The repeated defeats suffered by the Ottomans in the 18th century convinced the Ottoman sultan Selim III (r. 1789–1807) of the urgent need to introduce institutional reforms that would restore the power of the central government while preserving the territorial integrity of the empire against internal and external threats. Internally, the greatest challenge for the young sultan was to reduce the power of the local notables (āyāns). Although they accepted the suzerainty of the Ottoman sultan, some āyāns acted as quasi-independent rulers, maintaining private armies and conducting their own foreign policy. Externally, Russia posed the greatest threat to the territorial integrity of the Ottoman state. Thus, shortly after the signing of the Treaty of Jassy with the Russians at the conclusion of the Russo-Ottoman War of 1787–1792, the sultan implemented his ambitious reform agenda, the Nizam-i Cedid (Nizam-i Jedid; New Order). Selim centered his reforms on the creation of a modern army or Nizam-i Cedid Ordusu (Army of the New Order), which was to restore central governmental control over provincial notables.
Initially the sultan believed that the existing janissary and sipāhi corps could be modernized by introducing new methods of training and administration. He soon realized, however, that the reform would ignite fierce opposition from within the corps. Thus, he abandoned the plan and opted for the more radical approach of creating a new army altogether. The recruitment for the new army began in 1793–1794. By 1807, when Selim was forced out of power, the new army had nearly 30,000 well-armed and well-equipped men.
It is said in the history which treats of the terms of peace concluded by the sublime person who has received the mercy of God [The Sultan Abdülhamid I, ed.], that those States which from carelessness did not take proper precautions to guard against the violence of strangers, have remained without either honour or reputation, and dependent upon others. Or even from the consequence of their negligence, having fallen entirely into the hands of foreigners, their kings have become subjects, and their rich men poor. It is a principle to be observed by those who rule governments, and are men of understanding and penetration, that, “even if your enemy is an ant, you should use every effort against him”; that conformably to this proverb, they may not suffer themselves to be brought into calamity, by the treacherous machinations of the neighboring States, and other hostile nations. …
“This institution of the Nizam-y-Gedid has caused the established order of the world to be disturbed, and has given cause to the insolent conduct of the mountaineers in the country of Rumelia.” [A reference to the uprising in Serbia which began in 1804, ed.] Such are the expressions employed by a set of contentious and ignorant men, incapable of learning reason, I have sometimes questioned such persons, saying as follows—‘Ho, friend! allow me in the first place to ask you a question. What is this institution against which you make such continual and senseless outcry? First know precisely what it is, and then continue to oppose it. If there be reason in what you say, I am open to conviction, and am ready to concede the point in dispute.” On hearing this, all they could say was, that what they call the Nizam-y-Gedid is a body of troops trained and exercised; beyond which, and a mere profession of their aversion to it, they plainly showed that they knew nothing about the matter. Although I saw that an attempt to make this kind of rabble understand public affairs, is like trying to make a camel leap over a ditch, I proceeded to put some questions that occurred to me, as follows:—‘Shall I give you some account of the trouble which occurred in the world before the Nizam-y-Gedid existed, during the reigns of their highnesses the former Ottoman sultans, who have found mercy from God? Such as the disturbances raised in Anatolia by the Gellalli, and the insolence of Sarry Beÿ Oglou in the reign of Sultan Mahmoud, and especially the events which passed in Egypt, occasioned by Sacka-Yorghi Alli-Beÿ, the son of a glass-blower; and the affairs of Emir-Daher, of Abou-Vahib, all of which happened during the reign of Sultan Moustapha; and the calamities inflicted by the unemployed Levendis, who turned the province of Anatolia upside down; and the continued bad success which attended the arms of the followers of Islam, for the space of seven years, during the Muscovite war, which began in the year 1182; the defeats which our great armies suffered every year, with the loss of so many thousand tents, such abundance of camp equipage, treasure, artillery, bombs, and military stores, sufficient for the consumption of many years, and so great a loss of our troops, either taken, drowned, or killed, and the capture as well of our small forts and retrenched posts, as of our large fortresses, some of which were reduced by famine and others by force; and the impossibility of delivering so many thousand women and children whom they contained, and who, still remaining in captivity, pass their lives in tears. These are things, the bitter remembrance of which can never be erased from our hearts. Some of these calamitous events may be found in our annals, and some have happened in our days. Pray was the Nizam-y-Gedid the cause of all these disorders and disgraceful occurrences? It did not exist at that time, and yet you see that confusion was already introduced, and the regular order of things interrupted. Is then the Nizam-y-Gedid the only cause of revolution? …
Be it known to men of understanding, that after the conclusion of peace with the Muscovite infidels, in the year 1206 [AD 1792], when ambassadors were passing to and fro, at the time that the prisoners were released, diligent enquiry was made of many persons who had been in the hands of the Russians, with regard to the power and condition of the enemies of our faith. …
The Russian infidels having withal greatly improved the state of their dominions within the space of seventy or eighty years, and manifested their thirst of glory by their arrogant and insolent interference in the interior affairs of other States, and having annexed several foreign countries to their own dominions, especially the kingdom of Poland, we must not, by any means, consider ourselves secure from so treacherous and deceitful a nation. …
That therefore, as it was a maxim established that in an urgent case, when some remedy must be sought, resources must be found in the whole body of those who are attached to government, without consulting the lower orders; there was no other method of dispelling and removing the danger we have spoken of above, but by keeping a body of troops on foot ready for service … , and provided with requisite supply of artillery, ammunition, and military stores; and such troops as should not, like the rest of our forces, be composed of sellers of pastry, boatmen, fishermen, coffee-house keepers, baccals, and others who are engaged in the thirty-two trades, but of well disciplined men, who would take care to have their cannon and muskets ready for service, and on an urgent occasion, would be prepared in the space of half an hour to engage the troops and artillery of the enemy; to repulse them, and retaliate on them their own hostile devices. After these points had been taken into serious consideration, some men were in the first place dispatched to the corps of the Janissaries for the purpose of selecting from thence some young and chosen soldiers, whom they were to discipline and train to the use of arms. Upon this, our bravoes who are engaged in the thirty-two trades, considering that if they were obliged to attend punctually to the exercise of cannon and small arms, they would be occupied with that instead of their private affairs, and would be brought into trouble, no longer receiving their pay once in three months gratuitously, and without doing any thing for it, began to ponder the matter, stroking their beards and mustachioes, and to vent their discontent by saying, “We are not made for this sort of work, and we will have nothing to do with it.” Whatever pains were taken to enlighten their understandings, they obstinately persisted, addressing each other by these or similar terms, “Ho! Alli Sacka Baba, Oda Bashi, Bash Karakouloukgee! [The titles of some superior officers amongst the Janissaries, ed.] what say you to this business? the exercise of the Nizam-y-Gedid is now introduced; henceforth no pay is to be had without service, and what they call exercise is a very troublesome service; it is true that drawing up in a line makes a better show; but if they send us to war, we can fire our muskets, and then charging sword in hand, we can put the Russ
ians to flight and storm their camp. May Heaven preserve from decay our corps and our chiefs! we shall then take our pay when it is issued, and pass our times agreeably.” Such were their expressions, as though they could by frigid reasoning, and senseless allusions, induce the Sublime Government to abandon this enterprise, when the experience of two wars had proved, beyond dispute, both the total inefficiency of their services, and the feeble condition of the Mahometan community.
With respect to the apprehensions entertained of … [an attack on Istanbul] … by the Russian infidels, the first step which was taken for the purpose of procuring speedy and effectual means of guarding against so devilish a piece of treachery, consisted in an ordinance for levying a body of Bostangees [literally “gardeners,” actually a royal guard, ed.], who were to be quartered at the Levend-Chifflick, a military post newly established at no great distance from the reservoirs, in order that in an urgent crisis when we fly for refuge to Divine protection, they might be ready for service in a very short space of time. But the most important point is this: that the new levied troops, instead of engaging in trade, should remain day and night in their quarters, applying themselves daily to military exercises, and keeping their arms, cannon, muskets, and warlike implements of every description necessary for immediate service; thus practising a discipline suitable to their appellation of soldiers of the new regulation. To complete all, every Orta [regiment] … [had] an Imam attached to it for the due performance of religious worship, that nothing requisite might be omitted. …
The advantages of the new corps, and their superiority over the old are infinite; were we to write them all down, we should fill several volumes. In order, however, to make the people comprehend well, we will point out to them another of these advantages. The soldiers of our ancient corps, are not at all clothed alike; from this diversity of garment, the following bad effect results; if, in time of war, any of them should desert from the army, as there are no marks by which we can distinguish whether the deserters belong to the troops, or whether they are tradesmen, or servants, they have thereby the opportunities of escaping without being known. Whereas the new troops have a particular uniform of their own, so that the strugglers would be soon discovered. Hence it results, that in a large camp of the new troops, every man will be forced to remain fixed in his company, and stead in the performance of this duty, whether he would or no, since it is impossible to desert without greatly incurring the danger of punishment.
Another of their advantages is this: our old forces, when in presence of the enemy, do not remain drawn up in a line, but stand confusedly and promiscuously like a crowd in a place of diversion. Some load their muskets, and fire once, some twice, or oftener, just as they think proper, whilst others being at their wits’ end, and not knowing what they are about turn from side to side like fabulous storytellers [i.e., sufi dervishes, ed.]. If in consequence of any movement which they perceive on the side of the enemy, the officers endeavour to make the troops fall back a little, some will obey them, others will not, every one does just as he likes. If they wish to retire a little; the soldiers make that a pretence for flying to the distance of some days’ journey.
But the new troops remain drawn up in line as though they were at prayers, the rear ranks being exactly parallel with the front, and consisting of the same number of companies, neither more nor less, so that, when it is necessary, they turn with as much precision as a watch. The whole body, consisting of many thousand men, observe attentively the signals given them by the two fuglemen who explain by signs the commands of the officers, and not one dares to much as to turn his head. …
Although many similar stratagems have been employed at various times, by holy warriors, … and although the great Prophet hath given full permission and authority to do any thing which may conduce to the defeat of the infidels, yet an ignorant rabble keep chattering like parrots, some of whom do not approve of the dresses of the new troops, while others say that their exercise belongs specially to the Kiafers [i.e., “infidels,” the Europeans], and does not become Mussulmans.
Source: Mustafa Reshid Çelebi Effendi, “An Explanation of the Nizam-y Gedid by Tshelebi Effendi,” translation from the Turkish in William Wilkinson, An Account of the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia Including Various Political Observations Relating to Them (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, and Brown, 1820), 217–218, 221–224, 227–228, 232–237, 266–268, 271–272.
11. DESTRUCTION OF THE JANISSARY CORPS: MAHMUD II’S FIRMAN ABOLISHING THE JANISSARY CORPS (JUNE 17, 1826)
The Ottoman sultan, Mahmud II (r. 1808–1839), was determined to establish the authority of the central government by building a new and modern army. As long as the janissaries survived, the antireform forces could always rely on their support to challenge governmental reforms. Learning from the mistakes of his predecessor, Selim III, Mahmud did not create a new and separate army that could be viewed as a direct challenge to the janissaries. Instead, he selectively modernized army units such as the artillery corps, which were crucial in any future confrontation. By June 1826 the sultan was ready to act. First, he demanded that the janissaries follow the model of other military units and reform. When they revolted and tried to challenge him by rallying the conservative forces, Mahmud, unlike his cousin, refused to budge. He knew full well that concessions to the rebels would be construed as a sign of weakness. When the grand vizier and the ulema rallied to the banner of their sultan, and Mahmud’s agents called on the people of Istanbul to rise against the corrupt and rebellious troops, the janissaries did not have any other alternative but to return to their barracks. Determined to use the revolt as a justification to destroy them, the sultan struck back, ordering his artillerymen to shower the janissary barracks with cannonballs and force the gates open. This allowed the units loyal to the sultan to force their way into the barracks, mowing down every janissary they encountered. The victory was complete. The day after the massacre, the janissary corps was officially abolished.
The janissary units stationed in Istanbul were attacked by army troops loyal to Mahmud II. The day after the massacre the janissary corps was officially abolished. The destruction of the janissaries by Mahmud was celebrated throughout the empire as the Vaka-ye Hayriya or the beneficial event. The destruction of the janissaries may have removed a formidable obstacle to the creation of a modern army, which was the hallmark of the sultan’s efforts to build a strong and centralized governmental authority, but it also created a vacuum that could not be filled overnight.
As all Muslim people know, the Ottoman state owes its creation and its later conquest of the East and the West solely to the powerful influence of Islamic religious spirit, Muslim law, the sword of jihad [“striving” to spread Islam, ed.] and the gazi [“warrior for Islam,” ed.] spirit. It had always been necessary for the Ottoman state to maintain brave and numerous Muslim soldiers to fight as gazis against the enemies of the faith. The Janissary crops was first organized in a regular way for this purpose and rendered valuable services to the Ottoman state, may it endure forever. Thanks to the abandon with which they presented their bosoms to the enemy in jihad and gazi warfare, to their undaunted valor in battle, and their discipline, they were responsible for many victories.
However, as time went on, their discipline began to break down, evil men entered their ranks, and they began to be involved in criminal movements. Their obedience changed to insubordination. For the past century, on all the campaigns they have participated in, they have spread all sorts of baseless rumors against their commanders and have refused to obey their orders. They have shamefully deserted and abandoned our fortresses and our provinces to enemy infidels, by their lack of discipline and cowardice. On account of this, our enemies have been emboldened by these signs of our weakness and have taken advantage of this situation. From day to day they have invented countless insolent pretexts and demands upon us. They have encircled us on all sides with a belt of dangers and have threatened the very core of Islam.
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inally, this situation aroused the Muslim zeal. We longed to avenge all these defeats and sought to find the reasons for them and a means of avoiding them. It appears clear that the infidels’ apparently easy victories were the result of a knowledge of military tactics and a trained soldiery. Therefore, after the campaign of the year [1202 A. H. 1788, second war with Catherine the Great of Russia], and again on two other occasions [not specified, but apparently a reference to the attempt of Selim III, 1789–1807, to reform the army and the abortive attempt of Mahmoud II and his first Grand Vizir, Bayrakdar Mustafa Pasha, to undertake military reform in 1808], there were attempts made to organize disciplined troops. However, although they themselves were no longer competent or able to fight successfully, the Janissaries rioted three times against the formation of these troops, which they did not want. They were the cause of the failure and abolition of the useful new formations, which were beginning to take shape.
Even several sultans, who were to the universe what the spirit is for the body, became the victims of the Janissaries and lost their lives in the disasters brought about by their insubordinate sedition.
In this situation, nothing was said against the Janissaries because they were such an ancient body. There had been no thought of destroying them, but rather, in spite of everything, they had been allowed to do as they pleased, to obey when the spirit moved them and to mutiny if they felt like it. The result of this forbearance was that the enemies of our religion were not idle. No sooner did they observe our condition than they seized the opportunity to advance against us. They threaten us, press us on all sides and work for our total destruction. God forbid it but they have almost attained their objective.
In view of this situation, these matters were considered at a recent general council held in the mufti’s residence with all the vizirs, ulema, rijals, and again before all the officers of the Janissary corps when everything was explained. The ulema gave their sanction and issued a fatwa in support of the plan and the sacred oath to support it which was prepared, signed, and sealed by all those present. In accordance with these decisions, and with the firm conviction that today Muslim troops cannot accomplish their religious duty of combating and overcoming the infidel maneuvers without discipline and instruction in military science, it was unanimously decided to institute the eshkenji corps. This paid, standing army would not in any way infringe upon the ancient customs and regulations of the Janissaries, but each mess would supply only 150 men to the new formation.
The Ottoman Empire: a Historical Encyclopedia [2 Volumes] Page 75
