While the principal objective of finding and destroying the enemy regiments was not achieved, there was one significant contact with D800 Battalion of 274 VC Regiment; around 40 enemy troops were reportedly killed. The operation signified to the Viet Cong and the population within and beyond Phuoc Tuy that the province was no longer ‘owned’ by the Viet Cong. Substantial intelligence had been obtained and large amounts of weapons, equipment and food caches were located and destroyed. It was a significant propaganda win for the US and the South Vietnamese and a psychological shock to the local Viet Cong forces.20
Meanwhile, 5 RAR had just arrived in Vietnam and taken up a position at Vung Tau and was acclimatising. Within the week it was scheduled to join the US 173rd Airborne’s 1/503rd and 2/503rd battalions, who on 17 May had landed at Nui Dat by helicopter to clear the immediate area of enemy troops. The enemy were waiting. One company of 1/503rd Battalion alone suffered 12 killed and 35 wounded within hours of landing; around 20 enemy troops were killed. Two days later, operations to relocate the 3000 villagers from the nearby Long Phuoc village commenced. The immediate and swift aggressive action by the local Viet Cong forces did not bode well for a smooth operation.21 Indeed, the mission to relocate the villagers resulted in a battle between at least two companies of the D445 VC Battalion and the US 1/503rd Battalion, elements of the South Vietnamese Army, and Australians from 1 APC Troop commanded by Lieutenant Adrian Roberts and 3 APC Troop commanded by Captain Bob Hill. The Viet Cong used to great effect the tunnels, bunkers and trenches that made up its defences.
Long Phuoc village was not ‘captured’, and the South Vietnamese relocated, until 24 May. During Operation Hardihood, the US paratroopers alone suffered 23 killed and 160 wounded. Only then could the task of locating tunnels, weapons, equipment and food caches get underway. It was then that 5 RAR arrived at Nui Dat, along with about 50 members from 1 RAR who had volunteered to help out with securing the base; 5 RAR was tasked with seeking out and destroying any enemy force within 6000 metres east and north-east of the base. In doing so, among the five Australians killed as part of Operation Hardihood was 21-year-old Errol Noack from 5 RAR, the first national serviceman killed in Vietnam. He had been ‘in-country’ for less than two weeks and died from wounds received in action on 24 May 1966.22
1 ATF base occupied 3 square kilometres that were originally divided into seven main occupation areas; these comprised five perimeter positions occupied by 5 RAR in the north and 6 RAR to the north-east and east, with a broad gap of about 700 metres to the engineers’ area, which covered the south-east and south flank. The field artillery held the southern side, while the cavalry regiment with their APCs and the reinforcement unit held part of the western flank, astride Route 2. There was another gap on the western side to the north, which was dominated by Nui Dat. The two central areas were taken up with task-force headquarters, with signals, SAS and Task Force service units.23
The men inherited the tents formerly used by 1 RAR, which were in a very bad state of disrepair. Living conditions during this early period were primitive: the construction of the first huts (supplied with electricity) would not begin until October that year. Private Esler, who had been happy with his ‘little beach’ at Vung Tau, recalled being ‘whipped . . . up to Nui Dat into the middle of a rubber plantation. When we got there it was all mud. There was no machinery to help us, we had to [build the base] all by hand, using entrenching tools.’24 Private John Heslewood remembered that there were ‘absolutely no defences, no barbed wire, no pits, nothing. From the minute you got there, you were putting up barbed wire and digging pits, and we also had to start patrolling straight away, to make sure that the area around the place was clear. When you weren’t patrolling or doing ambushes at night-time, you were in camp digging holes in the ground or putting up barbed wire . . . All your gear got wet every day. It got dry the next day, then got wet again . . .’25
With the completion of a small airfield in December 1966, the men and aircraft of 161 Recce Flight were moved forward to Nui Dat. However, the helicopters of Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) No. 9 Squadron, under the command of Wing Commander Ray Scott and designated to support 1 ATF at Nui Dat, remained at the air base that had been established at nearby Vung Tau, where infrastructure was already available in terms of fuelling and maintenance. Also based there was 1 Australian Logistics Support Group.26
1 ATF officially occupied Nui Dat on 5 June 1966 with the arrival of the Task Force headquarters. Brigadier Jackson now initiated Operation Enoggera, which was to destroy the already ‘cleared’ Long Phuoc village (within Line Alpha). It was found to still contain a large number of tunnels and food caches and was being continually used by the Viet Cong as a major logistics hub. It was also assessed as being used by the local D445 VC Battalion as a base for rest and observation against Nui Dat.
While it was a successful operation, the men of 6 RAR who were assigned the task did not like it, as recalled by the battalion commander and Korean War veteran Lieutenant Colonel Colin Townsend: ‘It was obviously a rich village in the days when that part of the country was at peace . . . The buildings were well constructed and sound, filled with furniture, the place just reeked of a pretty rich productive area. Not a dirty hamlet with shacks falling down or anything like that. We knew we had to do it and we bloody well did it quite successfully, but we did not like it.’27
In all, 537 houses were destroyed, about 500 escape tunnels and air-raid shelters were collapsed, and over 1000 metres of tunnel were searched and destroyed. Large amounts of food (including 42 tonnes of rice) and medical and dental supplies were found, most of which were redistributed, while small arms, ammunition and land mines were found and destroyed.28 Undoubtedly, the destruction of the village added to the local people’s resentment of the presence of the Australians in the province and increased their allegiance to the Viet Cong, but importantly it also forced D445 VC Battalion deeper into the jungle, away from Nui Dat.29
Unlike many US bases, the Australian base at Nui Dat was under strict military control. Few members of the ARVN or civilians were allowed anywhere near it. The only Vietnamese to walk through the gates at Nui Dat were ARVN liaison officers and interpreters, prisoners and detainees.30 Lights were out at 7.30 p.m. and men were placed on picket duty throughout the night. Australian commanders were adamant that there would be no advance warning each time an Australian force moved out.
In contrast, US bases routinely employed local Vietnamese to perform tasks such as laundry and garbage disposal, and to work as waiters, kitchenhands, barbers, canteen staff, and so on. Lights remained on all night, lighting up the camps like Christmas trees. US bases were also usually set up close to a major township. This was a godsend to Viet Cong intelligence gathering, as operatives literally fell over each other collecting identity cards, base details, details of troop movements and particularly medical supplies, facilitating attacks against the bases themselves.
7
‘. . . aware of the threat to their stomach and nervous system’
Earlier, in February 1965, the communist COSVN had established a two-battalion regiment to operate in and around Phuoc Tuy Province – the People’s Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) 4th Infantry Regiment (Dong Nai Regiment). Its presence was soon identified by US forces, who gave it the name 274 Viet Cong Regiment.1 The regiment was based in Hat Dich, which was to the north-west of the province, and consisted of D800 and D308 battalions.2 It first saw significant action on 12 March 1966, when it conducted an attack on Route 15 and the US and ARVN base at Vung Tau. A month later it mounted an attack at Nui Le, north of Binh Gia, on the US 1st Infantry Division,3 and a few months after that it conducted an attack on the ARVN, successfully ambushing a convoy on Route 15 in Long Khanh Province, north of Phuoc Tuy. This was soon followed by a joint operation by 274 VC Regiment and the 240th Company of Long Khanh Province attacking a military training centre and capturing a large cache of arms and ammunition, including two 81mm mortars. Another attack against a c
onvoy quickly followed, resulting in the capture of a large quantity of ammunition. This force focused its attention on attacking convoys along Routes 1, 2, 13, 14, 15 and 20.4
By September 1965, 274 VC Regiment was reinforced with D265 Battalion, making it a three-battalion regiment. Orders soon reached the commanders of 274 VC Regiment and the local D445 VC Provincial Battalion that they were to defend the Long Phuoc, Long Tan and Hat Dich base areas of Phuoc Tuy Province. Over the next six months they confronted the ARVN.5 There has been much confusion regarding the presence of D440 VC Battalion and D806 and D860 VC battalions within the area and their participation in the Battle of Long Tan. Research by Ernest Chamberlain has shown that D440 VC Battalion did not exist until mid-1967 and that D806 and D860 were actually code names used by the Viet Cong for D445 VC Battalion.6
It wasn’t long before another force, the recently raised PLAF 5th Infantry Regiment, consisting mostly of personnel from the Mekong Delta region, was identified in the province; it was designated 275 Viet Cong Regiment by the US military.7 This regiment was initially in the May Tao Mountains to the north-east of the province. It was commanded by Senior Captain Nguyen Thoi Bung and consisted of about 900 individuals in three battalions.8 These troops did not fare well, as recalled later by an officer of the 5th VC Division: most were ‘unfamiliar with the climate, life was difficult and the unit had to urgently build bases and organize training, while at the same time, finalize the re-organisation and pay attention to the health of the cadre and soldiers, which was declining’.9 The great bulk of the men in this regiment suffered from malaria while trying to organise, study and train. Due to casualties sustained during fighting in Binh Tuy Province and sickness, 275 VC Regiment’s 2nd and 3rd battalions were combined to make up the 2nd Battalion; the regiment would soon be reinforced with the NVA (D605 Battalion), which would be assigned as the regiment’s 3rd Battalion, making it a three-battalion regiment.10
There has also been much confusion regarding the presence of an NVA regiment during the battle of Long Tan – NVA 45 Regiment. The day after the battle, a 6 RAR situation report noted recovering ‘ID cards issued in North Vietnam. Enemy units involved in battle identified as 014 Company, D3 Battalion, Q5 Regiment; D605 and incorrectly the 45 NVA Regiment’.11 Only one member of 445 VC Battalion was captured at Long Tan, while two members of 275 VC Regiment were captured – the latter declared that they were members of ‘Doan 45’, a cover designator for the 3rd Battalion of 275 VC Regiment. Later that day, 1 ATF incorrectly reported that the two ‘Northern’ prisoners were members of NVA 45 Regiment while the other was a member of D445 VC Battalion. However, in reality, Doan 45, D605 Battalion and C14/D3/Q5 Regiment were all designators for the 3rd Battalion of 275 VC Regiment, which alone consisted of NVA regulars.12
Both Viet Cong regiments were essentially staffed by southern-born Viet Cong, albeit with some northern political cadres.13 These units making up the 5th VC Division had a strength of about 3500 and were equipped with a number of 75mm recoilless rifles, 81 and 82mm medium mortars, 12.7mm anti-aircraft guns, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), light and heavy machine guns and an assortment of small arms, including AK-47 assault rifles. Each regiment consisted of three battalions of varying strength, with each battalion having three service companies, combined artillery, recoilless rifles and light mortars, as well as signals (with three radio sets) and a reconnaissance unit.
Lieutenant Colonel Chuyen, who defected to the south in early 1966, provided an assessment of the abilities of the two regiments of the division. The 1st and 3rd battalions of the 274 VC Regiment he considered battle-hardened and extremely reliable, but the 2nd Battalion he considered very poor. His assessment of the 275 VC Regiment indicated that its 1st and 2nd battalions lacked combat experience and were not ready for offensive operations in any strength. Many remained sick with malaria (in June 1966, 10 per cent of 274 VC Regiment suffered from malaria, while those in 275 VC Regiment suffered much worse at around 30 per cent and some operations had to be cancelled due to sickness) and most of its recruits were still very young – some just 16 years old. Its 3rd Battalion, however, was judged to consist of recruits from the north (formerly NVA D605 Battalion) and assessed to be more aggressive.14
On 23 October 1965, the VC 274 and 275 regiments were combined with 22 Mountain Artillery Battalion, 12 Anti-Aircraft Company, 95 Reconnaissance Company, 23 Mortar Company, 25 Engineer Company, 605 Communications Company and 96 Medical Company to form the PLAF 5th VC Infantry Division, under the command of Colonel Nguyen The Truyen, a patient and intelligent man who maintained his headquarters in the May Tao Mountains.15 With the expansion of his force, the division was assigned a greater area of operation that included not only Phuoc Tuy Province but also Bien Hoa Province and parts of Long Khanh Province, which were collectively known as Ba-Bien. During the first half of 1966 the 5th VC Infantry Division conducted a number of operations in Ba-Bien, but with the arrival of the Australian Task Force in Phuoc Tuy in mid-1966, COSVN reassigned the 5th VC Infantry Division the task of defending the province from the incursion by the newly arrived enemy force.16
In early July 1966, 275 VC Regiment was located just south-east of Phu Mountain, near the boundary of Binh Tuy and Long Khanh provinces, north-east of Phuoc Tuy, while 274 VC Regiment and other units of the division, including its headquarters (which consisted mostly of North Vietnamese staff), were located in Xuyen Moc District in the eastern part of Phuoc Tuy. In all, the total Viet Cong strength allocated to operations within Phuoc Tuy Province amounted to around 4500 troops.17
The Viet Cong set about trying to come up with a strategy to force the Australians out of Phuoc Tuy and hopefully, in the process, out of South Vietnam. Nguyen Thanh Hong, an operational officer of the 5th VC Infantry Division, recalled that when the Australians began to construct their base at Nui Dat in 1966, they assessed that their role was to be an independent mobile strike force that would focus on destroying D445 VC Battalion, which in 1966 could field just 380 troops consisting of three rifle companies, C1 to C3, and C4, which was a heavy-weapons unit.18
While small in size, these local insurgents, commanded by the experienced major Bui Quang Chanh, had conducted successful operations against the US and ARVN forces before the Australians arrived, and their morale was high. In addition, there were about 400 local guerrillas operating in groups of various sizes from five to 60 out of local villages and hamlets.19 That said, the Viet Cong were ‘well aware of the threat to their stomach and nervous system’ that 1 ATF presented in this location.20 While the commanders of the 5th VC Infantry Division were concerned about Australian commando tactics, they were confident that in any conventional confrontation the Australians would come off second best.21
In August 1966, a group led by the deputy commander of the 5th VC Infantry Division, Lieutenant Colonel Tran Minh Tam, met with the commander of the Ba Ria unit, Dang Huu Thuan, who had responsibility for military operations within Phuoc Tuy Province. They discussed a mobile ambush operation 2–3 kilometres in length against the Australian troops in the rubber plantation of Long Tan. The 2nd Battalion of 275 VC Regiment, along with a company of the local D445 VC Battalion with RPGs and a 57mm recoilless rifle, would be located along the eastern edge of the plantation to block the forward elements of the Australians, while the 3rd Battalion of the same regiment (the former NVA D605 Battalion) would be located 800 metres south-west – it was this battalion that would attack the main Australian force. Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion, reinforced with the remaining two companies from D445 VC Battalion, would be responsible for blocking the retreat of the Australians and was to assist in the attack led by the 3rd Battalion.22
This planned large-scale mobile ambush was not just a military priority: it was also seen as a political necessity to help garner further local support. It would be seen as revenging the evacuation of Long Tan village and the destruction of Long Phuoc. (Indeed, after the Battle of Long Tan, a considerable cache of food, ammunition and explosives was foun
d in Long Tan village, perhaps representing early preparations for the intended Viet Cong ambush.) However, events would overtake this operation, as the Battle of Long Tan commenced before the planned ambush could be put into effect.23
While most histories to date, including the Australian official history, state that 274 VC Regiment was to be involved in the mobile ambush of an Australian unit in the Long Tan rubber plantation by acting as a blocking force against any US forces coming down from the north, the captured notebook of the second-in-command of 274 VC Regiment (Nguyen Nam Hung) reveals this was not the case. Elements of 274 VC Regiment were spread over a number of base camps in north-eastern Phuoc Tuy at the time and had no plans for any involvement in operations supporting a battle to take place in Long Tan rubber plantation (or the Task Force base, as some have suggested) during August 1966. This was also later confirmed by contemporary signals intelligence.24 Captain Trevor Richards, commanding 547 Signal Troop, advised the 1 ATF commander on 18 August of the location of 274 VC Regiment and commented that it did not appear to be preparing for combat: it ‘seemed to be on R&R [rest and recreation]’.25
The Battle of Long Tan Page 6
