On June 13, about 9 A.M., insurgents launched a second attack on the al-Askari Mosque in Samarra, one of the holiest sites in Shia Islam. The bombing destroyed the mosque's two ten-story minarets. The first attack, 16 months earlier, had been the trigger that set off massive sectarian violence. In Baghdad, Petraeus and the American military intelligence officials held their breath.
Prime Minister Maliki was furious.
"How could this happen?" he asked Petraeus in an accusatory tone. "With all the coalition forces there, with all the Iraqi forces there, you and the coalition must have let this happen. How can these people get in?"
"There were plenty of forces present," Petraeus answered. "Something else is involved. What I suggest, Mr. Prime Minister, is I will give you a helicopter and my personal assistant. Go there. Go yourself. Have a look. Go talk to the commanders and see what happened."
Petraeus's assistant was a skillful translator and civilian contractor named Sadi Othman, who had attended a Mennonite college in Kansas and once worked as a driver in New York City. Known to everyone simply as Sadi, he was a towering man and former basketball player whom Petraeus referred to as "the Michael Jordan of Jordan," his native country. Sadi had begun working for Petraeus as a translator in Mosul after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. When Petraeus returned as the commanding general, he made Sadi one of his senior advisers. He answered Petraeus's cell phone in Iraq, and as far as most Iraqis were concerned, Sadi was Petraeus.
Maliki and Sadi flew to Samarra and were received by the local Iraqi commanders.
"Every time I ask you about Samarra," Maliki began yelling at the national police commander on the scene, "you say it's perfectly okay, there's nothing to worry about. How can this happen? You're an idiot! You're incompetent! You have all these protective guards" around the mosque.
Maliki then ordered a curfew shutting everything downóno walking, no driving. Later, it became clear that the bombing had been an inside job by members of the Iraqi police.
The next day, June 14, Maliki, Petraeus and Crocker met at about 12:45 P.M.
"We really understand two things about the terrorists now," Maliki said. "The first is that they target essential services because these have a direct impact on the people, and the people then have a direct impact on the government. It shows the government to be ineffective in stopping the attacks and restoring essential services." He specifically mentioned interruptions of oil and electricity. "The second thing we know is they'll target holy sites in order to generate sectarian violence between the groups."
Ignoring this recital of the obvious, Ambassador Crocker told him, "I applaud the orders you've given as a consequence of yesterday's events. I think you did exactly the right thing. The importance of these statements in your orders is that you're placing the blame squarely on al Qaeda and are demonstrating that this is an attack against all elements of Iraqóthe Sunnis, the Shia and the Kurds, as well. This is very important that it is seen as an al Qaeda attack on Iraq, not on any particular sect."
"Yes," Petraeus said, "I strongly agree. You did all the right things. And things are calm now, but we can't count on this calm."
"That's why we have this extended curfew," Maliki said. "And we also postponed the exams," referring to secondary school exams.
"Your trip yesterday was very important," Petraeus said. "You demonstrated leadership."
"We have closed off the entire scene."
"How quickly can this be rebuilt?" Petraeus asked. "Can construction start right away, with or without the U.N.?" He was referring to the plan to rebuild the mosque from the bombing 16 months earlier.
"Yes," the prime minister replied, "in fact yesterday we were about to sign the papers, UNESCO and the Turkish company that won the award, to begin the reconstruction." UNESCO was the branch of the United Nations collaborating on Iraq reconstruction projects. Maliki said President Bush had called him the previous day "to say that the U.S. would provide any support necessary for the reconstruction."
"It would be a powerful signal to the public," Crocker said, "to sign the contract in the next couple of days, with lots of media. The world would be pleased."
"Well," Maliki answered, "it's up to UNESCO."
Petraeus and Crocker recognized the typical Iraqi political response. Instead of reaching over and strangling Maliki as they seemed to want to do, Petraeus said, "There's a saying that you're really good if you can turn adversity into opportunity, and you can in this case."
"Right now the people of Samarra are intimidated," Maliki said, adding confidently, "But when they see the Iraqi security forces there, I am sure they'll openly support them."
U.S. intelligence showed, however, that the Iraqi police forces were highly sectarian, and some still carried pictures of Saddam. But neither challenged Maliki's assertion.
"Keep this quiet for two days," Petraeus said, "but we're about to start a major national, nationwide attack against al Qaeda sanctuaries." He promised that if the U.S. had any intelligence from the operations, he would share it with the prime minister. Crocker said that Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani had agreed to compromise on the Iraqi law to share oil revenues with the provinces, an important piece of legislation. "And the next step is to introduce it to the parliament," Crocker said.
Maliki was nodding yes. "Not only do we have this agreement," he said, "but we also have the framework agreement on the de-Baathification law."
Petraeus pounced on the public relations opportunity. He knew that Hadley and others in the administration were searching for a dramatic event. He suggested that Maliki capitalize on the agreement to rebuild the Samarra mosque and the news of a compromise on the oil law. "In another day," he said, "you have all the Sunday talk shows. So why don't you orchestrate a media campaign on these favorable events to show you in a good light?" He added, "Let me help generate the talk shows."
"There's another bit of good news," Maliki said. "Sadr has suspended his members' participation in the council, and the parliament can then expedite all of this activity." Recently, six government ministers loyal to Sadr had quit in protest at Maliki's refusal to set a timetable for a U.S. troop withdrawal. It had left Maliki free to choose their replacements.
"I'll be on Fox Sunday," Petraeus said, "and I'll emphasize all these points, so that you get from me support on the talk shows. Or at least on Fox."
"Yes," said Ali al-Dabbagh, Maliki's spokesman. "We should participate in the shows."
"We'll line it up," Petraeus said. He pointed to Dabbagh. "You do Al Jazeera."
"And we have more good news," Petraeus said. He made a point of ending meetings with Maliki on a positive note.
The repairs on the oil platforms in the Gulf that allow the loading of tankers had just been completed. "We should highlight this too," he said, "the completion of the repairs on the Basra oil terminals." He also had photographs of southwestern Baghdad, an area of focused redevelopment.
The Petraeus philosophy on media coverage was that the reporters would unearth the bad news on their own. If he and Maliki didn't serve up good news, however large or small, it most likely would go unreported.
On Fox News Sunday with Chris Wallace on June 17, General Petraeus said, "Yesterday, there was an agreement with UNESCO and the government of Iraq to rebuild that Samarra mosque." Wallace showed little interest, asking instead about the levels of violence and the absence of an oil law. Petraeus said all the problems in Iraq were not
"going to be resolved in a year or even two yearsÖ. Historically, counterinsurgency operations have gone at least nine or 10 years." But, he insisted, "there is good prospect for progress in the months ahead."
Ultimately, the contract to rebuild the Samarra mosque was signed, but agreements on de-Baathification reform and an oil law stalled.
* * *
On June 28, Rice gathered 20 senior State Department officials, the most senior undersecretaries and her closest seventh-floor aides for a two-day private retreat at Airlie Center, a conference facili
ty in the Virginia countryside. After they had discussed various programs to transform diplomacy and foreign assistance, she raised the real question.
"Do you want to talk about Iraq?" she asked.
All indicated that they did. Violence was at a peak, Iraq as much a mess as ever. Already, 3,562 U.S. servicemen and women had died.
Rice urged them to speak openly and honestly. It was as if someone had pushed a button to release pressures and tensions that had accumulated for years.
"The senior people kind of let loose," recalled a participant and a Rice ally within the department. "They were concerned about the strategy. Would it work? Could it work? What is the long-lasting impact of the Iraq War on the U.S. position in the world? In the region? Domestically, the impact on the United States? Rice didn't say much, but it was a very dreary moment because they were all saying, 'We don't know where we're going and we don't know what this is, and we don't know the surge strategy can work.'" Other participants confirmed how pessimistic the discussion of Iraq had been.
Rice, true to form, chose to focus on the sliver of optimism she heard. She later recalled, "Three or four assistant secretaries said, 'Not only can we not lose, we can't be perceived to lose.'" A loss in Iraq would have a devastating impact on American leadership, they had argued. So they had to win. No one was arguing for outright withdrawal.
But a majority left the conference deeply disheartened. The Bush administration's new strategy of sending more U.S.
troops to protect the population had shown few signs of working.
* * *
On June 29, Bush met with the Republican leaders from the Senate and House. "Mr. President," said Representative Roy Blunt, the Missouri Republican and the party's number two House leader,
"you have no credibility on communicating about Iraq."
"I know," Bush replied.
"The worst thing you could do is talk about Iraq," Blunt said.
"People believe I've been too optimistic for too long," Bush conceded.
Blunt remarked that in four years, the Iraqi people had not taken the opportunity to set up a functioning democracy.
"No one in the country has much concern for Jeffersonian democracy."
"I understand people feel that way," Bush replied, "but I disagree." He believed democracy was the only way, and he held high expectations for the surge.
* * *
Several times the president asked Petraeus, "Are we taking the fight to the enemy?" or "Are we on offense?" And on a number of occasions, he asked about enemy casualties, saying, "Well, and how many did we kill?" Petraeus gave him numbers only every few weeks. "Mr. President," he said, "we are not going to kill our way out of Iraq. This is not about exchange ratios" of enemy killed versus U.S. killed. But, he acknowledged, "We have totaled up, and the exchange ratios are enormous." The coalition was killing dozens of enemy fighters for each American loss.
* * *
General Casey went for a routine physical inside the sprawling grounds of Walter Reed Army Medical Center in northwest Washington. He spotted retired General Jack Keane standing in line at the radiology desk. The two generals locked eyes for a moment, then Keane turned away, as if he hadn't recognized Casey.
"Hi Jack, how are you?" Casey said, extending his hand. He had been waiting for a moment like this. "Has the chairman called you yet?"
"No, why?" Keane asked.
"Because we feelóthe chiefs feelóthat you are way too out in front advocating a policy for which you're not accountable. We're accountable. You're not accountable, Jack. And that's a problem."
Keane said he'd taken action as a member of the secretary of defense's policy board, whose members were supposed to offer their independent advice. All he was trying to do was help Petraeus, he said. He had supported the Rumsfeld- Casey strategy for three years. "And at some point, I no longer could support it. I'm not operating as some kind of Lone Ranger."
"It's not appropriate for a retired general to be so far forward advocating a policy that he is not responsible or accountable for," Casey said again.
"I'll take your counsel," said Keane, but he didn't suggest he would act any differently.
* * *
On the Fourth of July, Pelosi invited a group of wounded veterans to watch the celebration from her offices in the Capitol. Her balcony provided a sweeping view of the Mall and the evening fireworks display. One young Marine officer had no legs, just a torso sitting in a wheelchair.
"Madam Speaker," he said, straining up out of his wheelchair and pointing to where presidents take the oath of office. "I was there at the president's inauguration in '05. And I sang. And I stood there as part of the Naval Academy choir."
He had heard the president give one of the most ambitious inaugural addresses in history. "It is the policy of the United States," Bush had said that day, "to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world."
"How are you?" Pelosi asked the Marine.
"I've had some very dark days," said the young lieutenant, who'd survived a roadside bomb and was recovering at Walter Reed after numerous surgeries. "I'm trying to come around. I've had very dark months."
* * *
Petraeus tried to find a few minutes to read each night before he fell asleep. Little by little, he made his way through Grant Takes Command, by Bruce Catton, about General Ulysses S. Grant's campaigns to turn the tide for President Lincoln in the Civil War. Petraeus was particularly struck by how Grant handled setbacks. After the bloody first day of battle at Shiloh, General Sherman found Grant well past midnight, standing alone under a tree in heavy rain. "Well, Grant," Sherman said, "we had the devil's own day, haven't we?"
"Yes," said Grant, his cigar glowing in the darkness as he gave a quick, hard puff. "Yes. Lick 'em tomorrow, though."
Among Petraeus's inner circle, "lick 'em tomorrow, though" became a rallying cry after many bad days, including one in which 160 Iraqis were killed by car bombs. Petraeus was astounded by the way Grant had taken one pounding after another from General Robert E. Lee, who stubbornly refused to be outflanked. Grant wrote, "I propose to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer." This became another rallying cry.
"You don't think you're Grant?" a friend asked Petraeus.
"No," Petraeus said. He was also reading about General Matthew Ridgway, who had helped turn the tide of the Korean War.
* * *
In the spring of 2007, my assistant, Brady Dennis, and I tracked down notes of key interviews conducted by the Baker-Hamilton Iraq Study Group. Included was CIA Director Michael Hayden's bleak assessment of the Maliki government. Hayden had said that "the inability of the government to govern seems irreversible," adding that he could not "point to any milestone or checkpoint where we can turn this thing around." A majority of the study group members said that Hayden's assessment was the chief reason they began their report with the line "The situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating." I took this information to Len Downie, the executive editor of The Washington Post. Even months after Hayden's testimony to the group, I said, his dire assessment constituted news and should be published as soon as possible.
Downie agreed. Because the material had been gathered on the condition that it was for a book that would come out the next year, Downie and I met with one of the sources and asked that the ground rules be changed. Downie said he felt it would be a "dereliction of duty" on the part of the Post if this information were not made public soon. The source initially refused but eventually acknowledged that because Hayden's assessment was the most important and most authoritative the study group had received, it deserved to be published.
I contacted several CIA officials to ask whether Hayden would speak with me about his statements and whether his assessment had changed. Hayden declined, and he called Lee Hamilton, the Democratic co-chairman of the study group, to complain. According to Hamilton, Hayden said, "Woodward knows an awful lot
about this testimony. I presented the dark side, and Woodward is going to make it darker."
The Post story ran Thursday, July 12, under the headline "CIA Said Instability Seemed 'Irreversible.'"
That same day, the president was asked about the story at a news conference.
"Mike Hayden was in this morning to give me his weekly briefing," Bush said, "and I asked him about that newspaper article from which you quote. His answer was his comments to the Iraq Study Group were a little more nuanced than the quotation you read." According to Bush, Hayden's recollection of his statement to the study group was that in November 2006 "the current strategy in Iraq wasn't workingÖand that we needed a change of direction."
The president used what he said were Hayden's recollections to bolster his decision to change the strategy. Then he went further than he ever had in public: "As I told you last November, right about this time, I was part of that group of Americans who didn't approve of what was taking place in Iraq because it looked like all the efforts that we had taken to that point in time were about to fail."
It was as if Bush had been a bystander, just an ordinary American who objected to the course of the war.
Chapter 37
Keane made another two-week trip to Iraq in July. Petraeus, other military generals and the CIA station chief told him the Sunni insurgency was collapsing. Thousands of former Sunni insurgents were cooperating with the U.S. and other coalition forces. Some 21,000 Sunnis in Anbar province alone had joined up, and Prime Minister Maliki had authorized 18,000 former insurgents to bear arms and be paid. Keane attended a classified conference that Petraeus had with his subordinate commanders. Then the two went off alone.
Petraeus told Keane that what was mostly on his mind was the September testimony to Congress. There was a lot of good news to report, but Petraeus said he was going to be careful not to overstate the successes. That had been a problem in this war from the beginning.
The War Within Page 38
