military was the only neutral force in Iraq. Hadley seemed to agree but was moving too slowly.
In October, that began to change.
"I want to start an informal internal review," Hadley told the president, after he summarized the work of Pace's and Rice's groups. A small group of NSC staff and Rice's coordinator, Satterfield, would operate under the radar. They could decide later to formalize it.
"Do it," the president said.
Bush recalled telling Hadley, "Steve, let's take a look and see where we are." The president told me, "Let's just cut to the chase here. Hadley drove a lot of this. Why? Because I trust he and his team a lot."
On October 17, Hadley summoned O'Sullivan to his office. He asked her to start the review quietly. The military and the intelligence agencies wouldn't be involved. "I don't want to assume we know the answer," he cautioned. Do a thorough, bottom-to-top review. "We've got one more shot to get this right. I want to go back, and I want to do it in a systematic way. I want to look at our assumptions. What were our assumptions? What our assumptions should be?"
The NSC needed to take the lead on a new way forward. O'Sullivan and her group should assess everythingó"candid, no kidding." He wanted her to examine a few questions in particular: What are the strategic impediments to our policy? How come it isn't working? What's in the way of success? Does the strategy need changing? What resources might be needed if they did change the strategy?
Only a handful of her staffers and Satterfield from the State Department could be included, Hadley said.
Rice similarly encouraged Satterfield to think about radical change. The current strategy was failing. "This cannot succeed, this will not succeed," she said, "and no amount of fine-tuning around the edges is going to fix it."
* * *
On October 21, O'Sullivan gathered the small group in her third-floor office in the Eisenhower Executive Office Building, next to the White House, for their first meeting.
Satterfield wanted to consider all optionsóeven the extreme, dramatic onesófrom a significant drawdown of forces to a significant addition of forces. "Let's think as if everything were possible," he said. Personally, he dismissed the notion of adding more U.S. forces. That would be, he argued, a final throwing of the dice, exposing more American soldiers to harm with possibly little to show for it. In addition, he felt certain that Maliki would make it impossible for more U.S. forces to operate in an effective way. But they had to include it as an option.
The group listed the problems: lack of a political center; ethnic and sectarian agendas; individual Iraqi politicians pursuing their own ambitions; an inadequate military strategy to halt the violence; the impossibility of proceeding on a political track as the chaos spread; a Baghdad that was changing shape before their eyes due to sectarian divisions; and Iran as a looming strategic threat that the United States could not deal with adequately because of its preoccupation with Iraq. The United States had become Iran's biggest strategic asset.
"Let's list all our assumptions that our strategy is based on," and then see what has changed, O'Sullivan said.
Peter Feaver, 44, a Duke University political science professor, Navy Reserve officer and special assistant to Hadley, was assigned to work on the secret strategy review. He was glad to see them asking about basics, listing not only assumptions but asking: What are the problems? What don't we know? Is it a problem of military capacity or a problem of the will of the Iraqis and the Americans? In addition, they wanted to prepare the president to ask tough questions of the military. Feaver was struck by how pessimistic Satterfield seemed about the prospects. Satterfield's pessimism matched O'Sullivan's and his own.
The question of adding more troops was on the table. But many questions accompanied that option. How many?
When? How many were even available? What would they do that might make a difference?
Satterfield was skeptical that adding more force could quell sectarian violence or impact Iraq's dysfunctional leadership. But any serious discussion of the idea had to include a military voice.
"Guys, we can only go so far," Satterfield said at one point. "We can't make judgments about military force capabilities, about readiness capabilities. I don't even think George [Casey] necessarily knows those things. It's the chiefs, J-3 and J-5"óthe divisions in charge of operations, and plans and policy, respectivelyówho could say "what exists out there. You need a military input."
They were conducting a strategy review of an ongoing war without anyone in uniform in the room. And while the Council of Colonels was meeting separately, as long as Rumsfeld was in charge, the two groups could not merge.
* * *
On Thursday, October 19, in Baghdad, Army Major General William B. Caldwell IV, Casey's chief spokesman, issued a grim verdict about Operation Together Forward, the 12-week-old U.S.-Iraqi military campaign to stem sectarian and insurgent attacks in the capital city. It had failed to reduce the violence, which had continued to rise in large part due to counterattacks in the targeted areas, Caldwell said. Already 74 American troops had died in October, with the month barely half over. Operation Together Forward "has not met our overall expectations of sustaining a reduction in the levels of violence," Caldwell said. "We find the insurgent elements, the extremists, are in fact punching back hard. They're trying to get back into those areas" where Iraqi and U.S. forces have targeted them, he said. "We're constantly going back in and doing clearing operations." The violence, he added, "is indeed disheartening."
The news made instant headlines back in the States, fodder for the congressional elections, and increased the outcry for the president to change course.
A few days later, Rumsfeld sent a snowflake to Casey:
"Make sure you let Gen. Caldwell know that he is doing a darn good job, and not to worry about the press comments on that last briefing. He is doing very well and we appreciate it. Thanks."
* * *
On October 23, the Council of Colonels held its third session with the Joint Chiefs in the tank.
"We have some dark days ahead before we can mobilize the support to do what needs to be done," Chairman Pace said, neglecting to indicate exactly what that was. "Our country does not think we are at war." Contradicting what the president had said during his 9/11 anniversary address, the chairman said, "We may be safe, but we are not safer."
The colonels had reviewed most of the public and classified documents outlining Bush's national security strategy for Iraq, including the November 30, 2005, "National Strategy for Victory in Iraq." It was maddeningly vague, with statements such as "No war has ever been won on a timetable and neither will this one" and "Our mission in Iraq is to win the war. Our troops will return home when the mission is complete."
"We have this strategic boilerplate in documents and public statements that masks our real interests," General Schoomaker protested. "How do we measure progress against boilerplate?"
There were no meaningful responses, but General Moseley expressed the need for regional allies. "We can't do this alone."
"Israel and Iran are two problems that we can agree are problems," Schoomaker said. "We need to deal with them."
They should at least be agenda items, he added, not simply the "big elephants in the room."
But the elephants remained uncommented upon.
"How do we sustain the good trends and correct the bad trends?" Pace asked, referring to Iraq. "Some say things we are doing now are making the problem worse." He added, "We need a sanity check."
The colonels showed a slide of the goals that the administration hoped to achieve in Iraq, taken from the "National Strategy for Victory in Iraq."
"I am underwhelmed here," Schoomaker said. "Look at these words! Civil rights is not achievable in Iraq probably in my lifetime. Domestic order is not achievable." He looked at the rest of the list. "In fact I would argue we cannot realistically achieve the last three bullets on this slide." They were an Iraq that could sustain itself, defend itself, and be a partner in t
he global war on terror. He summarized, "We have not figured out how Iraq fits into the overall strategic context of our nation." Schoomaker did not let up. What was the big picture? What was the national interest? "We are accepting the proposition that Iraq's and America's survival are one and the same. I am not so sure."
* * *
That same afternoon at the White House, press secretary Tony Snow was asked by a reporter at the daily briefing, "The president met with Secretary Rumsfeld today and General Pace. Tomorrow, General Casey and Ambassador Khalilzad have a news conference in Baghdad. Is something afoot?"
"No," Snow replied. "What's afoot is simply trying to keep people apprised of what's been going on in Iraq and how we intend to proceed. But there's nothing dramatically new going on. The problem we have a lot of times when we talk about this is that there are constantly adjustments being made, so in that sense there are new things going on. But are there dramatic shifts in policy? The answer is no."
* * *
As promised, Khalilzad and Casey held a rare joint news conference in Baghdad, as Casey said, "to explain our strategy and plans for success in Iraq." Khalilzad spoke first, insisting that "success in Iraq is possible and can be achieved on a realistic timetable." He neither defined success nor offered how long a realistic timetable might be. But he said that a plan for transferring security responsibilities to the Iraqis would be ready before the end of the year.
Casey spoke next. "I'm sure for the folks back in the United States trying to look at this, it looks very confusing and very hard to understand. I'm not sure I can cut through all that, but let me try." He described the Samarra mosque bombing in February and the sectarian violence that had unfolded in its wake. He talked about the militias and death squads, and the destabilizing involvement of Syria and Iran.
"Now, what I just described is a fundamental change from how we saw the threat and the general situation here last year," Casey said. "So people are rightfully asking, 'How are you changing? What are you doing differently?'" He offered only the administration line that they had "continuously adapted" tactics to "stay ahead of the enemy."
Later, Casey said the Baghdad security plan "continues to have a dampening effect on sectarian violence" and the coalition and Iraqis were working to further reduce violence in the capital. "The additional U.S. brigades that we've kept here have had a decisive effect. And the Iraqi security forces are having a significant impact as well." It was a direct contradiction of General Caldwell's assessment only days earlier.
Casey added that they were about 75 percent through the process of building the Iraqi forces and that he believed such progress "can put Iraq in a very good place in 12 months."
Asked about troop levels in Baghdad, the commanding general talked about the goals of holding certain areas and improving basic services for the population.
"Now, do we need more troops to do that? Maybe," Casey said. "And as I've said all along, if we do, I will ask for the troops I need, both coalition and Iraqis."
A moment later, he added, "I still very strongly believe that we need to continue to reduce our forces as the Iraqis continue to improve, because we need to get out of their way."
* * *
On Wednesday, October 25, at 10:31 A.M., the president walked into the East Room of the White House for a long press conference. "The outcome will determine the destiny of millions across the world," the president said about Iraq in his opening remarks. "Defeating the terrorists and extremists is the challenge of our time and the calling of this generation." He praised the work of the Baker-Hamilton study group, noting that its members were "taking a fresh look at the situation in Iraq and will make recommendations to help achieve our goals. I welcome all these efforts. My administration will carefully consider any proposal that will help us achieve victory.
"I know many Americans are not satisfied with the situation in Iraq. I'm not satisfied either. And that is why we're taking new steps to help secure Baghdad and constantly adjusting our tactics."
Bush concealed the fact that he and key members of his war cabinet had undertaken sweeping strategic reviews, asking fundamental questions about the current approach to the war.
The first question at a presidential press conference traditionally goes to the senior wire service reporter. That meant Terence Hunt of the Associated Press was up.
"Do you think we're winning and why?" Hunt asked.
The president said he was confident that the United States would succeed. The Iraqis wanted to succeed. But it was a hard struggle, a different kind of war. He went on for nearly 500 words, ducking the question.
"Are we winning?" Hunt persisted.
"Absolutely, we're winning," the president finally said. "We're winning."
* * *
About the same time the president declared that the United States was winning the war, Iraq Study Group member Bob Gates was reviewing some memos and notes from his fellow group members. They had completed their interviews and research and were planning to meet in three weeks to begin writing their report and formulating their recommendations. Included in the material was a memo from months earlier from Bill Perry that had said the group should ask U.S.
commanders in Iraq if they needed more troops. Gates liked the idea of more troops. Even though Generals Casey and Chiarelli had told the group that they opposed additional U.S. forces, Gates feared they might be parroting Rumsfeld's company line. Though General Chiarelli, the ground commander, had been vehement in his opposition to more troops, he had acknowledged that there were not enough troops to hold the areas they had cleared.
If one thing was clear to Gates, the former CIA man, it was that the Iraqi security forces could not be counted on, especially to hold disputed areas in violent Baghdad. Clearly, they needed enough competent forces, meaning U.S.
troops, to help quell the violence in the capital city so that the political system might begin to work.
Gates sent an e-mail to Baker and Hamilton recommending a surge of 30,000 to 40,000 troops. The presence of these additional U.S. troops should be tied to performance of the Iraqis, he said. The better they did, the longer the U.S.
forces would stay.
* * *
On October 29, Hadley, O'Sullivan and Hadley's special assistant Peter Feaver left for an on-the-ground survey in Iraq. The next day, Rice summoned her top advisers to a meeting in her small inner office at the State Department. She closed the doors behind themóa rare precaution. She began by asking for their latest takes on Iraq.
"There is minimal chance of success on our current strategy," said David Satterfield.
Jim Jeffrey worried aloud if Iraq was edging toward "near-genocidal" levels of violence.
Rice asked if it were possible to scale back the goals. Suppose, she said, that the U.S. objective was simply to try to enforce a balance of power inside Iraq, to stabilize the existing and merging divisions of political power. Suppose they concentrated on the oil-revenue-sharing law and fighting al Qaeda, as well as limiting population exodus and ethnic cleansing? The United States could enforce the rules but not try to be a "leviathan." How might they look after the most important matters while limiting U.S. exposure?
"You could look at a lot of different options," Jeffrey said, including reduced force levels depending on how the mission was redefined.
Subdued, almost mournful, Rice said they had to play power politics. The United States had to be able to live to fight another day.
Chapter 19
Rice found herself "wandering," as she put it, in search of what they were going to do next. Was there some way to redefine what they needed to achieve? Had they put too much stock in the ability of the Maliki government to survive? Was the Iraqi government just a collection of self-interested power brokers? Were the Iraqis going to be able to come together as a national government?
The Bush administration couldn't afford to watch the violence continue to spiral out of control. "Suppose the Iraqis declared martial law in Baghdad?" Ri
ce proposed to the president and to Hadley. But the Iraqis had always fallen short, and martial law would be a big step. Would it be unenforceable?
Rice raised the possibility of restructuring. Had they put too much on the shoulders of the Iraqi government? Were the various factions irreconcilable? Perhaps the president needed to face the sectarianism and accept it as part of the nature of Iraq. Would the United States be better off saying to the Kurds in the north, "We'll put forces in Kurdistan"? And then find some group of Sunnis and make a deal with them to protect the center of the country?
And then come to some arrangement with the Shia leaders in the south? Would that stop the violence? Would that help maintain order?
Rice talked to Hadley about this other, secret option.
He said they had to consider it. Maybe reconciliation would not work. "Is reconciliation a fool's errand?" he had been asking.
Rice talked to the president about the Iraqis. "Look," she said, "if they're going to play a power game rather than the national unity game, should we play the power game?"
The president was not opposed to the idea. "Sure would be nice if this got better," Bush said, seemingly open to any option that would improve the situation.
As they explored that notion, they decided that maybe it really was about a lack of capability rather than will on the part of the Iraqis.
At every meeting now, Rice was arguing, "This is not about Maliki. This is Maliki and Talabani and Hashimi and al- Mahdi. Don't let them walk away from this and make it Maliki's problem."
In a practical sense, if the United States tried to make deals with the different factions, it might lead to the partitioning of Iraq. It could mean the end of a national democracy, Bush's much enunciated goal.
The War Within Page 19
