We thus see that much of the matter supplied by Kauṭilya’s work pertains to the period selected by us, and can be safely used to show how much the Indians knew of this science in that period. To the same period seem to belong the chapters from the Mahābhārata, especially from the Śānti-Parvan, which deal with rājadharm-anu-śāsna; and it is not at all improbable that this section represents in the main the work of the pre-Kauṭilvan political philosopher Kauṇapadanta as this is but another name for Bīshma. The account of polity which they contain seems to have heen drawn principally from the systems of Bṛihaspati, Uśanas and Manu. Again, when those chapters were written, only seven authors of this. Science were known. In Kauṭilya’s time they were at least twelve.26 Again, the name Gaurasiras, which is mentioned in the Śānti-Parvan, is not known to Kauṭilya showing probably that his work was forgotten when the prime-minister of Chandragupta wrote. Moreover, as the Mahābhārata does not know many of the authors adverted to by Kauṭilya, it is no wonder that it mentions none of the later authors such as Maharshis,27 Maya and Puloma who came into prominence after him and are referred to by Kāmandakara.28 These considerations show that those portions of the Mahābhārata, and especially of the Śanti-Parvan, which treat of the Science of Polity, are on the whole indebted for their account to authors who lived prior to Kauṭilya. I have shown above which verses are quoted in the Mahābhārata and from which of these authors. But there seem also to be verses in this epic which are paraphrases of the original of these authors. I shall give only one, hut typical, instance here. I informed you a short time ago that Kauṭilya quoted the second half of an Āryā metre from Bhāradvāja,viz.Indrasya hi sa praṇamati yo balīyaso namati. Now in the Mahābhārata, both in the Uddyoga and the Śānti-Parvan, we find an Anushṭubh which is an obvious rendering of this half of the Āryā verse of Bhāradvāja, viz:
Etay=opamayā vīra saṁnameta balīyasē
Indrāya sa praṇamate namate yo balīyase.29
We can easily infer that the Mahābhārata must contain many such metrical adaptations of verses from works on Arthaśāstra anterior to Kauṭilya.30
(b) Hindu conceptions of Monarchy.
So much for the literature bearing Upon Arthaśāstra. I will now turn to some subject connected with Administration which have a greater and general interest for us all. Let us see first what were the various forms of government prevalent at this time. The principal of these, of course, were monarchy and Gaṇa or Saṅgha Government. The former was a rule by one person, and the latter by many. The royal dynasties of the Magadha, Kośala, Avanti and Vatsa countries, which I described in my last lecture, represent the monarchical form of government. In that lecture I drew your attention also to two tribes—the Lichchhavis and the Mallas, which were brought under subjection by Ajātaśatru. They are in Buddhist literature described as Gaṇas or Saṅghas. In this lecture I shall confine myself to the first form of government only, viz. Monarchy, an shall treat of the other in my next. In regard to Monarchy manv interesting details are supplied by Hindu works on administration, but here I shall take up only those which appear to be important to me.
Now, why is a king required? Where was the necessity of a king at the helm of State affairs? Let us see what reply is given to this question by the Hindu science of polity of Chapter 67 of the Śānti-Parvan contains the following typical verses bearing on the question.
“For these reasons men desirous of prosperity should crown some person as their king. They, who live in countries where anarchy prevails cannot enjoy their wealth and wives (v.12).
“During times of anarchy, the sinful man derives great pleasure by plundering the wealth of other people. When, however, his(ill-got) wealth is snatched away by others, he wishes for a king (v. 13).
“It is evident, therefore, that in times of anarchy the very wicked even cannot be happy. The wealth of one is snatched away by two. That of these two is snatched away by many acting together (v. 14).
“He who is not a slave is made a slave. Women, again, are forcibly abducted. For these reasons the gods created kings for protecting the people.
“If there were no king on earth for wielding the rod of chastisement, the strong would then have preyed on the weak after the manner of fishes in the water.”
These verses set forth the reasons why a king is indispensable. Their essence is, however, concentrated in the last verse which tell us that if there were no king, the strong would devour the weak just as the fishes do in water, and refers to what is popularly known as the Mātsya-nyāya. This seems to have been a very favourite maxim with the Hindu writers on the political science and is constantly repeated when they have to explain the necessity of placing a king at the head of government. Thus the Manu-smṛiti gives the following verse :
Yadi na praṇayed=rājā daṇḍam
daṇḍyeshv=atandritaḥ
jale matsyān=iv=āhiṁsyan
durbalān balavattarāḥ.
Chapter VII. v. 20.
TRANSLATION
“If the king did not unwearisomely exercise the chastising rod on those deserving to be chastised, the stronger would kill the weaker like fish in water.”
Kauṭilya also gives the same illustration not once but twice in his Arthaśāstra. Thus on p. 9 he says: Apraṇīto hi Mātsya-nyāyam= udbhāvayati balīyān=abalaṁ hi grasate daṇḍadhar-ābhāve.“Because, if the chastising rod is not exercised it brings about the realisation of the proverb of the greater fish swallowing the smaller. In the absence of the wielder of the chastising rod, the strong devours the weak.” Here the employment of the word daṇḍa and the phrase Mātsya-nyāya and, above all, the use of the word apraṇīta, are all but conclusive in showing that when Kauṭilya wrote that passage, he had in mind the verse quoted above which must therefore be supposed to have been incorporated into the Manu-smṛiti from some older text of the Arthaśāstra. Mātsya-nyāya is again alluded to by Kauṭilya on p. 22, but as I am citing the whole passage further on and very shortly, I refrain from doing so here and content myself with saying that Kauṭilya twice speaks of the Mātsya-nyāya when he has to describe the anarchy that prevails in default of a king. Curiously enough this Mātsya-nyāya has been alluded to even in the Rāmāyaṇa when the condition is described of an arājaka janapada, i.e. a country without a king. Thus we have the verse:
N= ārājake janapade svakaṁ bhavati
kasyachit
matsyā iva janā nityam bhakshayanti
parasparam.
Ayodhyā-kāṇḍa, Chap. 67. v. 31.
TRANSLATION
“In a country where there is no king, nobody possesses anything which is his own. Like the fish the people are always devouring one another.”
Other reasons have been set forth in the Ayodhyā-kāṇḍa of the Rāmāyaṇa from where the above verse has been extracted, pointing to the paramount necessity of appointing a king. And it is very strange that most of them are precisely the same as those adduced in Chap. 68 of the Śānti-Parvan, showing that either one has borrowed from the other or, what is more probable, both of them drew upon some previous source. I fear it will be exceedingly irksome to you if I quote all these passages from both the works, and institute a comparison between them. Besides, such a thing is not at all necessary to my main purpose, which is simply to impress upon your mind the fact that the most favourite illustration given to describe the state of a country without a ruler is that of the fish preying upon one another. This idea seems have been so thoroughly assimilated by the Hindus that we find it repeated everywhere. Even the Khālimpur copper-plate charter of Dharmapāla of the Pāla dynasty, the contents of which most of you here in Bengal must be acquainted with, refers to the Mātsya-nyāya while speaking of Dharmapāla’s father, Gopāla. Thus we have:—
Mātsyu-nyāyam=apohituṁ prakṛitibhir=
Lakshmyāḥ karam grāhitaḥ
Śrī-Gopāla iti kshitīśa-śirasāṁ chūḍāmaṇis=tat-sutaḥ31
Let us now see what notions of kin
gship there were in our period, in other words, what theories were prevalent in regard to the origin kingship. The first theory that I shall here allude to is that of the Social Contract. The theory in Europe was, we know, originated by Hobbes and further developed or rather altered by Locke and Rousseau. So much do we read and hear of this view while studying European History that we are apt to suppose that a mental restlessness in this sphere was confined to Europe only and never manifested itself in the political horizon of ancient India. A study of the Arthaśāstra, however, will soon disillusion our mind. The theory of Social Contract was certainly known to Kauṭilya, and is referred to by him with approval and as being handed down to his time from time previous.“People afflicted with anarchy”, says he, “consequent upon the Mātsya-nyāya, i.e. the practice of the bigger fish swallowing the smaller, first elected Manu, son of Vivasvat, to be their king. They allotted one sixth of their grains and one tenth of their merchandise as his share. Subsisting on this wage kings become capable of giving safety and security to their subjects and removing their sins. Hence hermits, too, provide the king with one sixth of the grains gleaned by them, saying to themselves ‘it is a tax payable to him who protects us’.” The same story is repeated but at greater length in Chapter 67 of the Śānti-Parvan.32 I need not tell you that in this as in other chapters on Rājadharma Bhīshma is issuing instructions to Yudhishṭhira. And in Chapter 67 Bhīshma says that formerly men, being without a king, met with destruction, devouring one another like fish in water. They then assembled together, prepared a code of laws and proceeded to Brahmā, saying :“Without a king, O divine lord, we are going to destruction. Appoint some one as our king! All of us shall worship him and he shall protect us!” Thus solicited, Brahmā asked Manu, but Manu would not assent to the proposal. “I fear,” said he, “all sinful acts. To govern a kingdom is exceedingly difficult, especially among men who are always false and deceitful in their behaviour.” The inhabitants of the Earth then said to him: “Don’t fear! The sins that men commit will touch those only that commit them. For the increase of thy treasury, we will give thee a fiftieth part of our animals and precious metals and a tenth part of our grains.”33 Thus addressed, Manu agreed, and he made his round through the world, checking wackedness everywhere and setting all men to their respective duties.
A similar conception of the origin of monarchy is traceable in Buddhist literature also. The Aggañña-suttanta of the Dīgha-Nikāya34 of the Southern Buddhists describes at great length the evolution of man and society and tells us how mankind was righteous to begin with, how gradually and in diverse ways sinfuless crept into human society, and how theft, lying, reviling and assaulting became rife. Thereupon men assembled together, and after taking counsel, selected the most handsome gracious and powerful individual from amongst them, addressing him thus: “Come here, O being! Do punish, revile and exile those who well deserve to be punished, reviled and exiled. we will give you a portion of our rice.” He undertook the performance of this duty and received three different appellations in consequence. Because he was selected by all men (mahājana-sammata ), he was called Mahā-sammata. Because he was the lord of all fields (khettānaṁ patīti), he was called Kshatriya. And because he delighted others through righteousness (dhammena pare rañjetīti),35 he was called Rājan. Practically the same story is repeated in the Mahāvastu,36 a canonical work of the North Buddhists, and this conception of kingship seems to have so deeply permeated the Buddhist community that the story of Mahāsammata is narrated also in the post-canonical literature and of such widely separated countries as Ceylon, Burma and Tibet.37
From the above accounts it will be seen that sovereignty originated in a social contract. Human beings, we learn, were fighting with one another, by each person taking for himself all that he could. The state of nature was therefore a state of war, which came to an end only when men agreed to give their liberty into the hands of a sovereign. I need not tell you that this view of the origin of society bears a remarkably close correspondence with that propounded by Hobbes. But Hobbes expounded this notion of Agreement by saying that absolute power was thereby irrevocably transferred to the ruler. Such was not, however, the case with the Social Contract theory advocated by the Hindu Arthaśāstra. According to the latter the king was still the servant of the people. The sixth part of the grain and the tenth part of the merchandise that was his due was but the wage that he received for his service to the people. This is the view not only Kauṭilya, and the Śānti–Parvan but also of the authorities on the Dharmaśāstra. Baudhāyana e.g. who flourished in the fifth century B.C. says shaḍ-bhāga-bhṛito rājā rakshet prajām, “Let the king protect (his) subjects, receiving as his pay a sixth part (of their grains).”38 In another place in the Śānti-Parvan39 such sources of a king’s revenue as the sixth part of the yield of the soil, fines and imposts to which he is entitled according to the scriptures, have been called his vetana, his wage, for the protection he vouchsafes to his subjects. Nay, the king is exhorted in unmistakable language that if he is unable to restore to any subject of his the wealth that has been stolen away by thieves he should compensate him from his own treasury or with wealth obtained from his dependents.40 This was also laid down by Kauṭilya. “Whatever of the property of the citizens”, says he, “robbed by thieves the king cannot recover, shall be made good from his own pocket”.41 This was also the view of the Dharma-śāstrakāras. Gautama e.g. says that “having recovered property stolen by thieves, the king shall return it to the owner, or (if the stolen property is not recovered) he shall pay(its value) out of his treasury.” It will thus be seen that whatever the king received by way of taxation prescribed by scriptures was considered as his wage for the service rendered by him to the people and that he was compelled to make good from his pocket any loss that his subjects suffered from their stolen property not being recovered. The king’s power can thus hardly be supposed to be absolute. And it is this feature that distinguishes the Hindu theory of Social Contract from that propounded by Hobbes, and marks its superiority over the latter. The king, according to the Hindu notion, thus never wielded any unqualified power, but was looked upon as merely a public servant though of the highest order.
So much in regard to the theory of the Social Covenant so far as it was known to the early authors of the Arthaśāstra. The other theory that we now consider is that which ascribes divine origin to kingship. This theory has been set forth in Chapter 59 of the Śānti-Parvan. Yudhishṭhira begins by asking Bhīshma a most sensible question. “Whence arose the word rājan,” interrogates Yudhishṭhira “which is used on earth? Possessed of hand, arms and neck like others, having an understanding and senses like those of others, subject like others to the same kinds of joy and grief……in fact, similar to others in respect of all the attributes of humanity, for what reason does one man, viz. the king, govern the rest of the world? Why do all men seek to obtain his favour?” This was the question asked by Yudhisṭhira. To this Bhīshma gives the following reply. In the Kṛita age there was no sovereignty, no king. All men used to protect one another righteously. Soon after they were assailed by moha or infatuation. And in its train followed lobha, greed, wrath and rāga or unrestrained sexual indulgence. Confusion thus set in, and the Vedas (Brahman) and righteousness (Dharma) were lost. The gods were overcome with fear, and repaired to the god Brahmā. “O Lord of the three Worlds,” said they, “we are about to descend to the level of human beings! Men used to pour upwards while we used to pour downwards. In consequence, however, of the cessation of all pious rites among men, great distress will be our lot.” Thus addressed the god composed the treatise consisting of a hundred thousand chapters and treating of dharma, artha, kāma and moksha to which I have already referred. The gods then approached Vishṇu, the lord of creation (prajāpati), and said unto him—‘Indicate, O god, that one among mortals who deserves to have superiority over the rest.’ The god Nārāyaṇa created, by a fiat of his will, a son born of his tejas or lustre, named Virajas. It was, how
ever the seventh descendant from Vishṇu, who was crowned king and ruled according to the daṇḍa-nīti composed by the god Brahmā. His name was Pṛithu Vainya, and his coronation was celebrated not only by Brāhmaṇs and Ṛishis but also deities with Indra, Regents of the world, and, above all, Vishṇu himself. The eternal Vishṇu confirmed Pṛithu’s power, telling him: “No one, O King, shall transcend thee.” The divine Vishṇu entered the personality of that monarch, and for this reason, the entire universe offered divine worship to Pṛithu. Since that time there has been no difference between a deva and a naradeva: between a god and a human god, i.e. between a god and a king. And we are further told that a person, upon the exhaustion of his merit, comes down from heaven to earth and takes birth as a king conversant with Daṇḍa-nīti and is really portion of Vishṇu on earth. He is thus established by the gods, and no one can, therefore, transcend him. It is for this reason that the multitude obey his words of command, though he belongs to the same world and is possessed of similar limbs.
Lectures on the Ancient History of India Page 9
