Sabben and his men lay in the downpour firing into the approaching enemy troops, hoping to see the survivors of 11 Platoon making their way towards them. The enemy continued to probe their position, unsure of their strength. If they had known, they would have steamrolled right over the top of them. Sabben remembered that they were being probed on both flanks and that the enemy were likely reporting back on his position in order to put in a concentrated assault against his two sections. Worryingly, he still had had no contact with 11 Platoon.30 Indeed, it was now that he received a message from CHQ that enemy troops had bypassed them and were probing CHQ’s position from the north – these were likely enemy troops following up on 10 Platoon’s withdrawal back to CHQ.31 Sabben recalled that on two separate occasions enemy troops to his north ‘undertook a flanking move on Company [HQ] that brought them towards us and to within firing range, so we opened up on them. This caused great confusion both times and resulted in one instance of them changing direction towards us in a feeble attempt at an assault. The group was small – some ten or twelve – and they were easily beaten off, leaving behind half their number dead.’32
Private Alan Parr, still behind his M60, also recalled the enemy movement towards CHQ, but this time from the opposite flank. From near the hut ‘a large group of Viet Cong bunched quite close together were moving through the rubber trees around towards the rear of company headquarters. It looked like hundreds of them, and I think then all realised we were in big trouble. I moved position so I called fire at the line of VC; I let off a burst of rounds . . . It was in this spot, lying there with my M60 tucked in against my shoulder, when a bullet struck my gun. Punching a hole straight through the barrel just behind where the spare barrel fits on, and only a foot from my head – the gun was ratshit.’33
The main threat to 12 Platoon remained the enemy troops massing south of their position. Sabben recalled, chillingly, that ‘when the enemy went to ground, we couldn’t find them . . . they may well have crawled towards us, and we wouldn’t have seen them until they could see us, but when they stood, and when they advanced on us – because they had to advance; we were in defence, almost all the time – we could see them standing above the mist, so we could hit them and they didn’t know where the bullets were coming from. They could see the muzzle flashes but, so long as our aim was good, by the time they saw the flashes, it was too late for them.’34 By now Parr was anxious for a few shots at the enemy; Bextram had been blasting away when Parr asked him for a loan of his rifle. ‘Straightaway he handed it to me and I blasted a few rounds off at the VC then handed it back. It always amazed me how Neil just handed his rifle over to me. We never did talk about it.’35
Sabben and his men focused on keeping the tenuous corridor between his platoon and the men from 11 Platoon open. He just hoped that the survivors of 11 Platoon would realise that there was little fire coming to them from the rear, indicating that their avenue of escape lay there. He gave orders to the section on his right not to fire on any targets until they had been positively identified as enemy troops. Casualties continued to rise, and Private Terry Ryan, who was next to Sabben, was hit in the elbow. Luckily for him the bullet was an overshoot and had lost most of its velocity, allowing him to pluck it out and hand it to his officer: ‘Keep this for me, skipper. I wanna get the bugger that sent it.’ He continued to fire.36
Parr, who was close by, recalled that amid all of the fighting and exploding ordnance, ‘even though it was so frightening, if Lt Sabben or one of the corporals had said, “Jump up! We’re going through the gates of hell!” we would have followed them through. It has always amazed me how a person can function under such extreme conditions . . . Maybe it’s the mateship, training and the not-wanting-to-let-anyone-down that makes you get up and move when you know you have to.’37
20
‘Bugger you, George, I’m coming too’
1730–1745 hours
At 5.30 p.m., B Company, halfway between Nui Dat and the plantation, was finally ordered by 6 RAR commander Lieutenant Colonel Colin Townsend to return to the plantation to support Major Harry Smith and his men. Private David A. Thomas recalled how earlier ‘it [had] started to rain, and we were drinking water off the banana leaves. It was a fair while before we were told to go back. I think they’d basically forgotten us.’1 Major Noel Ford radioed back that his depleted company (now at platoon strength) was ‘moving to D Coy HQ at 477675’. Ford was heard to ask over the radio, ‘What do you want us to do when we get there?’ The reply by Major Brian Passey, 2IC of the battalion, was ‘Kill the enemy’.2 Soon, however, they themselves were being targeted by Viet Cong 60mm mortar fire. So far they had suffered no casualties, but the enemy clearly knew they were moving back towards Long Tan Plantation.3
Flight lieutenants Frank Riley, Bob Grandin, Bruce Lane and Cliff Dohle, along with their flight crews, knew that their mission to resupply D Company was going to be extremely hazardous. The weather presented truly atrocious flying conditions: not only was the rain pouring down, but it had now turned into a tropical thunderstorm, with low-lying clouds. The amount of enemy ordnance flying around the battle zone, including mortar bombs, could easily bring down a helicopter that was hovering 10 metres from the ground. Added to this was the fire from the ground from small arms and RPGs. They were also aware that Major Smith and his men would be open to mass infantry attacks without artillery support while they were flying in the area. It was crucial that they get in fast and get out even faster so the artillery could recommence laying down the vital artillery barrage against the enemy forces massing around the stranded infantry below. Indeed, finding D Company in these flying conditions was going to be a major task in the nondescript rubber plantation. If they failed to see the smoke grenade, the mission would be over, and D Company would likely be overrun within minutes with no ammunition and no artillery support while the helicopters were flying around trying to find the smoke.4
Earlier, Lieutenant Adrian Roberts, in command of 3 Troop, had arrived at A Company lines. The men and their officers were anxious to be on the move, and the young lieutenant expected a quick discussion regarding the route to be taken and other particulars. But there seemed to be no time – the infantry and their officers just wanted to push on and get to the scene of fighting as soon as possible. Not being able to allocate each of his platoons to an APC section, given Roberts’ troop was down by one APC section, Captain Charles Mollison ordered his platoon commanders to load up from the front of the column of APCs.5 This meant that not only would the vehicles be overloaded but there would also be a mix of men from differing sections in each APC. Sergeant Jim Myles of 1 Platoon recalled that as they began to mount up, one of the corporals from the carriers was handing out shell dressings (bandages). Myles didn’t ask why; he just stuffed them into his shirt. He and the others were informed of the seriousness of the situation – D Company had taken a lot of casualties.6 They were soon aboard but still pretty much in the dark about what was happening and what their specific objectives were, other than to relieve D Company.
Fortunately Roberts knew of the ford across the stream and that is what he headed for. It was the best way of crossing the swollen stream, whose banks in almost all other areas were steep and difficult to negotiate at the best of times. He had already discussed this with his commander, Major Bob Hagerty, who had approved his proposed route to the plantation. However, once across the stream all bets would be off, as there was no way of knowing what awaited them at the crossing and beyond; the situation was extremely fluid and largely unknown.
Three Troop and A Company did not leave their company lines until 5.35 p.m. Sergeant O’Reilly’s APC was in the lead as he was most familiar with the crossing point and had crossed many times while working with D Company.7 There were only a few gaps in the base’s wire defence wide enough to enable the carriers to pass through. Normally, when exiting south-east, they would pass through a gap in the engineers’ area, but the road here was blocked because of roadworks. Roberts was
forced to take a circuitous route through the base, heading north for a known gap in the wire. Time was ticking away.
Meanwhile, Warrant Officer George Chinn, the regimental sergeant major of 6 RAR, could not stand by as the men of D Company were in danger of being overrun. He organised volunteers to carry the heavy boxes of ammunition to the helicopter pad. Thought was given to whether they should open the boxes and fill magazines or just drop the boxes as is. It was decided to wrap the boxes in blankets and push them out. Even so, some were opened and ammunition belts were placed in a number of sandbags to make it easier for D Company to distribute the ammunition quickly. Soon, Major Owen O’Brien, commanding 6 RAR’s Administrative Company, joined Chinn in organising the men.
As this was going on, the pilots were discussing how they intended to carry out their critical mission. As recalled by Grandin, they would use a technique they had perfected when inserting SAS behind enemy lines. The lead helicopter, with Riley and Grandin on board, would take a lighter load of ammunition and go out at a height of about 600 metres to help locate the target zone. The other helicopter would fly at a lower level and be directed by Riley to the drop zone. After it had dropped its ammunition to those below, Riley would dive down and drop the other supply. This would improve their safety, as at height the probability of being hit by small-arms fire was unlikely and at treetop level the window of opportunity to fire an accurate shot was very much reduced. O’Brien informed the pilots that it was imperative they get in and out as soon as possible as the artillery fire would have to be suspended while they were flying in the battle zone, and D Company was just as reliant on the artillery fire to stop the enemy overrunning its position as it was on ammunition.8
Because the onboard door machine gunners had to man their weapons, several soldiers volunteered to board the aircraft to assist in dropping the ammunition. However, RSM Chinn was adamant that he would accompany the drop. O’Brien pointed out to Chinn that he was responsible for organising the ammunition and not for delivering it. However, Chinn almost insubordinately informed the major that he was going, come what may.9 O’Brien had served with Chinn in the SAS and had known him since he had joined the army 12 years before. He merely replied, ‘Bugger you, George, I’m coming too.’10
With the ammunition boxes stowed away and O’Brien and Chinn aboard, they were soon airborne and following the track that the APCs were using, which would take them into the plantation and hopefully to D Company. Grandin recalled that with O’Brien and Chinn aboard, ‘Beauty – two more to go up when our load of ammunition exploded with a hit from the ground.’ But another surprise awaited them: ‘To the east was a large thunderstorm with intense rain falling over Long Tan.’11 Of major concern now was the reduced efficiency of the rotors in the torrential downpour, which could result in the engine ‘flaming out’. Dohle recalled that it was an extremely ‘uncomfortable’ situation12 – an understatement if there ever was one.
Meanwhile, Sabben and his men were still fighting to keep a corridor open between them and the men of 11 Platoon. Enemy fire was still pouring into their position, even though the mist made it difficult to target individuals – most of the enemy fire was too high and hit the rubber trees. Sabben recalled that as the bullets pierced the tree trunks, the bark ruptured and the latex sitting beneath it leaked out. It didn’t dissolve, despite the rain, and a couple of minutes after a bullet pierced a tree, pure-white latex would dribble down the bark. There was no ‘dust or mud at that level, and the water isn’t going to dissolve it. It’s just there, like blood. It looked like the rubber trees were standing there bleeding.’13
At this point, an enemy heavy machine gun was sweeping their position with tracer, and with every burst of fire leaves and twigs showered on Sabben and his men. He was increasingly concerned that 11 Platoon might not be aware that 10 Platoon had retired to CHQ, and that they might think 10 Platoon was still on their left – if so, they might attempt to move in that direction to link up with them, which would be disastrous.14
Sabben knew that time was running out, not just for 11 Platoon but for his own men. He was continuing to take casualties and the enemy were becoming increasingly aggressive, perhaps now finally realising, with their continued probes against Sabben’s position, that they were facing at most one Australian platoon. They would soon have to retire to CHQ. However, he decided to hang on a little longer, hoping against hope that the survivors of 11 Platoon about 200 metres in front would make a break for it and head for his position through the corridor they were managing to keep open – just. Within minutes, however, his worst fears looked as though they were about to be realised.
Another large enemy force was seen forming up near the enemy heavy machine gun and was soon moving to the right of Sabben’s position, near the tapper’s hut – but it seemed to be ignoring them and beginning to form up for an assault against CHQ, about 200 metres to Sabben’s rear. Someone pointed to movement on their right flank, and Sabben could see a group of Viet Cong forming up beside the hut. They very quickly moved up the avenue of trees directly towards CHQ position. This force was bypassing his platoon by about 50 metres and crossed the front of 12 Platoon, about two or three rows of rubber trees away.
Sabben was still unsure of the position of Major Noel Ford and B Company, who were likely making their way back to the plantation – were these them? He got Corporal Kevin Miller to move his M60 machine gun into the centre of their position, pointing across to the avenue of trees that the advancing troops would have to cross, and told him to fire it only if they were positively identified as Viet Cong.15 Miller, commanding 8 Section, recalled: ‘We saw blokes coming from our right flank. When I first saw them I thought they were our blokes. They just looked like our fellas – they were almost dressed the same as us.’16
As these troops got closer, he and others recognised the curved and round magazines that identified the weapons as AK-47s. Sabben ordered his men to fire and recalled the enemy’s complete surprise: it looked like they had knocked over the first line of that advance with their concentrated fire. The others broke and ran south, back towards the area of the tapper’s hut. At this point Sabben heard on the radio that the ammunition resupply was on the way and the choppers would soon be overhead, and that CHQ would throw a smoke grenade to confirm their position.17
This gave Sabben the idea of using coloured smoke to try to gain the attention of 11 Platoon – it would provide a rallying point for the survivors of the stranded forward platoon. He would use yellow smoke as it would be the easiest to see through the trees. Even so, it would also attract the attention of the enemy force all around his position. He called up Corporal Laurie Drinkwater, who threw a smoke grenade well to their front and clear of their position. This was immediately followed by a hail of enemy fire, including from the heavy machine gun, with tracers crisscrossing the area, which was now covered in smoke. Sabben recalled being glad he ordered the grenade to be thrown well clear of their position.18
Behind Sabben and 12 Platoon, Smith was telling his men that the choppers would soon arrive with an airdrop of ammunition – great news. But this also meant the artillery support would be called off while they were in the area – not so great. He advised his platoon leaders that they would lose the guns while the choppers were near and they should be prepared for any Viet Cong attack. He didn’t need to tell them that during this period they would be extremely vulnerable and on their own.19
21
‘I just screamed at him to piss off’
1745–1800 hours
Lieutenant Adrian Roberts and his troop were arriving at the northern passage through the wire when he received a message from Lieutenant Colonel Townsend via the radio that Townsend had changed his mind: he would not be approaching the battle area by helicopter but would accompany his men in the APCs. Roberts was forced to detach two of his precious carriers under the command of Lieutenant Ian Savage in APC 30B, together with Corporal Paul ‘Jock’ Fottrill’s 33A, to go back and pick up Townse
nd’s group. He was already short by three APCs, and now he was short by five. The remaining eight carriers continued their approach to the hole in the wire. However, when they got there, to Roberts’ frustration – and that of Captain Mollison and his men of A Company on board – it had been closed off with a mass of newly installed barbed wire. Further delay was encountered as they tried to find someone to show them the new passage through the perimeter. Everything seemed to be working against them.1
A few hundred metres in front of 12 Platoon, Sergeant Bob Buick was still searching for a way to extricate what was left of his platoon. He figured he had about ten men left alive, two of them wounded. He had few alternatives and for a moment contemplated a charge straight through the enemy: ‘Do I go forward straight through these bastards and keep running?’2 This idea was quickly dismissed. Behind him was the only place where no Viet Cong had been seen, so the company must still be behind them. He decided to go back in that direction; if he couldn’t make contact with the rest of the company, the survivors of 11 Platoon would take cover during the night somewhere along the Suoi Da Bang. Buick passed the word that when he said, ‘Go!’, they were to ‘get up and go like hell and help anyone they could’.3
The Battle of Long Tan Page 19
