The Ottoman Empire: a Historical Encyclopedia [2 Volumes]

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The Ottoman Empire: a Historical Encyclopedia [2 Volumes] Page 18

by Kia, Mehrdad;


  Ali Pasha of Janina. (Ridpath, John Clark. Ridpath’s History of the World, 1901)

  Beginning in the reign of Mahmud II (r. 1808–1839), the Ottoman state embarked on a policy of curtailing the power of local notables and re-establishing central government authority over its many provinces. By 1819 Mahmud had concluded that Ali Pasha should be removed. The old and powerful notable and his sons “were dismissed from their official positions,” and “naval and ground forces were dispatched against them” (Shaw: 2:16; Sugar:19). Ali Pasha tried to negotiate with the Ottoman government and use his enormous political influence and financial power, as well as his friends at the Ottoman court, to bribe his way out of his quandary, but he failed. Recognizing that he had to choose between submission and resistance to the Ottoman sultan, Ali Pasha chose to resist. His strategy was to defeat the sultan’s armies by mobilizing the support of the local population, especially the Christian Albanians and Greeks who resented Ottoman rule. To win the hearts and the minds of his Greek and Albanian subjects, he improved the living conditions in villages and towns under his control. He recruited Greeks into his administration and Albanians into his army. He also established contact with the Greek revolutionary organization Philiki Hetairia (Filiki Etairia) (Society of Friends), which had been founded in Odessa in 1814 with the aim of organizing a nationalist insurrection against the authority of the Ottoman sultan.

  The Ottoman government responded by denouncing Ali Pasha as a rebel and attacked his territory in April 1820. By August 1820 Ali’s capital, Janina, was under siege. By attacking Ali Pasha, the Ottomans inadvertently destroyed “the last power in the western Balkans capable of putting down” the Greek revolution (Shaw: 2:18). With the majority of Ottoman forces concentrating their efforts on defeating Ali Pasha, the Greek nationalists were handed a golden opportunity to stage their revolution in late March 1821, although “the symbolic act that was henceforth celebrated as marking the commencement of the revolution occurred on April 6” (Jelavich: 217). The revolt was led by Alexandros Ypsilantis (Alexander Ipsilanti) one of the leaders of the Philiki Hetairia, who had already led an unsuccessful revolt against Ottoman rule in the Romanian-populated principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia. The Ottoman siege of Janina dragged on for more than a year. Shortages of food and ammunition finally forced Ali Pasha to surrender. The old notable expected to receive an imperial pardon, but he was executed by the order of Mahmud II in January 1822. His severed head was sent to Istanbul (Jelavich: 217). With the fall of Ali Pasha, there was no power left in Greece strong enough to suppress the Greek revolutionaries, who won independence for their nation in 1832 with considerable political and military support from Russia, France, and England.

  See also: Battles and Treaties: Greek War of Independence; Peoples and Cultures: Albania and Albanians; Sultans: Mahmud II; Selim III

  Further Reading

  Clayer, Nathalie. “The Myth of Ali Pasha and the Bektashis or the Construction of an Albanian Bektashi National History.” In Albanian Identities: Myth and History, edited by Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers and Bernd Fischer, 127–133. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002.

  Finkel, Caroline. Osman’s Dream: The History of the Ottoman Empire. New York: Basic Books, 2005.

  Fleming, Katherine E. The Muslim Bonaparte: Diplomacy and Orientalism in Ali Pasha’s Greece. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014.

  Glenny, Misha. The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers 1804–2011. London: Penguin Books, 2012.

  Jelavich, Barbara. History of the Balkans: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries. Vol 1. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

  Shaw, Stanford J. Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III, 1781–1807. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971.

  Shaw, Stanford J. History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey. 2 vols. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1976.

  Sugar, Peter. Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 1354–1805. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977.

  Woodhouse, C. M. The Greek War of Independence. London: Hutchinson’s University, 1952.

  Zürcher, Erik-Jan. Turkey: A Modern History. London: I. B. Tauris, 2004.

  Barbaros Hayreddin Pasha (d. 1546)

  Also known as Barbarossa (Italian; “Red Beard”), Hayreddin Pasha was one of the most accomplished of all military figures in Ottoman history. Starting his career as a barbary pirate, he was elevated by the Ottoman sultan Süleyman I (r. 1520–1566) to the post of the grand admiral of the Ottoman fleet after he captured Algiers in 1529 and conquered Tunisia in 1530. In 1538 the Ottoman fleet under his command defeated the naval forces of the Holy League under the general command of the Holy Roman Emperor, Charles V, at the Battle of Preveza.

  Hayreddin was born in Mytilene (Turkish: Midilli), the main port and capital of the island of Lesbos (Lesvos) in the eastern Aegean Sea. He and his brother, Uruc (Uruj), were Greek converts to Islam. The two brothers were pirates, whose exploits caught the attention of the Ottoman state. According to one source, the association of the two brothers with the Ottoman royal family began around 1500, when they became involved in piratical attacks “off the southern and western shores of Anatolia under the patronage of Korkud, one of the sons of Sultan Bayezid II (r. 1481–1512)” (Greene: 77). In 1513, after Korkud was executed by his brother, the new sultan, Selim I (r. 1512–1520), Hayreddin and Uruc fled to the western Mediterranean. At the time of their arrival in the western Mediterranean, Spain, which had been unified through the marriage of Isabella I of Castile (r. 1451–1504) to Ferdinand II of Aragon (r. 1452–1516) in 1479, was emerging as a major power. The Catholic monarchs had completed their unification of Spain by capturing Granada and putting an end to the last Islamic emirate on the Iberian Peninsula. In the same year they commissioned Christopher Columbus to discover a westward maritime route to India and the rest of Asia.

  The Ottoman admiral, Barbaros Hayreddin Pasha, also known as Barbarossa Hayreddin Pasha, brought a large part of North Africa under Ottoman rule. Hayreddin Pasha defeated Charles V’s fleet at the Battle of Preveza in 1538, thus securing the eastern Mediterranean for the Ottoman Empire until the Battle of Lepanto in 1571. (Yale University Art Gallery)

  A unified and powerful Spain posed a direct threat to the Muslim rulers of North Africa, who were frightened by the prospect of becoming the next target of Spain’s expansion. Beginning in 1502 Spain also began to expel its Muslim population who refused to convert to Catholicism. Thousands of Muslim refugees began to arrive in present-day Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco. Many of the Muslim refugees, who had lost their homes and property, sought vengeance. They organized pirate fleets and attacked “Christian ships and coasts” (Shaw: 1:96). Spain used these attacks as justification to invade and capture strategic points in northern Morocco and Algeria, forcing at least one Muslim dynasty, the Hafsids, who ruled Ifriqiyyah (present-day Tunisia and eastern Algeria), to accept Spanish sovereignty. Spain’s invasion of North Africa convinced the Muslim rulers of North Africa to appeal to the Ottoman Empire for support and protection. Searching desperately for an ally and a protector, the Muslim rulers of North Africa had begun to view the Ottoman Empire as the only power that could defend them against Spanish expansion.

  Initially the Ottomans were not interested in becoming involved in a conflict in the faraway waters of the western Mediterranean. In the first two decades of the 16th century the principal sources of anxiety for the Ottoman state were the Safavid dynasty of Iran and the Mamluks of Egypt. In sharp contrast to the Ottomans, Hayreddin and Uruc saw an opportunity in the conflict erupting between Spain and the Muslims of North Africa. By lending support to the Muslim rulers under attack by Spain and by assisting Muslim refugees who had been expelled from Spain, the two brothers could find a new theater for their “piratical activities,” attacking and raiding Spanish and other Christian targets (Greene: 78). In their naval confrontations with Spain, Hayreddin and Uruc proved to be enormously successful
. They captured Goletta, which served as the port of Tunis. From Goletta they began to organize raids and accumulate rich booty. Their success attracted Muslim pirates and privateers, who joined them in large numbers. While they were protecting North Africa’s Muslim states from Spanish invasion and occupation, they also were increasing their own power and wealth. Their success was so great that they decided to remove the local Muslim rulers and seize power for themselves. Thus, in 1516 Uruc captured Algiers and forced its ruler to flee (Greene: 78).

  The impressive accomplishments of Uruc and Hayreddin corresponded with the campaigns of Selim I (r. 1512–1520) against the Mamluks in Egypt. Selim defeated the Mamluk armies first at Marj Dabiq (Mercidabik) in Syria in August 1516, and a second time outside Cairo at Ridaniya in January 1517. These victories allowed the Ottoman state to impose its rule over Egypt. If the sultan was to expand his rule over the rest of North Africa, he needed Uruc and Hayreddin’s brilliant generalship, as well as their galleys, vessels, and ships, which could significantly boost and support the fire power of Ottoman land forces. Uruc and Hayreddin also recognized that with military and financial support from the Ottoman sultan, they could rule North Africa as vassals of the Ottoman sultan. Because of the preoccupation of Selim and his successor, Süleyman I (r. 1520–1566), with Iran and the Habsburgs, however, the Ottomans did not pay sufficient attention to their alliance with Uruc and Hayreddin until 1530.

  Beginning in 1530, the Holy Roman Emperor, Charles V, recruited the Genoese admiral Andrea Doria to command his fleet and attack the Greek coasts. By then Hayreddin’s brother, Uruc, had been killed in fighting against Spain (1518). With Uruc’s death, Hayreddin had emerged as the leader of the pirates fighting Christian navies in the western Mediterranean. In 1529 Hayreddin Pasha had recaptured Algiers. In 1533, after Andrea Doria had seized the ports of Lepanto and Koron, Süleyman I called on Hayreddin to sail to Istanbul. In December 1533 the Ottoman sultan appointed Hayreddin Pasha the grand admiral (kapudan-i derya) of the Ottoman Empire. Hayreddin Pasha went into action immediately and built up the Ottoman fleet. Algiers “was officially annexed to the Ottoman Empire and its governorship set aside in perpetuity for the grand admiral, who was to use its revenues to maintain the ships and pay their officers and men” (Shaw: 1:97). In 1534 Hayreddin Pasha attacked the Greek coasts and recaptured Koron and Lepanto. In April 1534 he conquered Tunis. Using Tunis as his operational base, Hayreddin raided Sicily.

  In response to the fall of Tunisia, Charles V organized a crusade. The crusader fleet under the command of Andrea Doria invaded and occupied Goletta and Tunis in July 1535. In 1537 Hayreddin Pasha responded to the invasion and occupation of Tunis by attacking a number of Aegean and Ionian islands held by Venice. This successful campaign established “Ottoman naval supremacy in the Aegean” (Shaw: 1:99). Hayreddin Pasha then attacked the island of Crete, besieged the Venetian stronghold of Corfu, and invaded the Spanish-held Calabrian coast in southern Italy. In response to these naval campaigns, Pope Paul III organized a Holy League comprising Spain, Venice, Genoa, the papacy, and the Knights of Malta. In September 1538, at the Battle of Preveza (Preveze) off the coast of Epirus at the mouth of the Gulf of Arta south of Janina, the Holy League’s naval forces under the command of Andrea Doria engaged the Ottoman fleet under the leadership of Hayreddin Pasha. The Ottoman fleet scored a decisive victory over the numerically superior Holy League navy. This victory secured the waters of the eastern Mediterranean for the Ottoman Empire until the Battle of Lepanto in 1571. Venice was forced to sign a new peace treaty with the Ottoman Empire in October 1540. According to this treaty, Venice surrendered all its possessions in the Morea, “acknowledging all of Hayreddin’s Aegean conquests, and agreeing to pay a heavy war indemnity as well as an increased tribute in return for Ottoman recognition of its continued rule in Crete and Cyprus plus restoration of its trade privileges” (Shaw: 1:99). Hayreddin Pasha died in 1546.

  See also: Battles and Treaties: Preveza, Battle of; Sultans: Süleyman I

  Further Reading

  Clot, André. Süleiman the Magnificent. London: Saqi Books, 2005.

  Crowley, Roger. Empires of the Sea: The Siege of Malta, the Battle of Lepanto, and the Contest for the Center of the World. New York: Random House, 2009.

  Finkel, Caroline. Osman’s Dream: The History of the Ottoman Empire. New York: Basic Books, 2005.

  Fisher, Godfrey. Barbary Legend: War, Trade and Piracy in North Africa 1415–1830. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957.

  Glete, Jan. Warfare at Sea, 1500–1650: Maritime Conflicts and the Transformation of Europe. London: Routledge, 2002.

  Goffman, Daniel. The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

  Greene, Molly. “Barbarossa Brothers.” In Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire, edited by Gábor Ágoston and Bruce Masters, 77–78. New York: Facts On File, 2009.

  Hess, Andrew. The Forgotten Frontier: A History of the Sixteenth Century Ibero-African Frontier. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1978.

  Imber, Colin. The Ottoman Empire, 1300–1650: The Structure of Power. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.

  Inalcik, Halil. The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300–1600. Translated by Norman Itzkowitz and Colin Imber. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973.

  Lybyer, Howe Albert. The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time of Suleiman the Magnificent. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1913.

  Quinn, Rodney S. Barbarosa: The Sword of Islam. Gorham, ME: Trafford Publishing, 2005.

  Shaw, Stanford J. History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey. 2 vols. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1976.

  Somel, Selçuk Akșin. Historical Dictionary of the Ottoman Empire. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2003.

  Cemal Pasha (Jemal Pasha) (1872–1922)

  Ahmed Cemal Pasha (Ahmed Jemal Pasha) or Cemal Pasha (Jemal Pasha), was an Ottoman army officer, commander, one of the leading figures of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), and a military governor, who together with Enver Pasha and Talat Pasha formed a triumvirate that ruled the Ottoman Empire from 1913 to 1918.

  Cemal was born in May 1872 in Mytilene (Midilli), the capital and the port of the Island of Lesbos. His father, Mehmed Nesip Bey, was a military pharmacist. Cemal attended the Kuleli Military High School, from which he graduated in 1890. He then enrolled in the Imperial War Academy in Istanbul. He completed his studies at the War Academy in 1893. Cemal was assigned to the Third Army, based in Salonika (Thessaloniki) in present-day northern Greece. It was in Salonika that he joined the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), which opposed the autocratic rule of the Ottoman sultan Abdülhamid II (r. 1876–1909). It was as chief of staff of the Third Reserve Division in Salonika that Cemal worked with Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), who would go on to lead the Turkish nationalist movement and establish the Republic of Turkey after the end of World War I. Cemal served as a military inspector and staff officer in Thrace and used his position to expand and consolidate the CUP organizational networks.

  Cemal played a central role in the victory of the Young Turk revolution in 1908. He was also a key player in suppressing the 1909 mutiny, which aimed to overthrow the CUP and restore Abdülhamid’s autocratic rule. After the suppression of the counterrevolutionary forces, Cemal was appointed governor of Adana in southern Anatolia after a revolt by local Armenians had been suppressed.

  In 1913 Cemal joined his friends Enver and Talat in staging a coup d’état that imposed a CUP dictatorship over the Ottoman Empire. Elevated to the rank of lieutenant general, Cemal was appointed commander of the First Army, which was responsible for the security of the Ottoman capital. He also served as the military governor of Istanbul. In December 1913 Cemal was appointed minister of public works. In February 1914 he became minister of the navy. Beginning in 1913, and particularly after February 1914, the triumvirate of Talat, Cemal, and Enver concentrated all power in its hands.

  Ahmed Cemal (Jemal) Pasha was an Ottoman military offi
cer and one of the members of the triumvirate that ruled the Ottoman Empire during World War I. (Aaronsohn, Alexander. With the Turks in Palestine, 1916)

  The Ottoman Empire entered World War I in November 1914. During the Great War Cemal was appointed commander of the Fourth Army and the military governor of Syria. For much of World War I he was stationed in Damascus. In 1915, and again in 1916, he led two Ottoman campaigns against British-occupied Egypt. Both of these campaigns failed to accomplish their objectives. Cemal adopted an iron fist policy vis-à-vis Arab nationalists, who dreamed of creating a free and independent Arab state. The requisition of the harvest in present-day Syria and Lebanon caused mass starvation. Cemal played a central role in the campaign against the Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire. The Armenian population of eastern Anatolia, which was deported to Syria, suffered brutal treatment at the hands of Cemal Pasha, with many Armenians who had survived the long and arduous journey to Syria being placed in camps, where many starved to death. Some Armenians were used as slave labor on the Baghdad railway project.

 

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