In the near term, they listed the standard goals of an Iraq that could maintain order and the rule of law, defend itself and prevent terrorists from establishing safe havens. "In the long term," they wrote, they envisioned an Iraq "that evolves into a free and unified federal republic that is representative of all Iraqi citizens. The U.S. will fail strategically if we fail to fulfill our strategic guarantees for Iraq." The generals felt that by invading Iraq, the United States had both strategic and moral obligations to leave the people of Iraq with a working democracy.
But they adopted a line straight from the Council of Colonels: "We are losing in Iraq because we are not winning."
Satterfield agreed. "There is no tie," he said. "A tie is losing."
The two generals also wrote, "Time is not on our side, because the American public does not see progress. Time is also running out in Iraq." And yet their memo ended with a surprise, a bureaucratic O. Henry short story. Rather than a bold new proposal to turn the tide of the war, the generals focused on the transfer of "responsibility for governance and security to Iraqis." They wrote, "The United States military will shift from a U.S.-led counterinsurgency effort to training and partnering efforts."
It was the Casey strategy: "Leave to win."
The generals were well aware that the administration's actions were limited because public support for the war had plummeted.
O'Sullivan disagreed. She believed that even when the president decided on a new strategy, it didn't have to be the final answer. They would be able to look at the strategy again down the road. In short, they always had more time.
"No," Crouch retorted. "We have a shot in this administrationójust oneóat this now. There will not be another bite at this apple." He said the decision the president was about to make was the strategy that the administration would take into the 2008 presidential elections and through the end of the Bush presidency on January 20, 2009.
Satterfield was with him. "There is no other bite," he said. That is what most troubled him about the idea of a surge.
"You've got to get this right this time. If we blow it, what we will have done is we will have precipitated a political process for the last thing any of us want, which is a precipitous withdrawal. We do not want by our own actions to create a circumstance that we are desperately trying to avoid."
* * *
David Gordon, the representative from the intelligence community, presented a TOP SECRET paper that examined four approaches. "Strengthen National Governance" was the first. Based on the British precedent in Northern Ireland and Malaysia, "more than 500,000 U.S. and Iraqi soldiers would be needed to secure all of Iraq, with 100,000 to 120,000 in Baghdad," his paper said. But that was perhaps too high, he acknowledged, adding that "U.S. stability operations in Mosul and Tall Afar suggest a lower number of U.S. and capable, nonpartisan Iraqi troops, between 207,000 and 263,000, might be enough." That did not include 80,000 to 90,000 support troops, according to the paper. That meant there were 15 U.S. combat brigades currently in Iraq, perhaps some 60,000 troops. It depended on how they determined "capable, nonpartisan Iraqi troops," and no one had a good answer. By any measure, the number fell far short. Gordon's intelligence paper was not optimistic about the formation of a strong national government, saying that even with reforms such as "robust guarantees of resources sharing" of oil revenue with all sects and regions, "the national government will be fragile."
The second approach was partitioning the country, and the paper said that would probably only make things worse.
A third approach of backing the Shia would likely result in "a large increase in violence," he wrote.
Gordon was the only one to address seriously a withdrawal of U.S. troops, the fourth approach in the paper. "Most analysts judge the immediate results of a rapid U.S. withdrawal would be largely negative: Further escalation of communal civil war, strengthening of al Qaeda in Iraq and terrorists, severe damage to U.S. prestige and destabilization of the region."
In summary, the paper concluded, "No approach stands out as clearly preferable to the others, and all entail significant risks and dangers to the United States."
The others generally found the paper interesting but unhelpful. After the intelligence blunder about weapons of mass destruction in Iraqóthe supposed "slam dunk" caseóthe intelligence agencies had become increasingly cautious and tended to hedge more and more, making their analytic work less and less useful.
At one point during the review, intelligence analysts provided Zelikow with a report about the serious sectarian divides within the Iraqi army. It showed that the Shia dominated to the point that no one could seriously call it a nonsectarian army.
"Let's circulate this to all the other people here in the review," Zelikow said to Crouch.
No, it couldn't be circulated, Crouch replied.
"You're saying I can't give this to Condi?" Zelikow asked. That was too preposterous, so Zelikow appealed to John Negroponte, the director of national intelligence. He ruled that it wasn't finished intelligence, had not been approved by the intelligence community formally, and could not be further circulated.
So Zelikow summarized it in the brief report he wrote for Rice after each strategy review meeting.
The Defense and JCS representatives several times argued that the State Department had to provide more personnel to the Iraq War. Zelikow noted that the State Department was a small operation compared to the Pentagon. He checked and reported back that there were about 6,500 foreign service officers. The American military had more musicians than that.
John Hannah, Cheney's man, wrote a paper that he insisted reflected only his views, which said that the strategy of reconciliation called for a large investment in talking to the Sunni insurgents, and in so doing the United States had paid a big price with the majority Shia, who had become more distrustful. This investment in trying to bring the Sunnis in and cater to them had not really worked. Essentially, Hannah said, let's stop forcing the Sunnis down the Shia's throats. Let's not be so scared of saying the Shia are the majority and that they have won.
Because the Shia and the Kurds made up 80 percent of the population, Hannah's paper was quickly dubbed "The 80
percent solution."
Despite Hannah's disclaimer, Cheney basically agreed with the paper. The Shia were the majority, and they had won the election. Too many people in the Middle East looked down on the Shia, especially the Sunni Saudis. He didn't want it to look as if the United States was in any way undermining the legitimately elected government in Iraq.
* * *
At the end of many intense days, the discussions and papers had yielded no consensus. Crouch, nonetheless, said he was going to put it all together for the briefing Bush wanted after Thanksgiving. He would control the pen, which meant he and Hadley would decide what to report to the president.
Chapter 24
Tom Ricks, a well-sourced Pentagon reporter for The Washington Post, published a front-page story on Monday, November 20, about the Council of Colonels and its "closely guarded" review, and he attempted to parse out its recommendations on Iraq.
Pace met with the colonels that day to thank them for their good work so far. Someone on the council has a big mouth, he said. The leak had really hurt their efforts to stay underneath the radar. "We, the chiefs, want you, the colonels, to tell us what you really think," he said.
Then he dropped a bomb. "General Casey has been asked by the SecDef and White House for his view on a surge.
Would it be a good idea? If so, what would you do with five more brigades?"
That caught many of the chiefs and colonels off guard. Of the options they had debated and presented, that was not among them. Where had this come from? Was it a serious option? Was it already a done deal?
Pace said he had another White House meeting in two days and he wanted as much input as possible. "I want to be able to give the president a recommendation on what is doable," he said. Though Sundayósix days from thenómarked the president's
deadline, he did not expect any decisions from the White House. "Only flavors and vectors," he said.
"I am willing to take forward other options."
"How fast must we make this happen?" Mullen asked, referring to a surge.
By late spring or early summer, Pace replied.
Lieutenant General Sattler, the head of the directorate of strategic plans and policy who was participating in the J. D.
Crouch review at the White House, summarized for them other positions currently circulating. The State Department is arguing that reconciliation is not possible, he said. Cheney's office is leaning toward taking sides with the Shiaó"that is, backing a winner." The Defense Department continues to support the current strategy and "believes there is a 'ray of hope.'"
The chiefs began editing and tweaking the slides developed by the colonels, taking a much more status quo emphasis; a conservative, less disparaging approach, softening the criticisms, emphasizing any sliver of optimism.
Some of the colonels wondered why their presentation had to be watered down for the president. But the chiefs prevailed.
As the chiefs sorted through the language and the slide presentation, Schoomaker again let go with a burst of frustration.
"If you listen to the discussion here, it is obvious," he said. "We have run out of timeÖ. Our strategic thinking has been reduced to recommending the fastest option, not necessarily the best option."
* * *
Some colonels felt the group's work was falling on deaf ears. A few also suspected that Pace wasn't representing their views very forcefully, if at all, at the White House.
The chairman was told that he had some frustrated colonels on his hands. He called the group together the next day, November 21. "What's wrong?" he asked. "I want to hear your concerns."
The colonels vented, but cautiously.
"You've given me some great things to think about," Pace said. "Let's meet tomorrow morning."
* * *
The next day, November 22, a secure video screen beamed General Casey from Baghdad to the tank, where the chiefs and colonels had gathered. They were to discuss a possible surge. "Additional coalition forces will have a temporary, local effect," Casey warned, repeating his mantra. "Is the tactical gain worth possibly unhinging progress with the government of Iraq to assume responsibility for their own security?
"There is a struggle for division of power between Iraqis. The longer we take to give them responsibility for their own security, the less incentive the government of Iraq has."
Despite his reluctance to surge, Casey offered four suggestions if it were to happen: 1. "Thicken the belts" around Baghdad, meaning put more troops in the areas surrounding the city, where intelligence showed al Qaeda had moved.
2. Pass control of Baghdad to Iraqis during the first 90 days of 2007.
3. Put troops in Diyala or Anbar to tamp down the sectarian violence.
4. Use additional forces to secure the borders and protect infrastructure.
* * *
As a precondition to sending more troops, Casey said he would first want a commitment from Maliki to expedite reconciliation. If the president were to approve the surge during the next 30 days, Pace said, five additional U.S. combat brigades could be in Iraq by April 2007, some 20,000 to 30,000, depending on the number of support troops. That would grow the force from 15 to 20 brigades. After six months, the number would drop back to 15 brigades due to normal rotations.
It'd be "a lot of pain to do this, but if it sustains support in the region and at home, it might be worth doing. But I am not convinced," Pace said. "I recognize that John [Abizaid] and you, George, are not recommending this at this time."
The number of divisions in the Iraqi army was growing, Casey said, "So progress is being made." If everything proceeded as planned, all provinces should be under "full national control" of the Iraqi government by the end of 2007.
"I am concerned about our lack of capacity to deal with any other threats in the world," Schoomaker said. "Building forces takes time. Investing all our eggs in Iraq is a big risk."
"We need to have contingency forces available," Admiral Edmund Giambastiani, the 58-year-old JCS vice chairman, added, "and to maintain a strategic reserve."
It was the type of abstract discussion that raised McMaster's blood pressure. "You can't manage your way through a war," he had confided to others privately. "You got to fight the war, man! Your enemy's fighting the war. Drives me fucking crazy." It seemed to him the chiefs and Casey were more worried about threats that might come rather than the very real war raging right in front of them.
"Now to your paper," Casey said at one point, referring to the recommendations that the colonels had compiled. "If H. R. wrote it," he said, referring to McMaster, "I would only give it a C-plus."
Chuckles around the room.
"Seriously, let me start with your assumptions," he said. "You are assuming away the tough problems."
The colonels' JCS paper had made three assumptionsóthat reconciliation between Shia and Sunni would occur in the near future, that the U.S. and Iraqi governments have the same interests, and that U.S. government agencies would work together.
"What you guys have listed as assumptions, I consider major tasks," Casey said. "If we achieve the three assumptions you have in your paper, we will be on our way to winning in Iraq. But the problem is, what strategy will get us there?"
McMaster spoke up. "You have to assume those things will work," he said, gently rebuffing Casey. If those things didn't happen, there was no ball game and no point in continuing.
"Your end state is incomplete," Casey told the group. The government of Iraq "will need our security guarantees even after fighting stopsÖ. They will need our assistance in building institutional capacity and self-reliance for years to come. I would include language about the current conflict being as much about division of political and economic power as it is sectarian violence," he said, repeating his long-held conclusion: "The fundamental strategic assumption: Success will be achieved by the Iraqis."
It was clear that a majority of those in the room, among them the most powerful military leaders in the country, had little stomach for sending more troops to Iraq, even as it became clearer that the president intended to do exactly that.
* * *
On November 26, the Sunday after Thanksgiving, the president called a meeting for 5 P.M. in the White House residence for a presentation on the J. D. Crouch strategy review. The gathering was to be held in the White House Solarium, a rooftop room with glass bays on three sides. Calvin Coolidge's wife had called a smaller, earlier version of the room the Sky Parlor. President Nixon had called it the California Room. It had been Ronald Reagan's favorite White House room, and he had used it often during his recovery from his bullet wound in the 1981 assassination attempt. The Clintons had used it for private political and policy meetings when they wanted to limit access to top advisers. In all her years as national security adviser and secretary of state, Rice had never been in the Solarium. The plan was to make this meeting differentóa new place on a late Sunday afternoon following a big holiday. She took a seat next to Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson, the former head of Goldman Sachs, the legendary New York investment bank.
Paulson, 60, a former All-East lineman at Dartmouth, where he'd also been Phi Beta Kappa, had made a fortune at Goldman. Though he had been treasury secretary for only five months, he was invited to the meeting to offer an outside perspective.
Rumsfeld, serving out his last days as defense secretary, took a seat. His successor, Gates, had not been confirmed but attended, hovering over the proceedings like a ghost, saying almost nothing.
Crouch had finished the final version of his 14-page briefing at 9 P.M. the Friday before. Summarizing a lot of familiar material about the importance of Iraq and the absence of a "silver-bullet solution," Crouch got to the present situation.
"Situation in Baghdad has not meaningfully improved," he said. "The government of Iraq
has been slowÖIraqi police in Baghdad are largely ineffective or worseÖIraqi army is better prepared but still fragileÖForce levels overall in Baghdad are inadequate to stabilize a city of its size."
Despite his positive comments, Maliki was unable or unwilling to act, Crouch said. The Sunnis and Shia were all
"hedging." He pronounced the grimmest line of all, that the "enemy has the initiative." He then presented a chart of nine key assumptions, illustrating what they had been optimistic about in the past versus the current reality. "Iraqi leaders are advancing sectarian agendas" was one. Another, an understatement: "The tolerance of the American people for efforts in Iraq is waning."
Summarizing what he called the "Emerging Consensus," Crouch said the ultimate goal was still to "accelerate the transfer of security responsibility to Iraqis." It was the Rumsfeld-Casey concept. He added, however, that they should
"consider a significant surge in U.S. forces."
A free-flowing discussion followed, with Rice arguing that there was too much focus on Iraq and that it was possible to create leverage by stepping back. Hadley made it clear that he recommended a surge of forces. The president didn't say much.
"You're not getting a clear picture of what's going on on the ground," Rice finally said. She had said it before to the principals but never this directly in front of the president. With Rumsfeld virtually out of the picture, she let loose.
"The briefings from the military are a bunch of maps that nobody can readóstatistics that don't relate to anything."
With such a blurred and incomplete picture, she said, it was hard to judge the truth. She turned to the president. "I don't know how anybody's going to tell you whether or not more troops are going to help when you don't know what's going on on the ground.
"Is this government so sectarian that it can't function?" she asked. "I don't know. And it makes me really uncomfortable. And if we're going to do anything, we better make sure that you've got that one tied down."
The War Within Page 25
