Young Turks
A coalition of reform-minded intellectuals, army officers, and underground committees and groups, which opposed the autocratic rule of the Ottoman sultan Abdülhamid II (r. 1876–1909) and advocated the establishment of a constitutional form of government. In 1908 the Young Turks seized power and introduced a series of modernization projects to prevent the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. Despite their best efforts, however, the Ottoman state continued to decline and lose territory to predatory European powers and states, which coveted various areas of the empire for themselves. After 1913 the Young Turks adopted an increasingly authoritarian approach, culminating with the rise of a triumvirate of Enver Pasha, Talat Pasha, and Cemal (Jemal) Pasha. It was this triumvirate that made the Ottoman Empire enter World War I as an ally of Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, resulting ultimately in the defeat and collapse of the Ottoman state in 1918. It was also during the reign of the Young Turks that over one million Armenians were subjected to deportation from their ancient homeland. The attack on the Armenian communities of the empire resulted in the death and destruction of a significant portion of the Armenian community, particularly those who lived in Anatolia.
Despite his best efforts to modernize Ottoman society, Sultan Abdülhamid II could not neutralize the opposition of the secular-minded intelligentsia and young army officers who opposed his authoritarian rule. In a government where power was the exclusive domain of an absolutist monarch and a small clique of loyal, obedient, and traditionally minded government officials, the members of the modern educated class, who served in the army and the bureaucracy, felt excluded and marginalized. On May 21, 1889, a small group of students at the army medical school organized the Ittihad-i Osmani Cemiyeti (Ittihad-i Osmani Jemiyeti) (Ottoman Unity Society), which became the nucleus of the Ittihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti (Ittihad ve Terakki Jemiyeti) or Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), a secret society that for the next two decades would lead the movement to establish a constitutional form of government. The “Union” referred to in the name of the CUP was the unity of all ethnic, linguistic, and religious groupings under a constitutional system of government. The Young Turks believed that only a constitutional form of government, under which the people of the Ottoman Empire were treated not as the subjects of an autocratic sultan, but as citizens enjoying equal rights and legal protections before the law, could save the empire from further disintegration.
By 1896 the CUP, which recruited primarily young, urban, and educated civil servants, army officers, teachers, and students, had accumulated sufficient organizational strength to plan a coup against Sultan Abdülhamid II (Shaw: 2:257). However, the plot was discovered and smashed by the sultan’s secret police. Although many conspirators were arrested and sent to the remote corners of the empire, some managed to flee to European countries, particularly France and Switzerland, where they joined the antigovernment intellectuals who were already publishing newspapers critical of Abdülhamid’s autocratic rule. Thus, the opposition that was neutralized inside the empire found a voice in the émigré community in Europe. The leaders of the movement that came to be called the Young Turks believed in the restoration of the 1876 constitution and insisted that the preservation of the empire depended on guaranteeing equal rights for all subjects of the Ottoman state. The Young Turks believed that the establishment of a constitutional government would neutralize the national aspirations of the non-Turkish minorities, allowing them to identify themselves as members of the larger Ottoman family (Ahmad: 16). They had concluded that the alienation of the Christian subjects of the sultan was caused by the absence of political rights and corrupt administrative practices. If the Ottoman government provided constitutional rights to its citizens and eliminated corruption, then the empire could be saved (Ahmad: 16). Beyond these commonly shared principles, however, a great deal of divergence and conflict existed within the movement. Indeed, the Young Turk movement in Europe was internally fragmented. One wing was led by Ahmed Riza, a former civil servant who emerged as the most prominent Young Turk leader after he fled to France in 1889 (Ahmad: 177). A devout follower of the French thinker Auguste Comte (1798–1857) and his positivist philosophy, Ahmed Riza, who published the newspaper Meșveret (Meshveret; Consultation), was an ardent materialist, scientist, and atheist who refused to appeal to popular religious sentiments as a means of organizing the masses against the sultan. One rival was Murad Bey, the publisher of the antigovernment newspaper Mizan (Balance) and the head of the Geneva branch of Young Turks, who challenged Ahmed Riza’s leadership and emphasized the need to preserve the movement’s Islamic identity. As a nationalist Ahmed Riza believed in a strong centralized state and rejected the idea of foreign intervention as the means of removing Abdülhamid from the throne, while another faction within the CUP, led by Prince Sabaheddin (Sabaheddin Bey), advocated a decentralized form of government and agreed with the Armenian faction within the CUP that foreign intervention could be used as a legitimate means of overthrowing the sultan’s autocratic rule (Finkel: 505–506).
In 1905 and 1906 the opposition reorganized itself, particularly in Salonika, where a secret organization managed to recruit a significant number of army officers stationed in the Balkans and particularly in Macedonia. In sharp contrast to the liberal-minded Young Turk leaders in Europe, many of the young army officers who joined the opposition came from the Balkans, where they had experienced firsthand the disintegration of the empire. Many were the children of the Ottoman borderlands, where they had lived or served as members of the Muslim minority side by side with non-Turkish, non-Muslim communities and had witnessed how the Christian subjects of the sultan had revolted successfully against the Ottoman Empire with the financial and military support of the European powers. Any illusion that the Christian communities of the empire wished to live side by side with the Muslim subjects of the sultan and remain loyal to the authority of the Ottoman state had evaporated in front of their eyes.
Revolution came from Macedonia in July 1908, when army officers loyal to the CUP staged an uprising, demanding the restoration of the 1876 constitution (Shaw: 2:266–267). After a fainthearted effort to suppress the rebellion, Abdülhamid concluded that resistance was futile. On July 23 he restored constitutional rule and ordered parliamentary elections (Ahmed: 12). Although the Young Turk movement had aimed at ending the autocratic rule of Abdülhamid, the sultan was not removed from the throne. Shortly after the victory of the revolution, the Austro-Hungarian Empire formally annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina, which had maintained its nominal affiliation with the empire by accepting the suzerainty of the sultan (Jelavich: 215–216). Greece annexed the island of Crete, while Bulgaria unified with Eastern Rumelia, which had remained an autonomous province under the nominal rule of the Ottoman sultan (Zürcher: 104).
Aside from Abdülhamid and his supporters, the new constitutional regime had other formidable opponents. Prince Sabaheddin and his liberal pro-British faction opposed the more authoritarian elements in the CUP, who advocated centralization of power. The urban religious classes such as the şeyhs and dervishes, as well as students from religious schools, viewed the leadership of the CUP as secular atheists who were trying to limit the power of the sultan/caliph by introducing alien European rules and laws, thereby undermining Islamic law. On April 12, 1909, army divisions that had recently been brought from Macedonia to Istanbul rose in rebellion and were joined by students from religious schools (Mango: 86–87). The demonstrators marched to the parliament, where they demanded the dismissal of the grand vizier and the president of the chamber of deputies, Ahmed Riza. They also called on the government to replace a number of CUP officers and banish several deputies from Istanbul. Finally, they called for the restoration of Islamic law and asked for amnesty for the troops who had mutinied (Shaw: 2:280). The government in Istanbul panicked, unsure how to respond. Every effort had to be made to avoid bloodshed and infighting between pro- and anti-CUP army units. By April 15 the troops loyal to the CUP, particularly thos
e stationed in Macedonia led by Mahmud Șevket (Shevket) Pasha, and primarily Albanian units headed by Niyazi Bey, struck back and began to march toward the capital, using the Ottoman railway system to transport their troops. Despite a last-ditch effort by the government to delay their entry into the capital, the pro-CUP divisions entered Istanbul without confronting any armed resistance. On April 27 the two chambers of parliament deposed Abdülhamid and replaced him with his younger brother, who ascended the throne as Mehmed (Zürcher: 98) V. A new era in Ottoman politics had been inaugurated. The center of power had shifted once again, this time from the palace to the army, the bureaucracy, and the parliament.
There were other political transformations, too. Although the CUP dominated both the government and the parliament, the Ottoman army emerged as the most powerful institution within the state. Neither the cabinet nor the CUP and the parliament could challenge the power of the army and its commander, Mahmud Șevkat Pasha, who had saved them from political extinction (Zürcher: 99–100). The army allowed the CUP to dominate the legislative branch and introduce new laws that significantly cut the budget for the palace and restricted the power of the sultan by granting him only the right to appoint the grand vizier and the şeyhülislam. In return, the CUP let the army do what it wanted as it undertook the purging of the senior commanders and officers who had served Abdülhamid (Zürcher: 100). The growing power of junior officers who were rising in rank and their interference in the political life of the empire allowed the opposition to reorganize. Initially, the army and the CUP did not prevent the creation of new political parties, including the Ottoman Socialist Party. However, as the new parties coalesced into a unified opposition, the army and the CUP felt compelled to act. The Albanian uprising, which began on April 1, 1910, and the assassination of the influential journalist Ahmed Samim on June 10, who had criticized the CUP, energized the opposition parties.
In October 1911 Italy invaded Libya by landing troops in Tripoli and Benghazi (Jelavich: 216). The grand vizier and his cabinet were forced to resign as the opposition forces unified in a coalition, which included both conservative and liberal parties. The CUP responded by dissolving the parliament and calling for new elections. Massive fraud and intimidation allowed the CUP to win the majority of seats in the new parliament (Zürcher: 103). Despite the convening of the new CUP-dominated parliament, the political situation continued to deteriorate. The central government was so weak that it failed to respond effectively to growing unrest in Albania, the uprising of Imam Yahya in Yemen, and the Italian invasion and occupation of Libya (Zürcher: 105–106). To their credit, a group of Ottoman officers affiliated with the CUP and under the leadership of Major Enver (later Enver Pasha) rushed to Libya and with assistance from the Sanusiya religious order organized a defense against the Italian occupiers. An Italian attack on the Dardanelles and the occupation of the Dodecanese islands in May 1912, however, forced the Ottoman government to sue for peace. (Zürcher: 105–106)
The Italian victory emboldened the neighboring Balkan states, which had been waiting for an opportunity to invade and occupy the remaining Ottoman provinces in Europe. After a series of negotiations, Serbia and Bulgaria formed an alliance in March 1912 (Jelavich: 216–217). Shortly afterward, in May, Bulgaria signed a similar agreement with Greece (Zürcher: 106). Finally, in October Serbia and Montenegro formed an alliance (Zürcher: 106). Using the imperial rhetoric of European powers, the four Balkan states demanded the implementation of fundamental reforms in Macedonia, knowing full well that they were weaving a convenient justification for their joint invasion of Ottoman territory (Zürcher: 106). On October 8 the Balkan states dropped their pretense and declared war. The Bulgarians soon defeated the Ottomans, on October 22–24 and again on October 22–November 2, followed by a Serbian victory at the battle of Kumanovo on October 23–24 (Zürcher: 107). The Greeks entered Salonika on November 8. In the absence of a unified command, the Ottomans were forced either to retreat or to take defensive positions. The major urban centers of the empire in Europe (Edirne, Janina, and Shkodër) were surrounded by the invading Balkan armies. By December the Ottoman government sued for peace. As the discussions dragged on in London, Bulgaria demanded the city of Edirne. This was too much for a group of young officers in Istanbul, who staged a military coup on January 23, 1913, killing the minister of war and forcing the grand vizier to resign. The former commander of the army, Mahmud Șevket Pasha, assumed the post of grand vizier and minister of war (Zürcher: 108). When news of the coup in Istanbul reached London, the Balkan states resumed their military campaigns. Despite a promise to adopt an offensive posture, the new government in Istanbul failed to repulse the Bulgarian forces, which captured Edirne on March 28, or the Serbs, who seized Shkodër on April 22. On May 30 the Ottoman government was forced to sign the Treaty of London, which resulted in the loss of much of its territory in Europe, including the city of Edirne. Disaster seemed to be complete with the murder of the new grand vizier, Mahmud Șevket Pasha, on June 11.
Enver Bey (Enver Pasha) speaking to the British military attaché in Istanbul, Lieutenant Colonel Tyrrel, after the victory of the January 1913 coup d’état. (Photo12/UIG/Getty Images)
Fortunately for the Ottomans, intense rivalries and jealousies among the Balkan states erupted shortly after the signing of the Treaty of London. Romania, which had not participated in the war, demanded territory from Bulgaria. The Greeks and Serbs also expressed dissatisfaction with the division of territory in Macedonia. As the negotiations for the creation of an anti-Bulgarian alliance began, Bulgaria attacked Serbia, which ignited a new Balkan war between the victors of the first one. The Ottomans used the opportunity to recapture Edirne under the leadership of Enver, forcing Bulgaria to sign the Treaty of Constantinople on September 29, 1913 (Zürcher: 108). The military coup of January 1913 brought the government under the control of the CUP, which soon began suppressing the activities of opposition parties with arrests and death sentences. As the CUP began to consolidate its power over the organs of the state, a triumvirate comprised of Cemal Pasha, Enver Pasha, and Talat Pasha began to rule the empire with support of an inner circle, which represented the various factions within the CUP. With the clouds of war gathering over Europe, the beleaguered Ottoman government appraised its various options, none of which looked very promising, given the predatory nature of the European powers. Then, on August 2, 1914, the Ottoman Empire signed a secret treaty of alliance with Germany. According to this treaty, the Ottoman Empire and Germany agreed “to observe strict neutrality” in the “conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia” (Hurewitz: 2:1–2). However, “in the event that Russia should intervene with active military measures and thus should pose a threat to Germany,” this threat “would also come into force for Turkey” (Hurewitz: 2:1–2). In the case of a threat or a war, Germany committed itself to defending the Ottoman Empire by “force of arms” (Hurewitz: 2:1–2).
The decision to enter the war on the side of Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire brought the Ottoman state into open military confrontation with France, czarist Russia, and the British Empire, which used the hostilities to terminate the nominal suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire over Egypt, depose Khedive Abbas Hilmi II, and establish a protectorate over the country on December 18, 1914 (Hurewitz: 2: 5–7). The British also annexed the island of Cyprus and occupied Basra in southern Iraq.
During World War I the Ottoman armies made important contributions to the war efforts of the Central Powers. Ottoman troops fought Russian forces in eastern Anatolia. They also fought and defeated the British and French forces at Gallipoli. In Mesopotamia the Ottoman armies initially managed to delay and defeat the British forces that were advancing toward Baghdad. As the war progressed, however, the policies of the CUP-dominated government caused enormous dissatisfaction and suffering in various provinces of the empire. These policies contributed significantly to the growing alienation of the non-Turkish population from the central government in Istanbul.
The Turk
ish nationalist ideology of the Young Turks alienated a group of Arab leaders, who revolted against the authority of the Ottoman state. This Arab revolt, which was backed by the British, hoped to create an independent Arab state after the end of World War I. After World War I began, many Armenian officers serving in the Ottoman army also defected and joined the Russians, with the hope that the defeat and collapse of the Ottoman Empire would fulfill the dream of establishing an independent Armenian state. These defections were followed by an uprising of the Armenians in the city of Van in April 1915. Alarmed by the popularity of the Armenian national movement, the central committee of the CUP adopted a policy of forcibly relocating the Armenian population to Syria. Starting in May 1915, virtually the entire Armenian population of central and eastern Anatolia were removed from their homes. This policy was then replicated in western Anatolia. Hundreds of thousands of Armenians perished from starvation, disease, and exposure, and many more were brutalized by Ottoman army units and irregular Kurdish regiments, who robbed, raped, and killed the defenseless refugees. The deportation of the Armenian population was designed and carried out by a small inner circle within the CUP’s central committee known as Teşkilat-i Mahsusa (Teshkilat-i Mahsusa) or Special Organization, which operated under the Ottoman ministry of defense beginning in January 1914.
For the Ottomans, World War I came to an end when British troops supported by Arab fighters under the leadership of Emir Faisal entered Damascus in August 1918. The British had already occupied Baghdad on March 11 and Jerusalem on December 9, 1917. The three Young Turk leaders, Enver Pasha, Talat Pasha, and Cemal Pasha, fled Istanbul for Berlin. The Ottoman Empire sued for peace in October 1918.
See also: Beys and Pashas: Cemal Pasha; Enver Pasha; Talat Pasha; Empire and Administration: Atatürk, Kemal; Sultans: Abdülhamid II; Primary Documents: Document 14
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