterfeldt: Des Grossen Konigs Generalstabschef (Berlin: Stilke Publishing, 1913), 294–323.
20. At a time when the delicacy was widely considered to be dangerous for human consumption.
21. Campbell, III, 37–38.
22. Instead of three columns, which had been the original intent.
23. Colin Lindsay, trans., Extracts from Colonel Tempelhoffe’s History of the seven years war: His remarks on General Lloyd: On the subsistence of armies; and on the march of convoys. Also a treatise on winter posts [by K. F. Lindenau] To which is added a narrative of events at St. Lucie and Gibraltar, and of John duke of Marlborough’s march to the Danube, two volumes (London: 1793), I, 16–17.
24. Schaefer, I, 313; Stühr, first part, 145–147; Reihe von Vorlesungen, I, 153–160.
25. Campbell, III, 41.
26. Duffy, A Military Life, 112–113.
27. Duffy, Wild Goose, 237; Showalter, 150.
28. Asprey, 441.
29. As Lloyd points out, positioning crucial supply depots so close to harm’s way was “against the most common rules of military prudence” (Lloyd, I, 30). On the other hand, Browne’s heaping up the magazines where they were meant he probably intended to remain on the defense, and “unless this were his motive, it is difficult to understand why… he should have formed his magazines upon the frontier” (Jomini, Treatise, I, 99).
30. Züverlassige, 138–142.
31. Without the commander himself, who was temporarily sidetracked on a different matter.
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