by Damien Burke
Early May 1963, and XR219 is now at stage 4 and looking like an aircraft, with its wing test-fitted and equipping well under way in the cockpit and elsewhere. Some idea of the size of the fuselage fuel tanks can be gained from the heads of workers popping out of the top of the centre fuselage. BAE Systems via Brooklands Museum
The TSR2’s large equipment bay; this is XR219’s starboard bay being equipped in May 1963. BAE Systems via Brooklands Museum
The first TSR2, XR219, in the final assembly stage, early July 1963. The forward and centre fuselage sections have been married up to the rear fuselage, and the tailplanes have been fitted. The wing had been test-fitted and then removed to allow equipment to be installed. Following in the background is XR220. BAE Systems via Warton Heritage Group
At the end of August 1963 XR219 was nearing the end of final assembly. It is seen here with the surrounding scaffolding cleared away for the camera. The aircraft is supported by jacks, as the main undercarriage could only be partly extended because the jack height was insufficient for full extension. Cockpit transparencies and the SLR and HF dielectric covers are obvious missing items at this point. BAE Systems via Brooklands Museum
Meanwhile, at Weybridge, progress on the development batch proceeded fairly well, the second airframe, XR220, coming off the line while XR221 was being equipped. After sustained engine problems and the huge embarrassment of XR220 being damaged on arrival at Boscombe Down, the first flight of the TSR2 finally took place on 27 September 1964, after a summer blighted by negative publicity. It was a brief flight, and was really only made as a political gesture at significant risk (just as the RAF had feared), but was entirely successful in that it did not result in a fireball scattering expensive bits of aircraft over the Wiltshire countryside. To say that the accomplishment of the first flight lifted spirits at BAC would be a huge understatement, and the flurry of congratulatory telegrams and letters that followed further improved the atmosphere. The first flight had been ‘copybook stuff’ and a ‘jolly good show’, but, as Freddie Page said, ‘Now the hard work really starts’.
In early October, while XR219 was laid up for engine changes and various modifications to bring it up to a standard that would actually enable it to carry out some genuinely useful test flying, thoughts turned to the Ministry’s requirement for final assembly of the aircraft to be moved up north as quickly as was feasible. A plan had been worked out by BAC to try to minimize the inevitable disruption caused by moving final assembly responsibilities from Weybridge to Samlesbury. This meant that the first pre-production aircraft, number 10, would have its fuselage components married up at Weybridge and would then be transported to Samlesbury for completion. Numbers 11 and 12 would be completed at Weybridge and 13 at Samlesbury, and thereafter final assembly would alternate between Weybridge and Samlesbury to complete the pre-production batch. Production aircraft (i.e. No. 21 onwards) would all be assembled at Samlesbury. While there would be some additional costs because of duplication of some jigs, it was a carefully planned schedule, and this, along with a flight development programme that had received the seal of approval from the Flight Trials Progress Committee, did a great deal to relieve tension between the Air Ministry, the MoA and BAC. The Air Staff even suggested that they might be able to relax some of their clearance requirements to assist with an earlier CA release, such as delaying the clearance of the in-flight refuelling system until after CA release. The project, it seemed, was finally showing some real promise.
The publicity department of BAC had been champing at the bit for some months before Ministry clearance was finally given to release some photos to the press. This was one of the handful of shots taken of XR219 in October 1963, released too late to have any possible influence on the attempts to sell the aircraft to the Australians. BAE Systems via Brooklands Museum
By April 1964 XR219 had been transported to Boscombe and reassembled in the hangar given over to BAC. The aircraft is seen here on jacks, undergoing functional checks of the undercarriage and other hydraulically powered items such as the bomb bay doors and airbrakes. BAE Systems via Brooklands Museum
Now structurally complete, XR220 is towed out to the paint shop at Weybridge. The painting of XR219 and XR220 was complicated by widespread surface contamination by DP.47 hydraulic fluid, and for a time it looked like XR219, at least, would fly in primer finish. Additional delays gave enough time for a clean-up job followed by painting. BAE Systems via Brooklands Museum
But it was too little, too late. Delays, poor management (at all levels from subcontractors through to BAC and onward up to the MoA and beyond), development problems and an underestimation of the complexity of the overall weapons system had all conspired to raise the development costs to previously unheard-of levels. While BAC had been desperately trying to get XR219 into the air, the government and the RAF had been quietly realizing that they could no longer afford such an expensive aircraft, and had been looking at alternatives. By the time XR219 was ready for a second flight it was nearly Christmas. A new government was in power; a government that had included in its election manifesto promises to cut back on the excesses of defence spending. The Americans had just flown the first prototype of their new TFX variable-sweep tactical strike aircraft. Bad weather delayed the TSR2’s second flight until New Year’s Eve, and while XR219 was carrying out a very brief and highly unsatisfactory second flight above a snow-covered Wiltshire landscape, the icy fingers of cancellation were drawing ever tighter around the project’s throat.
July 1964, and XR220, freshly painted, is undergoing final equipment installation. Visible in the background are XR221 and XR222. BAE Systems via Brooklands Museum
The final months
Throughout January 1965, as concerns over cancellation became ever more prevalent, assembly of the development-batch aircraft continued fairly smoothly and the flight test programme with XR219 proceeded in halting fashion, dogged by undercarriage problems. The second airframe, XR220, was nearing the end of its repair and reassembly, which had been slowed down by the need to rob it from time to time for spares to use on XR219. Having the aircraft at Boscombe Down inevitably resulted in additional delays, as the most simple of spares had to come from factories a great distance away. Had the aircraft been based at Warton, or even Wisley, the petty day-to-day issues that arose would never have snowballed into larger problems, and BAC was anxious to get the aircraft ‘home’ to Warton. While the staff at Boscombe were never less than helpful, BAC was also aware of an undercurrent of friction; TSR2 operations were hugely disruptive to the busy Boscombe programme, with all other flying being stopped for a long time either side of any intended TSR2 movement. The staff at BAC was keen to work all hours, in all weathers and over weekends to try and get the project back on track, and there was only so much the Boscombe staff could do to support this.
TSR2 fails to meet the Operational Requirement
At this point BAC was aware that the aircraft had become so heavy that it could not meet two of the most important requirements it had to fulfil: a combat radius of 1,000nm and a short take-off roll of 1,000yd. A confidential BAC summary of problem areas on the aircraft, written in January 1965, paints a depressing picture. In this brief report, various areas of the aircraft are highlighted for the difficulties they were undergoing and those likely to arise. Some of the more worrying of these (such as a concern that fuselage gust response was going to be poor) would evaporate after further flight testing. Others, however, would not. The engine-starting system was complex and troublesome. The undercarriage was unlikely to be able to meet the required full 15ft (4.5m)-per-second descent velocity, and operation on rough fields could be difficult. There was little room to modify the undercarriage, and modifications would only add weight. Poor fatigue characteristics were being exhibited by X2020 and heat-treated steels, and the integral fuel tanks could be expected to leak after sustained flight in turbulence. The windscreen and canopies were compromized by the need for bird-strike protection, and the view was poor. The
variable intakes had been troublesome on rigs and on the first aircraft, and it looked as though a redesign would be necessary. The engine installation was too tight, and there was no room for future growth. The fire hazard was higher than it should have been, owing to a lack of conventional zoning and the proximity of fuel and engines. The lack of electrical generation and computer capacity was embarrassing the nav/attack system. Most seriously of all, the aeroplane could no longer meet many of the sortie requirements laid down in OR.343. Combat radius, for instance, was predicted to be 816nm (938 miles; 1,509km), not 1,000nm. Short take-off roll from a dispersed site was 1,403yd (1,283m) rather than the 1,000yd required.
The full extent of this devastating news was not passed on to the customer, in the hope that improvements could be made or the requirements relaxed. In fact the RAF was not entirely ignorant of the implications of weight and engine performance, but its own internal estimates on range and performance shortfalls in the summer of 1964 had predicted a combat radius of 957nm (1,100 miles; 1,770km) and a take-off distance of 1,300yd (1,188m), nowhere near as bad as BAC’s better-informed estimates. As part of what was to be a final cost-saving exercise, BAC was asked to come up with fixed prices for the various elements of the TSR2 programme. To make any actual cost reductions a more realistic prospect, it was agreed at a discussion on 27 January that a reduced specification would form the basis for any such offer. This must have come as a relief to BAC management, facing what would have been a protracted and costly struggle to make the aircraft meet the requirements.
There followed an all-day meeting at BAC Weybridge on 11 February, with RAF and MoA representatives thrashing out the details of a relaxed specification for the aircraft. The RAF was prepared to accept quite stunning reductions in performance against a fixed price with guarantee points: the internal-fuel-only 1,000nm sortie was reduced to 750nm (860 miles; 1.380km); the dispersed short take-off roll was up from 1,000yd to 1,250yd (1,140m); the landing roll, similarly, was up from 1,300yd (1,190m) to 1,500yd (1,370m) with a lowered crosswind limit; continuous flight ceiling was down from 56,000ft (17,000m) to 40,000ft (12,000m) (with safe operation up to 50,000ft (15,000m)); and the engine change time was up from 3hr to 12hr. The dive-toss nuclear attack could be deleted. The TSR2 still could not meet some of these much-relaxed requirements, but the differences were slight and there was a distinct positive margin in some areas, such as combat radius on internal fuel. However, BAC refused to accept Mach 2 as a guarantee point, or even Mach 1.7, though was prepared to accept limited penalties if it did not meet Mach 1.7. There was a distinct fear that a huge amount of flight development would be needed to clear the auto-stiffener system required at speeds above Mach 1.5, and it was was felt that it might be more prudent simply to limit the aircraft to Mach 1.5 instead. In addition, BAC pressed hard for a relaxation of the aircraft’s maximum g loading. This was meant to be 6.6g (with a 6g in-service limit), but BAC wanted it reduced to 5.5g (4.8g in-service limit); the static-test wing had failed at 8.5g. On this point, however, the RAF did not want to shift. The company went on to produce its new cost estimates, which included the offer to accept up to £9 million in losses if costs continued to rise beyond the estimates. Beyond that point, however, any additional funding would have to be borne by the government.
After a summer of repeated delays, mostly caused by engine development problems, XR219 lifts off from Boscombe on 27 September 1964. BAE Systems via Brooklands Museum
Guarantee points, TSR2 specification issue 2
Item
Specification
New guarantee point
Continuous speed at sea level
Mach 0.9
Mach 0.9
Maximum speed at 40,000ft
(12,000m)
Mach 2.0
Mach 1.75
Combat radius, low-level sortie with 2,000lb (900kg) weapon
1,000nm
750nm
Continuous operation ceiling
56,000ft (17,000m)
40,000ft (12,000m)
Take-off run, dispersed conditions, full fuel and 2,000lb (900kg) weapon, 15°C ISA
600yd (548m)
1,100yd (1,005m)
Landing run, dispersed conditions, wet runway
600yd (548m)
750yd (685m)
Max design speed
The lower of 800kt or Mach 2.25
The lower of 730kt or Mach 1.75
Terrain following
200ft (60m),
automatic control
200ft (60m),
manual control
Meanwhile, during the flight of 6 February 1965 XR219’s undercarriage retraction problems had been overcome and a new atmosphere of optimism was evident among the BAC team at Boscombe. A date was set for the transit to Warton; 20 February. The day dawned cold and grey. The Press had been invited to Warton to watch the arrival, but all they saw was mist and low cloud. The flight was cancelled, and the result was an inevitable slew of newspaper reports that the RAF’s new all-weather bomber could not fly in poor weather. They were not interested in explanations that the aircraft’s instrument fit was not really up to blind navigation yet, or that the risks of flying a valuable prototype in known icing conditions were simply unacceptable. After staying at Boscombe for another two days, XR219 finally departed on the 22nd and made a high-speed medium-altitude transit, including use of the Irish Sea supersonictest-run route. The arrival at Warton was made in typical Roland Beamont fashion, low and noisy (460kt (530mph, 850km/h) at 150ft (4.5m)), and when the aircraft taxied in, followed by the Lightning chase aircraft, the crowd of BAC workers who had been allowed out of the factory to watch broke into cheers and applause.
Thenceforth test flying accelerated, concentrating on meeting various guarantee points that had been agreed, and also dealing with the undercarriage vibration problems being experienced on landing. On the ground, work continued on finishing the third aircraft, XR221, and there was hope for a first flight of XR220 in March, and for XR221 to fly (from Wisley) in late May or June. Once XR222 was complete, much later in the year, it would probably be transported to Wisley for an initial flight and then go straight to Warton. All of this, however, depended on the delivery of flight-cleared engines, and BSEL’s problems with the Olympus showed little sign of ending in the immediate future. But XR220 finally had its engines by the end of February, and ground runs began on 1 March.
Meanwhile, early investigations into the static-wing test failure had led to a hurried drawing-up of a strengthened wing and stiffened wingtips, and these were to be introduced on all of the pre-production and production aircraft. As XS660, XS661 and XS662 had already had their wings built, they would be retrofitted with the new strengthened wing when it became available. The various major problems that had arisen were gradually being dealt with and ticked off. There was, however, still no real evidence that costs were being kept under control, or that the delays were going to be reduced. The men at the Ministries had been just as busy as BAC, but they were looking into buying an alternative aircraft. Even the Air Staff had lost interest in TSR2, and BAC men suddenly found it difficult to get hold of people. Telephone calls were not returned, letters were ignored, and senior officers were ‘unavailable’ for days at a time.
By the start of April 1965 the mood at BAC was one of optimism mixed with fear of cancellation. The first aircraft, XR219, had performed well in the limited test programme, with generally good serviceability and no more scary moments after those of the first handful of flights. Even the weather had been kind. On 2 April, when XR219 had to taxy back to the hangar after suffering an hydraulic leak on the way to the runway for Flight 25, there was no big disappointment, and no hint that the aircraft had already made its last flight. At BSEL, good news had arrived in the shape of improved fuel consumption figures on the latest standard of engine, and flight-test results had also shown better-than-predicted fuel consumption. The engine’s fuel economy was still not up to specification, so the aircraft would
still be unable to meet the sortie requirements, but the shortfall was now going to be much less and BSEL was still improving fuel consumption.
A BAC advertisement from 1964. BAE Systems via Brooklands Museum
However, BAC’s fixed-price offer had been examined and rejected, as it still offered no real ceiling to what appeared to be ever-rising costs. At the end of March the most recent progress report from the Department of the Controller (Aircraft) at the MoA included the following confidential policy dates for important milestones in the TSR2 programme (confidential policy dates were generally more pessimistic than BAC estimates, and were never disclosed to BAC lest they were taken as an inducement to relax and meet these dates rather than the company’s own promises):
