Early the next Monday, Bush met with the NSC for a report on recent conversations with Maliki. The prime minister had agreed to a joint, immediate operation in Baghdad against all purveyors of violence, Casey and Khalilzad reported, even though U.S. planning called for the operation to begin the next month, in January. "Maliki needs to announce to his people and to our people that he's going against all who act outside the law, that he's asked the coalition for help," the president said. "And Maliki then needs to announce the plan that you're going to help him develop in a speech to the nation." Maliki's speech should be a day or two before Bush's speech.
"Iraqi forces would need to be in the lead. What does that mean? Do the Iraqis have the forces?" Bush asked.
"We want the Iraqis to take ownership," Casey told him. "They have the command and control. They have enough forces. But the issue is reliability. We're working through it. And the result may mean that they have to lean more on coalition forces."
"How will we ensure Maliki will see it through?" the president asked.
It was suggested they start with the plan that Maliki had submitted in Amman.
"If the politics get hot, will the Iraqi leadership stick to it?" asked the president.
Casey and Khalilzad reported that there were conflicting pressures. The Iraqi government wanted to do it. But they were going to want to minimize the political cost. So Maliki would say it needed to be his plan, his troops, as much as possible against all elements, not just JAM. And when they briefed the plan, they would have to run through the contingencies with Maliki.
"We can't have him back out once he sees the plan," Bush said, "especially if it isn't until a couple days before my speech. If he needs more help, will he accept more coalition forces?"
Several said they believed Maliki would accept more coalition forces, but no one had yet discussed the specific number with him.
"Maliki needs to be bold and aggressive," the president said. "He needs to tell his country that they need to end the violence and that he needs our help to do it."
Discussion again turned to Maliki and the requirement that he hold his government together. A military effort alone would not be enough. Then someoneóit is unclear who from the notes of the meetingóadded optimistically, "We'll see a gradual diminution of violence over time with some spikesÖmay be a month or two before people see things as different."
"We need to buy time," the president said, "so the moderate coalition can emerge and the police can function. We need to bridge and buy time for the government so that violence does not get out of hand and prevent the government from taking steps it needs to take. We need to try to tamp down the extremist cleansing so the government can function. Does that mean we need more U.S. forces?"
The discussion turned to what resources Maliki possessed. The reports indicated that 40 percent of the local police were suspect as to their loyalty, an astoundingly high number. It was clear that Maliki didn't have enough force.
"Maliki should take credit, getting the U.S. to put in the forces that are needed for success," Bush said.
They discussed the importance of getting religious leaders to call for calm.
"What about martial law as a way to achieve a psychological impact?" Bush asked.
"We need a security plan, an economic plan and a political plan," Rice said.
"Once we get Maliki on board, and once we start this plan, we can't stop it," the president said. "Keep me posted on how the conversations with Maliki are going. Raise the martial law with him."
Discussion turned to which moderates in Iraq might support Maliki and the importance of making Baghdad the main priority.
But what about Anbar province? The local U.S. commander there was submitting plans for new troops. Would more troops help there?
J. D. Crouch, Hadley's deputy, had visited Anbar during a trip to Iraq earlier in the fall and gotten a strong sense from the soldiers and officers on the ground that more troops would help solidify the gains that had been made there.
"They basically said, 'Look, Anbar is a big place, but it's really not a big place,'" he recalled. "'Because if you control the river and you control the road, that's all of Anbar. The rest is dust.'" They told him there wasn't enough force to hold the river and the road, and in sections the insurgents could move freely. He said they had told him that a little more U.S. force, coupled with the local uprising against al Qaeda, might make a big difference. Crouch saw it as an opportunity.
"Don't be timid about asking for more troops," the president finally said, and he adjourned the meeting.
* * *
General Jack Keane had been working for several days with Frederick W. Kagan, a former professor of military history at West Point and expert on ground warfare who was a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, a conservative Washington think tank. Kagan, 36, heavyset and mild-mannered, did not fit the model of a hawkish, detail-oriented military planner. For years he had been publishing articles calling for more force in Iraq, and for months he had been working full-time with an Iraq planning group he had assembled at the think tank. Retired senior and midlevel military officers and several currently on active duty had joined his group. Kagan hoped his freelance effort would raise the level of discourse and get some attention in conservative circles. Kagan was appalled by the conclusions of the Baker-Hamilton Iraq Study Group. "The default function of politicians is to come to consensus. The problem is that the consensus strategies in war almost never work," said Kagan, a 19th-century military warfare expert. "A reason why Napoleon did so well against people for so long is because they were having councils of war, and he was just doing stuff, and he wasn't compromising."
Kagan was a good friend of Colonel H. R. McMaster, who had thanked him in print for his help with Dereliction of Duty. The two had taught together at West Point, and Kagan was impressed with the work McMaster had done to stabilize Tall Afar, calling it a model of counterinsurgency. Kagan and his team figured out which Army units could be sent as part of a surge. It came to at least five brigades. They were preparing charts, tables and maps detailing how counterinsurgency could work in Baghdad. One map divided Baghdad into 75 different districts and showed the sectarian or mixed affiliation of each. They planned to issue a 45-page report the next month, after a crash weekend work session starting December 9.
Keane went to the AEI offices that weekend for detailed briefings on the plan. He'd spent years as a member of Rumsfeld's Defense Policy Board, getting TOP SECRET briefings and traveling to Iraq. But he was stunned by the depth of the material the AEI group had compiled.
"Where the hell did you get all of that?" he asked Kagan and his experts, figuring the active duty officers had brought much of it from the Pentagon. "Don't bullshit me, guys. Where'd you get that stuff?"
They insisted it all had come from the Internet and other open sources. They showed him some examples, much of which matched up with the classified material he'd seen. In any case, it was impressive work. Keane left convinced that it carefully and systematically answered the question of how additional U.S. troops could be used to protect the Iraqi population.
Chapter 28
On Monday, December 11, Hadley had arranged for five outside experts, including Jack Keane, to come to the Oval Office and share their views on the military strategy in Iraq with the president, Cheney and himself. Each had several minutes to make his pitch.
Eliot Cohen, a member of the Defense Policy Board and director of the strategic studies program at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, said there had been no accountability for failure.
"Everybody's just a great guy," he said. "You know what? It's true. They're all great guys." But the war could not be about how likable the generals were. "It has to do with how effective they are." Neither the status quo nor the timetables for withdrawal were going to work, Cohen said. It was a clear repudiation of Casey's plan.
"Hey, big guy," Bush said to Keane. "You're looking pretty good."
; "I finally got a life," Keane replied.
"Well," the president joked, "I got to get a life, too."
Keane had brought notes for his presentation. "I believe we're in a crisis and that time is running out," he said. "All the recommendations that are being made in and around townóand also by the Iraq Study Groupónone of these actually solve the crisis. They actually permit, in many cases, the crisis to get worse. The crisis is that the level of violence has increased to such a high level that the Iraqi government is being pushed toward a cliff, in terms of being fractured, and then that would lead to civil war inside the country. And we wouldn't have to debate itówhether it's a civil war or not. It would be obvious."
This crisis "has brought to light that security is the single most important issue in Iraq." Keane noted the steady increase in violence, each year "outrageously" higher than the last. "And it demonstrated to us clearly that our political strategy in Iraqóthe rush to get a representative democracyóhas failed to stem the violence. And the military strategy of training Iraqis and transitioning to them has failed."
The result, he said: "We don't have a plan to defeat the insurgency."
A quizzical look crossed the president's face, but he didn't say anything.
Keane said that this was a "short-war strategy"óestablish democracy and train the Iraqis, all with the intent of getting out. "We need a comprehensive shift in strategy. It would not just be a surge in the numbers of troops that would make a difference, but what we would do with them is really the difference. So for the first time, we would secure the population, which is the proven way to defeat an insurgency that we have never, ever done before, except in Tall Afar. And the place to start, with the main effort, is in Baghdad, where we would secure the population 24/7." He explained that that would entail living among the Iraqi population instead of returning to big bases after patrols and operations. It would take about five brigades in Baghdad, more than doubling the U.S. combat power there, and another two battalions in Anbar province, he said.
"To use a military term," Keane said, "there is such a thing as key terrain." He said they should direct their attention toward Baghdad's Sunni/Shia mixed neighborhoods on both sides of the river, home to about 1.8 million people.
"The military operation would focus thereÖit's where most of the violence is."
This plan would "show the Sunnis and the Shia that we intend to protect them both, that we are not choosing sides."
He ambitiously predicted that the Sunni insurgents, al Qaeda terrorists and Shia death squads would all be removed.
"Once we've cleared that force out, then a combined U.S. and Iraqi force would stay in the neighborhoods 24/7."
Keane recommended a two-tier economic reconstruction packageófirst to get basic services to the people and then
"an enhanced quality-of-life package, but it would be based on their willingness to cooperate." He said they should not risk a major confrontation with Shia militias in Sadr City. An all-out military operation in Sadr City could potentially unite the fragmented Shia militia of up to 70,000. "We should not be distracted by Sadr City," he said.
Finally, Keane said, "Don't let people tell you that this is going to break the back of the Army and the Marine Corps, because it will not. These forces are available. We can extend tours." The opportunity to win, he said, would give a boost to the military. Morale, motivation and dedication would rise. There have been many lessons in the nearly four years since the invasion, he said. "One of the most significant things that we have learned is that security is a necessary precondition for political and economic progress."
Agreeing with Eliot Cohen, Keane said, "If you're going to put new generals in, then hold them accountable for their performance. And tell them you're holding them accountable and you expect them to be successful."
Retired Army General Barry McCaffrey went next. "I don't believe we need to escalate forces," he said. "We need to increase the advisory program, put our money on the Iraqi security forces. We shouldn't be stepping in the middle of a civil war."
Wayne Downing, another retired Army general, said he was opposed to increasing forces and proposed a dramatic focus on Special Forces. He had headed the Special Operations Command during the 1990s. A determined concentration of Special Operations Forces in Iraq could turn the Iraqi army around, he said.
Stephen Biddle, a senior fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations, said he basically thought that adding force was the only option that offered a chance to turn things around.
After the meeting, John Hannah, Cheney's national security adviser, called Keane. He complimented him on his presentation and asked him to come brief Cheney in detail. Later, Keane and Kagan gave the vice president and Hannah the extended version of Kagan's briefing, which went on for hours. The patron and chief defender of Rumsfeld, Cheney had largely stayed out of the strategy review, which clearly was aimed at changing Rumsfeld's approach to the war. The AEI plan was the first detailed presentation Cheney had seen of how a surge of additional forces might work, and the plan seemed all the more credible because it had been conceived of by a respected former West Point professor and had the backing of the former vice chief of staff of the Army.
* * *
At 10:30 that morning, the president went to the State Department to meet with members of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, units of American civilians in Iraq helping to rebuild the country. "I want to know how to win," Bush told the group.
Several of Rice's senior aides who were present were surprised. "God, what is he talking about?" one wondered.
Considering the war was such a mess, was the president out of touch? The State Department view was that the United States needed to take a step back. Nonetheless, Jim Soriano, a longtime foreign service officer and the leader of a team in Anbar province, came up on the secure video link to brief Bush.
"You know, Mr. President," Soriano said, "I can't tell you exactly what it is, but something's going on out here in Anbar. Things are starting to turn." He talked about how local citizens were starting to come to the Americans with their problems and how al Qaeda's brutal intimidation tactics were making the terrorist network more and more unpopular. "I don't want to say anything's changed," Soriano repeated, "but things are starting to turn."
It was the first time Rice had heard that Anbar might be really changing. She walked the president back downstairs after the meeting.
"That was great," Bush told her. "Those people are really something." He seemed energized by the flicker of good news and one field officer's optimism.
* * *
Later that day, the president called Hadley and said he would postpone his decision and the planned speech to the nation about a new strategy. He wanted to wait for Gates to be sworn in, visit Iraq and come back with a recommendation. There was no way to take such a significant step without the direct involvement of the new secretary of defense. The next day, Tuesday, December 12, the NSC returned to the Roosevelt Room at 9 A.M.
From Baghdad, General Casey repeated that enduring strategic success would be achieved by the Iraqis and would require political reconciliation. On the proposed "surge operation," he stuck to his view that additional forces would have "a temporary, local effect in reducing sectarian violence where they are committed." He wrote in green pen on his copy of the SECRET brief that they faced "prolonged, tough choices." Though a surge might provide "breathing space for a committed government," a surge "could be seen as a step backward" from putting Iraqi security forces in the lead. It also would result in additional casualties and might be perceived as targeting the Shia.
"I'm going to delay the speech until early January, ease up on the throttle," the president said. "We're going to empower Maliki to go into Sadr City right off. Is that the right priority? Would it be better to start with mixed neighborhoods? Especially if we want to surge, it may be a better way to get security in Baghdad than doing the hardest thing first." He didn't want the operation to look anti-Shia or anti-Sadr. I
t should be anticriminal and antiextremist.
"We never intended to go immediately into Sadr City," Casey said. "We need to feel Maliki out on this, but we need to strengthen the presence in the city peacefully and leverage the political elements in Sadr City first."
"We have to do something different," Bush said. "We have to demonstrate that we're doing something fundamentally different." And he reminded his general, "We've got to win." He posed the question: "Okay, what can you do that's fundamentally different?"
Casey said they could increase the number of troops. That would be different. But again, he was not recommending it.
"What else can you do?" the president asked.
Put in more money and perhaps increase the Provincial Reconstruction Teams made up of State Department officials and other civilians, Casey said. "But that's not going to be fundamentally different."
It was clear to Casey that the president had tuned him out. From his mind-set to his body language, Bush had changed in the month since the midterm elections. More to the point, Casey realized that he had lost a basic, necessary ingredient for a commanding general in wartime. He had lost the confidence of the president, a stunning and devastating realization.
At another point, Bush addressed General Abizaid. "Yeah, I know," the president said, "you're going to tell me you're against the surge."
Yes, Abizaid said, and presented his argument that they needed to get out of Iraq in order to win. But the president was not listening to Abizaid anymore, either.
"The U.S. presence helps to keep a lid on," Bush said toward the end of the session. "It buys time for the Maliki government and the Iraqi security forces. It gets the situation to a more manageable level in Baghdad." Troops added under a "bridge" or "surge" would "also help here at home, since for many the measure of success is reduction in violence. And it'll help Maliki to get control of the situation. A heavier presence will buy time for his government."
The War Within Page 29
